Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 8, 1863

To-day the city is in fine spirits. Hooker had merely thrown up defenses to protect his flight across the river. The following dispatch was received last night from Gen. Lee:

“Chancellorville, May 7th, 1863.

“To His Excellency, President Davis.

”After driving Gen. Sedgwick across the Rappahannock, on the night of the 4th inst., I returned on the 5th to Chaccellorville. The march was delayed by a storm, which continued all night and the following day. In placing the troops in position on the morning of the 6th, to attack Gen. Hooker, it was ascertained he had abandoned his fortified position. The line of skirmishers was pressed forward until they came within range of the enemy's batteries, planted north of the Rappahannock, which, from the configuration of the ground, completely commanded this side. His army, therefore, escaped with the loss of a few additional prisoners.

“R. E. Lee, General.”

Thus ends the career of Gen. Hooker, who, a week ago, was at the head of an army of 150,000 men, perfect in drill, discipline, and all the muniments of war. He came a confident invader against Gen. Lee at the head of 65,000 “butternuts,” as our honest poor-clad defenders were called, and we see the result! An active campaign of less than a week, and Hooker is hurled back in disgrace and irreparable disaster! Tens of thousands of his men will never live to “fight another day” —and although the survivors did “run away,” it is doubtful whether they can be put in fighting trim again for many a month.

And the raiding cavalry have not been heard from to-day. If they be not back on the north side of the Rappahannock by this time, it is probable they will reach Richmond in a few days without arms, and on foot.

Gens. Hood's and Pickett's divisions (Longstreet's corps) are now passing through the city — perhaps 15,000 of the best fighting men in the South. Oh, what wisdom and foresight were evinced by Gen. Lee, when, some ten days ago, he telegraphed the President to send him Longstreet's corps, via Gordonsville! It was referred to the Secretary of War, who consulted with Gen. Cooper —and of course it was not done. This corps was not in the battle. If it had been on the field, Hooker's destruction would have been speedy and complete; and his routed regiments would have been followed to the very gates of the Federal capital. As it was, Lee lost a day in driving Sedgwick back — and then Hooker “escaped,” as Lee expresses it.

I do not understand the Assistant Secretary of War's official correspondence. He sent in the other day a letter addressed to him two years ago to be filed — and to day an envelope addressed to him as Assistant Secretary by Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of State, merely covering a letter (sealed) for R. S. Bunkee, Mobile, Alabama. Well, it is filed.

The pressure for permits to leave the Confederacy is not renewed to-day. Judge Campbell will not have so many passports to “approve,” and I trust confidence in the permanency of the Confederacy will be unshaken. How must they feel who, in anticipation of Lee's defeat, had received, in advance, a pardon from the powers at Washington!

Col. Lay was in to-day; he thinks the North will be cheered a little by their capture of Grand Gulf, in the West. But that is not Vicksburg, or Charleston, or Richmond.

We have had short allowance of food yesterday and to-day; the country people being afraid to come to market, lest their horses should be seized to go in quest of the enemy's cavalry. My family dined to-day on eight fresh herrings, which cost two dollars.

The trains from Fredericksburg brought down several hundred Federal officers; among them was a general, a large number of colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains, etc. These, when exchanged, as I suppose they will be—for victory makes our government magnanimous—may, if they choose, deny the report that the raiding cavalry destroyed the railroad.

Now what will the Tribune say? It did say, a few months ago, that if the effort to crush the rebellion failed this spring, it would be useless to prolong the war — and that peace should be made on the best practicable terms. Since the beginning of the war, I doubt not 500,000 men have been precipitated upon Virginia. Where are they now? In the third year of the war, we see “the finest army the world ever saw,” overthrown by about half its numbers, and in full retreat toward its own frontier. Perhaps 100,000 invaders have found bloody graves in Virginia — and an equal number have died of their wounds, or from disease contracted in this State. The number of maimed and disabled must also be 100,000 — and yet Richmond is not taken, or likely to be. To invade and subjugate a vast territory, inhabited by millions of warlike people, the assailants must always have four times as many men as the assailed; therefore we stand on an equal footing with the United States in this war, and they may, if they be insane enough, protract it indefinitely, and in the end reap no substantial benefit. On the contrary, the fortune of war may shift the scene of devastation to their own homes. Perhaps Lee may follow up this blow until he enters Pennsylvania.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 314-6

Captain Charles Fessenden Morse: May 7, 1863

Stafford C. H., May 7, 1863.

I am going to give you, without any introduction, a history of this last campaign against Richmond by the army under the great Joe Hooker. I believe I have seen it and judged it fairly.

