Sheffield arrived this morning before breakfast. At 12 I
called on the President. He was apparently very glad to see me, and received
me with much cordiality. We had a long familiar talk. When speaking of the
result of the recent elections I told him that his proclamations had been
disasterous to us. That prior to issuing them all loyal people were united in
support of the war and the administration. That the masses of the democratic
party were satisfied with him, and warmly supporting him, and that their
disloyal leaders could not rally them in opposition — They had no issue without
taking ground against the war, and upon that we would annihilate them. But the
proclamations had revived old party issues — given them a rallying cry — capitol
to operate upon and that we had the results in our defeat. To this he made no
reply.
I added that the Republican party could not put down the
rebellion — that no party could do it — that it required a union of all loyal
men in the free states to give us success, and that without that union we must
disasterously fail. To all this he fully assented.
I asked him whether Genl Pope was a failure, or whether he
had been sacrificed by the bad faith of his officers. He replied that he knew
no reason to suspect any one of bad faith except Fitz John Porter,1
and that he very much hoped an investigation would relieve him from suspicion,
but that at present he believed his disobedience of orders, and his failure to
go to Popes aid in the battle of Friday had occasioned our defeat, and deprived
us of a victory which would have terminated the war. That all Popes orders, and
all his movements had met with the full approval of Genl Halleck and himself
with one exception. That during the conflict between Popes and the rebel army,
he Pope, had placed a portion of his army in a position, which he pointed out
to me on the map, which alarmed him, but that no bad results followed — in fact
it had turned out fortunately
That after the last battle fought by Pope the army was much
demoralized, and it was feared the enemy would be down on Washington. In this
emergency he had called McClellan here to take upon him the defence of the City
— That he soon brought order out of chaos, and got the army in good condition.
That for such work McClellan had great talents — Indeed for organizing,
disciplining and preparing an army for the field and handling it in the field he
was super he was superior to any of our Genls That when the rebels crossed
into Maryland he sent for Burnsides and told him he must take command of our
army, march against the enemy and give him battle. Burnsides declined — said
the responsibility was too great — the consequences of defeat too momentous — he
was willing to command a Corps under McClellan, but was not willing to take the
chief command of the army — hence McClellan was reinstated. The battles of
South Mountain and Antietam were fought with ability — as well as any Genl
could have fought them, but McClellan was too slow in his movements. He could
and ought to have prevented the loss of Harper’s Ferry, but was six days
marching 40 miles, and it was surrendered. He did not follow up his advantages
after Antietam. The army of the enemy should have been annihilated, but it was
permitted to recross the Potomac without the loss of a man, and McClellan would
not follow. He coaxed, urged & ordered him, but all would not do. At the
expiration of two weeks after a peremptory order to that effect he had only 3/4
of his army across the River, and was six days doing that, whereas the rebel
army had effected a crossing in one day
He concluded as he has in all the conversations I have had
with him about McClellan by saying that his great defect was his excess of
caution I asked him about what Butler told me in Springfield that Fitz John
Porter & Genl Griffing had sent a despatch to McClellan to hold on, that
they had Pope where they could ruin, and that this despatch was in the
Presidents hands — He said there was no shadow of foundation for such a story
and no truth in it. I asked him about Burnsides army before Fredericksburg, and
whether it was likely soon to accomplish any thing. He answered that Burnsides
was now here consulting upon that subject — That he and Halleck had just left
the room as I entered. That to get at the enemy he had to cross the
Rappanhannock, and that to cross in the face of an opposing army was very
hazardous, especially as he did not know its strength, and could not ascertain
it. They had just been debating whether to move immediately, or whether to wait
a few days till some collateral movement could be made to create a diversion
which would render the passage less difficult, and that the question would be
decided to day Burnside had then gone with Halleck and would receive his final
orders before he left him.
*Sheffield arrived this morning, and Cowan at night. Also
Giffin and his wife
__________
1 For failure to obey Pope’s orders at the time
of the second battle of Manassas, General Fitz-john Porter was cashiered by court
martial in 1863, but after a long struggle he secured the reopening of his case
by act of Congress and his reinstatement as colonel in the regular army, 1886.
SOURCE: Theodore Calvin Pease, editor, The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning: Volume 1, 1850-1864, p.
588-90
