WASHINGTON, April 25, 1850.
DEAR CRITTENDEN,—I have been thinking for several months that I would write to you, but as I did not wish to annoy you with disagreeable intelligence, I deferred it, hoping that events would open up a better prospect for the future. That expectation has not yet been realized. "It were a tale too long" to detail all the blunders of the cabinet, which have brought the Whig party to the brink of ruin; but of the special question upon which their policy has nearly estranged the whole Whig party of the South it is proper to give you some brief hints, that you may understand our position. During the last summer, the government, with the consent of the whole cabinet, except Crawford, threw the entire patronage of the North into the hands of Seward and his party. This was done under some foolish idea of Preston's, that they would get rid of a Northern competition for 1852, as Seward stood for 1856. The effect of this was to enable Seward to take the entire control of the New York organization, and force the whole Northern Whig party into the extreme anti-slavery position of Seward, which, of course, sacked the South. I knew the effect of this policy would certainly destroy the Whig party, and perhaps endanger the Union. When I came to Washington, I found the whole Whig party expecting to pass the proviso, and that Taylor would not veto it, that thereby the Whig party of the North were to be built up at the expense of the Northern Democracy, who, from political and party considerations, had stood quasi opposed to the proviso. I saw General Taylor, and talked fully with him, and while he stated he had given and would give no pledges either way about the proviso, he gave me clearly to understand that if it was passed he would sign it. My course became instantly fixed. I would not hesitate to oppose the proviso, even to the extent of a dissolution of the Union. I could not for a moment regard any party considerations on the treatment of the question. I therefore determined to put the test to the Whig party and abandon its organization upon its refusal. Both events happened to defeat this policy; it was of the first importance to prevent the organization of the House going into the hands of the Northern Whig party. I should have gone to any extent to effect that object, they foolishly did it themselves. Without fatiguing you with details, my whole subsequent course has been governed by this line of policy. I have determined to settle the question honorably to my own section of country, if possible, at any and every hazard, totally indifferent to what might be its effect upon General Taylor or his administration. In the course of events, the policy of the cabinet has vacillated to and fro, but has finally settled upon the ground of admitting California, and non-action as to the rest of the territories. Seward and his party have struck hands with them on this policy, but Stanly is the only Southern Whig who will stand by them. I think it likely the course of events may throw the whole of the Southern Whigs into opposition,-such a result will not deter us from our course. We are willing to admit California and pass territorial governments on the principle of McClernand's bill; we will never take less. The government, in furtherance of their stupid and treacherous bargain with the North, are endeavoring to defeat it; with their aid we could carry it, as more than twenty-five Northern Democrats are pledged to it. They may embarrass us, possibly may defeat us, but our defeat will be their ruin. The cabinet have intense hostility to Mr. Clay, and I think it likely we, and the country, will be greatly benefited by the feud, inasmuch as it makes Clay the more anxious to conform to the interests of his own section and of the Southern Whigs, and this the rather because the government has the whip hand of him (through Seward) with the Northern Whigs. The Senate's committee will, I think, agree upon propositions which will pass; this can only be defeated by the want of common sense and common prudence on the part of Mason, Butler, and others of that "ilk" in both houses of Congress, and the efforts of the administration. But as to the latter it is but candid to say that they have little power, either for good or evil. For some reason, wholly unaccountable to me, the Northern members of the cabinet are universally odious, even to the Northern Whigs. Clayton is a dead body tied to the concern. Johnson is honorable and clever, but without wisdom. Preston is speculative, and, what is worse, has no sentiment in common with the section which he represents. Crawford alone is true and faithful to the honor and interest of our section, and the late scene about the Galphin claim is an effort of men in the service of government to drive him out. He is the last link that binds a majority of the Southern Whigs to the government, and I have no doubt but they will soon make it inconsistent with his own honor to remain there. I have thus given you a brief outline of men and parties in the government. I have said nothing of General Taylor; my opinion is that he is an honest, well-meaning man, but that he is in very bad hands, and his inexperience in public affairs, and want of knowledge of men, is daily practiced upon, and renders him peculiarly liable to imposition. I think there has been a studied effort to alienate him from his original friends, and that it has been eminently successful; time will show that he and not they will suffer most by that alienation. Morehead is now making a good speech at my back, and has perhaps, to some extent, destroyed the continuity of my narrative. Let me hear from you.
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