The report prevalent yesterday that the Rebels had crossed
the upper Potomac at or near the Point of Rocks is confirmed, and it is pretty
authentic that large reinforcements have since been added.
Found Chase in Secretary's room at the War Department with
D. D. Field. No others present. Some talk about naval matters. Field censorious
and uncomfortable. General Pope soon came in but stayed only a moment. Was
angry and vehement. He and Chase had a brief conversation apart, when he
returned to Stanton's room.
When I started to come away, Chase followed, and after we
came down stairs asked me to walk with him to the President's. As we crossed
the lawn, he said with emotion everything was going wrong. He feared the
country was ruined. McClellan was having everything his own way, as he (Chase)
anticipated he would if decisive measures were not promptly taken for his
dismissal. It was a reward for perfidy. My refusal to sign the paper he had
prepared was fraught with great evil to the country. I replied that I viewed that
matter differently. My estimate of McClellan was in some respects different
from his. I agreed he wanted decision, that he hesitated to strike, had also
behaved badly in the late trouble, but I did not believe he was unfaithful and
destitute of patriotism. But aside from McClellan, and the fact that it would,
with the feeling which pervaded the army, have been an impolitic step to
dismiss him, the proposed combination in the Cabinet would have been
inexcusably wrong to the President. We had seen the view which the President
took of the matter and how he felt at the meeting of the Cabinet on Tuesday.
From what I have seen and heard within the last few days, the more highly do I
appreciate the President's judgment and sagacity in the stand he made, and the
course he took. Stanton has carried his dislike or hatred of McC. to great
lengths, and from free intercourse with Chase has enlisted him, and to some
extent influenced all of us against that officer, who has failings enough of
his own to bear without the addition of Stanton's enmity to his own
infirmities. Seward, in whom McC. has confided more than any member of the
Administration, from the common belief that Seward was supreme, yielded to
Stanton's malignant feelings, and yet, not willing to encounter that officer,
he went off to Auburn, expecting the General would be disposed of whilst he was
away. The President, who, like the rest of us, has seen and felt McClellan's
deficiencies and has heard Stanton's and Halleck's complaints more than we
have, finally, and I think not unwillingly, consented to bring Pope here in
front of Washington; was also further persuaded by Stanton and Chase to recall
the army from Richmond and turn the troops over to Pope. Most of this originated,
and has been matured, in the War Department, Stanton and Chase being the
pioneers, Halleck assenting, the President and Seward under stress of
McClellan's disease “the slows,” and with the reverses before Richmond, falling
in with the idea that a change of commanders and a change of base was
necessary. The recall of the army from the vicinity of Richmond I thought
wrong, and I know it was in opposition to the opinion of some of the best
military men in the service. Placing Pope over them roused the indignation of
many. But in this Stanton had a purpose to accomplish, and in bringing first
Pope here, then by Pope's assistance and General Scott's advice bringing
Halleck, and concerting measures which followed, he succeeded in breaking down
and displacing McClellan, but not in dismissing and disgracing him. This the
President would not do or permit to be done, though he was more offended with
McC. than he ever was before. In a brief conversation with him as we were
walking together on Friday, the President said with much emphasis: “I must have
McClellan to reorganize the army and bring it out of chaos, but there has been
a design, a purpose in breaking down Pope, without regard of consequences to
the country. It is shocking to see and know this; but there is no remedy at
present, McClellan has the army with him.”
My convictions are with the President that McClellan and his
generals are this day stronger than the Administration with a considerable
portion of this Army of the Potomac. It is not so elsewhere with the soldiers,
or in the country, where McClellan has lost favor. The people are disappointed
in him, but his leading generals have contrived to strengthen him in the hearts
of the soldiers in front of Washington.
Chase and myself found the President alone this Sunday
morning. We canvassed fully the condition of the army and country. Chase took
an early opportunity, since the report of Pope was suppressed, to urge upon the
President the propriety of some announcement of the facts connected with the
recent battles. It was, he said, due to the country and also to Pope and
McDowell. I at once comprehended why
Chase had invited me to accompany him in this visit. It was that it might
appear that we were united on this mission. I therefore promptly stated that
this was the first time I had heard the subject broached. At a proper time, it
seemed to me, there would be propriety in presenting a fair, unprejudiced, and
truthful statement of late disasters. The country craved to know the facts, but
the question was, Could we just now with prudence give them? Disclosing might
lead to discord and impair the efficiency of the officers. The President spoke
favorably of Pope, and thought he would have something prepared for publication
by Halleck.
When taking a walk this Sunday evening with my son Edgar, we
met on Pennsylvania Avenue, near the junction of H Street, what I thought at
first sight a squad of cavalry or mounted men, some twenty or thirty in number.
I remarked as they approached that they seemed better mounted than usual, but
E. said the cavalcade was General McClellan and his staff. I raised my hand to
salute him as they were dashing past, but the General, recognizing us, halted
the troop and rode up to me by the sidewalk, to shake hands, he said, and bid
me farewell. I asked which way. He said he was proceeding to take command of
the onward movement. “Then,” I added, “you go up the river.” He said yes, he
had just started to take charge of the army and of the operations above. “Well,”
said I, “onward, General, is now the word; the country will expect you to go
forward.” “That,” he answered, “is my intention.” “Success to you, then,
General, with all my heart.” With a mutual farewell we parted.
This was our first meeting since we parted at Cumberland on
the Pamunkey in June, for we each had been so occupied during the three or four
days he had been in Washington that we had made no calls. On several occasions
we missed each other. In fact, I had no particular desire to fall in with any
of the officers who had contributed to the disasters that had befallen us, or
who had in any respect failed to do their whole duty in this great crisis.
While McClellan may have had some cause to be offended with Pope, he has no
right to permit his personal resentments to inflict injury upon the country. I
may do him injustice, but I think his management has been generally
unfortunate, to say the least, and culpably wrong since his return from the
Peninsula.
He has now been placed in a position where he may retrieve
himself, and return to Washington a victor in triumph, or he may, as he has
from the beginning, wilt away in tame delays and criminal inaction. I would not
have given him the command, nor have advised it, strong as he is with the army,
had I been consulted; and I feel sad that he has been so intrusted. It may,
however, be for the best. There are difficulties in the matter that can
scarcely be appreciated by those who do not know all the circumstances. The
army is, I fear, much demoralized, and its demoralization is much of it to be
attributed to the officers whose highest duty it is to prevent it. To have
placed any other general than McClellan, or one of his circle, in command would
be to risk disaster. It is painful to entertain the idea that the country is in
the hands of such men. I hope I mistake them.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 111-5
No comments:
Post a Comment