CAMP NEAH PURCELLVILLE,
VA., November 3, 1862.
We yesterday moved to this place, which for a time placed us
in the advance, but to-day Burnside has gone ahead of us, and I presume
to-morrow we shall push on again. It appears the enemy are still either in the
Valley of the Shenandoah or are manoeuvring to make us believe so. To-day their
cavalry in large force, with artillery, have been disputing the advance of our
cavalry, and I understand this afternoon they displayed infantry. If this be
the case, they either intend to give us battle in this valley, which lies
between the Bull Run Mountains and the Mountains of the Shenandoah, or else
they desire to check our advance and gain time to concentrate their forces in
those mountain defiles, which the position of our forces seem to threaten. Of
these gaps, or defiles, there are two principal ones, one called Ashby's Gap,
through which the pike from Alexandria to Winchester runs; the other, Snicker's
Gap, through which the pike from Leesburg to Winchester passes. One or the
other of these, or probably both, we shall attempt to force, and they of course
to dispute, in case they are going to remain at Winchester. Their infantry
appearing would seem to indicate they feel strong enough to descend the
mountain and meet us in this valley, which I think is all the better for us, as
it would save us the trouble of forcing the mountain passes, which, after all,
as at South Mountain, is only a preliminary step to the battle to be fought
afterwards. It is not impossible, therefore, we may have a decisive battle in a
day or two, of which perhaps the telegraph will give you notice before this
reaches you. At the same time, they are so skillful in strategy, all their
present movements may only be to cover the withdrawal of their army to
Gordonsville and the line of the Rapidan. If it should prove so, as we will
have immediately to follow them and attack them there, we might just as well do
so here as to have to march some forty or fifty miles to do the same thing. We
shall have, from all I can learn, about one hundred and thirty thousand men,
nearly double our force at Antietam. I don't see how they can have doubled
theirs, in which case we ought to outnumber them; and if we only do that, and
are properly handled, victory is sure to be ours.
I saw to-day General Willcox, our Detroit friend. I also saw
Poe for a few minutes yesterday, looking very well, but very much disgusted at
not being made a brigadier general. He told me he was in Washington a few days
ago and saw General Halleck about his promotion, showing him letters from
Generals Kearney, Hooker, Stoneman and others under whom he had served, warmly
recommending his promotion. Halleck told him they were the strongest letters he
had ever seen and proved most fully his claims, but said he: "To be frank
with you, Colonel Poe, with only such letters (i. e., military evidence
of fitness), your chances of promotion are about equal to those of a stumped-tail
bull in fly-time." In other words, merit without political
influence is no argument in your favor. Poe told me that Chandler was
bitterly opposed to him and had denounced him to the War Department as
disloyal, and that he had been compelled to file at the War Department
evidences of his loyalty. I told him he ought to have sent to you for a letter
endorsing his Black Republicanism at Detroit in the spring of 1861, at which he
laughed. He told me Kirby Smith had never been in a fight, and received his
wound at Corinth, at the very commencement of the action, just as he was
mounting his horse. He also said he heard the other day of Beckham, through an
officer who was a prisoner, and that Beckham was chief of artillery to G. W.
Smith's division. He knew nothing of Procter Smith, but understood he was in
the Confederate service.
SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George
Gordon Meade, Vol. 1, p. 323-4
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