You will remember
while we were at Montgomery, when the first commissioners were sent to
Washington with a view to settle and adjust all matters of difference between
us and the United States, without a resort to arms, you desired me to be one of
those clothed with this high and responsible trust. I then declined, because I
saw no prospect of success — did not think, upon a survey of the whole field,
that I could effect anything good or useful in any effort I could then
make on that line. You will allow me now to say that at this time I
think possibly I might be able to do some good not only on the immediate
subject in hand, but were I in conference with the authorities at Washington on
any point in relation to the conduct of the war, I am not without
hopes that indirectly I could now turn attention to a general adjustment
upon such basis as might ultimately be acceptable to both parties and stop the
further effusion of blood in a contest so irrational, unchristian, and so
inconsistent with all recognized American principles.
The undertaking,
I know, would be a great one. Its magnitude and responsibility I fully realize.
I might signally fail. This I also fully comprehend; but still, be assured, I
am not without some hopes of success, and whenever or wherever I see any
prospect of the possibility of being useful or of doing good I am
prepared for any risk, any hazards, and all responsibilities commensurate with
the object. Of course, I entertain but one idea of the basis of final
settlement or adjustment; that is, the recognition of the sovereignty of the
States and the right of each in its sovereign capacity to determine its own
destiny. This principle lies at the foundation of the American system. It was
what was achieved in the first war of Independence, and must be vindicated in
the second. The full recognition of this principle covers all that is really
involved in the present issue. That the Federal Government is yet ripe
for such acknowledgment I, by no means, believe, but that the time has come
for a proper presentation of the question to the authorities at Washington I do
believe — such presentation as can be made only in a diplomatic way. While,
therefore, a mission might be dispatched on a minor point, the greater
one could possibly, with prudence, discretion, and skill, be opened to view and
brought in discussion in a way that would lead eventually to successful
results. This would depend upon many circumstances, but no little upon the
character and efficiency of the agent. It so occurs to me, and so feeling I
have been prompted to address you these lines. My object is, solely, to inform
you that I am ready and willing to undertake such a mission with a view to such
ulterior ends, if any fit opportunity offers in the present state of our
affairs in relation to the exchange of prisoners, or any other matter of
controversy growing out of the conduct of the war, and if also you
should be of opinion that I could be useful in such position. I am at your
service, heart and soul, at any post you may assign me where I see any prospect
of aiding, assisting, or advancing the great cause we are engaged in and of
securing with its success the blessings of permanent peace, prosperity, and
constitutional liberty.
Should the present
position of affairs in your opinion be suitable, of which I am not so well
informed as you are, and this suggestion so far meet your approval as to cause
you to wish to advise further with me on the subject, you have but to let me
know; otherwise no reply is necessary, and none will be expected.
With best wishes
for you personally and our common country in this day of her trial, I remain
yours, etc.,
* Mr. Stephens states that “it was genuine, and of a character not much short of savage.
SOURCE: A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, Including the Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861-1865, Volume I: First Congress, Third Session, p.339-41
No comments:
Post a Comment