The President called on me to know what we had authentic of
the destruction of the Rebel steamer in Savannah River. He expressed himself
very decidedly concerning the management or mismanagement of the army. Said, “We
had the enemy in the hollow of our hands on Friday, if our generals, who are
vexed with Pope, had done their duty; all of our present difficulties and
reverses have been brought upon us by these quarrels of the generals.” These
were, I think, his very words. While we were conversing, Collector Barney of
New York came in. The President said, perhaps before B. came, that Halleck had
turned to McClellan and advised that he should command the troops against the
Maryland invasion. “I could not have done it,” said he, “for I can never feel
confident that he will do anything effectual.” He went on, freely commenting
and repeating some things said before B. joined us. Of Pope he spoke in
complimentary terms as brave, patriotic, and as having done his duty in every
respect in Virginia, to the entire satisfaction of himself and Halleck, who
both knew and watched, day and night, every movement. On only one point had
Halleck doubted any order P. had given; that was in directing one division, I
think Heintzelman's, to march for the Chain Bridge, by which the flanks of that
division were exposed. When that order reached him by telegraph, Halleck was
uneasy, for he could not countermand it in season, because the dispatch would
have to go part of the way by courier. However, all went off without disaster;
the division was not attacked. Pope, said the President, did well, but there
was here an army prejudice against him, and it was necessary he should leave.
He had gone off very angry, and not without cause, but circumstances controlled
us.
Barney said he had mingled with all descriptions of persons,
and particularly with men connected with the army, and perhaps could speak from
actual knowledge of public sentiment better than either of us. He was positive
that no one but McClellan could do anything just now with this army. He had
managed to get its confidence, and he meant to keep it, and use it for his own
purposes. Barney proceeded to disclose a conversation he had with Barlow some
months since. Barlow, a prominent Democratic lawyer and politician of New York,
had been to Washington to attend one of McClellan's grand reviews when he lay
here inactive on the Potomac. McClellan had specially invited Barlow to be
present, and during this visit opened his mind, said he did not wish the
Presidency, would rather have his place at the head of the army, etc., etc.,
intimating he had no political views or aspirations. All with him was military,
and he had no particular desire to close this war immediately, but would pursue
a line of policy of his own, regardless of the Administration, its wishes and
objects.
The combination against Pope was, Barney says, part of the
plan carried out, and the worst feature to him was the great demoralization of
his soldiers. They were becoming reckless and untamable. In these remarks the
President concurred, and said he was shocked to find that of 140,000 whom we
were paying for in Pope's army only 60,000 could be found. McClellan brought
away 93,000 from the Peninsula, but could not to-day count on over 45,000. As
regarded demoralization, the President said, there was no doubt that some of
our men permitted themselves to be captured in order that they might leave on
parole, get discharged, and go home. Where there is such rottenness, is there
not reason to fear for the country?
Barney further remarked that some very reliable men were
becoming discouraged, and instanced Cassius M. Clay, who was advocating an
armistice and terms of separation or of compromise with the Rebels. The
President doubted if Clay had been rightly understood, for he had had a full
and free talk with him, when he said had we been successful we could have had
it in our power to offer terms.
In a conversation this morning with Chase, he said it was a
doubtful matter whether my declining to sign the paper against McClellan was
productive of good or harm. If I had done it, he said, McClellan would have
been disposed of and not now in command, but the condition of the army was such
under his long manipulation that it might have been hazardous at this juncture
to have dismissed him. I assured him I had seen no moment yet when I regretted
my decision, and my opinion of McClellan had undergone no change. He has
military acquirements and capacity, dash, but has not audacity, lacks decision,
delays, hesitates, vacillates; will, I fear, persist in delays and inaction and
do nothing affirmative. His conduct during late events aggravates his
indecision and is wholly unjustifiable and inexcusable.
But I will not prophesy what he will do in his present
command. He has a great opportunity, and I hope and pray he may improve it. The
President says truly he has the “slows,” but he can gather the army together
better than any other man. Let us give him credit when he deserves it.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 115-8
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