No. 232.
Reports of General John B. Hood, C. S. Army, commanding Army
of Tennessee.
RICHMOND, VA., February 15, 1865.
GENERAL:
1
Forrest's cavalry joined me on the 21st of November and the
movement began, Major-General Cheatham's corps taking the road toward
Waynesborough, and the other two corps moving on roads somewhat parallel with
this, but more to the eastward, with the cavalry under General Forrest in the
advance and upon their right flank. The enemy's forces at this time were
concentrated at Pulaski, with some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be
able to place the army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville; but he
evacuated Pulaski upon the 23d, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having
furiously driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by the
turnpike and railroad to Columbia.
The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud
through which the army marched, prevented our overtaking the enemy before he
reached Columbia, but on the evening of the 27th of November our army was
placed in position in front of his works at that place. During the night,
however, he evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the
river about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong
in front.
Late in the evening of the 28th of November General Forrest,
with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and I
followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps,
and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's
corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order,
with only a battery to the corps, my object being to turn the enemy's flank, by
marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, at or
near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near Columbia.
When I had gotten well on his flank the enemy discovered my intention and began
to retreat on the pike toward Spring Hill. The cavalry became engaged near that
place about midday, but his trains were so strongly guarded that they were
unable to break through them. About 4 p.m. our infantry forces, Major-General
Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two
miles from Spring Hill, through which place the Columbia and Franklin pike
runs. The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of
his troops formed on the flank of his column to protect it. Major-General
Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once vigorously and get possession
of this pike, and, although these orders were frequently and earnestly
repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point
indicated. Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt that we
should have possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's corps and Johnson's
division were arriving upon the field to support the attack. Though the golden
opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of
dealing the enemy a heavy blow. Accordingly, Lieutenant-General Stewart was
furnished a guide and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's and place it
across the road beyond Spring Hill. Shortly after this General Cheatham came to
my headquarters, and when I informed him of Stewart's movement, he said that
Stewart ought to form on his right. I asked if that would throw Stewart across the
pike. He replied that it would, and a mile beyond. Accordingly, one of
Cheatham's staff officers was sent to show Stewart where his (Cheatham's) right
rested. In the dark and confusion he did not succeed in getting the position
desired, but about 11 p.m. went into bivouac. About 12 p.m., ascertaining that
the enemy was moving in great confusion, artillery, wagons, and troops
intermixed, I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of
skirmishers against him and still further impede and confuse his march. This
was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and
confusion, within hearing nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great
opportunity of striking the enemy for which we had labored so long—the greatest
this campaign had offered, and one of the greatest during the war.
Lieutenant-General Lee, left in front of the enemy at
Columbia, was instructed to press the enemy the moment he abandoned his
position at that point. The enemy did not abandon his works at that place till
dark, showing that his trains obstructed the road for fifteen miles during the
day and a great part of the night.
At daylight we followed as fast as possible toward Franklin,
Lieutenant-General Stewart in the advance, Major-General Cheatham following,
and General Lee, with the trains, moving from Columbia on the same road. We
pursued the enemy rapidly and compelled him to burn a number of his wagons. He
made a feint as if to give battle on the hills about four miles south of
Franklin, but as soon as our forces began to deploy for the attack and to flank
him on his left he retired slowly to Franklin.
I learned from dispatches captured at Spring Hill, from
Thomas to Schofield, that the latter was instructed to hold that place till the
position at Franklin could be made secure, indicating the intention of Thomas
to hold Franklin and his strong works at Murfreesborough. Thus I knew that it
was all important to attack Schofield before he could make himself strong, and
if he should escape at Franklin he would gain his works about Nashville. The
nature of the position was such as to render it inexpedient to attempt any
further flank movement, and I therefore determined to attack him in front, and
without delay.