On Monday, April 27th, our corps broke camp early in the morning and marched to Hartwood Church, ten miles; there it went into camp for the night. The Eleventh and Fifth Corps also came up there and camped in our vicinity; next morning, we all moved and camped that night near Kelly's Ford. A pontoon bridge was thrown across and the Eleventh was over before daylight Wednesday; the other corps followed rapidly and the advance began towards the Rapidan. The Eleventh and Twelfth marched on the road to Germana Ford, the Fifth on the road to Ely's Ford; all three of the corps were under command of General Slocum. I was detailed, the morning of the advance, as Aide to General Slocum, and another officer was made Acting Provost Marshal. All the companies of the Second Massachusetts were sent to the Regiment. We skirmished all the way to Germana Ford; there we met quite a determined resistance; our cavalry was drawn in and the Second Massachusetts and the Third Wisconsin sent forward to clear the way; they drove everything before them and, by their heavy fire, forced the rebels at the Ford to surrender (about one hundred officers and men). We lost in this skirmish about a dozen killed and wounded.

General Slocum now determined to cross the Rapidan, though there was no bridge and the ford was almost impassable. He sent the First and Third Brigade, (First Division, Twelfth Corps), through the water although it was more than waist deep, also five batteries of artillery, which took position on the other side of the river. A bridge was then constructed, and before daylight Thursday morning, the remainder of the Twelfth and Eleventh Corps were across the river. By eight o'clock, A. M., we were moving again. The rebels kept attacking us on our flank with cavalry and artillery, and any less bold officer than General Slocum would have halted his column and delayed the march; but he kept along steadily, detaching a small force at intervals to repel the enemy. I had the pleasure of superintending, at one of these skirmishes, having in charge the Twenty-ninth Pennsylvania Regiment; we drove the rebels before us for nearly a mile, almost capturing their artillery, taking a large number of prisoners. At about noon, we arrived at Chancellorsville, and found the Fifth Corps already there. We had a small cavalry skirmish, in which Colonel McVicars was killed with about a dozen of his men, but besides that, nothing of importance occurred that day; the troops were formed in line of battle, but were not attacked. Up to this time you see everything had gone well and success seemed certain.

Towards night, General Hooker arrived with his staff, and we heard of the crossing at the U. S. Ford of the Second, Third and First Corps. All the headquarters were in the vicinity of the Chancellor House, a large, fine brick mansion. General Hooker took supper with General Slocum; he didn't seem to be able to express his gratification at the success of General Slocum in bringing the three corps up so rapidly. Then, in the most extravagant, vehement terms, he went on to say how he had got the rebels, how he was going to crush them, annihilate them, etc.

The next morning at ten, the Fifth and Twelfth Corps advanced in order of battle on two parallel roads; we soon met the enemy and skirmished for about two miles, when they appeared in considerable force and the battle began. We were in a splendid position and were driving the enemy when an order came to General Slocum to retire his command to its former position. No one could believe that the order was genuine, but almost immediately, another of General Hooker's staff brought the same order again. Now, perhaps, you don't know that to retire an army in the face of an enemy when you are engaged, is one of the most difficult operations in war; this we had to do. I carried the order to General Geary to retire his division in echelon by brigades, and stayed with him till the movement was nearly completed. It was a delicate job; each brigade would successively bear the brunt of the enemy's attack. Before the last brigades of the Fifth and Twelfth Corps were in position, the enemy made a furious attack on the Chancellor House; luckily, we had considerable artillery concentrated there and they were driven back. The next attack was on our corps, but the enemy were severely repulsed. This about ended the fighting on Friday; we lost, I suppose, about five hundred men.

During the night, the men were kept at work digging trenches and throwing up breastworks of logs. Our headquarters were at Fairview, an open piece of ground rising into quite a crest in the centre. Skirmishing began at daylight next morning and continued without much result to either side, till afternoon, when the enemy began to move, in large force, towards our right, opposite General Howard, Eleventh Corps. This corps was in a fine position in intrenchments, with almost open country in front of them, the right resting on Hunting creek. At about four P. M., the Third Corps, General Sickles, was moved out to the right of the Twelfth and advanced towards Fredericksburgh. The order then came to General Slocum that the enemy were in full retreat, and to advance his whole line to capture all he could of prisoners, wagons, etc. Our right, General Williams’ Division, advanced without much trouble, driving the enemy before it, but the Second Division had hardly got out of the trenches before it was attacked with great determination, yet it steadily retained its position. At about five P. M., a tremendous and unceasing musketry fire began in the direction of the Eleventh Corps. As it was necessary to know what was going on there in order to regulate the movements of the Twelfth Corps, General Slocum and the rest of us rode for our lives towards this new scene of action. What was our surprise when we found, that instead of a fight, it was a complete Bull Run rout. Men, horses, mules, rebel prisoners, wagons, guns, etc., etc., were coming down the road in terrible confusion, behind them an unceasing roar of musketry. We rode until we got into a mighty hot fire, and found that no one was attempting to make a stand, but every one running for his life. Then General Slocum dispatched me to General Hooker to explain the state of affairs, and three other staff officers to find General Williams and order him back to his trenches with all haste.

