No. 232.
Reports of General John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding Army of Tennessee.
Forrest's cavalry joined me on the 21st of November and the movement began, Major-General Cheatham's corps taking the road toward Waynesborough, and the other two corps moving on roads somewhat parallel with this, but more to the eastward, with the cavalry under General Forrest in the advance and upon their right flank. The enemy's forces at this time were concentrated at Pulaski, with some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place the army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville; but he evacuated Pulaski upon the 23d, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having furiously driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by the turnpike and railroad to Columbia.
The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through which the army marched, prevented our overtaking the enemy before he reached Columbia, but on the evening of the 27th of November our army was placed in position in front of his works at that place. During the night, however, he evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the river about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong in front.
Late in the evening of the 28th of November General Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and I followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order, with only a battery to the corps, my object being to turn the enemy's flank, by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, at or near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near Columbia. When I had gotten well on his flank the enemy discovered my intention and began to retreat on the pike toward Spring Hill. The cavalry became engaged near that place about midday, but his trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break through them. About 4 p.m. our infantry forces, Major-General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which place the Columbia and Franklin pike runs. The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops formed on the flank of his column to protect it. Major-General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we should have possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the enemy a heavy blow. Accordingly, Lieutenant-General Stewart was furnished a guide and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. Shortly after this General Cheatham came to my headquarters, and when I informed him of Stewart's movement, he said that Stewart ought to form on his right. I asked if that would throw Stewart across the pike. He replied that it would, and a mile beyond. Accordingly, one of Cheatham's staff officers was sent to show Stewart where his (Cheatham's) right rested. In the dark and confusion he did not succeed in getting the position desired, but about 11 p.m. went into bivouac. About 12 p.m., ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion, artillery, wagons, and troops intermixed, I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him and still further impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy for which we had labored so long—the greatest this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war.
Lieutenant-General Lee, left in front of the enemy at Columbia, was instructed to press the enemy the moment he abandoned his position at that point. The enemy did not abandon his works at that place till dark, showing that his trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles during the day and a great part of the night.
At daylight we followed as fast as possible toward Franklin, Lieutenant-General Stewart in the advance, Major-General Cheatham following, and General Lee, with the trains, moving from Columbia on the same road. We pursued the enemy rapidly and compelled him to burn a number of his wagons. He made a feint as if to give battle on the hills about four miles south of Franklin, but as soon as our forces began to deploy for the attack and to flank him on his left he retired slowly to Franklin.
I learned from dispatches captured at Spring Hill, from Thomas to Schofield, that the latter was instructed to hold that place till the position at Franklin could be made secure, indicating the intention of Thomas to hold Franklin and his strong works at Murfreesborough. Thus I knew that it was all important to attack Schofield before he could make himself strong, and if he should escape at Franklin he would gain his works about Nashville. The nature of the position was such as to render it inexpedient to attempt any further flank movement, and I therefore determined to attack him in front, and without delay.
On the 30th of November Stewart's corps was placed in position on the right, Cheatham's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank, the main body of the cavalry on the right, under Forrest. Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, also became engaged on the left during the engagement. The line advanced at 4 p.m., with orders to drive the enemy into or across the Big Harpeth River, while General Forrest, if successful, was to cross the river and attack and destroy his trains and broken columns. The troops moved forward most gallantly to the attack. We carried the enemy's first line of hastily constructed works handsomely. We then advanced against his interior line, and succeeded in carrying it also in some places. Here the engagement was of the fiercest possible character. Our men possessed themselves of the exterior of the works, while the enemy held the interior. Many of our men were killed entirely inside the works. The brave men captured were taken inside his works in the edge of the town. The struggle lasted till near midnight, when the enemy abandoned his works and crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded in our possession. Never did troops fight more gallantly. The works of the enemy were so hastily constructed that while he had a slight abatis in front of a part of his line there was none on his extreme right. During the day I was restrained from using my artillery on account of the women and children remaining in the town. At night it was massed ready to continue the action in the morning, but the enemy retired.
We captured about 1,000 prisoners and several stand of colors. Our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,500. Among the killed was Maj. Gen. P. R. Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and Granbury. Major-General Brown, Brigadier-Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell, and Scott were wounded, and Brigadier-General Gordon captured.