On the 30th of November Stewart's corps was placed in
position on the right, Cheatham's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank,
the main body of the cavalry on the right, under Forrest. Johnson's division,
of Lee's corps, also became engaged on the left during the engagement. The line
advanced at 4 p.m., with orders to drive the enemy into or across the Big
Harpeth River, while General Forrest, if successful, was to cross the river and
attack and destroy his trains and broken columns. The troops moved forward most
gallantly to the attack. We carried the enemy's first line of hastily
constructed works handsomely. We then advanced against his interior line, and
succeeded in carrying it also in some places. Here the engagement was of the
fiercest possible character. Our men possessed themselves of the exterior of
the works, while the enemy held the interior. Many of our men were killed
entirely inside the works. The brave men captured were taken inside his works
in the edge of the town. The struggle lasted till near midnight, when the enemy
abandoned his works and crossed the river, leaving his dead and wounded in our
possession. Never did troops fight more gallantly. The works of the enemy were
so hastily constructed that while he had a slight abatis in front of a part of
his line there was none on his extreme right. During the day I was restrained
from using my artillery on account of the women and children remaining in the
town. At night it was massed ready to continue the action in the morning, but
the enemy retired.
We captured about 1,000 prisoners and several stand of
colors. Our loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners was 4,500. Among the killed
was Maj. Gen. P. R. Cleburne, Brigadier-Generals Gist, John Adams, Strahl, and
Granbury. Major-General Brown, Brigadier-Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles,
Cockrell, and Scott were wounded, and Brigadier-General Gordon captured.
The number of dead left by the enemy on the field indicated
that his loss was equal or near our own.
The next morning at daylight, the wounded being cared for
and the dead buried, we moved forward toward Nashville, Forrest with his
cavalry pursuing the enemy vigorously.
On the 2d of December the army took position in front of
Nashville, about two miles from the city. Lieutenant-General Lee's corps
constituted our center, resting upon the Franklin pike, with Cheatham's corps
upon the right and Stewart's on the left, and the cavalry on either flank,
extending to the river. I was causing strong detached works to be built to
cover our flanks, intending to make them inclosed works, so as to defeat any
attempt of the enemy should he undertake offensive movements against our flank
and rear. The enemy still held Murfreesborough with about 6,000 men, strongly
fortified; he also held small forces at Chattanooga and Knoxville. It was
apparent that he would soon have to take the offensive to relieve his garrisons
at those points or cause them to be evacuated, in which case I hoped to capture
the forces at Murfreesborough, and should then be able to open communication
with Georgia and Virginia. Should he attack me in position I felt that I could
defeat him, and thus gain possession of Nashville with abundant supplies for
the army. This would give me possession of Tennessee. Necessary steps were
taken to furnish the army with supplies, which the people were ready and
willing to furnish. Shoe-shops were in operation in each brigade. We had
captured sufficient railroad stock to use the road to Pulaski, and it was
already in successful operation. Having possession of the State, we should have
gained largely in recruits, and could at an early day have moved forward to the
Ohio, which would have frustrated the plans of the enemy, as developed in his
campaign toward the Atlantic coast.
I had sent Major-General Forrest, with the greatest part of
his cavalry and Bate's division of infantry, to Murfreesborough, to ascertain
if it was possible to take the place. After a careful examination and
reconnaissance in force, in which, I am sorry to say, the infantry behaved
badly, it was determined that nothing could be accomplished by assault. Bate's
division was then withdrawn, leaving Forrest with Jackson's and Buford's
divisions of cavalry in observation. Mercer's and Palmer's brigades of infantry
were sent to replace Bate's division. Shortly afterward Buford's division was
withdrawn and ordered to the right of the army, on the Cumberland River.
Nothing of importance occurred until the morning of the 15th
of December when the enemy, having received heavy re-enforcements, attacked
simultaneously both our flanks. On our right he was handsomely repulsed, with
heavy loss, but on our left, toward evening, he carried some partially
completed redoubts of those before mentioned.
During the night of the 15th our whole line was shortened
and strengthened; our left was also thrown back; dispositions were made to meet
any renewed attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was transferred from
our right to our left, leaving Lieutenant-General Lee on our right, who had
been previously in the center, and placing Lieutenant-General Stewart's corps
in the center, which had been previously the left.
Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a general
attack on our lines, accompanied by a heavy fire of artillery. All his assaults
were repulsed with heavy loss till 3.30 p.m., when a portion of our line to the
left of the center, occupied by Bate's division, suddenly gave way. Up to this
time no battle ever progressed more favorably; the troops in excellent spirits,
waving their colors and bidding defiance to the enemy. The position gained by
the enemy being such as to enfilade our line caused in a few moments our entire
line to give way and our troops to retreat rapidly down the pike in the
direction of Franklin, most of them, I regret to say, in great confusion, all
efforts to reform them being fruitless. Our loss in artillery was heavy—54
guns. Thinking it impossible for the enemy to break our line, the horses were
sent to the rear for safety, and the giving way of the line was so sudden that
it was not possible to bring forward the horses to move the guns which had been
placed in position. Our loss in killed and wounded was small. At Brentwood,
some four miles from our line of battle, the troops were somewhat collected, and
Lieutenant-General Lee took command of the rear guard, encamping for the night
in the vicinity. On leaving the field I sent a staff officer to inform General
Forrest of our defeat, and to direct him to rejoin the army with as little
delay as possible to protect its rear, but owing to the swollen condition of
the creeks, caused by the heavy rain then falling, he was unable to join us
until we reached Columbia, with the exception of a portion of his command,
which reached us while the enemy was moving from Franklin to Spring Hill.
On the 17th we continued the retreat toward Columbia,
encamping for the night at Spring Hill. During this day's march the enemy's
cavalry pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry
repeatedly with the saber, and at times penetrating our lines. The country
being open was favorable to their operations. I regret to say that also on this
day Lieutenant-General Lee, commanding the covering force, was severely wounded
in the foot. We continued our retreat across Duck River to Columbia, the corps
alternating as rear guards to the army. Lieutenant-General Lee and the corps
commanded by him deserve great credit.
After the fight at Nashville I at first hoped to be able to
remain in Tennessee, on the line of Duck River; but after arriving at Columbia
I became convinced that the condition of the army made it necessary to recross
the Tennessee without delay; and on the 21st the army resumed its march for
Pulaski, leaving Major General Walthall, with Ector's, Strahl's, Maney's,
Granbury's, and Palmer's infantry brigades,2 at Columbia as a rear
guard, under General Forrest. From Pulaski I moved by the most direct road to
the Bainbridge crossing on the Tennessee River, which was reached on the 25th,
where the army crossed without interruption, completing the crossing on the
27th, including our rear guard, which the enemy followed with all his cavalry
and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, and with cavalry between Pulaski and
the Tennessee River. After crossing the river the army moved by easy marches to
Tupelo, Miss. Our pontoon and supply trains were ordered at once to the
vicinity of Columbus, Miss., by the most direct route, that the animals might
be more easily foraged, and while on the march there were pursued by a small body
of the enemy's cavalry, and owing to the neglect of Brigadier General Roddey's
cavalry were overtaken and the pontoon train and a small portion of the supply
train destroyed. Here, finding so much dissatisfaction throughout the country
as in my judgment to greatly impair, if not destroy, my usefulness and
counteract my exertions, and with no desire but to serve my country, I asked to
be relieved, with the hope that another might be assigned to the command who
might do more than I could hope to accomplish. Accordingly, I was so relieved
on the 23d of January by authority of the President.3
My reasons for undertaking the movement into Tennessee have,
I think, been sufficiently stated already. Had I not made the movement I am
fully persuaded that Sherman would have been upon General Lee's communication
in October, instead of at this time.
From Palmetto to Spring Hill the campaign was all that I
could have desired. The fruits ought to have been gathered at that point. At
Nashville, had it not have been for an unfortunate event which could not justly
have been anticipated, I think we would have gained a complete victory. At any
time it was in the power of the army to retire from Tennessee in the event of
failure, as is established by the leisurely retreat which was made under the
most difficult and embarrassing circumstances. It is my firm conviction that,
notwithstanding that disaster, I left the army in better spirits and with more
confidence in itself than it had at the opening of the campaign. The official
records will show that my losses, including prisoners, during the entire
campaign do not exceed 10,000 men. Were I again placed in such circumstances I
should make the same marches and fight the same battles, trusting that the same
unforseen and unavoidable accident would not again occur to change into
disaster a victory which had been already won.
In support of the statement touching the strength and losses
of the army, I respectfully tender the official records of the assistant
adjutant-general (Maj. Kinloch Falconer), alike on duty with General Johnston
and myself. Those who have seen much service in the field during this war will
at once understand why it was that desertion, which had been so frequent on the
retreat from Dalton to Atlanta, almost entirely ceased as soon as the army
assumed the offensive and took a step forward. I did not know of a desertion on
the march from Palmetto to Dalton or from Dalton to Florence. I am informed
that the provost-marshal general of the Army of Tennessee reports less than 300
desertions during the whole Tennessee campaign. The Tennessee troops entered
the State with high hopes as they approached their homes; when the fortunes of
war were against us the same faithful soldiers remained true to their flag, and,
with rare exceptions, followed it in retreat as they had borne it in advance.
