Showing posts with label McMinnville TN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label McMinnville TN. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 9, 2018

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 1. — Reports of Major-General Don Carlos Buell, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Ohio, including General Orders, No. 32.

No. 1.

Reports of Maj. Gen. D.C. Buell, U.S. Army, commanding Army of the Ohio, including General Orders, No. 32.

HUNTSVILLE, ALA., July 15, 1862.

My information, up to the night of the 13th, from Murfreesborough was that the Ninth Michigan had been captured, but that Colonel Lester's regiment and Hewett's battery were doing well, and felt confident of being able to hold out. Re-enforcements were being started from Nashville. It appears that before they arrived Colonel Lester surrendered, at 4 p.m. the same day. I have no particulars, and at present no remarks to make upon what appears to be a most disgraceful affair. Of course it may embarrass me considerably. I have been busy to counteract it. The worst is the interception of the Chattanooga road, which was just completed. I had taken the precaution to place some twelve regiments on that route until it should be securely established. We will go to work again.
D. C. BUELL,                       
Major-General.
General HALLECK.
_______________

HUNTSVILLE, ALA., July 19, 1862.

As nearly as I can ascertain the force captured at Murfreesborough on the 13th consisted of nine companies of the Third Minnesota, under Colonel Lester; six companies of the Ninth Michigan, four companies of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, three companies of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, and two sections of Hewett's Kentucky battery. All except Colonel Lester's regiment and the artillery, including Colonel Duffield and General T. T. Crittenden, seem to have been completely surprised in the town and captured without time or opportunity for resistance. The case of the rest of the command was but little better. They maintained their position until 4 o'clock and then surrendered. I had concentrated a larger force at that point to occupy McMinnville, but a considerable portion of it had been sent away a day or two before to Kentucky to meet the difficulties there. I regard the whole affair as most disgraceful and demanding prompt and vigorous treatment. It has also caused serious delay in the means of supplying the army so that it can move on the Decatur route. The difficulty has been increased by damages to bridges by swollen streams. Every effort is being made to remove these difficulties and I hope to have the Murfreesborough road repaired and in working order in a very few days. It is not my habit to plead difficulties or represent them even; but it is important that they should be somewhat understood, lest impossible expectations should be formed, and the opinion taken up that this army is idle and has nothing to do but march rapidly along the road. Our lines of supply are very long and difficult to protect; for, without ascribing hostility to the mass of the people, there is still enough of hostile and bad element to involve us in all the difficulties of operating in an enemy's country.

D.C. BUELL,            
Major - General, Commanding.
Major-General HALLECK, or
ADJUTANT-GENERAL U.S. ARMY.
_______________

GENERAL ORDERS No. 32.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,         
In Camp, Huntsville, Ala., July 21, 1862.

On the 13th instant the force at Murfreesborough, under command of Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden, late colonel of the Sixth Indiana Regiment, and consisting of six companies of the Ninth Michigan, nine companies of the Third Minnesota, two sections of Hewett's (Kentucky) battery, four companies of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, and three companies of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, was captured at that place by a force of the enemy's cavalry variously estimated at from 1,800 to 3,500. It appears from the best information that can be obtained that Brigadier-General Crittenden, and Colonel Duffield, of the Ninth Michigan, with the six companies of that regiment and all of the cavalry, were surprised and captured early in the morning in the houses and streets of the town or in their camp near by, with but slight resistance and without any timely warning of the presence of an enemy. The rest of the force, consisting of the Third Minnesota and the artillery, under Colonel Lester, left its camp and took another position, which it maintained with but few casualties against the feeble attacks of the enemy until about 3 o'clock, when it was surrendered and marched into captivity.

Take it in all its features, few more disgraceful examples of neglect of duty and lack of good conduct can be found in the history of wars. It fully merits the extreme penalty which the law provides for such misconduct. The force was more than sufficient to repel the attack effectually. The mortification which the army will feel at the result is poorly compensated by the exertion made by some — perhaps many — of the officers to retrieve the disgrace of the surprise. The action fit to be adopted with reference to those who are blamable, especially the officers highest in command, cannot be determined without further investigation.