I found General Hooker sitting alone on his horse in front of the Chancellor House, and delivered my message; he merely said, “Very good, sir.” I rode back and found the Eleventh Corps still surging up the road and still this terrible roar behind them. Up to this time, the rebels had received no check, but now troops began to march out on the plank road and form across it, and Captain Best, Chief of Artillery of our corps, had on his own responsibility gathered together all the batteries he could get hold of, had put them in position (forty-six guns in all) on Fairview, and had begun firing at the rate of about one hundred guns a minute, into the rebels. This, in my opinion, saved our army from destruction. After delivering my message to General Hooker, I went back and tried to find General Slocum, but it was now after eight o'clock and I was unsuccessful in my search, so I took hold and tried to rally some of the cowardly Dutchmen. With the help of one cavalry orderly, I succeeded in forming a good many of them on the left of the new line, but an unusually heavy volley coming, they broke and ran like sheep. After this little episode, I again searched after the General. Towards ten, I found the rest of the staff, and soon after, we came across the General. At about eleven, the fighting stopped, but we were all hard at work getting the men of our corps into position. You see, while our First Division was advancing, the rebels had routed the Teutons and were now occupying our trenches. The Second and Third Brigades got into their former position, but the First made out only to cut through the rebels, losing a large part of its men and taking a position considerably in the rear of its former one. General Sickles fought his way through with the exception of one division and one battery, which were left out in front of our lines that night. The artillery men were hard at work all night, throwing up traverses to protect their guns, and about two in the morning we all lay down on the ground and slept until about four, when daylight began to appear. Our right was now formed by the Third, Fifth and First Corps, about five hundred yards in the rear of our first position. The rebels began the attack, as soon as there was light enough, from the left of our First Division to about the right of the Third Corps. General Birney's Division of the Third Corps was out in front of General Williams; his men behaved badly, and after a slight resistance, fell back into our lines, losing a battery.

The rebels now charged down our First Division, but were met with such a deadly fire that they were almost annihilated. Their second line was then sent in, but met the same fate, and their third and last line advanced. Our men now had fired more than forty rounds of cartridges and were getting exhausted. General Slocum sent almost every one of his staff officers to General Hooker, stating his position and begging for support; Hooker's answer was, “I can't make men or ammunition for General Slocum.” Meantime, Sickles' Corps was holding its own on the right of ours, but it was rapidly getting into the same condition as the Twelfth. The rebels were driven back every time they advanced, and we were taking large numbers of prisoners and colors. All this time while our infantry was fighting so gallantly in front, our battery of forty-six guns was firing incessantly. The rebels had used no artillery till they captured the battery from Birney, when they turned that on us, making terrible destruction in General Geary's line. General Meade, Fifth Corps, now went to Hooker and entreated that he might be allowed to throw his corps on the rebel flank, but General Hooker said, “No, he was wanted in his own position.” On his own responsibility, General Meade sent out one brigade, which passed out in rear of the enemy's right, recaptured a battery, three hundred of our men who were prisoners, and four hundred of the rebels, and took them safely back to their corps.

It was now after seven o'clock. Our men had fired their sixty rounds of cartridges and were still holding their position; everything that brave men could do, these men had done, but now nothing was left but to order them to fall back and give up their position to the enemy. This was done in good order and they marched off under a heavy fire to the rear of our batteries. The rebels, seeing us retreating, rushed forward their artillery and began a fearful fire. I found I could be useful to Captain Best, commanding our artillery, so I stayed with him. I never before saw anything so fine as the attack on that battery; the air was full of missiles, solid shot, shells, and musket balls. I saw one solid shot kill three horses and a man, another took a leg off one of the captains of the batteries. Lieutenant Crosby of the Fourth Artillery was shot through the heart with a musket ball; he was a particular friend of Bob Shaw and myself; he lived just long enough to say to Captain Best, “Tell father I die happy.”