The number of dead left by the enemy on the field indicated that his loss was equal or near our own.
The next morning at daylight, the wounded being cared for and the dead buried, we moved forward toward Nashville, Forrest with his cavalry pursuing the enemy vigorously.
On the 2d of December the army took position in front of Nashville, about two miles from the city. Lieutenant-General Lee's corps constituted our center, resting upon the Franklin pike, with Cheatham's corps upon the right and Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank, extending to the river. I was causing strong detached works to be built to cover our flanks, intending to make them inclosed works, so as to defeat any attempt of the enemy should he undertake offensive movements against our flank and rear. The enemy still held Murfreesborough with about 6,000 men, strongly fortified; he also held small forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville. It was apparent that he would soon have to take the offensive to relieve his garrisons at those points or cause them to be evacuated, in which case I hoped to capture the forces at Murfreesborough, and should then be able to open communication with Georgia and Virginia. Should he attack me in position I felt that I could defeat him, and thus gain possession of Nashville with abundant supplies for the army. This would give me possession of Tennessee. Necessary steps were taken to furnish the army with supplies, which the people were ready and willing to furnish. Shoe-shops were in operation in each brigade. We had captured sufficient railroad stock to use the road to Pulaski, and it was already in successful operation. Having possession of the State, we should have gained largely in recruits, and could at an early day have moved forward to the Ohio, which would have frustrated the plans of the enemy, as developed in his campaign toward the Atlantic coast.
I had sent Major-General Forrest, with the greatest part of his cavalry and Bate's division of infantry, to Murfreesborough, to ascertain if it was possible to take the place. After a careful examination and reconnaissance in force, in which, I am sorry to say, the infantry behaved badly, it was determined that nothing could be accomplished by assault. Bate's division was then withdrawn, leaving Forrest with Jackson's and Buford's divisions of cavalry in observation. Mercer's and Palmer's brigades of infantry were sent to replace Bate's division. Shortly afterward Buford's division was withdrawn and ordered to the right of the army, on the Cumberland River.
Nothing of importance occurred until the morning of the 15th of December when the enemy, having received heavy re-enforcements, attacked simultaneously both our flanks. On our right he was handsomely repulsed, with heavy loss, but on our left, toward evening, he carried some partially completed redoubts of those before mentioned.
During the night of the 15th our whole line was shortened and strengthened; our left was also thrown back; dispositions were made to meet any renewed attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was transferred from our right to our left, leaving Lieutenant-General Lee on our right, who had been previously in the center, and placing Lieutenant-General Stewart's corps in the center, which had been previously the left.
Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a general attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of artillery. All his assaults were repulsed with heavy loss till 3.30 p.m., when a portion of our line to the left of the center, occupied by Bate's division, suddenly gave way. Up to this time no battle ever progressed more favorably; the troops in excellent spirits, waving their colors and bidding defiance to the enemy. The position gained by the enemy being such as to enfilade our line caused in a few moments our entire line to give way and our troops to retreat rapidly down the pike in the direction of Franklin, most of them, I regret to say, in great confusion, all efforts to reform them being fruitless. Our loss in artillery was heavy—54 guns. Thinking it impossible for the enemy to break our line, the horses were sent to the rear for safety, and the giving way of the line was so sudden that it was not possible to bring forward the horses to move the guns which had been placed in position. Our loss in killed and wounded was small. At Brentwood, some four miles from our line of battle, the troops were somewhat collected, and Lieutenant-General Lee took command of the rear guard, encamping for the night in the vicinity. On leaving the field I sent a staff officer to inform General Forrest of our defeat, and to direct him to rejoin the army with as little delay as possible to protect its rear, but owing to the swollen condition of the creeks, caused by the heavy rain then falling, he was unable to join us until we reached Columbia, with the exception of a portion of his command, which reached us while the enemy was moving from Franklin to Spring Hill.
On the 17th we continued the retreat toward Columbia, encamping for the night at Spring Hill. During this day's march the enemy's cavalry pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry repeatedly with the saber, and at times penetrating our lines. The country being open was favorable to their operations. I regret to say that also on this day Lieutenant-General Lee, commanding the covering force, was severely wounded in the foot. We continued our retreat across Duck River to Columbia, the corps alternating as rear guards to the army. Lieutenant-General Lee and the corps commanded by him deserve great credit.
