Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, December 2, 1863.
I expect your wishes will now soon be gratified, and that I
shall be relieved from the Army of the Potomac. The facts are briefly these: On
the 26th ultimo I crossed the Rapidan, intending to turn the right flank of
General Lee and attack him, or compel him to attack me out of his formidable
river entrenchments. I had previously been advised, by deserters and others,
that he had commenced a line of works running perpendicular to the river, but
only extending a few miles, but which he designed covering his flank, and
permitting him to leave the lower fords unguarded. I accordingly made my plans
to cross in three columns, to unite at a common point below his entrenchments,
and then to advance rapidly and attack him before he could prepare any
defenses. The plan was a good one, but owing to the failure of others to whom
its execution was necessarily intrusted, it failed. In the first place, one
corps was three hours behind time in arriving at the river, and slow of
movement afterwards; which caused a delay of one day, enabled the enemy to
advance and check my columns before they united, and finally to concentrate his
army in a very formidable position, behind entrenchments almost as strong as
those I was making a long detour to avoid. Again, after I had come up with the
enemy, one corps commander1 reported he had examined a position
where there was not the slightest doubt he could carry the enemy's works, and
on his positive and unhesitating judgment, he was given twenty-eight thousand
men, and directed to attack the next morning at eight o'clock. At the same time
another attack was to be made by fifteen thousand men, at a point where the
enemy evidently was not fully prepared. On the eventful morning, just as the
attack was about being made, I received a despatch from the officer commanding
the twenty-eight thousand men, saying he had changed his opinion, and that the
attack on his front was so hopeless, that he had assumed the
responsibility of suspending it till further orders were received. This
astounding intelligence reached me just ten minutes before the hour of
attacking, and barely in time to suspend the other attack, which was a
secondary one, and which, even if successful, could not be supported with so
large a portion of my force away for the main attack. This lost me another day,
during which the enemy so strengthened the point threatened by the secondary
attack as to render it nearly as strong as the rest of his line, and to have
almost destroyed the before probable chances of success. Finding no possibility
of attacking with hope of success, and power to follow up success, and that the
only weak point visible had been strengthened during the delay caused by the
change of opinion of a corps commander, I determined not to attempt an assault.
I could not move any further around the enemy's flank, for want of roads, and
from the danger at this season of the year of a storm, which would render
locomotion, off the prepared roads, a matter of impossibility. After reviewing
all the circumstances, notwithstanding my most earnest desire to give battle,
and in the full consciousness of the fact that my failure to do so was certain
personal ruin, I, having come to the conclusion that an attack could not be
successful, determined to, and did, withdraw the army. I am fully aware it will
be said I did wrong in deciding this question by reasoning, and that I ought to
have tried, and then a failure would have been evidence of my good judgment;
but I trust I have too much reputation as a general to be obliged to encounter
certain defeat, in order to prove that victory was not possible. Political
considerations will, however, enter largely into the decision, and the failure
of the Army of the Potomac to do anything, at this moment, will be considered
of vital consequence, and if I can be held responsible for this failure, I will
be removed to prove that I am. I therefore consider my fate as settled; but as
I have told you before, I would rather be ignominiously dismissed, and suffer
anything, than knowingly and wilfully have thousands of brave men slaughtered
for nothing. It was my deliberate judgment that I ought not to attack; I acted
on that judgment, and I am willing to stand or fall by it at all hazards. I
shall write to the President, giving him a clear statement of the case, and
endeavoring to free his action as much as possible, by assuming myself all the
responsibility. I feel of course greatly disappointed; a little more good
fortune, and I should have met with brilliant success. As it is, my conscience
is clear. I did the best I could. If I had thought there was any reasonable
degree of probability of success, I would have attacked. I did not think so; on
the contrary, believed it would result in a useless and criminal slaughter of
brave men, and might result in serious disaster to the army. I determined not
to attack, no other movements were practicable, and I withdrew. There will be a
great howl all over the country. Letter writers and politicians will denounce
me. It will be proved as clear as the light of day, that an attack was
perfectly practicable, and that everyone, except myself, in the army, particularly
the soldiers, was dying for it, and that I had some mysterious object in view,
either in connection with politics, or stock-jobbing, or something else about
as foreign to my thoughts, and finally the Administration will be obliged to
yield to popular clamor and discard me. For all this I am prepared, fortified
as I said before by a clear conscience, and the conviction that I have acted
from a high sense of duty, to myself as a soldier, to my men as their general,
and to my country and its cause, as the agent having its vital interests
solemnly entrusted to me, which I have no right wantonly to play with and to
jeopardize, either for my own personal benefit, or to satisfy the demands of
popular clamor, or interested politicians.2
George3 was sent with one of the messages to
suspend the attack; his horse fell with him, he was a little bruised and cut
about the eye, but nothing serious.
_______________
1 General G. K. Warren.
2 Mine Run campaign.
3 Son of General Meade.
SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George
Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 156-9
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