EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, D.C.,
October 13, 1862.
Major-General MCCLELLAN:
MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I
called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you
cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at
least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you
telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester
unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order.
But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly
twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without
the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just
about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly
not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should
be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to
Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in
fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again,
one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the
enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You
seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor.
Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your
communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours. You dread his
going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his
communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and
ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is
left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer
Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can
you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your
equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord.
The roads are as good on yours as on his. You know I desired, but did not
order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue
Ridge. My idea was that this would at once menace the enemy's communications,
which I would seize if he would permit.
If he should move northward I would follow him closely,
holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications
and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him; fight him, if a
favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond
on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try we shall never
succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I
would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the
wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him.
This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of
for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not
waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat
him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than
far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again
being within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside
track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is
remarkable, as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel extending from the
hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the
inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see,
carries you by Aldie, Hay Market, and Fredericksburg; and you see how
turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all
points from Washington ;the same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you
press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way.
The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the
following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, 5 miles; Gregory's,
13; Snicker's, 18; Ashby's, 28; Manassas, 38; Chester, 45; and Thornton's, 53.
I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him
to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep
his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if
you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between
the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the
greatest number of troops from here. When at length running for Richmond ahead
of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the
rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is
all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say
they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.
Yours, truly,
A. LINCOLN.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
19, Part 1 (Serial No. 27), p. 13-4
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