After the fight at Nashville I at first hoped to be able to remain in Tennessee, on the line of Duck River; but after arriving at Columbia I became convinced that the condition of the army made it necessary to recross the Tennessee without delay; and on the 21st the army resumed its march for Pulaski, leaving Major General Walthall, with Ector's, Strahl's, Maney's, Granbury's, and Palmer's infantry brigades,2 at Columbia as a rear guard, under General Forrest. From Pulaski I moved by the most direct road to the Bainbridge crossing on the Tennessee River, which was reached on the 25th, where the army crossed without interruption, completing the crossing on the 27th, including our rear guard, which the enemy followed with all his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, and with cavalry between Pulaski and the Tennessee River. After crossing the river the army moved by easy marches to Tupelo, Miss. Our pontoon and supply trains were ordered at once to the vicinity of Columbus, Miss., by the most direct route, that the animals might be more easily foraged, and while on the march there were pursued by a small body of the enemy's cavalry, and owing to the neglect of Brigadier General Roddey's cavalry were overtaken and the pontoon train and a small portion of the supply train destroyed. Here, finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country as in my judgment to greatly impair, if not destroy, my usefulness and counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country, I asked to be relieved, with the hope that another might be assigned to the command who might do more than I could hope to accomplish. Accordingly, I was so relieved on the 23d of January by authority of the President.3
My reasons for undertaking the movement into Tennessee have, I think, been sufficiently stated already. Had I not made the movement I am fully persuaded that Sherman would have been upon General Lee's communication in October, instead of at this time.
From Palmetto to Spring Hill the campaign was all that I could have desired. The fruits ought to have been gathered at that point. At Nashville, had it not have been for an unfortunate event which could not justly have been anticipated, I think we would have gained a complete victory. At any time it was in the power of the army to retire from Tennessee in the event of failure, as is established by the leisurely retreat which was made under the most difficult and embarrassing circumstances. It is my firm conviction that, notwithstanding that disaster, I left the army in better spirits and with more confidence in itself than it had at the opening of the campaign. The official records will show that my losses, including prisoners, during the entire campaign do not exceed 10,000 men. Were I again placed in such circumstances I should make the same marches and fight the same battles, trusting that the same unforseen and unavoidable accident would not again occur to change into disaster a victory which had been already won.
In support of the statement touching the strength and losses of the army, I respectfully tender the official records of the assistant adjutant-general (Maj. Kinloch Falconer), alike on duty with General Johnston and myself. Those who have seen much service in the field during this war will at once understand why it was that desertion, which had been so frequent on the retreat from Dalton to Atlanta, almost entirely ceased as soon as the army assumed the offensive and took a step forward. I did not know of a desertion on the march from Palmetto to Dalton or from Dalton to Florence. I am informed that the provost-marshal general of the Army of Tennessee reports less than 300 desertions during the whole Tennessee campaign. The Tennessee troops entered the State with high hopes as they approached their homes; when the fortunes of war were against us the same faithful soldiers remained true to their flag, and, with rare exceptions, followed it in retreat as they had borne it in advance.
But few of the subordinate reports have reached me. I am, consequently, unable, without risk of injustice, to describe the instances of individual skill and gallantry.
I invite special attention to the report of Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith of the operations of the Georgia militia in the vicinity of Atlanta,4 the reports of Lieutenant-General Stewart and his subordinate officers, herewith submitted. Maps of the campaign accompany this report.5
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.
SIR: On the 21st of November, after a delay of three weeks, caused by the bad condition of the railroad from Okolona to Cherokee, and of the dirt road from the latter point to Florence, and also by the absence of Major-General Forrest's command, this army moved forward from Florence, Major-General Cheatham's corps taking the road leading toward Waynesborough and the other two corps moving on roads somewhat parallel to this, but more to the eastward, with the cavalry, under General Forrest, in their advance and upon their right flank. The enemy's forces were concentrated at this time at Pulaski, with some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place our army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville; but they evacuated Pulaski upon the 23d, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having previously driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by the turnpike and the railroad to Columbia.
The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud through which the army marched, prevented our coming up with the enemy before they reached Columbia, but on the evening of the 27th of November our army was placed in position in front of the enemy's works at Columbia. During the night, however, they evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the river about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong in front.