In contrast to this shameful affair the general commanding takes pleasure in making honorable mention of the conduct of a detachment of 22 men of Companies I and H, Tenth Wisconsin Regiment, under the command of Sergts. W. Nelson and A. H. Makinson. The detachment was on duty guarding a bridge east of Huntsville, when it was attacked on April 28 by a force of some 200 or 300 cavalry, which it fought for two hours and repulsed in the most signal manner. Such is the conduct that duty and honor demand of every soldier; and this example is worthy of imitation by higher officers and larger commands.

By command of Major-General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,        
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 792-4

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 2. — Report of Brigadier-General Thomas T. Crittenden, U.S. Army, commanding at Murfreesborough.

No. 2.

Report of Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden, U.S. Army, commanding at Murfreesborough.

I submit the following report of the affair of July 13, 1862, at Murfreesborough, Tenn.:

While at Athens, Ala., I received the special order of Major-General Buell assigning me to the command of the post of Murfreesborough, and went there as speedily as possible. I arrived there on the same train with Colonel Duffield, of the Ninth Michigan, on July 11. The next day I assumed command of the post and Colonel Duffield of the Twenty-third Brigade. Having no instructions, and knowing nothing of the affairs at the post, I had several interviews with Col. [Henry C.] Lester [Third Minnesota], then in command, and from his statements, made both to myself and Colonel Duffield, it was evident that he apprehended no danger. He stated that the only points from which the enemy could approach were McMinnville and Lebanon, that there was no force between Chattanooga and Murfreesborough, and that Morgan's force was far beyond Lebanon, en route for Kentucky.

Colonel Lester had separated his forces on or about June 23, 1862, leaving five companies of the Ninth Michigan and about 80 men of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry at the old camp, and removing the Third Minnesota Regiment and Hewett's First Kentucky Battery (four guns) about 1¼ miles northwest of the former camp. This was the whole force there on July 13, except one company Ninth Michigan posted in the court-house as provost-guard, altogether numbering about 950 effective men.

I appointed Lieut. [Henry M.] Duffield, Ninth Michigan, acting assistant adjutant-general, Lieut. C. H. Blakey, who had been previously acting, having left for Minnesota on recruiting service on July 12.

Lieutenant Duffield, under my orders, proceeded at once to prepare a morning report, but did not complete it that day.

I then went with Colonel Duffield to look for a proper camp for the whole force, as I would not permit it to remain separated. I found the water, the scarcity of which Colonel Lester assigned as the reason for such division, abundant to supply 5,000 men and a good camp ground within a quarter of a mile of the former camp. I examined other camp sites, but preferred the first, and ordered Colonel Duffield to concentrate his force there.

The same day I rode out with the officer of the day and made an examination of the pickets. Being dissatisfied with its strength and locations, I directed Major Seibert, commanding the cavalry, to double his cavalry force on all the roads to Lebanon and McMinnville, which he did, but withdrew them at night, in accordance with the custom and orders of Colonel Lester under which he had previously acted, of which custom and order I was entirely ignorant. There was no such order on the order-book, it being merely verbal. I had doubled the cavalry on the points of danger, as a temporary strengthening of the pickets, until next day, when I had ordered a much larger detail for picket duty from the infantry. My temporary headquarters were opposite to and about 75 yards from the court-house.

I have been informed that Colonel Lester had some intelligence of a cavalry force of the enemy assembling near McMinnville, but he did not inform me nor did I have any information of impending danger. I found things negligently and loosely done at the post and attempted to remedy all the negligence I saw there.

At daylight of July 13 General Forrest, with 2,500 cavalry, consisting of four regiments and one battalion — among them the First and Second Georgia and Seventh Texas, having marched 48 miles between noon of the 12th and that time — surrounded and captured the pickets on one of the roads to McMinnville without the firing of a gun, rushed at full speed into the camp of the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and into the court-house square and streets of the town. Passing through the cavalry camp they attacked the Ninth Michigan, which was ready to receive them. Severe fighting at this point resulted in driving the enemy back some 300 yards after repeated assaults, both sides losing heavily.

Colonel Duffield, commanding Twenty-third Brigade, was severely wounded early in the action and carried from the field. He was paroled at once, and I have had no report from him.

Lieutenant-Colonel Parkhurst, commanding the Ninth Michigan, after holding his camp nearly eight hours against superior numbers, finding the enemy were surrounding him with their whole force and having no hope of re-enforcement (not receiving any reply to several messages for assistance sent by him to Colonel Lester), surrendered his force, then reduced to 134 men. This fragment of a regiment, under its gallant lieutenant-colonel (Parkhurst), fought splendidly, and deserves honorable mention. Their loss was 11 killed, 86 wounded, and 36 missing.

