Robert Jefferson Breckinridge to John J. Crittenden, November 23, 1850

LEXINGTON, Nov. 23, 1850.

MY DEAR SIR,—More than a year ago our friend Garnett Duncan made application to the President and to the Secretary at War for a cadet's warrant at West Point for my oldest son. He did this spontaneously as an act of personal regard, and perhaps as some expression of his sense of things of other days. I had other friends whose influence might have aided him; but in the same spirit that actuated him, I told him I would do nothing; so that if he succeeded, he should have all the gratitude of the lad and all the pleasure of the good deed. He failed. But the President and the Secretary both promised to put the lad's name on the list, and held out strong hopes, if not a certain assurance, of his appointment a year from that time, to wit, now.

Now, my dear sir, if this appointment can be had, I shall be very glad; my boy will be gratified in the strongest and almost the earliest wish of his heart, and I trust the country may be gainer thereby in the end. The lad is now a little past sixteen years of age; he is a member of the Sophomore class at Danville, and is of robust constitution, fine talents, and earnest, firm, and elevated nature. It is to gratify him in a strong, nay, a vehement, passion that I desire this thing. For myself I never did, never will, solicit anything from any government. The ancestors of this lad, paternal and maternal, have done the State some service. You know all about all I could with propriety say.

If there is any impropriety in my thus addressing you, I pray you to excuse it; if there is none, and this thing can be accomplished, it will be only another proof of your goodness and another ground of the grateful and affectionate friendship of Yours ever,

R. J. B.

Hon. J. J. CRITTENDEN.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 384

Congressman Robert Toombs to Senator John J. Crittenden, April 25, 1850

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1850.

DEAR CRITTENDEN,—I have been thinking for several months that I would write to you, but as I did not wish to annoy you with disagreeable intelligence, I deferred it, hoping that events would open up a better prospect for the future. That expectation has not yet been realized. "It were a tale too long" to detail all the blunders of the cabinet, which have brought the Whig party to the brink of ruin; but of the special question upon which their policy has nearly estranged the whole Whig party of the South it is proper to give you some brief hints, that you may understand our position. During the last summer, the government, with the consent of the whole cabinet, except Crawford, threw the entire patronage of the North into the hands of Seward and his party. This was done under some foolish idea of Preston's, that they would get rid of a Northern competition for 1852, as Seward stood for 1856. The effect of this was to enable Seward to take the entire control of the New York organization, and force the whole Northern Whig party into the extreme anti-slavery position of Seward, which, of course, sacked the South. I knew the effect of this policy would certainly destroy the Whig party, and perhaps endanger the Union. When I came to Washington, I found the whole Whig party expecting to pass the proviso, and that Taylor would not veto it, that thereby the Whig party of the North were to be built up at the expense of the Northern Democracy, who, from political and party considerations, had stood quasi opposed to the proviso. I saw General Taylor, and talked fully with him, and while he stated he had given and would give no pledges either way about the proviso, he gave me clearly to understand that if it was passed he would sign it. My course became instantly fixed. I would not hesitate to oppose the proviso, even to the extent of a dissolution of the Union. I could not for a moment regard any party considerations on the treatment of the question. I therefore determined to put the test to the Whig party and abandon its organization upon its refusal. Both events happened to defeat this policy; it was of the first importance to prevent the organization of the House going into the hands of the Northern Whig party. I should have gone to any extent to effect that object, they foolishly did it themselves. Without fatiguing you with details, my whole subsequent course has been governed by this line of policy. I have determined to settle the question honorably to my own section of country, if possible, at any and every hazard, totally indifferent to what might be its effect upon General Taylor or his administration. In the course of events, the policy of the cabinet has vacillated to and fro, but has finally settled upon the ground of admitting California, and non-action as to the rest of the territories. Seward and his party have struck hands with them on this policy, but Stanly is the only Southern Whig who will stand by them. I think it likely the course of events may throw the whole of the Southern Whigs into opposition,-such a result will not deter us from our course. We are willing to admit California and pass territorial governments on the principle of McClernand's bill; we will never take less. The government, in furtherance of their stupid and treacherous bargain with the North, are endeavoring to defeat it; with their aid we could carry it, as more than twenty-five Northern Democrats are pledged to it. They may embarrass us, possibly may defeat us, but our defeat will be their ruin. The cabinet have intense hostility to Mr. Clay, and I think it likely we, and the country, will be greatly benefited by the feud, inasmuch as it makes Clay the more anxious to conform to the interests of his own section and of the Southern Whigs, and this the rather because the government has the whip hand of him (through Seward) with the Northern Whigs. The Senate's committee will, I think, agree upon propositions which will pass; this can only be defeated by the want of common sense and common prudence on the part of Mason, Butler, and others of that "ilk" in both houses of Congress, and the efforts of the administration. But as to the latter it is but candid to say that they have little power, either for good or evil. For some reason, wholly unaccountable to me, the Northern members of the cabinet are universally odious, even to the Northern Whigs. Clayton is a dead body tied to the concern. Johnson is honorable and clever, but without wisdom. Preston is speculative, and, what is worse, has no sentiment in common with the section which he represents. Crawford alone is true and faithful to the honor and interest of our section, and the late scene about the Galphin claim is an effort of men in the service of government to drive him out. He is the last link that binds a majority of the Southern Whigs to the government, and I have no doubt but they will soon make it inconsistent with his own honor to remain there. I have thus given you a brief outline of men and parties in the government. I have said nothing of General Taylor; my opinion is that he is an honest, well-meaning man, but that he is in very bad hands, and his inexperience in public affairs, and want of knowledge of men, is daily practiced upon, and renders him peculiarly liable to imposition. I think there has been a studied effort to alienate him from his original friends, and that it has been eminently successful; time will show that he and not they will suffer most by that alienation. Morehead is now making a good speech at my back, and has perhaps, to some extent, destroyed the continuity of my narrative. Let me hear from you.