Therefore, late in the evening of the 28th of November, General Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and I followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order, with only one battery to the corps, my object being to make a rapid march on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, and by placing the troops across this pike at or near Spring Hill to cut off that portion of the enemy. The cavalry engaged the enemy near Spring Hill about midday, but their trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break through them. About 4 p.m. our infantry forces, Major-General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which the Columbia and Franklin pike passes. The enemy were at this time moving along this pike, with some of their troops formed on the flank of their column to protect it. Major-General Cheatham was ordered at once to attack the enemy vigorously and get possession of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Darkness soon came on, and to our mortification the enemy continued moving along this road, almost in ear-shot, in hurry and confusion, nearly the entire night.
Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for which we had labored so long--the best which this campaign has offered, and one of the best afforded us during the war. Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches all blame to himself. While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe lesson to him, by which he will profit in the future. In consideration of this and of his previous conduct I think that it is best that he should retain for the present the command he now holds.
Before daylight next morning (30th of November) the entire column of the enemy had passed us, retreating rapidly toward Franklin, burning many of their wagons. We followed as fast as possible, moving by the Columbia and Franklin pike, Lieutenant-General Lee, with the two divisions and trains and artillery, moving from Columbia by the same road. The enemy made a feint of making a stand on the hills about four miles from Franklin in the direction of Spring Hill, but as soon as our forces commenced deploying to attack them, and extending to outflank them on their left, they retired slowly to Franklin. This created a delay of some hours. We, however, commenced advancing on Franklin, and attacked the place about 4 p.m. with the corps of Generals Stewart and Cheatham, Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, becoming engaged later. We carried the enemy's outer lines of temporary works, but failed to carry the interior line. During the night I had our artillery brought forward and placed in position to open upon them in the morning, when the attack should be renewed, but the enemy retreated rapidly during the night on Nashville, leaving their dead and wounded in our hands. We captured about 1,000 prisoners and several stand of colors. Our loss in officers was severe. The names of the general officers I have already given by telegraph. Our entire loss was about 4,500.
We continued our march toward Nashville, and on the 2d of December our army took its present position, in front and about two miles from the city. Lieutenant-General Lee's corps, which constitutes our center, rests upon the Franklin pike, with General Cheatham upon his right and General Stewart upon his left. Our line is strongly intrenched, and all the available positions upon our flanks and in rear of them are now being fortified with strong, self-supporting, detached works, so that they may easily be defended should the enemy move out upon us.
The enemy still have some 6,000 troops strongly intrenched at Murfreesborough. This force is entirely isolated, and I now have the larger part of the cavalry under General Forrest, with two brigades of infantry, in observation of these forces, and to prevent the foraging on the country. Should this force attempt to leave Murfreesborough, or should the enemy attempt to re-enforce it, I hope to be able to defeat them.
I think the position of this army is now such as to force the enemy to take the initiative. Middle Tennessee, although much injured by the enemy, will furnish an abundance of commissary stores, but ordnance and certain quartermaster's stores will have to come from the rear, and therefore it is very important that the railroad should be repaired at once from Cherokee to Decatur. The cars can now run from here to Pulaski on the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, and we have sufficient rolling-stock captured from the enemy to answer our purposes. I will endeavor to put this road in order from Pulaski to Decatur as soon as possible.
As yet I have not had time to adopt any general system of conscription, but [hope] soon to do so, and to bring into the army all men liable to military duty. Some 15,000 of the enemy's Trans-Mississippi troops are reported to be moving to re-enforce the enemy here. I hope this will enable us to obtain some of our troops from that side in time for the spring campaign, if not sooner.
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit an outline of the movements and operations of the army from its leaving Palmetto to the present time.
The army left its bivouac near Palmetto, Ga., on the 29th of September last, with Jackson's cavalry in its front, Brigadier-General Iverson with his command being left in observation of the enemy in and around Atlanta, and moving first on the prolongation of its left flank to the westward, we crossed the Chattahoochee the same day on pontoon bridges at Pumpkin Town and Phillips' Ferry, while our supplies, which we brought by wagon trains from Newnan, Ga., crossed at Moore's Ferry, where we had constructed a temporary trestle bridge. As soon as we crossed the river the army moved at once to the immediate vicinity of Lost Mountain, reaching there on the 3d of October, our cavalry during the march watching the enemy from our front and right flank, and occasionally skirmishing with his cavalry along the banks of Sweet Water Creek.