The rebels came up to the attack in solid masses and got within three hundred yards, but they were slaughtered by the hundreds by the case-shot and canister, and were driven back to the woods. Still not an infantry man was sent to the support of the guns. More than half the horses were killed or wounded; one caisson had blown up, another had been knocked to pieces; in ten minutes more, the guns would have been isolated. They, too, therefore, were ordered to retire, which they did without losing a gun. You see, now, our centre was broken, everything was being retired to our second line, the rebel artillery was in position, their line of battle steadily advancing across our old ground. This fire of the batteries was concentrated on the Chancellor House, Hooker's original headquarters, and it was torn almost to pieces by solid shot and was finally set on fire by a shell.

The army was now put in position in the second line; the centre was on a rising piece of ground and protected by a battery of forty or fifty guns. The Fifth Corps was on the right and was the last to fall back out of the woods and it was closely followed by the rebel masses, but these were met by such a tremendous artillery fire that they were actually rolled back into the woods. Our corps was ordered to support first the Third, afterwards the Second and Eleventh. Towards night the enemy made another desperate assault on our centre, but they were again repulsed. Our corps was now ordered to the extreme left to form behind the Eleventh. I believe that General Slocum remonstrated with General Hooker so firmly that he finally got permission to put the Twelfth Corps on the extreme left and to have only one division of the Eleventh in the trenches on his right.

You can easily see that, if the enemy once forced our right or left, our communications would at once be cut and all possibility of retreat prevented. Late that night, we lay down close beside the Rappahannock. By three o'clock next morning, we were awakened by a heavy artillery fire and shells bursting over us. Our guns replied and kept at it for about an hour, when the enemy's batteries were silenced. We now mounted our horses and rode along the lines to look at our position; we found that it was a very strong one and capable of being made very much more so.

We found that the sharpshooters were getting altogether too attentive to our party, so we moved back to our line and had hardly turned away, when a sergeant was shot dead almost on the spot where the general had been standing. All that day, our men were hard at work throwing up breastworks, cutting abattis, etc. No attack was made on us, but throughout that day and night, we heard Sedgwick fighting in the direction of Fredericksburgh.

Tuesday morning, I knew by appearances that a retreat was to be effected, as a large part of the artillery, all the ambulances, etc., were removed across the river, although the men were kept at work making line after line of trenches and breastworks. Just before dark, the order of retreat came, the Fifth and Twelfth Corps being the last to cross. About four o'clock that afternoon it began to rain in torrents. There were originally three pontoon bridges, but before most of the crossing had been effected, the river became so swollen that one of the bridges had to be taken up to piece out the other two; this caused a great delay. At about twelve, I was sent down to the ford to examine into the condition of things; it was a terrible night, the wind blowing a gale and the rain pouring, the road for a mile full of artillery. I found, at the bridge, that not a thing was moving, and learned from General Patrick that the order for retreat had been suspended and everything was to move back to its former position. This order came, remember, when half of the artillery was on the north side of the Rappahannock, the soldiers without a ration and the supply trains ten miles the other side of the river. I ran my horse back to headquarters and made my report; the telegraph was down between U. S. Ford and Falmouth, where General Hooker was. General Slocum wrote a dispatch, saying, that unless the movement was continued, our army would have to be surrendered within twenty-four hours; this was sent by an orderly who was ordered to kill his horse carrying it. Then to prepare for the worst, General Slocum sent one of his aides and myself back to the Ford to get our artillery ready to move back into position, that our corps might, at least, be ready to make a desperate fight in the morning; but at about two-thirty A. M., the messenger returned from General Hooker with orders for the movement to continue.

At about five, one of our divisions began to cross. The two or three succeeding hours were the most anxious I ever passed in my life. A large part of our army was massed on the south side of the river, only two bridges for the whole of it to cross, the river full to the edge of its banks; a very little extra strain would have carried away the upper bridge, and this would have swept away the lower one and all retreat would have been cut off. The rebel artillery began to fire on our troops and bridges, but was silenced by our guns; we had sixty in position on the north side.

It soon became evident that the enemy were not in force in our vicinity, but for all that, it was one of the happiest moments of my life when I saw the last of our corps over the bridge. We all started then for Stafford C. H., where our corps was ordered to its old camp. We arrived at our old headquarters at about two P. M., and found, to our joy, that our wagons had arrived and tents were being pitched. It was not until after we were in comfortable quarters that the terrible fatigue of the last ten days began to tell on us. Since we had left Stafford, we had been without wagons or blankets, with nothing to eat except pork and hard bread, and half the time not even that, and we had averaged each day at least twelve or sixteen hours in the saddle. The moment we touched a seat, we sunk into the most profound sleep and stayed in this condition for several hours. It may seem strange to you that I speak of being happy to get back into our old quarters, but you must remember that we had been through danger and hardship for ten days and had met with constant disappointment and were now safe back again where we were going to have sleep, rest, and food.