I am truly your friend,

R. TOOMBS.

SOURCE: Ann Mary Butler Crittenden Coleman, Editor, The Life of John J. Crittenden: With Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 364-6

Congressman Robert Toombs to Governor George W. Crawford, February 16, 1846

Washington, D. C, Ho. or Reps., Feb. 6, 1846.

Dear Crawford, I received your letter of the 31st ult. last night. Lest you may not receive the speech I first sent, I send you another by this mail. The authorities on the Galphin claim to [which] you refer I will consult in a few days. I think from your statement of the case it is “in pint.” This is a very bad body before which to argue such a question, but if it can be got through the Senate and is backed by a strong report in this House I think it could be got through without much difficulty. A majority report favourable would certainly settle it, but the committees of this House are very badly constituted for any just purpose. They [are] nearly as rabid against all sorts of claims as the Locos in the Georgia legislature. They have promised a good deal in the way of reform, and instead of honestly retrenching actual abuses, which they have neither the honesty or the firmness to do, they desire to retrench by defeating all sort of claims, honest as well as dishonest, against the government.

I suppose you have the defective receipts sent you by Mr. Stephens. You will perceive from the nature of the objections that it [is] impossible ever to settle with the government without legislation, and I am decidedly of opinion that a gross appropriation for a full settlement will be the very best we can do, if we can carry it. If you can get the Secretary of War to recommend or acquiesce in it, it can I think be carried, and I very much wish you could bring him to that point. Without it I see little or no chance of ever getting any considerable portion of the remaining claim, if indeed we can get anything more.

I am glad to hear from you that you will not be obliged “to stop” during your administration. I had supposed your only resource against such a calamity would be in the act of 1843 authorizing you to raise money to pay off that debt by new 6 per cents. You will probably recollect at that time I favoured that policy in any event. I don't care to pay that debt. I would much prefer letting it remain the 25 or 30 years, when I doubt not its interest and much of the principal can be paid from the road,¹ and the experience of the last five years is very conclusive that all railroads judiciously located will pay, and I think ours will be one of the very best in the South. I perceive from the newspapers that you are adopting the policy of raising the wind by means of the 6 per cents. If they are pressed gradually on the market they will rise, unless we have war.

I do not think a war in the least probable. Mr. Polk never dreamed of any other war than a war upon the Whigs. He is playing a low grog-shop politician's trick, nothing more. He would be as much surprised and astonished and frightened at getting into war with England as if the Devil were to rise up before him at his bidding. The Democratic Party had declared our title to “all Oregon” “clear and unquestionable.” Mr. Polk adopted and asserted the same thing in his inaugural speech. Both moves were political blunders. It became necessary to retrieve them. He was bound to offer 49°. He supposed as the British Gov[ernment] had refused that proposition when made with more advantageous additions than were embraced in his proposition that that Gov[ernment] would do so again. It was an affectation of moderation when he knew that it was the best we could ever get. He withdraws the proposition and begins his game of “bluster,” with the full conviction that the Whig Party, true to their fatality to blunders, would raise the shout of peace, peace, and which would make him, the vilest poltroon that ever disgraced our Government, the head of the war party. His party were already committed to him to 54° 40', they would stand by him, and he expected finally to be forced by the British Whigs and Southern Calhoun men to compromise; but he greatly hoped that he would not be forced even to this alternative until he had “all Oregon” on every Democratic banner in the Union for his “second heat.” I have not the least doubt but that he fully calculated that the “notice” would be rejected by a combination between the Whigs and Calhoun men of this Congress, and then he could have kept it open for a new presidential campaign. That these were the objects of the Administration I have not the least doubt. Hence I urged the Whigs to stand up and give him the power to give the notice whenever he thought proper, which would have “blocked” him. But they would save themselves and their party for the same reason that the lad did in scripture, “because” their friends “had much goods.” Wall street howled, old Gales was frightened into fits at the possibility of war, and the Whig press throughout the country screamed in piteous accents peace, peace, with the vain foolish hope of gaining popular confidence by their very fears, and like the magnetic needle, they expected to tremble into peace. Nothing could be more absurd. If we have peace they are disarmed, and whatever may be the terms of accommodation they will be stopped from uttering a word of complaint. If war comes, no people were ever foolish enough to trust its conduct to a “peace party,” for very good sufficient reasons. If the country should be beaten and dishonored they will be called upon to patch up a dishonorable peace, but in no other event.