On the 4th [3d] of October Lieutenant-General Stewart's corps, in obedience to my orders, struck the enemy's railroad at Acworth and Big Shanty, capturing the garrisons at both places, consisting of some 400 prisoners, with some animals and stores. Hearing that the enemy had a quantity of stores at Allatoona, I desired, if possible, to destroy the bridge over the Etowah River, and directed Lieutenant-General Stewart to send a division also to Allatoona, instructing the officer in command to destroy the railroad there and take possession of the place, if in his judgment, when he reached there, he deemed it practicable. Accordingly Major-General French was sent, who attacked the place early on the morning of the 5th of October, and quickly carried the enemy's outer line of works, driving him into a redoubt and taking possession of the place, with this exception, that just at this critical juncture he (General French) received information, which he considered correct (but which subsequently proved false), that a large body of the enemy were moving to cut him off from the remainder of the army, and he immediately withdrew his command from the place without having accomplished the desired object. Lieutenant-General Stewart's command succeeded in destroying completely some ten miles of the railroad. These operations caused the enemy to move his army, with the exception of one corps, from Atlanta to Marietta, threatening an advance in the direction of our position at Lost Mountain; but not deeming our army in condition for a general engagement, I withdrew it on the 6th of October to the westward, continuing to march daily, and crossed the Coosa River near Coosaville and moved up the west bank of the Oostenaula, striking the railroad again between Resaca and Mill Creek Gap, just above Dalton, on the 13th of October, destroying the railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill, capturing the enemy's posts at Tilton, Dalton, and Mill Creek Gap, with about 1,000 prisoners and some stores, after which I again withdrew the army from the railroad, moving to the southwest toward Gadsden, Ala., the enemy following and skirmishing constantly with our cavalry, then under command of Major-General Wheeler, who joined the army on the march just before it crossed the Coosa River.
The army reached Gadsden, Ala., on the 20th of October, and
remained there a day to issue supplies, which had met us there, having been
sent via Selma and Jacksonville. As soon, however, as these supplies were
issued the army took up the line of march for the Tennessee River, and I hoped
to have crossed at or near Gunter's Landing; but not having a sufficient force
of cavalry with me, and learning that Major-General Forrest was not then in
Middle Tennessee, our march was continued to Tuscumbia, Ala., that the supplies
necessary to subsist the army till it should reach the rich portion of
Tennessee might be obtained, and also to effect a junction with the cavalry
under Major-General Forrest. We reached Tuscumbia on the 31st of October, and,
for the reasons mentioned in my letter to you of December 11,6 we were
not able to commence the movement into Tennessee until the 21st of November.
For a report of operations of the army from that time till the 11th of
December, I respectfully refer to my letter of the latter date, a copy of which
is inclosed.6
Our army took its position in front of Nashville on the 2d of December, but the enemy still holding Murfreesborough with some 6,000 troops, Major-General Forrest, with the larger portion of the cavalry and Bate's division of infantry, was sent there to see if it was practicable to take the place. But after an examination and reconnaissance, during which, I am pained to say, our infantry behaved badly, Major-General Forrest reported that nothing could be done with the place by assault. Accordingly Bate's division was withdrawn, leaving General Forrest, with Jackson's and Buford's divisions of cavalry, in observation of the place, together with Mercer's and Palmer's infantry brigades, which were ordered there as Bate's division was withdrawn. I hoped thus to isolate the enemy's force at Murfreesborough and prevent them from foraging on the country or obtaining fuel, and if they should attempt to leave the place to have attacked them on their march.
Nothing of importance occurred till the morning of the 15th of December, when the enemy attacked simultaneously both our flanks. On our right he was handsomely repulsed, with heavy loss, but on our left he succeeded in driving in our flank, and toward evening carried some partially completed works which were in process of erection for the protection of this flank. Our line being necessarily very extended, a series of works had been commenced on each flank for their protection. During the night of the 15th our whole line was shortened and our left thrown back, and dispositions were made to meet any renewed attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was passed from our right to our left, leaving Lieutenant-General Lee on our right, who had been previously in the center, and placing Lieutenant-General Stewart's corps in the center, which had been previously the left.
Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a general attack on our lines, accompanied by a very heavy fire of artillery. All his assaults were repulsed with great loss till 3.30 p.m., when a portion of our line to the left of the center, occupied by Bate's division, suddenly gave way. In a few moments our entire line was broken, our troops retreating rapidly down the pike in the direction of Franklin, most of them, I regret to say, in great confusion, and all efforts to reform them were fruitless. Our loss in artillery was heavy, the giving way of the lines being so sudden that it was impossible to bring away the guns that had been placed in position. Our loss in killed and wounded was small. Our exact loss in prisoners I have not been able to ascertain, but do not think it great. I regret to say that among them were Maj. Gen. Ed. Johnson and Brig. Gens. H. R. Jackson and T. B. Smith. At Brentwood, some four miles from our line of battle, the troops were somewhat collected, and Lieutenant-General Lee took command of the rear guard, camping for the night in that vicinity. On leaving the field I sent a staff officer to inform General Forrest of our defeat and to direct him to rejoin the army, with as little delay as possible, to protect its rear; but owing to the swollen condition of the creeks, caused by the heavy rain then falling, he was unable to join until we reached Columbia, with the exception of a portion of his command which joined while the army was moving from Franklin to Spring Hill.
On the 17th we continued our retreat toward Columbia, camping for the night on Spring Hill. During this day's march the enemy's cavalry pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry repeatedly with the saber, and a few times going through our lines. The country, being open, was favorable for their operations. I regret to say, also, on this day, that Lieutenant-General Lee was [wounded] severely in the foot. We continued our retreat across the Duck River to Columbia, the corps alternating as rear guards to the army. While at Columbia Major-General Forrest rejoined.
After the fight at Nashville I at first hoped to have been able to remain in Tennessee on the line of the Duck River; but after arriving at Columbia I became convinced that the condition of the army made it necessary to recross the Tennessee River without delay; and on the 21st the army resumed the march for Pulaski, leaving Major-General Forrest, with the cavalry, and Major-General Walthall, with Ector's, Strahl's, Maney's, Granbury's, and Palmer's infantry brigades, at Columbia as a rear guard.7 From Pulaski I moved by the most direct route to the Bainbridge crossing on the Tennessee River, which we reached on the 25th of December, and our pontoon was completed at daylight on the 26th, when the army crossed as rapidly as possible, the whole having crossed on the 27th, including the rear guard, which the enemy followed with all his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, but only with cavalry between Pulaski and the Tennessee River. Since crossing the river I have moved the army by easy marches to this place. After recrossing the Tennessee our pontoon and supply trains were ordered at once to the vicinity of Columbus, Miss., by the most direct route, that the animals might be more easily foraged, and while on the march they were pressed by a small body of the enemy's cavalry, and owing to the inefficiency of Brigadier-General Roddey's cavalry were overtaken and the pontoon train and a small portion of the supply train destroyed.
My reasons for having made the campaign are as follows: After the fall of Atlanta this army was, consequent therefrom, in position upon the plains, all the mountain fastnesses having been given up from Dalton to the Chattahoochee River. I did not feel able to keep General Sherman from advancing to Macon or Augusta and continuing his line of blockhouses as a thorough protection to his communications, and feeling that the morale of the army was such as to require some change of position, I resolved to move to his rear and force him to fall back with his entire army to Chattanooga, or divide his forces and attempt to move with one wing to the Atlantic and the other to Tennessee, thereby giving me the chance of crushing one part of his army. General Sherman did divide his army, and moved upon Savannah with four corps, and Thomas with the remainder to Tennessee. I hoped and expected our people to have harassed, and in a great measure destroyed, that portion moving to the coast, while I attempted to destroy Thomas and gain Nashville, and thereby large re-enforcements and all kinds of supplies for the army. Sherman, however, succeeded in marching to Savannah with but little annoyance, and we failed to gain Nashville, and have been forced to fall back to the prairies of Mississippi. I regard, however, our situation far better in having the grand army of the Federals divided, with one wing in Tennessee and one in Savannah, than to have had their entire force now lying in the heart of Georgia upon the great railroad, to us, running from the east to the west, with the Army of Tennessee in line of battle, with their backs upon the cane-brake country of Alabama in order to subsist, and General Sherman and the army now under Thomas between General Lee and myself.
