Memoranda read
before the President and Cabinet, General Scott and Commodore Stringham, and
Mr. Fox, late of the Navy, Washington, March 15, 1861, by Bvt. Brig. Gen.
Joseph G. Totten, Chief of Engineers.*
The obstacles to the relief of Fort Sumter are natural or
artificial obstacles to navigation, and military opposition.
The main channel in its best natural state would not admit
the passage of vessels larger than sloops of war; so that, before it was
obstructed, a naval attack, to be very formidable, must have consisted of many
vessels of this kind.
In designing the defenses of Charleston Harbor, therefore,
it was considered that Fort Sumter, with Castle Pinckney, would suffice, with
some improvement of Fort Moultrie, and the erection of batteries in time of war
on James Island at the position called Fort Johnson. A deeper entrance would
have demanded a stronger system.
The South Carolina troops have strengthened Fort Moultrie
and added batteries thereto; they possess Castle Pinckney; they have erected
batteries at Fort Johnson, and, not having Fort Sumter, they have planted a
number of guns (number not known) on Morris Island.
These last do not, certainly, bring their system up to that
which included Fort Sumter; but they, as is represented, have also so blocked
the main channel, or made its navigation so intricate, that only vessels light
in draught can enter – vessels unavoidably weak to resist and impotent to
assail.
If we suppose a squadron of war vessels as large as can be
forced through the impediments of the main bar to have overcome that
difficulty, and, under pressure of steam, to advance in daylight (as I think
would be indispensable), they would suffer greatly from the fire of Morris
Island, Fort Moultrie, and its adjacent batteries – but they would suffer much
less than the small vessels, because much stronger and with vital parts better
secured, and because their own fire would, to a certain extent, keep under,
and, to a great degree, render uncertain the fire of the batteries. But whether
larger or smaller, the vessels have not merely to pass the fire of the batteries
– they must remain exposed to it. Because, before getting beyond the fire of
Fort Moultrie, they come within scope of Fort Johnson, and while yet under the
guns of these batteries they will be reached by Castle Pinckney. There is no
point of shelter within these waters; and although the squadron of heavy sloops
might survive the dangers of the passage, they could not long endure the
cannonade that would be concentrated on any anchorage. In these very waters,
this problem was settled in the Revolutionary War by the contest between the
squadron of Sir Peter Parker and the single work of Fort Moultrie – then
certainly not more powerful than now.
To enable the supposed squadron to remain, it is
indispensable that a military force should capture the batteries from the land,
and be strong enough, besides, to hold possession against the troops now
assembled in and around them, and those that would rapidly come from the
interior.
Should small vessels attempt this entrance by daylight,
their destruction would be inevitable; at any rate, the chances of getting
through would be too slender to justify any such enterprise. We have certain
information that there is much practice with these guns, and that the practice
now is good. If this risk were to be run by daylight, the vessels might have a
draught of about eight feet, and could use the “Swash Channel,” or a passage
between this and the main channel, or, finally, the latter. But I must repeat
that unless we were to find a degree of inaptness and imbecility, and a want of
vigilance and courage that we have no right to assume, this attempt by daylight
with small vessels, even of great speed, must fail.
There remains another project, namely, to enter at night by
the “Swash” Channel with a few (two or three) fast steam-tugs, having a draught
of only (or about)five feet. To do this it will be necessary to take position
before dark off this channel, so as to get upon the proper leading line to be
followed after dark by the ascertained course, or, possibly, by the bearing of
the lights of Fort Sumter. With proper precautions in screening the lights and
fires of the boats, &c., I think the risk would not be so great, considering
only the batteries, as to deter from this attempt, provided the object were
of very great importance. I should expect one or two, perhaps all, of these
vessels to reach Fort Sumter, and the shoal upon which they must be grounded – provided
no other impediments awaited them.
But, in the first place, it is a necessary condition that
the boats arrive off the harbor before night. If they can see to take these
bearings, they can be seen from the shore. In the next place, it seems
impossible to fit out any expedition, however small and unobtrusive, without
arousing inquiry, and causing the intelligence to be transmitted by telegraph.
We may be certain, therefore, that these tugs will be waited for by steamers
lying in the channelway, full of men.
This mode of relieving Fort Sumter, or another by men in
rowboats passing up the same channel, is so obvious that it is unreasonable to
suppose it has not been duly considered and provided for, where so much
intelligence and resource in military means have been displayed in the scheme
of defense, and so much earnestness and energy in execution. We know that guard
rowboats and steamers are active during the night; and that they have all the
means of intercepting with certainty this little expedition, and overpowering
it, by boarding – a commencement of war.
This attempt, like any other, will inevitably involve a
collision.
This raises a question that I am not called on to discuss,
but as to which I may say that if the General Government adopts a course that
must be attended with this result, its first measure should not be one so
likely to meet disaster and defeat; nor one, I may add, which, even if
successful, would give but momentary relief, while it would open all the powers
of attack upon the fort, certainly reducing it before the means of recovering
Charleston Harbor, with all its forts and batteries and environs, can possibly
be concentrated there.
Respectfully
submitted.
J. G. T.
_______________
* See also General Totten to Secretary of War, April 3,
1861, post.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume
1 (Serial No. 1), p. 198-200
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