HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF
THE POTOMAC,
BEFORE YORKTOWN.
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:
SIR: I received to-day a note from Assistant Secretary
Watson enclosing an extract from a letter the author of which is not mentioned.
I send a copy of the extract with this. I hope that a copy has also been sent
to Gen. McDowell, whom it concerns more nearly, perhaps, than it does me.
At the risk of being thought obtrusive I will venture upon
some remarks which perhaps my position does not justify me in making, but which
I beg to assure you are induced solely by my intense desire for the success of
the government in this struggle. You will, I hope, pardon me if I allude to the
past, not in a captious spirit, but merely so far as may be necessary to
explain my own course and my views as to the future.
From the beginning I had intended, so far as I might have
the power to carry out my own views, to abandon the line of Manassas as the
line of advance. I ever regarded it as an improper one; my wish was to adopt a
new line, based upon the waters of the lower Chesapeake. I always expected to
meet with strong opposition on this line, the strongest that the rebels could
offer, but I was well aware that upon overcoming this opposition the result
would be decisive and pregnant with great results.
Circumstances, among which I will now only mention the
uncertainty as to the power of the Merrimac, have compelled me to adopt
the present line, as probably safer, though far less brilliant, than that by
Urbana. When the movement was commenced I counted upon an active and disposable
force of nearly 150,000 men, and intended to throw a strong column upon West
Point either by York river or, if that proved impracticable, by a march from
the mouth of the Severn, expecting to turn in that manner all the defences of
the Peninsula. Circumstances have proved that I was right, and that my intended
movements would have produced the desired results.
After the transfer of troops had commenced from Alexandria
to Fort Monroe, but before I started in person, the division of Blenker was
detached from my command — a loss of near 10,000 men. As soon as the mass of my
troops were fairly started I embarked myself. Upon reaching Fort Monroe I
learned that the rebels were being rapidly reinforced from Norfolk and
Richmond. I therefore determined to lose no time in making the effort to invest
Yorktown, without waiting for the arrival of the divisions of Hooker and
Richardson and the 1st corps, intending to employ the 1st corps in mass to move
upon West Point, reinforcing it as circumstances might render necessary.
The advance was made on the morning of the second day after
I reached Fort Monroe. When the troops reached the immediate vicinity of
Yorktown the true nature of the enemy's position was for the first time
developed. While my men were under fire I learned that the 1st corps was
removed from my command. No warning had been given me of this, nor was any
reason then assigned. I should also have mentioned that the evening before I
left Fort Monroe I received a telegraphic despatch from the War Department
informing me that the order placing Fort Monroe and its dependent troops under
my command was rescinded. No reason was given for this, nor has it been to this
day. I confess that I have no right to know the reason. This order deprived me
of the support of another division which I had been authorized to form for
active operations from among the troops near Fort Monroe.
Thus when I came under fire I found myself weaker by five
divisions than I had expected when the movement commenced. It is more than
probable that no general was ever placed in such a position before.
Finding myself thus unexpectedly weakened, and with a
powerful enemy strongly entrenched in my front, I was compelled to change my
plans and become cautious. Could I have retained my original force I
confidently believe that I would now have been in front of Richmond instead of
where I now am. The probability is that that city would now have been in our
possession.
But the question now is in regard to the present and the
future rather than the past.
The enemy, by the destruction of the bridges of the
Rappahannock, has deprived himself of the means of a rapid advance on
Washington. Lee will never venture upon a bold movement on a large scale.
The troops I left for the defence of Washington, as I fully
explained to you in the letter I wrote the day I sailed, are ample for its
protection.
Our true policy is to concentrate our troops on the fewest
possible lines of attack; we have now too many, and an enterprising enemy could
strike us a severe blow.
I have every reason to believe that the main portion of the
rebel forces are in my front. They are not "drawing off" their
troops from Yorktown.
Give me McCall's division and I will undertake a movement on
West Point which will shake them out of Yorktown. As it is, I will win, but I
must not be blamed if success is delayed. I do not feel that I am answerable
for the delay of victory.
I do not feel authorized to venture upon any suggestions as
to the disposition of the troops in other departments, but content myself with
stating the least that I regard as essential to prompt success here. If
circumstances render it impossible to give what I ask, I still feel sure of
success, but more time will be required to achieve the result.
Very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gcn.
Commanding.
SOURCE: George B. McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story, p. 281-3
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