Company B, Ninth Michigan, the provost guard, made a resolute defense of the court house for three hours during repeated assaults, killing 12 and wounding 18 of the enemy. They did not surrender until the court-house was set on fire. During these hours of suspense only an occasional shot was heard from the Third Minnesota and Hewett's battery. Of course their comparative quiet showed that they were not attacked in three. From the reports of Colonel Lester and Captain Hewett and from other sources I learned that their commands turned out promptly, marched unattacked nearly half a mile, and were there halted by Colonel Lester. Except slight changes of position, they remained there from 4.30 a.m. until 2.30 p.m., twice or three times menaced by small squads and once attacked by about 300 cavalry. The latter were repulsed by the fire of the skirmishers and one volley from two companies on the left flank of the regiment. Within three-quarters of a mile of their position they heard the fighting at the court-house for three hours and during seven hours and a half' the fight at the Michigan camp.

The Third Minnesota was a splendidly drilled regiment. The officers and men were anxious to fight, but Colonel Lester held them there without seeing any enemy in force. Colonel Lester received two dispatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Parkhurst, begging for aid, but would afford none. When all was lost except his own command Colonel Lester went under a flag of truce to see Colonel Duffield, and there saw the enemy, who had not dared to come within range of his artillery, and was so impressed with what he saw that he returned, determined to surrender. This is proved by his calling a council of his company commanders and his lieutenant-colonel [Chauncey W. Griggs]. They, by a viva-voce vote, decided to fight. Part of them went from the council. Colonel Lester reopened and reargued the matter. A ballot vote was taken and the force was surrendered. This was done by the statements and influence of Colonel Lester. Lieutenant-Colonel Griggs bitterly opposed the surrender and voted against it to the last. Not a man was killed in the line of the Third Minnesota during the day. I state the facts without comment.

With a few men I held my headquarters until after the court-house was taken. I early sent a messenger, in citizen's clothes, with orders to Colonel Duffield, but he could not pass through the enemy's lines. They had my quarters surrounded from the time they entered the square. I submit copies of reports made to me and refer to them. I respectfully demand a court of inquiry into the disaster at Murfreesborough.

T. T. CRITTENDEN,            
Brigadier-General, late Commanding Post.
Lieut. Col. J.P. GARESCHÉ,
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Nashville, Tenn., November 26, 1862.

Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army, with the request that this case may receive prompt attention and that Colonel Lester be ignominiously dismissed the service.* As Capt. [John A.]  Tanner is under my command, I propose to avail myself of the authority delegated to me by the Secretary of War and shall dismiss him. General Crittenden I will order to duty.

W. S. ROSECRANS,            
Major-General, U.S. Volunteers, Comdg. Department.
_______________

* Dismissed December 1, 1862.

Dismissed to date September 22, 1862.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 794-6

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 3. — Findings of a Court of Inquiry.

GENERAL ORDERS,
No. 4.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE CUMBERLAND,                      
Murfreesborough, Tenn., January 24, 1863.

I. At a court of inquiry, convened at the city of Nashville, December 17, 1862, by Special Field Orders, No. 19, Headquarters Fourteenth Army Corps, Department of the Cumberland, on the request of Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden, to investigate and give an opinion on the facts connected with the surrender of the troops at Murfreesborough, under his command, of which court Brig. Gen. James G. Spears was president, and Col. Joseph R. Scott, Nineteenth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, was recorder, the following facts were found upon the testimony:

1st. That he (General Crittenden) assumed command of the post at Murfreesborough on the 12th day of July, 1862, between the hours of 9 and 10 o'clock a.m.

2d. That he found the camp had been divided for three weeks previous and the forces separated.

3d. That he rode out on the morning of the 12th July, with Colonel Duffield, commanding the Twenty-third Brigade, and selected a camp, and told Colonel Duffield to concentrate the whole force there at once.

4th. That he rode out and inspected the pickets with the field officer of the day, and not being satisfied with their strength and location, ordered Major Seibert, commanding the cavalry, to double his cavalry patrol on the roads leading to Lebanon and McMinnville.

5th. That the pickets on these roads were re-enforced, but were withdrawn at night without the knowledge of General Crittenden, as was the custom of the post by order.