I have not as yet required the reports of subordinate commanders; will forward them as soon as received.
Commanding Military Division of the West.
ADDENDA.
Strength of the
Army of Tennessee on the 6th of November and loth of December, 1864.8
|
|
Present. |
[Present] and absent. |
|||
|
Effective. |
Total. |
Aggregate. |
Total. |
Aggregate. |
|
|
November 6, 1864: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Infantry |
25,889 |
34,559 |
38,119 |
79,997 |
87,016 |
|
Cavalry |
2,306 |
3,258 |
3,532 |
4,778 |
5,148 |
|
Artillery |
2,405 |
2,913 |
3,068 |
4,018 |
4,203 |
|
Total |
30,600 |
40,730 |
44,719 |
88,793 |
96,367 |
|
|
|||||
|
December 10, 1864: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Infantry |
18,342 |
27,222 |
29,826 |
71,329 |
77,631 |
|
Cavalry. |
2,306 |
3,258 |
3,532 |
4,778 |
5,148 |
|
Artillery. |
2,405 |
2,913 |
3,068 |
4,018 |
4,203 |
|
Total |
23,053 |
33,393 |
36,426 |
80,125 |
86,982 |
Richmond, Va.:
GENERAL: In compliance with your request, made a few days since, in reference to the strength of the Army of the Tennessee at the time you left Tupelo, Miss., I respectfully submit that, according to my recollection of a field return of the army which was being made at that time, and finished a day or two after your departure, the effective total of the infantry and artillery was about 15,000--perhaps a few hundred less. This return was made after the West Tennessee regiments of Major-General Cheatham's corps had been furloughed, as well as some men furloughed under an order published at Tupelo, and some small organizations also furloughed at Tupelo. I cannot form any estimate of the numbers of men thus furloughed, because you will remember that all the organization furloughs were given by the corps commanders, your sanction having been previously obtained; consequently the strength of such organizations at the time they were furloughed was not furnished the assistant adjutant-general's office at army headquarters.
The field return above referred to was sent to Colonel Brent, and was in his office in Augusta when I passed there a few weeks since.
Crossed Tennessee, November 21, 30,600 men.
Abstract from
inspection report of the Army of Tennessee, for January 20, 1865.
|
Command. |
Present for duty. |
A |
B |
C |
Present effective for the field. |
||||||
|
Infantry. |
Cavalry. |
Artillery. |
|||||||||
|
O |
M |
O |
M |
O |
M |
O |
M |
||||
|
Stewart's corps9 (Stewart) |
477 |
4,273 |
.... |
6,833 |
22,367 |
510 |
4,371 |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
|
Cheatham's corps3 (Cheatham). |
519 |
5,001 |
.... |
7,368 |
25,709 |
513 |
5,197 |
5 |
55 |
.... |
.... |
|
Lee's corps10 (Stevenson). |
698 |
5,573 |
.... |
8,317 |
25,248 |
638 |
5,302 |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
|
Artillery, Army of Tennessee (Elzey). |
101 |
2,066 |
67 |
2,535 |
4,042 |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
88 |
2,063 |
|
Three divisions of cavalry (Forrest)11 |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
.... |
|
Grand total |
1,795 |
16,913 |
67 |
25,053 |
77,366 |
1,661 |
14,870 |
5 |
55 |
88 |
2,063 |
1 For portions of report (here omitted) relating to the Atlanta campaign and operations from September 8-November 13, 1864, see Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, p. 628, and Vol. XXXIX, Part 1, p. 801
2 But see composition of infantry rear guard as reported by Walthall, p. 726.
3 For portion of report (here omitted) see Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, pp.634-636.
4 See Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, p. 969.
5 Such of these maps as may be found will appear in the atlas.
6 See p. 657.
7 But see composition of infantry rear guard as reported by Walthall, p. 726.
8 For the part of the statement showing strength of Hood’s army July 31 and September 20, 1864, see Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, p. 637
9 At Tupelo, Miss.
10 Moving to Georgia.
11 Headquarters at Verona; no inspection reports forwarded.