Now, let us see what this campaign shows. It seems to me that the plan was a very good one, with the exception of separating Sedgwick with thirty thousand men from the army, and that it was carried out with great success till General Hooker arrived at Chancellorsville. The next thing shown is that the commander of our army gained his position by merely brag and blow, and that when the time came to show himself, he was found without the qualities necessary for a general. If another battle had been fought on Monday, it would have been by the combined corps commanders, and the battle would have been won.

I doubt if, ever in the history of this war, another chance will be given us to fight the enemy with such odds in our favor as we had last Sunday, and that chance has been worse than lost to us. I don't believe any men ever fought better than our Twelfth Corps, especially the First Division; for two hours, they held their ground without any support, against the repeated assaults of the enemy; they fired their sixty rounds of cartridges and held their line with empty muskets till ordered to fall back. The old Second, of course, did splendidly, and lost heavily, twenty-two killed, one hundred and four wounded, ten missing; my company had five killed and eleven wounded. Lieutenant Fitzgerald was killed, Coggswell, Grafton, Perkins, and Powers, wounded. George Thompson had a narrow escape; a grape shot tore one leg of his trousers and his coat almost off and grazed his leg. Our colors got thirty new holes in them and the staff (the third one), was smashed to pieces.*

You cannot imagine the amount of admiration I have for General Slocum, for the gallant way in which he conducted himself throughout the campaign, and his skillful management of his command; then besides all that, we have been so together, that he has seemed almost like my old friends in the regiment.

I have written in this letter a pretty full account of the operations as I have seen them, and I don't believe any one has had a better chance, for during the fighting, I was at different times at every part of our lines, and in communication with General Hooker and other generals.

Our staff casualties were as follows: — Lieutenant Tracy, badly wounded in right arm, his horse shot in four places; one of our orderlies shot and two more horses. I feel thankful to have come out unharmed from so much danger. Tracy was carrying an order to General Williams, when he was hit: somehow, he got outside our lines and was ordered to surrender; he said he thought he wouldn't, turned his horse and ran for it, while the rebels put two volleys after him.

I telegraphed, last Monday, that I was all right; I hope you received the message.

_______________

* Actual loss: 31 killed and mortally wounded, 91 wounded, 7 prisoners. Total loss, 129.

SOURCE: Charles Fessenden Morse, Letters Written During the Civil War, 1861-1865, p. 127-39

Major-General John Sedgwick to his Sister, May 9, 1863

May 9, 1863.

My dear sister:

You have no doubt seen the disastrous termination of our late move. I have not time, and but little inclination, to allude to the matter. I have received nothing but congratulations for the splendid conduct of my corps — except from the General, and he dare not come out boldly and accuse me or my corps of any want of skill in handling, or bad behaviour on the part of the men. I will not attempt to say where the fault lay. It will some day be exposed.

Your affectionate brother,

J. S.

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 109

Official Reports of the Chancellorsville Campaign, April 27-May 6, 1863: No. 206. – Report of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

No. 206.

Report of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS, May 15, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations on the left:

On Tuesday, the 28th ultimo, in compliance with the orders of the commanding general, received that morning, the Sixth Corps moved to the vicinity of Franklin's crossing, near the mouth of Deep Run; the First Corps, Major-General Reynolds, to a position about 1 mile farther down the river, and the Third Corps, Major-General Sickles, took position slightly to the rear and between the positions of the First and Sixth Corps. All the troops encamped that night behind the heights, without fires, and concealed from the observation of the enemy. During the night the pontoons were carried to the river by hand. At the upper crossing, and shortly before daylight, Brooks' division, of the Sixth Corps, crossed in the boats, Russell's brigade taking the lead, and receiving the fire of the enemy's pickets and reserves. The enemy's rifle-pits were immediately occupied, and three bridges were rapidly laid, under the direction of Brigadier-General Benham.

At Reynolds' crossing, 1 mile farther down, the passage was delayed by a severe fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, but was at length gallantly accomplished, General Wadsworth crossing with a portion of his division in the boats, and driving the enemy from their rifle-pits.

During the day, Wednesday, April 29, the command was held in readiness to cross, while the enemy was rapidly intrenching on his entire front, and occasionally shelling Reynolds' position, on the left.

On Thursday, the 30th, Sickles' corps was detached from my command, and ordered to the United States Ford, and during the night one of the bridges at the upper and one at the lower crossing were taken up, under orders from headquarters, and sent to Banks' Ford.

