Brigadier-General Albin F. Schoepf to Brigadier General George H. Thomas, December 2, 1861

CAMP GOGGIN, December 2, 1861.

GENERAL: I arrived here yesterday, reconnoitered same day and today. This morning the enemy opened fire from three pieces, one rifled, and infantry on Colonel Haskins' camp subsequent to my order for the removal of the camp some distance back.

The strength of the enemy is estimated, by the best accounts we can get, of the following distant from Mill Springs 2 miles, 1,000 infantry; at Steubenville, 2 miles distant from West's, 2,000 infantry; and at Monticello, 5 miles from Steubenville, 3,000 infantry. Mill Springs is distant from this point 12 miles, at which place they can cross the Cumberland with facility, and 2 miles below that point they can also cross.

Apprehending the probability of their crossing at Mill Springs, I detailed two companies of cavalry to that place. I deem the position east of me safe, but west of me they may cross.

The river is high and not fordable, but by means of flats they can cross anywhere; the troops under my command are not sufficient to keep the river guarded as far as Mill Springs. Should they cross in the vicinity of my camp I can defend my position. The Thirty-eighth Ohio will be with me to-day. The Seventeenth will occupy a position on Fishing Creek, to defend against a flank movement should the enemy cross.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,    

Brigadier-General.

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,
        Commanding Eastern Division.

P. S.—The enemy have moved their artillery and opened fire again. I have hardly time to write.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 7

Colonel John M. Connell to Brigadier-General Albin F. Schoepf, December 5, 1861

CAMP AT FISHING CREEK, December 5, 1861.        

(Received December 6, 1861.)

General SCHOEPF, Commanding Camp Goggin:

GENERAL: On yesterday I moved forward with the artillery to take position at Mill Springs, according to your order, having sent the cavalry the evening before; they however did not proceed more than 2 miles.

I advanced to within 2½ miles of the Ford at Mill Springs with my whole force, and went forward with Captain Ricketts and Lieutenant Fife, of artillery, to the Ford to make a personal reconnaissance. Found their pickets within 100 yards of the Ford, on this side; endeavored to avoid them, and took the woods on the left hand and spent about twenty minutes examining their position, and found it too strong and the enemy too numerous to face with our small force.

You have been misinformed as to the possibility of securing a good position that any small force can hold at that point. The rebel camp completely overlooks the bluffs on this side, and it is impossible to take position upon them without being exposed to their full view and in range of all their arms. Upon attempting by myself to pass to the right bluff near the creek I was fired upon by a body of their cavalry, who were just coming up the hill at the Ford within 50 yards of me. They followed, firing deliberately as I spurred my horse back. In turning a sharp angle my saddle turned, girth broke, and I was thrown within 100 yards of them, and but for the noble conduct and cool bravery of Captain Ricketts I would have been killed or captured. He got off his horse and waited until I ran up to him and gave me his horse, while he escaped into the woods.

I found no tenable position at all between Mill Springs and Fishing Creek, and certainly none at or near Mill Springs or mouth of Meadow Creek.

The rebels have already several boats and cross the Ford with ease. Their cavalry can cross in a few minutes.

Captain Fullerton made diligent inquiry as to their force, and reports to me that he has no doubt that there are twelve regiments at Mill Springs. They have very extensive encampments.

We have not a very strong position here, but it is better than any we can get between here and Mill Springs, and if we had a force to throw across the creek I think we could make a very strong resistance.

Finding ourselves in an exposed condition, where we could in a few minutes be completely surrounded and the rebels beating to arms, with cavalry across the Ford in our front, and night just upon us, my own judgment, supported by the opinion of all the officers of my command, influenced me to fall back, and finding no place where I could make a stand and save my train except this, I moved back here during the night quietly and in good order; my men and teams terribly fatigued with 25 miles’ rough marching and counter-marching.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. CONNELL,        

Colonel Seventeenth Ohio Regiment.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 475

Colonel Thomas E. Bramlette to Brigadier-General George H. Thomas, November 2, 1861

CAMP WOLFORD, ONE AND A HALF MILES FROM CAMP GOGGIN,        

November 2, 1861.    

(Received November 6.)

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

I reached here with my command last evening.

The enemy on 31st ultimo threw forward to Monticello 400 to 600 of his cavalry. I learn to-day that he withdrew them the same night to some point not ascertained below Monticello, toward the Tennessee border. His infantry is yet in Clinton County, and I think will not now advance.

I have dispatched a messenger to Columbia, where I learn Colonel Haggard [and] Colonel Grider are with their regiments; and one of my wagoners, who had just come into camp from Adair, reports two Ohio or Indiana regiments are in camp. By to-morrow night I shall get reply. I have written to them to know what effective force they have at Columbia; whether they can move in concert with me, and when; whether they have sufficient force to throw in the rear to cut off his retreat, and, if so, can they still furnish, and how much, force to join with me in front.

If they will throw forward to Burkesville sufficient force to hold the passes and cut off communication with Buckner's line, the rebel and rabble crew can be effectually crushed.

I have ordered 400 of Colonel Wolford's cavalry go forward one hour before day to reconnoiter, to advance as far as they can prudently go, gather all they can of the strength, character of forces, positions, and movements of the enemy and return and report, by which time I shall hear from Columbia. From all I can gather I take it that this is the same body of unorganized, badly-armed rebels who have been heretofore gathered near Monroe, in Overton County, Tennessee. Their strength has doubtless been greatly exaggerated. There were for some two months near Monroe 2,000 to 2,500; they left there to join Buckner, and returned through Monroe County, Kentucky, Cumberland County, and to Clinton, where they were at last accounts, with the purpose of breaking up the unarmed camps at Burkesville and then at this place. Their failure to advance, I suppose, grows out of the fact that they ascertained that the camp at Goggin was armed.

Colonels Wolford and Hoskins requested me in your absence to take command.

I have sent back for the provisions we were unable to bring up. There is no possible chance for the enemy to advance upon our front without being cut to pieces. He may attempt a flank movement, but I will guard that in time to meet him at equally as formidable a pass.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 327-8