No. 206.
Report of Maj.
Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
CORPS, May 15, 1863.
GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the
operations on the left:
On Tuesday, the 28th ultimo, in compliance with the orders
of the commanding general, received that morning, the Sixth Corps moved to the
vicinity of Franklin's crossing, near the mouth of Deep Run; the First Corps,
Major-General Reynolds, to a position about 1 mile farther down the river, and
the Third Corps, Major-General Sickles, took position slightly to the rear and
between the positions of the First and Sixth Corps. All the troops encamped that
night behind the heights, without fires, and concealed from the observation of
the enemy. During the night the pontoons were carried to the river by hand. At
the upper crossing, and shortly before daylight, Brooks' division, of the Sixth
Corps, crossed in the boats, Russell's brigade taking the lead, and receiving
the fire of the enemy's pickets and reserves. The enemy's rifle-pits were
immediately occupied, and three bridges were rapidly laid, under the direction
of Brigadier-General Benham.
At Reynolds' crossing, 1 mile farther down, the passage was
delayed by a severe fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, but was at length
gallantly accomplished, General Wadsworth crossing with a portion of his
division in the boats, and driving the enemy from their rifle-pits.
During the day, Wednesday, April 29, the command was held in
readiness to cross, while the enemy was rapidly intrenching on his entire
front, and occasionally shelling Reynolds' position, on the left.
On Thursday, the 30th, Sickles' corps was detached from my
command, and ordered to the United States Ford, and during the night one of the
bridges at the upper and one at the lower crossing were taken up, under orders
from headquarters, and sent to Banks' Ford.
On Friday, May 1, at 5 p.m., an order was received from the
commanding general to make a demonstration in force at 1 o'clock that same day;
to let it be as severe as possible without being an attack; to assume a
threatening attitude, and maintain it until further orders. It was already some
hours after the time fixed for the movement, but the last clause of the order,
as stated here, determined me to execute it without delay. Reynolds' corps was
accordingly displayed in force; General Newton was directed to send one
division of the Sixth Corps to Reynolds' support, to cover his bridges in case
of an attack, and the Light Brigade across at the upper bridges, to support
General Brooks, who was to display his force as if for advance. When these
movements had been executed, an order was received countermanding the order for
the demonstration.
The following day, Saturday, May 2, Reynolds' corps was
withdrawn from my command, and ordered to proceed to headquarters of the army,
at or near Chancellorsville, one division, General Wheaton's, of the Sixth
Corps, being sent by General Newton to cover his crossing and take up his
bridge. I was also ordered to take up all the bridges at Franklin's crossing
and below before daylight. This order was received at 5.25 a.m., after
daylight, and could not, of course, be executed without attracting the
observation of the enemy, and leaving him free to proceed against the forces
under General Hooker.
At 6.30 p.m. the order to pursue the enemy by the Bowling
Green road was repeated, and my command was immediately put under arms and
advanced upon the right, driving the enemy from the Bowling Green road and
pushing him back to the woods. That night at 11 o'clock I received an order,
dated 10.10 p.m., directing me to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg
immediately upon receipt of the order, and move in the direction of
Chancellorsville until I connected with the major-general commanding; to attack
and destroy any force on the road, and be in the vicinity of the general at
daylight.
I had been informed repeatedly by Major-General Butterfield,
chief of staff, that the force in front of me was very small, and the whole
tenor of his many dispatches would have created the impression that the enemy
had abandoned my front and retired from the city and its defenses had there not
been more tangible evidence than the dispatches in question that the chief of
staff was misinformed.
The order to cross at Fredericksburg found me with my entire
command on the south side of the river, ready to pursue by the Bowling Green
road. To recross for the purpose of crossing again at Fredericksburg, where no
bridges had been laid, would have occupied until long after daylight. I
commenced, therefore, to move by the flank in the direction of Fredericksburg,
on the Bowling Green road, General Newton taking the advance, followed by the
Light Brigade and Howe's division. A sharp skirmish commenced as the head of
the column moved from the immediate vicinity of the bridges, and continued all
the way to the town, the enemy falling slowly back. At the same time, a sudden
attack was made upon the pickets in front of the Bernard house. When the head
of the column entered the town, four regiments from Wheaton's and Shaler's
brigades were sent forward against the rifle pits, and advanced within 20 yards
of the enemy's works, when they received a sudden and destructive fire. An
immediate assault was made, but repulsed by the fire of the rifle-pits and the
batteries on the heights. It was evident that the enemy's line of works was
occupied in considerable force, and that his right, as it appeared from reports
from General Brooks, extended beyond my left.