On Friday, May 1, at 5 p.m., an order was received from the commanding general to make a demonstration in force at 1 o'clock that same day; to let it be as severe as possible without being an attack; to assume a threatening attitude, and maintain it until further orders. It was already some hours after the time fixed for the movement, but the last clause of the order, as stated here, determined me to execute it without delay. Reynolds' corps was accordingly displayed in force; General Newton was directed to send one division of the Sixth Corps to Reynolds' support, to cover his bridges in case of an attack, and the Light Brigade across at the upper bridges, to support General Brooks, who was to display his force as if for advance. When these movements had been executed, an order was received countermanding the order for the demonstration.

The following day, Saturday, May 2, Reynolds' corps was withdrawn from my command, and ordered to proceed to headquarters of the army, at or near Chancellorsville, one division, General Wheaton's, of the Sixth Corps, being sent by General Newton to cover his crossing and take up his bridge. I was also ordered to take up all the bridges at Franklin's crossing and below before daylight. This order was received at 5.25 a.m., after daylight, and could not, of course, be executed without attracting the observation of the enemy, and leaving him free to proceed against the forces under General Hooker.

At 6.30 p.m. the order to pursue the enemy by the Bowling Green road was repeated, and my command was immediately put under arms and advanced upon the right, driving the enemy from the Bowling Green road and pushing him back to the woods. That night at 11 o'clock I received an order, dated 10.10 p.m., directing me to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg immediately upon receipt of the order, and move in the direction of Chancellorsville until I connected with the major-general commanding; to attack and destroy any force on the road, and be in the vicinity of the general at daylight.

I had been informed repeatedly by Major-General Butterfield, chief of staff, that the force in front of me was very small, and the whole tenor of his many dispatches would have created the impression that the enemy had abandoned my front and retired from the city and its defenses had there not been more tangible evidence than the dispatches in question that the chief of staff was misinformed.

The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with my entire command on the south side of the river, ready to pursue by the Bowling Green road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg, where no bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight. I commenced, therefore, to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg, on the Bowling Green road, General Newton taking the advance, followed by the Light Brigade and Howe's division. A sharp skirmish commenced as the head of the column moved from the immediate vicinity of the bridges, and continued all the way to the town, the enemy falling slowly back. At the same time, a sudden attack was made upon the pickets in front of the Bernard house. When the head of the column entered the town, four regiments from Wheaton's and Shaler's brigades were sent forward against the rifle pits, and advanced within 20 yards of the enemy's works, when they received a sudden and destructive fire. An immediate assault was made, but repulsed by the fire of the rifle-pits and the batteries on the heights. It was evident that the enemy's line of works was occupied in considerable force, and that his right, as it appeared from reports from General Brooks, extended beyond my left.

It was now daylight, and batteries were placed in position to shell the enemy until the troops could be formed for another attack.

General Gibbon was ordered to cross the river as soon as the bridge opposite the Lacy house was completed, and about 7 o'clock proceeded to take position on my right. General Howe was directed to move on the left of Hazel Run, to turn the enemy's right. Upon advancing as directed, he found that the works in his front were occupied, and that the character of the stream between his command and that of General Newton's prevented any movement of his division to the right. General Gibbon, upon moving forward to turn the left of the enemy, was checked by the canal and compelled to halt. Nothing remained but to carry the works by direct assault.

Two storming columns were formed, composed as follows:

Right column, commanded by Col. George C. Spear, who fell while gallantly leading it: The Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Dawson, and the Forty-third New York, Colonel Baker. This column was supported by the Sixty-seventh New York (First Long Island), Colonel Cross, and the Eighty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Bassett, under command of Colonel Shaler.

Left column: The Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Johns, who fell, severely wounded in the assault, and the Thirty-sixth New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh.

Line of battle, Colonel Burnham: The Fifth Wisconsin, Colonel Allen, as skirmishers; Sixth Maine, Lieutenant-Colonel Harris; Thirty-first New York, Colonel Jones, and the Twenty-third Pennsylvania, Colonel Ely, this latter regiment volunteering.

The columns moved on the Plank road and to the right of it directly up the heights. The line of battle advanced on the double-quick to the left of the Plank road against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a shot until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works. In the meantime the storming columns had pressed forward to the crest, and carried the works in the rear of the rifle-pits, capturing the guns and many prisoners. These movements were gallantly executed under a most destructive fire.

In the meantime Howe advanced rapidly on the left of Hazel Run, in three columns of assault, and forced the enemy from the crest in front, capturing five guns. The entire corps was at once put in motion and moved in pursuit. Considerable resistance was made on the next series of heights, but the position was carried without halting. A section of horse artillery on our right occupied every successive crest upon our line of march, and much annoyed our advance.