There is another view of this question, purely sectional, which our people don't seem to understand. Some of our Southern papers seem to think we are very foolish to risk a war to secure anti-slave power. They look only at the surface of things. If we had control of the government and could control this question, I have not the least doubt that Calhoun is right in saying that his “masterly inactivity” policy is the only one which ever could acquire “all Oregon”. It can never be done in any other way except to give the notice and stand still, which would effect the same object rightfully; but notice and action never will secure all Oregon. Mark the prediction. Notice will force an early settlement. That settlement will be upon or near the basis of 49°, and therefore a loss of half the country. Now one of the strongest private reasons which governs me is that I don't [care] a fig about any of Oregon, and would gladly get ridd of the controversy by giving it all to anybody else but the British if I could with honor. The country is too large now, and I don't want a foot of Oregon or an acre of any other country, especially without “niggers.” These are some of my reasons for my course which don't appear in print.

I deeply regret that the Whigs, especially of the Senate, have given and will give a different direction to the question. If Polk wants war he can make it in spite of any let or hindrance from them. If he does not want [it], he will not need their aid to keep out of it; but they “gabble” and “chatter” about the peace of the country and the horrors of war as if they had any real power over either question. . . .

P. S. — We are still on Oregon. The question will be taken on Monday. “Notice” will pass this time, in what form is doubtful, but I think unqualified. Negotiations are undoubtedly renewed and are now pending on the subject.

_______________

¹ The Western & Atlantic Railroad.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 72-5

Congressman Alexander H. Stephens to Governor George W. Crawford,* February 3, 1846

Washington, D. C., Feb. 3,1846.

Dear Crawford, Yours in relation to the Galphin claim came to hand last night and I will examine the case you cite. I turned over the papers relating to the claim to Judge Berrien some weeks ago who I think likewise turned them over to Mr. McDuffie who is to bring the subject before the Senate. This I think the better course. They have more time in the Senate, and being a smaller body are more disposed to attend to the real merits of the case. If a favourable report can be got through that body it will stand a much better chance in our House. And should it come there I would do all that labour, research and investigation can do to effect its passage. I have bestowed a good deal of attention to the subject and am clearly of opinion that it is founded in right and justice and ought to be passed. Our time however for some weeks, as you see from the papers, has been taken up almost exclusively with the Oregon debate, and when we will bring that to a close I am wholly unable to conjecture. Every one in the House I believe (myself alone excepted) is desirous of making a speech upon the subject. Even those who have spoken are anxious many of them to make another. But I suppose the debate will be ended in the House when it is taken up in the Senate, which will take place next week. It is a subject I feel no disposition to speak upon in its present shape and condition, and I partake very little of that excitement in relation to it which seems to prevail amongst others. I am for our rights as far as they are clear, and in maintaining them thus far I should not suffer myself to be influenced by any considerations growing out of a fear or apprehension of war. Nor do I conceive that the questions of peace or war are at all involved in terminating the joint occupancy under the convention of 1818. It seems to me that such a measure would only bring about a settlement of our boundary, which ought to be done, as our people are new going there in large companies for the purpose of colonizing. Whether this will lead to a rupture with England or not I cannot pretend to say. It ought not, and will not if properly managed. But one thing is certain, our government will have to recede from the position of Mr. Polk that our "title to the whole of the territory is clear and unquestionable ", or war will be inevitable unless I greatly mistake the temper of the British Government. The war however will not be the result of the giving the notice but subsequent legislation taking possession of the whole of the country. And this I am not prepared to do, and will not do, for I do not think our rights clear to that extent. And I moreover think that the whole subject is proper for negotiation and settlement upon terms of mutual compromise. And if I may go a step further I think this will be the result of the whole matter. If the notice is given, negotiations (if the President does his duty) will be opened, he will recede from his position, and the controversy will ultimately be ended in some sort of amicable adjustment. I can not bring myself to the belief that war will result. But enough of this. I am doing what I can to facilitate the settlement of the amount of our state at the Treasury Department, but my progress is slow. I sent you some papers upon this subject a few days ago.

P. S. — My health is good, much better than it has been for several years.

_______________

* Governor of Georgia, 1843-1847, Secretary of War in Taylor's Cabinet, 1849-1850. He was for many years attorney for the Galphin claimants.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 71-2