It was now daylight, and batteries were placed in position
to shell the enemy until the troops could be formed for another attack.
General Gibbon was ordered to cross the river as soon as the
bridge opposite the Lacy house was completed, and about 7 o'clock proceeded to
take position on my right. General Howe was directed to move on the left of
Hazel Run, to turn the enemy's right. Upon advancing as directed, he found that
the works in his front were occupied, and that the character of the stream
between his command and that of General Newton's prevented any movement of his
division to the right. General Gibbon, upon moving forward to turn the left of
the enemy, was checked by the canal and compelled to halt. Nothing remained but
to carry the works by direct assault.
Two storming columns were formed, composed as follows:
Right column, commanded by Col. George C. Spear, who fell
while gallantly leading it: The Sixty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major
Dawson, and the Forty-third New York, Colonel Baker. This column was supported
by the Sixty-seventh New York (First Long Island), Colonel Cross, and the
Eighty-second Pennsylvania Volunteers, Major Bassett, under command of Colonel
Shaler.
Left column: The Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Johns, who
fell, severely wounded in the assault, and the Thirty-sixth New York,
Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh.
Line of battle, Colonel Burnham: The Fifth Wisconsin,
Colonel Allen, as skirmishers; Sixth Maine, Lieutenant-Colonel Harris;
Thirty-first New York, Colonel Jones, and the Twenty-third Pennsylvania,
Colonel Ely, this latter regiment volunteering.
The columns moved on the Plank road and to the right of it
directly up the heights. The line of battle advanced on the double-quick to the
left of the Plank road against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a
shot until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works. In the
meantime the storming columns had pressed forward to the crest, and carried the
works in the rear of the rifle-pits, capturing the guns and many prisoners.
These movements were gallantly executed under a most destructive fire.
In the meantime Howe advanced rapidly on the left of Hazel
Run, in three columns of assault, and forced the enemy from the crest in front,
capturing five guns. The entire corps was at once put in motion and moved in
pursuit. Considerable resistance was made on the next series of heights, but
the position was carried without halting. A section of horse artillery on our
right occupied every successive crest upon our line of march, and much annoyed
our advance.
At Salem Chapel the enemy were re-enforced by a brigade from
Banks' Ford and by troops from the direction of Chancellorsville, and made a
determined resistance. Brooks' division formed rapidly across the road and
Newton's upon his right, and advanced upon the woods, which were strongly held
by the enemy. After a sharp and prolonged contest, we gained the heights, but were
met by fresh troops pouring in upon the flank of the advanced portion of the
line. For a short time the crest was held by our troops with obstinate
resistance, but at length the line was forced slowly back through the woods.
The advance of the enemy is checked by the splendid firing of our batteries,
Williston's, Rigby's, and Parsons'. Wheaton still holds his position on the
right, gallantly fighting. On the left the troops are rapidly reformed, and,
after a short interval, again advance upon the woods. The enemy is once more
forced back in much confusion on our right, but steadily resisting on the left.
This was the condition of things when night put an end to
the battle. The troops rested on their arms until morning.
During the night the enemy were re-enforcing heavily, and
our wounded, as far as was practicable, were collected and sent to
Fredericksburg.
The following morning, at an early hour, I was informed that
a column of the enemy, 15,000 strong, coming from the direction of Richmond,
had occupied the heights of Fredericksburg, cutting off my communications with
the town. Expecting a movement of this kind, I had already formed Howe's
division in line of battle to the rear. General Howe promptly extended his left
to the river, and admirably checked an effort of the enemy to cut us off from
Banks' Ford, where a pontoon bridge had been laid the day previous. In this
affair he captured 200 prisoners and a battle-flag.