6th. That he ordered morning reports to be made out and one-fifth of the entire effective force to be detailed as grand guards.

7th. That he examined the brigade order books, and ordered a plot of the town and its approaches to be made.

8th. That he consulted fully and freely with Colonels Lester and Duffield, did a large amount of executive business, and was constantly employed until 9 p.m. July 12.

9th. That he was informed, on what should have been good authority, that there was no force of the enemy nearer than Chattanooga, with the exception of small parties of guerrillas, and that there was no danger of an immediate attack.

10th. That the attack was made upon the Ninth Michigan Infantry and Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and the town at daylight on the morning of the 13th July.

11th. That the Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry was immediately overpowered. That the Ninth Michigan Infantry was promptly formed and repeatedly repulsed the enemy. That about 8 o'clock a.m. they took a more sheltered position, which they held until 12 o'clock, when they surrendered; their commanding officer being wounded and having lost nearly one-half their number in killed and wounded.

12th. That one company of the Ninth Michigan Infantry, acting as provost guards, held the court-house in the town until 8 o'clock, when they surrendered after it was set on fire.

13th. That General Crittenden surrendered himself and staff at 8 o'clock, having endeavored to communicate with the troops, but failed, owing to the stopping of his message by rebel guards.

14th. That the Third Minnesota Infantry and Hewett's battery of four guns, under command of Colonel Lester, being 1¼ miles from town and about the same distance from the Ninth Michigan Infantry and cavalry, immediately on hearing the attack on these places marched up the turnpike and took position in an open field, with woods in front, about 600 yards distant, where they remained until about 12 o'clock, cavalry occasionally appearing in their front in small parties, which were driven off with shot and shell from the battery, after which they fell back about one-half mile, near their camp, and remained there until they surrendered.

15th. That the estimated number of troops at the post was about 1,040; that of the enemy 2,600. Upon which statement of facts the court give the following opinion:

“We therefore are of the opinion from the evidence that Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden did all that should be expected of a vigilant commander from the time he took command until the surrender. We find  no evidence that impugns his skill or courage; on the contrary, he was very active on the day before the attack up to 9 p.m. in obtaining information and placing the post in a proper state of defense. Although it may be said that he should have immediately concentrated his forces and that any delay in so doing was dangerous, yet we find all ample apology for the delay in the facts that he was an entire stranger to the place and country, and that he was assured by Colonel Lester, who had preceded him in the command for two months, that there was no danger of an attack and that no enemy of importance was nearer than Chattanooga.”

All which is published for the information of the army.

II. The general commanding, after a careful examination of the testimony adduced before the court of inquiry, is of opinion that the defeat of our forces under Brig. Gen. T. T. Crittenden at Murfreesborough was chiefly owing to the withdrawal of picket guards from the roads leading to the town during the night and to the separation of the forces at the post; that the post was taken by surprise and the forces overpowered by being attacked in detail, all which would have been provided against had the timely orders of General Crittenden been obeyed.

By command of Major-General Rosecrans:

C. GODDARD,         
Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 796-8

Tuesday, May 8, 2018

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 12. — Report of Brigadier-Geneneral Nathan Bedford Forrest, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.

No. 12.

Report of Brig. Gen. N. B. Forrest, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF EAST TENNESSEE,    
Knoxville, Tenn., July 22, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward the report of an engagement of our forces under the command of Col. N. B. Forrest and the enemy at Murfreesborough, Tenn., the 13th instant. A portion of the captured property has been brought in and turned over to the department. Colonel Forrest is now on his way to Columbia, Tenn., purposing the destruction of the railroad and bridges between Nashville and that place.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. KIRBY SMITH,
Major-General, Commanding.
General S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Richmond, Va.

———, —— 1862.

SIR: We left Chattanooga on July 9 with the Texan Rangers, under Colonel Wharton, and the Second Georgia Cavalry, under Colonel Lawton. We made a forced march of nearly 50 miles, reaching Altamont on the night of the 10th instant. After resting one night we passed on to McMinnville, where I was joined on the night of the 11th by Colonel Morrison with a portion of the First Georgia Cavalry, two companies of Colonel Spiller's battalion, under Major Smith, and two companies of Kentuckians, under Captains Taylor and Waltham. After this junction my whole force was about 1,400 men, and both men and horses were much jaded and worn by their long travel. After feeding and refreshing for a single day and being joined by some few volunteers I left on the 12th at 1 o'clock for Murfreesborough. It was over 50 miles to our destination, but there was no halt except for a short time to feed the men and horses.