But few of the subordinate reports have reached me. I am,
consequently, unable, without risk of injustice, to describe the instances of
individual skill and gallantry.
I invite special attention to the report of Maj. Gen. G. W.
Smith of the operations of the Georgia militia in the vicinity of Atlanta,4
the reports of Lieutenant-General Stewart and his subordinate officers,
herewith submitted. Maps of the campaign accompany this report.5
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD,
General.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va. ——
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Near Nashville, Tenn., December 11, 1864.
SIR: On the 21st of November, after a delay of three weeks,
caused by the bad condition of the railroad from Okolona to Cherokee, and of
the dirt road from the latter point to Florence, and also by the absence of
Major-General Forrest's command, this army moved forward from Florence,
Major-General Cheatham's corps taking the road leading toward Waynesborough and
the other two corps moving on roads somewhat parallel to this, but more to the
eastward, with the cavalry, under General Forrest, in their advance and upon
their right flank. The enemy's forces were concentrated at this time at
Pulaski, with some force also at Lawrenceburg. I hoped to be able to place our
army between these forces of the enemy and Nashville; but they evacuated
Pulaski upon the 23d, hearing of our advance (our cavalry having previously
driven off their forces at Lawrenceburg), and moved rapidly by the turnpike and
the railroad to Columbia.
The want of a good map of the country, and the deep mud
through which the army marched, prevented our coming up with the enemy before
they reached Columbia, but on the evening of the 27th of November our army was
placed in position in front of the enemy's works at Columbia. During the night,
however, they evacuated the town, taking position on the opposite side of the
river about a mile and a half from the town, which was considered quite strong
in front.
Therefore, late in the evening of the 28th of November,
General Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above
Columbia, and I followed early in the morning of the 29th with Stewart's and
Cheatham's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, leaving the other
divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in
light marching order, with only one battery to the corps, my object being to
make a rapid march on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, and by
placing the troops across this pike at or near Spring Hill to cut off that
portion of the enemy. The cavalry engaged the enemy near Spring Hill about
midday, but their trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to
break through them. About 4 p.m. our infantry forces, Major-General Cheatham in
the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from
Spring Hill, through which the Columbia and Franklin pike passes. The enemy
were at this time moving along this pike, with some of their troops formed on
the flank of their column to protect it. Major-General Cheatham was ordered at
once to attack the enemy vigorously and get possession of this pike, and,
although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a
feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Darkness soon
came on, and to our mortification the enemy continued moving along this road,
almost in ear-shot, in hurry and confusion, nearly the entire night.
Thus was lost the opportunity for striking the enemy for
which we had labored so long--the best which this campaign has offered, and one
of the best afforded us during the war. Major-General Cheatham has frankly
confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches all blame to
himself. While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe
lesson to him, by which he will profit in the future. In consideration of this
and of his previous conduct I think that it is best that he should retain for
the present the command he now holds.
Before daylight next morning (30th of November) the entire
column of the enemy had passed us, retreating rapidly toward Franklin, burning many
of their wagons. We followed as fast as possible, moving by the Columbia and
Franklin pike, Lieutenant-General Lee, with the two divisions and trains and
artillery, moving from Columbia by the same road. The enemy made a feint of
making a stand on the hills about four miles from Franklin in the direction of
Spring Hill, but as soon as our forces commenced deploying to attack them, and
extending to outflank them on their left, they retired slowly to Franklin. This
created a delay of some hours. We, however, commenced advancing on Franklin,
and attacked the place about 4 p.m. with the corps of Generals Stewart and
Cheatham, Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, becoming engaged later. We
carried the enemy's outer lines of temporary works, but failed to carry the
interior line. During the night I had our artillery brought forward and placed
in position to open upon them in the morning, when the attack should be
renewed, but the enemy retreated rapidly during the night on Nashville, leaving
their dead and wounded in our hands. We captured about 1,000 prisoners and
several stand of colors. Our loss in officers was severe. The names of the
general officers I have already given by telegraph. Our entire loss was about
4,500.
We continued our march toward Nashville, and on the 2d of
December our army took its present position, in front and about two miles from
the city. Lieutenant-General Lee's corps, which constitutes our center, rests
upon the Franklin pike, with General Cheatham upon his right and General
Stewart upon his left. Our line is strongly intrenched, and all the available
positions upon our flanks and in rear of them are now being fortified with
strong, self-supporting, detached works, so that they may easily be defended
should the enemy move out upon us.