At Salem Chapel the enemy were re-enforced by a brigade from Banks' Ford and by troops from the direction of Chancellorsville, and made a determined resistance. Brooks' division formed rapidly across the road and Newton's upon his right, and advanced upon the woods, which were strongly held by the enemy. After a sharp and prolonged contest, we gained the heights, but were met by fresh troops pouring in upon the flank of the advanced portion of the line. For a short time the crest was held by our troops with obstinate resistance, but at length the line was forced slowly back through the woods. The advance of the enemy is checked by the splendid firing of our batteries, Williston's, Rigby's, and Parsons'. Wheaton still holds his position on the right, gallantly fighting. On the left the troops are rapidly reformed, and, after a short interval, again advance upon the woods. The enemy is once more forced back in much confusion on our right, but steadily resisting on the left.

This was the condition of things when night put an end to the battle. The troops rested on their arms until morning.

During the night the enemy were re-enforcing heavily, and our wounded, as far as was practicable, were collected and sent to Fredericksburg.

The following morning, at an early hour, I was informed that a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, coming from the direction of Richmond, had occupied the heights of Fredericksburg, cutting off my communications with the town. Expecting a movement of this kind, I had already formed Howe's division in line of battle to the rear. General Howe promptly extended his left to the river, and admirably checked an effort of the enemy to cut us off from Banks' Ford, where a pontoon bridge had been laid the day previous. In this affair he captured 200 prisoners and a battle-flag.

While these things were occurring on my left, I received a dispatch from the major-general commanding, informing me that he had contracted his lines; that I must look well to the safety of my corps, preserve my communications with Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, and suggesting that I fall back upon the former place, or recross, in preference, at Banks' Ford, where I could more readily communicate with the main body. To fall back upon Fredericksburg was out of the question. To adopt the other alternative, except under cover of night, was equally so, for the enemy still maintained his position on Salem Heights, and was threatening my flank and rear from the direction of Fredericksburg. My line was formed with the left resting on the river, about midway between Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, thence extending slightly beyond the Plank road, when it turned at right angles to the right, following the direction of the Plank road for a mile, and then again turning to the right at right angles, and recrossing the Plank road in front of Salem Heights, my right resting where it had been placed in the engagement of the previous evening. A line of battle of such length was necessarily weak, yet to contract it would inevitably provoke immediate attack from vastly superior forces.

Batteries were skillfully posted by Colonel Tompkins, chief of artillery, to maintain the weaker points, and rendered invaluable service.

Thus, fronting in three directions, I was compelled to await attack, determined to hold the position until dark and then fall back upon Banks' Ford. A dispatch from the major-general commanding had informed me that he could not relieve me, as he was in position in which he hoped to be attacked, and that he was too far away to direct my operations.

Subsequent dispatches directed me to hold a position on the right bank of the river until the following morning. During the day there was more or less skirmishing on the whole front, and in the evening a most determined attack was made upon Howe's line, for the purpose of cutting our communication with the river, and at the same time Brooks was attacked farther toward the right. The attack on Brooks was readily repulsed, chiefly by the skirmish line and the firing by the battery of McCartney's (First Massachusetts) battery. That on Howe was of a more determined character, being made en échelon of battalions and in columns. It was gallantly resisted by our infantry by a counter charge, while the artillery of the division played with fearful effect upon their advance. At length our line was forced back upon the left, and General Howe directed his right to retire to a less advanced position. The movement was quietly executed, the enemy still pressing fiercely on his front.

Wheaton's brigade and two regiments of the Light Brigade had been sent from the extreme right to his support, and Butler's battery (G, Second U.S. Artillery) was sent rapidly by a road through the wood to his rear. The division reformed promptly, the batteries keeping up a most effective fire upon the wood. The advance of the enemy was checked, his troops were scattered and driven back with fearful loss, and the new position was easily maintained until nightfall. Several hundred prisoners, including 1 general officer and many others of rank, and 3 battle-flags, were captured from the enemy in this engagement.

As soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks' divisions, with the Light Brigade, fell rapidly back upon Banks' Ford, and took position on the heights in that neighborhood and in the rifle-pits. When these movements were completed, Howe was directed to fall back, and at once abandoned his position and moved to the river, taking position on Newton's right.