We approached Murfreesborough about 4.30 a.m. and fortunately captured the pickets of the enemy without firing a gun. I then learned that there were two regiments in and near Murfreesborough, one the Ninth Michigan and the other the Third Minnesota, 200 Pennsylvania cavalry, 100 of the Eighth Kentucky, and Captain Hewett's battery of four guns, numbering in all 1,400 or 1,500 men, under the command of General Thomas Crittenden, of Indiana. There were said to be two camps, one in Murfreesborough of one infantry regiment and the cavalry, the other with the artillery about a mile distant, and a small force with the officers in the court-house and private houses around the public square. I decided immediately to attack the camp in town and the buildings, while the camp with the artillery should be held in check until the first was stormed and surrendered. Colonel Wharton with his Texan Rangers was ordered to charge the camp in town. He moved forward in gallant style at the head of his men, but owing to the urgent necessity of using a portion of the Rangers for the attack on the buildings he did not carry with him but two of his companies. This fact, however, did not abate his courage or that of his men. They charged over the tent ropes right into the camp. Colonel Wharton was soon severely wounded and the command of his Rangers devolved on Colonel Walker.

Colonel Morrison with a portion of the Second Georgia was ordered to storm the court-house while the balance of the Texan Rangers were attacking the private buildings. After two or three hours' hard struggle the court-house was fired and surrendered to Colonel Morrison. The private buildings were also cleared by the Rangers and General Crittenden and his staff surrendered.

Lieut. Col. [Arthur] Hood, of the Second Georgia, with a portion of his force was ordered to storm the jail, which he did, releasing many prisoners confined for political offenses; he also took the telegraph office, capturing the operator.

Colonel Lawton, with the First Georgia, the Tennesseeans and Kentuckians, was ordered to attack the second camp with the artillery, which he did with great efficiency for several hours. The Tennesseeans, under Major Smith, and Kentuckians, under Captains Taylor and. Waltham, stood the fire of shot and shell like veterans. The Georgians, under Captain Dunlop and Major Harper, made a gallant charge almost to the mouths of the cannon. After fighting them in front two or three hours I took immediate command of this force and charged the rear of the enemy into their camps and burned their camps and stores, demoralizing their force and weakening their strength.

The force of Texan Rangers sent to attack the first camp was so small that, although they fought with desperate courage and great skill, they were gradually driven back.

After the court-house and private buildings were surrendered and the fight had lasted five or six hours I prepared my whole force to storm both camps and summoned them to surrender. After some parley Colonel Duffield surrendered the infantry and artillery.

My aide, Colonel Saunders, rendered me efficient aid until he was severely wounded by a ball from the court-house. Major Strange, my adjutant, also performed his whole duty. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker and Major Harrison, of the Rangers, acted with their usual daring and bravery. All the officers and men who acted bravely cannot be particularly mentioned, but they acted their part nobly.

After the action was over I detached Major Smith to burn a railroad bridge below Murfreesborough, which he executed well. I intended to burn a railroad bridge above Murfreesborough and gave orders for the purpose, but by mistake they were not executed. I had the telegraph wire cut and a large portion of the railroad track torn up. I found four car-loads of provisions on the railroad track and the depot house full of stores, all of which I burned.

There were between 1,100 and 1,200 privates and non-commissioned officers captured and brought to McMinnville and paroled on condition not to serve until exchanged. The officers have been already sent to Knoxville, in charge of Colonel Wharton (and I trust have safely reached their destination), except one or two who were wounded and left at Murfreesborough, on condition to surrender when restored to health.

I captured four pieces of artillery — three brass pieces and one Parrott gun — which are still in my possession, With harness and ammunition. There were some 50 or 60 large road wagons with the mule teams, harness, &c., captured. I burnt some of the wagons, which could not be got away, and sent you the balance. There were a large number of cavalry horses, saddles, and small-arms, with the ammunition, captured, and such as I have not been compelled to use are also forwarded to you.

In consequence of our being compelled to leave Murfreesborough, and not having received reports of the killed from some of my command, it is impossible to report accurately my loss. My best information is that we had about 25 killed and from 40 to 60 wounded. Among those killed is Lieutenant Green, of the Tennessee Battalion. The reports of the officers under my command when furnished will show more definitely the loss.