The enemy still have some 6,000 troops strongly intrenched
at Murfreesborough. This force is entirely isolated, and I now have the larger
part of the cavalry under General Forrest, with two brigades of infantry, in
observation of these forces, and to prevent the foraging on the country. Should
this force attempt to leave Murfreesborough, or should the enemy attempt to
re-enforce it, I hope to be able to defeat them.
I think the position of this army is now such as to force
the enemy to take the initiative. Middle Tennessee, although much injured by
the enemy, will furnish an abundance of commissary stores, but ordnance and
certain quartermaster's stores will have to come from the rear, and therefore
it is very important that the railroad should be repaired at once from Cherokee
to Decatur. The cars can now run from here to Pulaski on the Tennessee and
Alabama Railroad, and we have sufficient rolling-stock captured from the enemy
to answer our purposes. I will endeavor to put this road in order from Pulaski
to Decatur as soon as possible.
As yet I have not had time to adopt any general system of
conscription, but [hope] soon to do so, and to bring into the army all men
liable to military duty. Some 15,000 of the enemy's Trans-Mississippi troops
are reported to be moving to re-enforce the enemy here. I hope this will enable
us to obtain some of our troops from that side in time for the spring campaign,
if not sooner.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD,
General.
Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. ——
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Tupelo, Miss., January 9, 1865.
GENERAL: I have the honor to submit an outline of the
movements and operations of the army from its leaving Palmetto to the present
time.
The army left its bivouac near Palmetto, Ga., on the 29th of
September last, with Jackson's cavalry in its front, Brigadier-General Iverson
with his command being left in observation of the enemy in and around Atlanta,
and moving first on the prolongation of its left flank to the westward, we
crossed the Chattahoochee the same day on pontoon bridges at Pumpkin Town and Phillips'
Ferry, while our supplies, which we brought by wagon trains from Newnan, Ga.,
crossed at Moore's Ferry, where we had constructed a temporary trestle bridge.
As soon as we crossed the river the army moved at once to the immediate
vicinity of Lost Mountain, reaching there on the 3d of October, our cavalry
during the march watching the enemy from our front and right flank, and
occasionally skirmishing with his cavalry along the banks of Sweet Water Creek.
On the 4th [3d] of October Lieutenant-General Stewart's
corps, in obedience to my orders, struck the enemy's railroad at Acworth and
Big Shanty, capturing the garrisons at both places, consisting of some 400
prisoners, with some animals and stores. Hearing that the enemy had a quantity
of stores at Allatoona, I desired, if possible, to destroy the bridge over the
Etowah River, and directed Lieutenant-General Stewart to send a division also
to Allatoona, instructing the officer in command to destroy the railroad there
and take possession of the place, if in his judgment, when he reached there, he
deemed it practicable. Accordingly Major-General French was sent, who attacked
the place early on the morning of the 5th of October, and quickly carried the
enemy's outer line of works, driving him into a redoubt and taking possession
of the place, with this exception, that just at this critical juncture he
(General French) received information, which he considered correct (but which
subsequently proved false), that a large body of the enemy were moving to cut him
off from the remainder of the army, and he immediately withdrew his command
from the place without having accomplished the desired object.
Lieutenant-General Stewart's command succeeded in destroying completely some
ten miles of the railroad. These operations caused the enemy to move his army,
with the exception of one corps, from Atlanta to Marietta, threatening an
advance in the direction of our position at Lost Mountain; but not deeming our
army in condition for a general engagement, I withdrew it on the 6th of October
to the westward, continuing to march daily, and crossed the Coosa River near
Coosaville and moved up the west bank of the Oostenaula, striking the railroad
again between Resaca and Mill Creek Gap, just above Dalton, on the 13th of
October, destroying the railroad from Resaca to Tunnel Hill, capturing the
enemy's posts at Tilton, Dalton, and Mill Creek Gap, with about 1,000 prisoners
and some stores, after which I again withdrew the army from the railroad,
moving to the southwest toward Gadsden, Ala., the enemy following and
skirmishing constantly with our cavalry, then under command of Major-General
Wheeler, who joined the army on the march just before it crossed the Coosa
River.
