HEADQUARTERS, April 15,
1864.
MR. PRESIDENT:
The reports of the scouts are still conflicting as to the
character of the reinforcements to the Army of the Potomac and the composition of
that at Annapolis under General Burnside. I think it probable that the Eighth
Corps, which embraces the troops who have heretofore guarded the line of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the intrenchments around Washington, Alexandria,
etc., has been moved up to the Rappahannock, and that an equivalent has been
sent to Annapolis from General Meade. Lieutenant-Colonel Mosby states that the
Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, consolidated, have also been sent to General
Burnside. But, whatever doubt there may be on these points, I think it certain
that the enemy is organizing a large army on the Rappahannock and another at
Annapolis, and that the former is intended to move directly on Richmond, while
the latter is intended to take it in flank or rear. I think we may also
reasonably suppose that the Federal troops that have so long besieged
Charleston will, with a portion of their ironclad steamers, be transferred to
the James River. I consider that the suspension of the attack on that city was
virtually declared when General Gillmore transferred his operations to the St.
John's River. It can only be continued during the summer months by the fleet.
The expedition of the enemy up Red River has so diminished his forces about New
Orleans and Mobile that I think no attack upon the latter city need be
apprehended soon, especially as we have reason to hope that he will return from
his expedition in a shattered condition. I have thought, therefore, that
General Johnston might draw something from Mobile during the summer to strengthen
his hands, and that General Beauregard with a portion of his troops might move
into North Carolina to oppose General Burnside should he resume his old
position in that State, or be ready to advance to the James River should that
route be taken. I do not know what benefit General Buckner can accomplish in
his present position. If he is able to advance into Tennessee, reoccupy
Knoxville, or unite with General Johnston, great good may be accomplished, but
if he can only hold Bristol, I think he had better be called for a season to
Richmond. We shall have to clean troops from every quarter to oppose the
apparent combination of the enemy. If Richmond could be held secure against the
attack from the east, I would propose that I draw Longstreet to me and move
right against the enemy on the Rappahannock. Should God give us a crowning
victory there, all their plans would be dissipated, and their troops now
collecting on the waters of the Chesapeake would be recalled to the defense of
Washington. But to make this move I must have provisions and forage. I am not
yet able to call to me the cavalry or artillery. If I am obliged to retire from
this line, either by a flank movement of the enemy or the want of supplies,
great injury will befall us. I have ventured to throw out these suggestions to
your Excellency in order that in surveying the whole field of operations you
may consider all the circumstances bearing on the question. Should you
determine it is better to divide this army and fall back toward Richmond, I am
ready to do so. I, however, see no better plan for the defense of Richmond than
that I have proposed.
I am, with great
respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of
Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 331-2
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