The enemy lost about 75 killed and 125 wounded. The pecuniary loss to the enemy must be near half a million of dollars.

Yours, respectfully,
N. B. FORREST,       
Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade of Cavalry.
 Maj. H. L. CLAY,
Adjutant-General, Army of East Tennessee.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 809-11

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 11. — Report of Major-General John P. McCown, C. S. Army.

No. 11.

Report of Maj. Gen. J. P. McCown, C. S. Army.

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., July 17, 1862.
Colonel Forrest dispatches me as follows:

Attacked Murfreesborough 5 a.m. last Sunday morning; captured two brigadier-generals, staff and field officers, and 1,200 men; burnt $200,000 worth of stores; captured sufficient stores with those burned to amount to $500,000, and brigade of 60 wagons, 300 mules, 150 or 200 horses, and field battery of four pieces; destroyed the railroad and depot at Murfreesborough. Had to retreat to McMinnville, owing to large number of prisoners to be guarded. Our loss 16 or 18 killed; 25 or 30 wounded. Enemy's loss 200 or 300.

Leaves to-day for re-enforcements coming from Kingston.

J. P. McCOWN.
General BRAXTON BRAGG.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF MISSISSIPPI,      
Tupelo, Miss., July 18, 1862.
Brigadier-General CHALMERS,
Commanding Cavalry, Army of Mississippi:

GENERAL: The general commanding directs that the above dispatch be read to the Troops.
Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

 D. H. POOLE,
 Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 809

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 10. — Report of Colonel John F. Miller, Twenty-ninth Indiana Infantry, commanding at Nashville

No. 10.

Report of Col. John F. Miller, Twenty-ninth Indiana Infantry, commanding at Nashville

NASHVILLE, July 19, 1862 12 p.m.

GENERAL: Statements of prisoners and others establish these facts: Complete surprise of the Ninth Michigan and cavalry at about 4 a.m. Enemy attacked Michigan camp and provost guard in town simultaneously, approaching in two directions between roads; no grand guard; pickets only in roads; Michigan troops in discord; men killed in tents attempting to form square; Colonel Duffield wounded; failed to form, and surrendered. Provost guards in court-house did most fighting, holding enemy at bay perhaps an hour, killing 10 rebels; surrendered; part cavalry attempted to join Michigan regiment; did little fighting; surrendered.

Third Minnesota, 1½ miles in rear, formed on alarm; had Hewett’s battery; left their camp and reserve ammunition; marched short distance, halted, took position, waited for attack; enemy, some in front and flank. At 7 a.m. burned camp charged on battery; were repulsed with slight loss; made several weak attempts to charge. Infantry hovered about in woods; but little firing by infantry. Enemy showed signs of intention to retreat; burned depot supplies; surrender demanded; men anxious to continue fight; colonel and six captains anxious to surrender. Infantry had plenty ammunition; battery short, but had 64 rounds left; surrendered at about 3 p.m.; loss, 2 killed, 5 wounded in Michigan. Colonel Lester reported as having been stupid with fear, some complain, cowardly: strength of enemy, five regiments; average estimate, 1,800. Marched the prisoners 7 miles beyond McMinnville. Whole force left for Chattanooga, moving rapidly.

Jealousy of officers, causing separation of troops beyond supporting distance in sudden emergency. Bad picketing, lack of skill, vigilance, and personal courage on part of officers caused the disaster according to testimony.

Loss of Ninth Michigan, 14 killed and 63 wounded.

Respectfully,
 JNO. F. MILLER.    
Colonel, Commanding Post.
Maj. Gen. D.C. BUELL.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 808-9

Monday, May 7, 2018

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 9. — Report of Colonel Henry C. Lester, Third Minnesota Infantry

No. 9.

Report of Col. Henry C. Lester, Third Minnesota Infantry.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report the share taken by my regiment in the action at Murfreesborough, Tenn, on Sunday, July 13, 1862.