On Tuesday, the 5th, at 2 a.m., I received the order of the commanding general to withdraw from my position, cross the river, take up the bridge, and cover the ford. The order was immediately executed, the enemy meanwhile shelling the bridges from commanding positions above us, on the river. When the last of the column was on the bridge, I received a dispatch from the commanding general countermanding the order to withdraw. My command was on the left bank it could not recross before daylight, and must do it then, if at all, in face of the enemy, whose batteries completely commanded the bridges. I accordingly went into camp in the vicinity of the ford, sending an adequate force to guard the river and watch the ford.

The losses of the Sixth Corps in these operations were 4,925 killed, wounded, and missing.*  We captured from the enemy, according to the best information we could obtain, 5 battle-flags, 15 pieces of artillery – 9 of which were brought off, the others falling into the hands of the enemy upon the subsequent reoccupation of Fredericksburg by his forces-and 1,400 prisoners, including many officers of rank. No material of any kind belonging to the corps fell into the hands of the enemy except several wagons and a forge that were passing through Fredericksburg at the time of its reoccupation by his forces.

I must add, in closing, that the conduct of the troops from the first crossing of the river until our return to Banks' Ford was such as to merit my heartiest approbation.

To Major-General Newton, commanding Third Division, and Brigadier-General Brooks, commanding First Division, I am indebted for excellent counsel and for the gallant and spirited manner in which they carried out their orders.

To Brigadier-General Howe, for his determined bravery in resisting repeated charges of an overwhelming force of the enemy, the safety of the command was greatly indebted.

To General Gibbon I am indebted for his effective support in the engagement of Sunday morning.

The gallant conduct of Colonel Burnham, in leading the Light Brigade to the assault on the rifle-pits in rear of Fredericksburg, is worthy of the highest admiration.

It is no disparagement to the other regiments of the corps to say that the steadiness and valor of the Sixth Maine, Fifth Wisconsin, Seventh Massachusetts, and the Vermont Brigade could not be excelled.

The skill and personal gallantry of Brigadier-Generals Bartlett, Wheaton, Russell, and Neill, Colonels Grant, Shaler, William H. Browne, Thirty-sixth New York, and H. W. Brown, Third New Jersey, displayed in the management of their respective brigades, deserve the special notice of the commanding general.

Colonel Browne, of the Thirty-sixth New York, I regret to say, was severely wounded in the action of Sunday afternoon, and the command of the brigade devolved upon Col. H. L. Eustis, who is specially mentioned by his division commander for gallant service.

Colonel Brown, of the New Jersey Brigade, was also wounded, and the command of the brigade passed to Colonel Buck, Second New Jersey. He, too, fell, wounded, and the command devolved on Colonel Penrose, Fifteenth New Jersey. Both these officers performed their duties with admirable coolness.

I desire also to call the special attention of the commanding general to the officers named in connection with the assault on the heights of Fredericksburg.

For a further mention of officers who deserve his notice, I respectfully refer to the reports of division commanders, herewith transmitted.

To the following-named officers of my staff I am indebted for prompt and efficient assistance rendered at all times during the operations I have reported, and often under circumstances of exceeding danger and confusion; Lieut. Col. M. T. McMahon, assistant adjutant-general and chief of staff'; Col. C. H. Tompkins, chief of artillery; Lieut. Col. J. Ford Kent, inspector-general, slightly wounded in the action of Sunday morning; Maj. C. A. Whittier, aide-de-camp; Maj. T. W. Hyde, provost-marshal and acting aide-de-camp, Maj. H. H. Janeway, acting aide-de-camp; Capts. R. F. Halsted and H. C. Pratt, aides-de-camp; Lieut. J. N. Andrews, commissary of musters and acting aide-de-camp, and Lieut. H. W. Farrar, acting aide-de-camp, taken prisoner while carrying an important order.

The management of the artillery, under Colonel Tompkins, was singularly effective.

The difficult details of the commissary and quartermaster's departments were excellently conducted by Lieut. Col. C.W. Tolles, chief quartermaster, and Capt. J. K. Scofield, chief commissary. Those officers are entitled to much credit.

I notice with particular approbation the arrangements made for the care and prompt removal of the wounded by Surg. Charles O'Leary, medical director of the corps, and Surg. Charles F. Crehore, medical inspector. These arrangements were carried into effect by Capt. W. H. Robinson, chief of ambulance corps.

I respectfully request that the regiments and batteries of the corps be permitted to inscribe “Fredericksburg” and “Salem Heights” on their colors. It is an honor they have bravely earned.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN SEDGWICK,

Major-General, Commanding Sixth Army Corps.

 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

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* But see revised statement, pp. 172, 189

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 25, Part 1 (Serial No. 39), p. 557-62; George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 93-108, which dates this report as May 7, 1863.