GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 4.
HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE
CUMBERLAND,
Murfreesborough,
Tenn., January 24, 1863.
I. At a court of inquiry, convened at the city of Nashville,
December 17, 1862, by Special Field Orders, No. 19, Headquarters Fourteenth
Army Corps, Department of the Cumberland, on the request of Brig. Gen. T. T.
Crittenden, to investigate and give an opinion on the facts connected with the
surrender of the troops at Murfreesborough, under his command, of which court
Brig. Gen. James G. Spears was president, and Col. Joseph R. Scott, Nineteenth
Regiment Illinois Volunteers, was recorder, the following facts were found upon
the testimony:
1st. That he (General Crittenden) assumed command of the
post at Murfreesborough on the 12th day of July, 1862, between the hours of 9
and 10 o'clock a.m.
2d. That he found the camp had been divided for three weeks
previous and the forces separated.
3d. That he rode out on the morning of the 12th July, with
Colonel Duffield, commanding the Twenty-third Brigade, and selected a camp, and
told Colonel Duffield to concentrate the whole force there at once.
4th. That he rode out and inspected the pickets with the
field officer of the day, and not being satisfied with their strength and
location, ordered Major Seibert, commanding the cavalry, to double his cavalry
patrol on the roads leading to Lebanon and McMinnville.
5th. That the pickets on these roads were re-enforced, but
were withdrawn at night without the knowledge of General Crittenden, as was the
custom of the post by order.
6th. That he ordered morning reports to be made out and
one-fifth of the entire effective force to be detailed as grand guards.
7th. That he examined the brigade order books, and ordered a
plot of the town and its approaches to be made.
8th. That he consulted fully and freely with Colonels Lester
and Duffield, did a large amount of executive business, and was constantly
employed until 9 p.m. July 12.
9th. That he was informed, on what should have been good
authority, that there was no force of the enemy nearer than Chattanooga, with
the exception of small parties of guerrillas, and that there was no danger of
an immediate attack.
10th. That the attack was made upon the Ninth Michigan
Infantry and Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and the town at daylight on the
morning of the 13th July.
11th. That the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry was immediately
overpowered. That the Ninth Michigan Infantry was promptly formed and
repeatedly repulsed the enemy. That about 8 o'clock a.m. they took a more
sheltered position, which they held until 12 o'clock, when they surrendered;
their commanding officer being wounded and having lost nearly one-half their
number in killed and wounded.
12th. That one company of the Ninth Michigan Infantry,
acting as provost guards, held the court-house in the town until 8 o'clock,
when they surrendered after it was set on fire.
13th. That General Crittenden surrendered himself and staff
at 8 o'clock, having endeavored to communicate with the troops, but failed,
owing to the stopping of his message by rebel guards.
14th. That the Third Minnesota Infantry and Hewett's battery
of four guns, under command of Colonel Lester, being 1¼ miles from town and
about the same distance from the Ninth Michigan Infantry and cavalry,
immediately on hearing the attack on these places marched up the turnpike and
took position in an open field, with woods in front, about 600 yards distant,
where they remained until about 12 o'clock, cavalry occasionally appearing in
their front in small parties, which were driven off with shot and shell from
the battery, after which they fell back about one-half mile, near their camp,
and remained there until they surrendered.
15th. That the estimated number of troops at the post was
about 1,040; that of the enemy 2,600. Upon which statement of facts the court
give the following opinion:
“We therefore are of the opinion from the evidence that
Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden did all that should be expected of a vigilant
commander from the time he took command until the surrender. We find no evidence that impugns his skill or
courage; on the contrary, he was very active on the day before the attack up to
9 p.m. in obtaining information and placing the post in a proper state of
defense. Although it may be said that he should have immediately concentrated
his forces and that any delay in so doing was dangerous, yet we find all ample
apology for the delay in the facts that he was an entire stranger to the place
and country, and that he was assured by Colonel Lester, who had preceded him in
the command for two months, that there was no danger of an attack and that no
enemy of importance was nearer than Chattanooga.”
All which is published for the information of the army.
II. The general commanding, after a careful examination of
the testimony adduced before the court of inquiry, is of opinion that the
defeat of our forces under Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden at Murfreesborough was
chiefly owing to the withdrawal of picket guards from the roads leading to the
town during the night and to the separation of the forces at the post; that the
post was taken by surprise and the forces overpowered by being attacked in
detail, all which would have been provided against had the timely orders of
General Crittenden been obeyed.
By command of Major-General Rosecrans:
C. GODDARD,
Assistant
Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 796-8
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