The attack was made about daylight upon the camp of the Ninth Michigan, the pickets having been captured without firing a shot. With the first alarm my regiment was formed in line and marched from camp toward town, for the purpose of effecting a junction with the other troops, the camping ground of the two regiments having been necessarily separated about 1½ miles in consequence of scarcity of water. We had proceeded nearly half a mile when the enemy appeared in force in the woods in our front, and also upon our left flank. Line of battle was at once formed upon the crest of a hill and we opened upon the enemy with shell. The firing was principally directed to the woods in front, where they were evidently forming for a charge. In the mean time a small force had made its way through a corn field on our left and attacked our camp, which, after a sharp skirmish with the camp guard they took, killing or capturing the guard and firing the tents. Some time was passed in shelling the woods, when a train arrived from Nashville, and was only stopped when it had reached a point opposite our position and distant from it about 100 yards. As soon as the enemy had seen the train pass they commenced to tear up the track between it and Nashville, and were repeatedly driven off by the artillery. A charge was made upon our left from the woods, but was easily repulsed, with some loss to the enemy. At this time a scout returned from the camp of the Ninth Michigan, reporting the enemy in strong three on the Lebanon road between the Michigan regiment and our position; and as the force in front seemed to be still too strong to attempt to push through with any prospect of success I determined to maintain my own position for the present. The firing in town having ceased for some time I sent a scout through the corn field to try and get news from our friends, but the effort was unsuccessful, the enemy being still in strong force on the Lebanon road. Shortly after a soldier of the Ninth Michigan came through and reported his regiment as having surrendered. Thereupon we fell back to a farm-house a short distance in our rear, which being surrounded by a fence I expected to make as strong as possible and to hold until the end.

While taking up our new position a flag of truce appeared, borne by yourself, and sent at the request of Colonel Duffield, commanding Twenty-third Brigade, for the purpose of procuring an interview with me. I returned to town with the flag and had an interview with the colonel commanding, in which I learned that we were attacked by the rebel General Forrest with a brigade of cavalry. Learning from the Colonel that the enemy were in overwhelming force, and that even should the road be uninjured the forces at Nashville were absent upon an expedition and that there was no hope of re-enforcements, at his suggestion I agreed to refer the matter of surrender to my officers. Accordingly the matter was represented to them as derived from Colonel Duffield, and the great majority, looking upon further resistance as involving the certainty of an ultimate defeat with great loss, and with no possibility of an escape or assistance, it was decided to surrender, which was done at 3.30 p.m.

The force surrendered by me consisted of about 450 infantry. The enemy's force consisted of about 2,600 troops, together with some hundreds of citizens of the country between McMinnville and Murfreesborough, being in all about 3,000 men.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

H. C. LESTER,          
Colonel, Commanding Third Minnesota.
Lieut. H. M. DUFFIELD,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Twenty-third Brigade.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 807-8

Thursday, September 25, 2014

Official Reports of the Action at and Surrender of Murfreesborough, Tenn., July 13, 1862: No. 4. – Report of Maj. James J. Seibert, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry.

No. 4.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following as my report of the battle at Murfreesborough, Tenn., on Sunday, July 13, 1862:

I first assumed command of the cavalry attached to that command, consisting of the Third Battalion Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, and one squadron of the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, on May 29, but was called to Nashville on duty on June 19, returning again on July 6.

When I first assumed command it was the custom, as well as the order, of Colonel Lester, then in command, to send out daily from the cavalry a patrol of 5 men on each of the seven pikes leading to and from the town, starting out in the morning and returning in the evening. This order was not changed while I was in command until the day before the occurrence. When you assumed command you ordered me to double the number of the patrols on the roads to Lebanon and McMinnville, which was done. When the patrols returned in the evening I received the report daily from each of the non-commissioned officers in charge, which, after committing to writing, I handed to Colonel Lester.

The attack was made at daybreak in the morning, and I first saw the enemy when charging on my camp, which was a short distance to the right of the Woodbury pike. I had not over 80 duty men in camp at the time of the attack, most of whom were captured there. We then left my camp and joined the Ninth Michigan and surrendered with them at noon. I lost 5 killed and 20 wounded.

Before closing this report I would state that a report reached me about midnight that several men were seen in the night between our pickets and the town on the Bradyville pike. I immediately mounted  12 men and went to the points named, but after examining the fields and several houses and barns on the Bradyville and Woodbury pikes and discovering no signs of the enemy I returned with the men to camp, having reached it only a little more than an hour before the attack.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 JAMES J. SEIBERT,
 Major, Seventh Pa. Cav., Comdg. Cav., Twenty-third Brigade.

General T. T. CRITTENDEN,
Commanding Forces at Murfreesborough, Tenn.:

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 16, Part 1 (Serial No. 22), p. 798-9