The army reached Gadsden, Ala., on the 20th of October, and
remained there a day to issue supplies, which had met us there, having been
sent via Selma and Jacksonville. As soon, however, as these supplies were
issued the army took up the line of march for the Tennessee River, and I hoped
to have crossed at or near Gunter's Landing; but not having a sufficient force
of cavalry with me, and learning that Major-General Forrest was not then in
Middle Tennessee, our march was continued to Tuscumbia, Ala., that the supplies
necessary to subsist the army till it should reach the rich portion of
Tennessee might be obtained, and also to effect a junction with the cavalry
under Major-General Forrest. We reached Tuscumbia on the 31st of October, and,
for the reasons mentioned in my letter to you of December 11,6 we were
not able to commence the movement into Tennessee until the 21st of November.
For a report of operations of the army from that time till the 11th of
December, I respectfully refer to my letter of the latter date, a copy of which
is inclosed.6
Our army took its position in front of Nashville on the 2d
of December, but the enemy still holding Murfreesborough with some 6,000
troops, Major-General Forrest, with the larger portion of the cavalry and
Bate's division of infantry, was sent there to see if it was practicable to
take the place. But after an examination and reconnaissance, during which, I am
pained to say, our infantry behaved badly, Major-General Forrest reported that
nothing could be done with the place by assault. Accordingly Bate's division was
withdrawn, leaving General Forrest, with Jackson's and Buford's divisions of
cavalry, in observation of the place, together with Mercer's and Palmer's
infantry brigades, which were ordered there as Bate's division was withdrawn. I
hoped thus to isolate the enemy's force at Murfreesborough and prevent them
from foraging on the country or obtaining fuel, and if they should attempt to
leave the place to have attacked them on their march.
Nothing of importance occurred till the morning of the 15th
of December, when the enemy attacked simultaneously both our flanks. On our
right he was handsomely repulsed, with heavy loss, but on our left he succeeded
in driving in our flank, and toward evening carried some partially completed
works which were in process of erection for the protection of this flank. Our
line being necessarily very extended, a series of works had been commenced on
each flank for their protection. During the night of the 15th our whole line
was shortened and our left thrown back, and dispositions were made to meet any
renewed attack. The corps of Major-General Cheatham was passed from our right
to our left, leaving Lieutenant-General Lee on our right, who had been
previously in the center, and placing Lieutenant-General Stewart's corps in the
center, which had been previously the left.
Early on the 16th of December the enemy made a general
attack on our lines, accompanied by a very heavy fire of artillery. All his
assaults were repulsed with great loss till 3.30 p.m., when a portion of our
line to the left of the center, occupied by Bate's division, suddenly gave way.
In a few moments our entire line was broken, our troops retreating rapidly down
the pike in the direction of Franklin, most of them, I regret to say, in great
confusion, and all efforts to reform them were fruitless. Our loss in artillery
was heavy, the giving way of the lines being so sudden that it was impossible
to bring away the guns that had been placed in position. Our loss in killed and
wounded was small. Our exact loss in prisoners I have not been able to
ascertain, but do not think it great. I regret to say that among them were Maj.
Gen. Ed. Johnson and Brig. Gens. H. R. Jackson and T. B. Smith. At Brentwood,
some four miles from our line of battle, the troops were somewhat collected,
and Lieutenant-General Lee took command of the rear guard, camping for the
night in that vicinity. On leaving the field I sent a staff officer to inform
General Forrest of our defeat and to direct him to rejoin the army, with as
little delay as possible, to protect its rear; but owing to the swollen
condition of the creeks, caused by the heavy rain then falling, he was unable
to join until we reached Columbia, with the exception of a portion of his
command which joined while the army was moving from Franklin to Spring Hill.
On the 17th we continued our retreat toward Columbia,
camping for the night on Spring Hill. During this day's march the enemy's
cavalry pressed with great boldness and activity, charging our infantry
repeatedly with the saber, and a few times going through our lines. The
country, being open, was favorable for their operations. I regret to say, also,
on this day, that Lieutenant-General Lee was [wounded] severely in the foot. We
continued our retreat across the Duck River to Columbia, the corps alternating
as rear guards to the army. While at Columbia Major-General Forrest rejoined.
