Showing posts with label Cavalry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cavalry. Show all posts

Sunday, May 29, 2022

Colonel Theophilus T. Garrard to Brigadier-General George H. Thomas, October 3, 1861

OCTOBER 3, 1861.

I have not said anything about the cavalry, as I supposed they would return. It will be very inconvenient for our men to go so far from camp as they should to be effective. The road from our camp towards London for several miles is only tolerable, but from that point to the rebel camp on Cumberland River is as good if not better than and other dirt road in Kentucky that I know.

Respectfully,
T. T. GARRARD,        
Colonel Third Regiment Volunteers.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 4 (Serial No. 4), p. 290

Saturday, October 26, 2019

Brigadier-General George W. Cullum to Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant., February 7, 1862

CAIRO, ILL., February 7, 1862.
Brig. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Comdg. U.S. Forces on Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers:

By direction of Major-General Halleck I am here with his authority to give any necessary orders in his name to facilitate your very important operations. Do you want any more cavalry? If so, General Halleck can send you a regiment from Saint Louis. I have directed General Paine to send you, as soon as transportation can be provided, the Thirty-second and Forty-ninth Illinois and Twenty-fifth Indiana. The Fifty-seventh Illinois will be here on Wednesday, en route to join you. Several regiments are about moving from Saint Louis to add to your forces. Please ask Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson whether he wants intrenching tools or anything else I can supply.

G. W. CULLUM,      
Brig. Gen. Vols., U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 594

Thursday, October 24, 2019

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General George B. McClellan, February 7, 1862

SAINT LOUIS, February 7, 1862.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

Gunboats and cavalry ordered up the Tennessee River to destroy bridges. I think the enemy is collecting forces at Paris to prevent this by threatening our right flank. Paris must be taken. I am throwing in additional forces as rapidly as possible, and want all I can get. Fort Donelson will probably be taken to-morrow. Possibly a dash can be made on Columbus, but I think not. It is very strong. I shall endeavor to cut the railroad at Union City, and if possible occupy New Madrid, so as to cut off supplies by the river; but these movements must depend upon the arrival of troops and the condition of the roads, which are now almost impassable.

H. W. HALLECK,    
Major-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 7 (Serial No. 7), p. 591-2

Friday, April 26, 2019

George S. Denison to Salmon P. Chase, January 15, 1863

(Private)
New Orleans, January 16th, 1863.

Dear Sir: I have just been informed by Gen. Banks that the expedition to the Teche under Weitzel, was completely successful and accomplished all he intended. The rebels had in the Bayou a large and powerful gunboat called the “Cotton,” which boat got aground below their fortifications. This boat we destroyed. They have no other boats in any of the bayous below Red River.

Gen. Banks can now take the Teche country whenever he pleases. Weitzel's force has returned, but, I judge, Gen. Banks intends occupying the country by flank movement according to suggestions made by me at first.

I hear much complaint of Gen. Banks that he has not accomplished, or prepared to accomplish, anything — that his time is occupied in listening to complaints of secessionists — that four weeks of fine weather have been lost without military operations — that no step has been taken to open the river — and other similar complaints.

Gen. Banks told me this morning, he cannot yet undertake the opening of the river, because he has no cavalry — no transportation — no medicines, &c. He says everything has been done that ought to have been — and that he shall operate up the River at the earliest day possible. I will say one thing strongly in his favor — that he conceals his plans (whatever they may be) perfectly — and I hardly think even the members of his staff know his intentions.

SOURCE: Diary and correspondence of Salmon P. ChaseAnnual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 350

Friday, March 29, 2019

Diary of William Howard Russell: July 13, 1861

I have had a long day's ride through the camps of the various regiments across the Potomac, and at this side of it, which the weather did not render very agreeable to myself, or the poor hack that I had hired for the day, till my American Quartermaine gets me a decent mount. I wished to see with my own eyes what is the real condition of the army which the North have sent down to the Potomac, to undertake such a vast task as the conquest of the South. The Northern papers describe it as a magnificent force, complete in all respects, well-disciplined, well-clad, provided with fine artillery, and with every requirement to make it effective for all military operations in the field.

In one word, then, they are grossly and utterly ignorant of what an army is or should be. In the first place, there are not, I should think, 30,000 men of all sorts available for the campaign. The papers estimate it at any number from 50,000 to 100,000, giving the preference to 75,000. In the next place their artillery is miserably deficient; they have not, I should think, more than five complete batteries, or six batteries, including scratch guns, and these are of different calibres, badly horsed, miserably equipped, and provided with the worst set of gunners and drivers which I, who have seen the Turkish field-guns, ever beheld. They have no cavalry, only a few scarecrow men, who would dissolve partnership with their steeds at the first serious combined movement, mounted in high saddles, on wretched mouthless screws, and some few regulars from the frontiers, who may be good for Indians, but who would go over like ninepins at a charge from Punjaubee irregulars. Their transport is tolerably good, but inadequate; they have no carriage for reserve ammunition; the commissariat drivers are civilians, under little or no control; the officers are unsoldierly-looking men; the camps are dirty to excess; the men are dressed in all sorts of uniforms; and from what I hear, I doubt if any of these regiments have ever performed a brigade evolution together, or if any of the officers know what it is to deploy a brigade from column into line. They are mostly three months' men, whose time is nearly up. They were rejoicing to-day over the fact that it was so, and that they had kept the enemy from Washington "without a fight." And it is with this rabblement, that the North proposes not only to subdue the South, but according to some of their papers, to humiliate Great Britain, and conquer Canada afterwards.

I am opposed to national boasting, but I do firmly believe that 10,000 British regulars, or 12,000 French, with a proper establishment of artillery and cavalry, would riot only entirely repulse this army with the greatest ease, under competent commanders, but that they could attack them and march into Washington, over them or with them, whenever they pleased. Not that Frenchman or Englishman is perfection, but that the American of this army knows nothing of discipline, and what is more, cares less for it.

Major-General McClellan — I beg his pardon for styling him Brigadier — has really been successful. By a very well-conducted and rather rapid march, he was enabled to bring superior forces to bear on some raw levies under General Garnett (who came over with me in the steamer), which fled after a few shots, and were utterly routed, when their gallant commander fell, in an abortive attempt to rally them by the banks of the Cheat River. In this “great battle” McClellan's loss is less than thirty killed and wounded, and the Confederate loss is less than one hundred. But the dispersion of such guerrilla bands has the most useful effect among the people of the district; and McClellan has done good service, especially as his little victory will lead to the discomfiture of all the Secessionists in the valley of the Kanawha, and in the valley of Western Virginia. I left Washington this afternoon, with the Sanitary Commissioners, for Baltimore, in order to visit the Federal camps at Fortress Monroe, to which we proceeded down the Chesapeake the same night.

SOURCE: William Howard Russell, My Diary North and South, Vol. 1, p. 403-4

Saturday, May 23, 2015

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: August 26, 1861

What a number of cavalry companies are daily tendered in the letters received at this department. Almost invariably they are refused; and really it is painful to me to write these letters. This government must be aware, from the statistics of the census, that the South has quite as many horses as the North, and twice as many good riders. But for infantry, the North can put three men in the field to our one. Ten thousand mounted men, on the border of the enemy's country, would be equal to 30,000 of the enemy's infantry; not in combat: but that number would be required to watch and guard against the inroads of 10,000 cavalry. It seems to me that we are declining the only proper means of equalizing the war. But it is my duty to obey, and not to deliberate.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 75