While these things were occurring on my left, I received a
dispatch from the major-general commanding, informing me that he had contracted
his lines; that I must look well to the safety of my corps, preserve my
communications with Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, and suggesting that I fall
back upon the former place, or recross, in preference, at Banks' Ford, where I
could more readily communicate with the main body. To fall back upon
Fredericksburg was out of the question. To adopt the other alternative, except
under cover of night, was equally so, for the enemy still maintained his
position on Salem Heights, and was threatening my flank and rear from the
direction of Fredericksburg. My line was formed with the left resting on the
river, about midway between Fredericksburg and Banks' Ford, thence extending slightly
beyond the Plank road, when it turned at right angles to the right, following
the direction of the Plank road for a mile, and then again turning to the right
at right angles, and recrossing the Plank road in front of Salem Heights, my
right resting where it had been placed in the engagement of the previous
evening. A line of battle of such length was necessarily weak, yet to contract
it would inevitably provoke immediate attack from vastly superior forces.
Batteries were skillfully posted by Colonel Tompkins, chief
of artillery, to maintain the weaker points, and rendered invaluable service.
Thus, fronting in three directions, I was compelled to await
attack, determined to hold the position until dark and then fall back upon
Banks' Ford. A dispatch from the major-general commanding had informed me that
he could not relieve me, as he was in position in which he hoped to be
attacked, and that he was too far away to direct my operations.
Subsequent dispatches directed me to hold a position on the
right bank of the river until the following morning. During the day there was
more or less skirmishing on the whole front, and in the evening a most
determined attack was made upon Howe's line, for the purpose of cutting our
communication with the river, and at the same time Brooks was attacked farther
toward the right. The attack on Brooks was readily repulsed, chiefly by the
skirmish line and the firing by the battery of McCartney's (First
Massachusetts) battery. That on Howe was of a more determined character, being
made en échelon of battalions and in columns. It was gallantly resisted
by our infantry by a counter charge, while the artillery of the division played
with fearful effect upon their advance. At length our line was forced back upon
the left, and General Howe directed his right to retire to a less advanced
position. The movement was quietly executed, the enemy still pressing fiercely
on his front.
Wheaton's brigade and two regiments of the Light Brigade had
been sent from the extreme right to his support, and Butler's battery (G,
Second U.S. Artillery) was sent rapidly by a road through the wood to his rear.
The division reformed promptly, the batteries keeping up a most effective fire
upon the wood. The advance of the enemy was checked, his troops were scattered
and driven back with fearful loss, and the new position was easily maintained
until nightfall. Several hundred prisoners, including 1 general officer and
many others of rank, and 3 battle-flags, were captured from the enemy in this engagement.
As soon as it was dark, Newton's and Brooks' divisions, with
the Light Brigade, fell rapidly back upon Banks' Ford, and took position on the
heights in that neighborhood and in the rifle-pits. When these movements were
completed, Howe was directed to fall back, and at once abandoned his position
and moved to the river, taking position on Newton's right.
On Tuesday, the 5th, at 2 a.m., I received the order of the
commanding general to withdraw from my position, cross the river, take up the
bridge, and cover the ford. The order was immediately executed, the enemy
meanwhile shelling the bridges from commanding positions above us, on the
river. When the last of the column was on the bridge, I received a dispatch
from the commanding general countermanding the order to withdraw. My command
was on the left bank it could not recross before daylight, and must do it then,
if at all, in face of the enemy, whose batteries completely commanded the
bridges. I accordingly went into camp in the vicinity of the ford, sending an
adequate force to guard the river and watch the ford.
The losses of the Sixth Corps in these operations were 4,925
killed, wounded, and missing.* We
captured from the enemy, according to the best information we could obtain, 5
battle-flags, 15 pieces of artillery – 9 of which were brought off, the others
falling into the hands of the enemy upon the subsequent reoccupation of
Fredericksburg by his forces-and 1,400 prisoners, including many officers of
rank. No material of any kind belonging to the corps fell into the hands of the
enemy except several wagons and a forge that were passing through
Fredericksburg at the time of its reoccupation by his forces.