After the fight at Nashville I at first hoped to have been
able to remain in Tennessee on the line of the Duck River; but after arriving
at Columbia I became convinced that the condition of the army made it necessary
to recross the Tennessee River without delay; and on the 21st the army resumed
the march for Pulaski, leaving Major-General Forrest, with the cavalry, and
Major-General Walthall, with Ector's, Strahl's, Maney's, Granbury's, and
Palmer's infantry brigades, at Columbia as a rear guard.7 From Pulaski
I moved by the most direct route to the Bainbridge crossing on the Tennessee
River, which we reached on the 25th of December, and our pontoon was completed
at daylight on the 26th, when the army crossed as rapidly as possible, the
whole having crossed on the 27th, including the rear guard, which the enemy
followed with all his cavalry and three corps of infantry to Pulaski, but only
with cavalry between Pulaski and the Tennessee River. Since crossing the river
I have moved the army by easy marches to this place. After recrossing the
Tennessee our pontoon and supply trains were ordered at once to the vicinity of
Columbus, Miss., by the most direct route, that the animals might be more
easily foraged, and while on the march they were pressed by a small body of the
enemy's cavalry, and owing to the inefficiency of Brigadier-General Roddey's
cavalry were overtaken and the pontoon train and a small portion of the supply
train destroyed.
My reasons for having made the campaign are as follows:
After the fall of Atlanta this army was, consequent therefrom, in position upon
the plains, all the mountain fastnesses having been given up from Dalton to the
Chattahoochee River. I did not feel able to keep General Sherman from advancing
to Macon or Augusta and continuing his line of blockhouses as a thorough
protection to his communications, and feeling that the morale of the
army was such as to require some change of position, I resolved to move to his
rear and force him to fall back with his entire army to Chattanooga, or divide
his forces and attempt to move with one wing to the Atlantic and the other to
Tennessee, thereby giving me the chance of crushing one part of his army.
General Sherman did divide his army, and moved upon Savannah with four corps,
and Thomas with the remainder to Tennessee. I hoped and expected our people to
have harassed, and in a great measure destroyed, that portion moving to the
coast, while I attempted to destroy Thomas and gain Nashville, and thereby
large re-enforcements and all kinds of supplies for the army. Sherman, however,
succeeded in marching to Savannah with but little annoyance, and we failed to
gain Nashville, and have been forced to fall back to the prairies of
Mississippi. I regard, however, our situation far better in having the grand
army of the Federals divided, with one wing in Tennessee and one in Savannah,
than to have had their entire force now lying in the heart of Georgia upon the
great railroad, to us, running from the east to the west, with the Army of Tennessee
in line of battle, with their backs upon the cane-brake country of Alabama in
order to subsist, and General Sherman and the army now under Thomas between
General Lee and myself.
I have not as yet required the reports of subordinate
commanders; will forward them as soon as received.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. HOOD,
General.
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Commanding Military Division of the West.
[Indorsement.]
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WEST,
Montgomery, Ala., January 9, 1865.
Respectfully forwarded to the War Department for its information. The plan of campaign into Middle Tennessee was correct as originally designed by General Hood, and if carried out without modification would have compelled General Sherman to return to Middle Tennessee to protect and repair his lines of communication before he could have collected enough supplies to march his army from Atlanta to the seacoast. But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Guntersville, as General Hood intended at Gadsden, he changed his course while on the march and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence, where the want of supplies, due to the bad condition of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston Railroads, and the non-arrival of additional cavalry, delayed his offensive movement three weeks, thereby enabling General Sherman to repair the damages done to the Atlanta and Chattanooga Railroad and to collect sufficient supplies for his march across Georgia. This report being only a synopsis of the operations of the Army of Tennessee, unaccompanied by any sub-reports, I am unable yet to express my opinion as to the causes of its failure. It is clear to my mind, however, that after the great loss of life at Franklin the army was no longer in a condition to make a successful attack on Nashville--a strongly fortified city, defended by an army nearly as strong as our own, and which was being re-enforced constantly by river and railroads. From Franklin General Hood should have marched, not on Nashville, but on Murfreesborough, which could doubtless have been captured, with its garrison of about 8,000 men; and after having destroyed the railroad bridges across Duck and Elk Rivers, which would doubtless have caused the evacuation of Bridgeport and Chattanooga, he could have retired, with the prestige of success, into winter quarters behind the Duck or Tennessee Rivers, as circumstances might have dictated.
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General.
——
ADDENDA.
Strength of the
Army of Tennessee on the 6th of November and loth of December, 1864.8
|
|
Present.
|
[Present] and
absent.
|
|
Effective.
|
Total.
|
Aggregate.
|
Total.
|
Aggregate.
|
|
November 6, 1864:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Infantry
|
25,889
|
34,559
|
38,119
|
79,997
|
87,016
|
|
Cavalry
|
2,306
|
3,258
|
3,532
|
4,778
|
5,148
|
|
Artillery
|
2,405
|
2,913
|
3,068
|
4,018
|
4,203
|
|
Total
|
30,600
|
40,730
|
44,719
|
88,793
|
96,367
|
|
|
|
December 10, 1864:
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Infantry
|
18,342
|
27,222
|
29,826
|
71,329
|
77,631
|
|
Cavalry.
|
2,306
|
3,258
|
3,532
|
4,778
|
5,148
|
|
Artillery.
|
2,405
|
2,913
|
3,068
|
4,018
|
4,203
|
|
Total
|
23,053
|
33,393
|
36,426
|
80,125
|
86,982
|
Respectfully submitted.
A. P. MASON,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
——
RICHMOND, VA., March 10, 1865.
General J. B. HOOD,
Richmond, Va.:
GENERAL: In compliance with your request, made a few days
since, in reference to the strength of the Army of the Tennessee at the time
you left Tupelo, Miss., I respectfully submit that, according to my
recollection of a field return of the army which was being made at that time,
and finished a day or two after your departure, the effective total of the
infantry and artillery was about 15,000--perhaps a few hundred less. This
return was made after the West Tennessee regiments of Major-General Cheatham's
corps had been furloughed, as well as some men furloughed under an order
published at Tupelo, and some small organizations also furloughed at Tupelo. I
cannot form any estimate of the numbers of men thus furloughed, because you
will remember that all the organization furloughs were given by the corps
commanders, your sanction having been previously obtained; consequently the
strength of such organizations at the time they were furloughed was not
furnished the assistant adjutant-general's office at army headquarters.
The field return above referred to was sent to Colonel
Brent, and was in his office in Augusta when I passed there a few weeks since.
Most respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. P. MASON,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.
[Indorsement.]
Crossed Tennessee, November 21, 30,600 men.
——
Abstract from
inspection report of the Army of Tennessee, for January 20, 1865.
|
Command.
|
Present for duty.
|
A
|
B
|
C
|
Present effective for the field.
|
|
Infantry.
|
Cavalry.
|
Artillery.
|
|
O
|
M
|
O
|
M
|
O
|
M
|
O
|
M
|
|
Stewart's corps9 (Stewart)
|
477
|
4,273
|
....
|
6,833
|
22,367
|
510
|
4,371
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
|
Cheatham's corps3 (Cheatham).
|
519
|
5,001
|
....
|
7,368
|
25,709
|
513
|
5,197
|
5
|
55
|
....
|
....
|
|
Lee's corps10 (Stevenson).
|
698
|
5,573
|
....
|
8,317
|
25,248
|
638
|
5,302
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
|
Artillery, Army of Tennessee (Elzey).
|
101
|
2,066
|
67
|
2,535
|
4,042
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
88
|
2,063
|
|
Three divisions of cavalry (Forrest)11
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
....
|
|
Grand total
|
1,795
|
16,913
|
67
|
25,053
|
77,366
|
1,661
|
14,870
|
5
|
55
|
88
|
2,063
|
[O = Officers. M = Men. A = Number of guns. B = Aggregate present. C = Aggregate present and absent.]
_______________
1 For portions of report (here omitted) relating
to the Atlanta campaign and operations from September 8-November 13, 1864, see
Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, p. 628, and Vol. XXXIX, Part 1, p. 801
2 But see composition of infantry rear guard as
reported by Walthall, p. 726.
3 For portion of report (here omitted) see Vol.
XXXVIII, Part III, pp.634-636.
4 See Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, p. 969.
5 Such of these maps as may be found will appear
in the atlas.
6 See p. 657.
7 But see composition of infantry rear guard as
reported by Walthall, p. 726.
8 For the part of the statement showing strength
of Hood’s army July 31 and September 20, 1864, see Vol. XXXVIII, Part III, p.
637
9 At Tupelo, Miss.
10 Moving to Georgia.
11 Headquarters at Verona; no inspection reports
forwarded.
SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1
(Serial No. 93), p. 652-64