I must add, in closing, that the conduct of the troops from
the first crossing of the river until our return to Banks' Ford was such as to
merit my heartiest approbation.
To Major-General Newton, commanding Third Division, and
Brigadier-General Brooks, commanding First Division, I am indebted for
excellent counsel and for the gallant and spirited manner in which they carried
out their orders.
To Brigadier-General Howe, for his determined bravery in
resisting repeated charges of an overwhelming force of the enemy, the safety of
the command was greatly indebted.
To General Gibbon I am indebted for his effective support in
the engagement of Sunday morning.
The gallant conduct of Colonel Burnham, in leading the Light
Brigade to the assault on the rifle-pits in rear of Fredericksburg, is worthy
of the highest admiration.
It is no disparagement to the other regiments of the corps
to say that the steadiness and valor of the Sixth Maine, Fifth Wisconsin,
Seventh Massachusetts, and the Vermont Brigade could not be excelled.
The skill and personal gallantry of Brigadier-Generals
Bartlett, Wheaton, Russell, and Neill, Colonels Grant, Shaler, William H.
Browne, Thirty-sixth New York, and H. W. Brown, Third New Jersey, displayed in
the management of their respective brigades, deserve the special notice of the
commanding general.
Colonel Browne, of the Thirty-sixth New York, I regret to
say, was severely wounded in the action of Sunday afternoon, and the command of
the brigade devolved upon Col. H. L. Eustis, who is specially mentioned by his
division commander for gallant service.
Colonel Brown, of the New Jersey Brigade, was also wounded,
and the command of the brigade passed to Colonel Buck, Second New Jersey. He,
too, fell, wounded, and the command devolved on Colonel Penrose, Fifteenth New
Jersey. Both these officers performed their duties with admirable coolness.
I desire also to call the special attention of the
commanding general to the officers named in connection with the assault on the
heights of Fredericksburg.
For a further mention of officers who deserve his notice, I
respectfully refer to the reports of division commanders, herewith transmitted.
To the following-named officers of my staff I am indebted
for prompt and efficient assistance rendered at all times during the operations
I have reported, and often under circumstances of exceeding danger and
confusion; Lieut. Col. M. T. McMahon, assistant adjutant-general and chief of
staff'; Col. C. H. Tompkins, chief of artillery; Lieut. Col. J. Ford Kent,
inspector-general, slightly wounded in the action of Sunday morning; Maj. C. A.
Whittier, aide-de-camp; Maj. T. W. Hyde, provost-marshal and acting
aide-de-camp, Maj. H. H. Janeway, acting aide-de-camp; Capts. R. F. Halsted and
H. C. Pratt, aides-de-camp; Lieut. J. N. Andrews, commissary of musters and
acting aide-de-camp, and Lieut. H. W. Farrar, acting aide-de-camp, taken
prisoner while carrying an important order.
The management of the artillery, under Colonel Tompkins, was
singularly effective.
The difficult details of the commissary and quartermaster's
departments were excellently conducted by Lieut. Col. C.W. Tolles, chief
quartermaster, and Capt. J. K. Scofield, chief commissary. Those officers are
entitled to much credit.
I notice with particular approbation the arrangements made
for the care and prompt removal of the wounded by Surg. Charles O'Leary,
medical director of the corps, and Surg. Charles F. Crehore, medical inspector.
These arrangements were carried into effect by Capt. W. H. Robinson, chief of
ambulance corps.
I respectfully request that the regiments and batteries of
the corps be permitted to inscribe “Fredericksburg” and “Salem Heights” on
their colors. It is an honor they have bravely earned.
I am, general, very
respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN SEDGWICK,
Major-General,
Commanding Sixth Army Corps.
Brig. Gen. S.
WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.
_______________
* But see revised
statement, pp. 172, 189
SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 25,
Part 1 (Serial No. 39), p. 557-62; George William Curtis, Correspondence
of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 93-108, which dates this
report as May 7, 1863.
I have received a couple of letters from you, one of the
5th, the other of the 9th, both of which took first a trip to Port Royal. I
hope my telegraphic despatch may prevent any more from traveling so far in
vain.
