July 31, 1864
I will continue now my letter that broke off last night, and
confide to you in all honesty, that I went fast to sleep on the bed and never
woke till it was too late for more writing! The fact is, it was a day of
extraordinary heat, and remarkably close also. I had been up at half-past two
that morning, and I felt a great deal depressed by the day's work. Well, I had
got my fuse to the mouth of the gallery. You must know that all the time they
were putting in the powder they could hear the enemy digging pretty near them,
over their heads; for they had suspected we were mining, and had begun digging,
to try to find it: they sunk a "shaft" or well inside their bastion,
and then ran a gallery outside, from which they dug each way, to cut our
gallery. But they did not go deep enough and so missed their object. The
enemy had lately sent a large part of their force to head off Hancock at Deep
Bottom, across the James, a movement that had seriously alarmed them. So the
forces in our front were much weakened and the moment was favorable. . . .
On the 29th Hancock was ordered to withdraw, hold two
divisions in reserve, and relieve the 18th Corps on the line with the third.
The 18th Corps was then to move up in the night, and take position to support
the 9th Corps in the assault. The 5th Corps was to be held in readiness on its
part of the line, and to open with musketry as soon as the mine was sprung, in
order to keep down the enemy's fire on the assaulting column. New batteries of
heavy mortars and siege guns were put in position and the whole artillery was
ordered to open on the enemy's batteries, the moment the mine was blown up. The
9th Corps was arranged to make a rush to the gap, the moment the explosion took
place, and then one column was to keep on, and occupy the crest beyond (the key
of the whole position), and others were to look out for an attack on either
flank. The hour for springing the mine was 3.30 A.m.
General Hunt had been everywhere and arranged his artillery
like clockwork; each chief of piece knew his distances and his directions to an
inch. We were all up and horses saddled by 2.30. . . . We were to go to
Burnside's Headquarters to wait — an arrangement that I regretted, as you can
see nothing from there. It was near half-past three when we got there, and only
a faint suspicion of daylight was yet to be noticed. It was an anxious time —
eight thousand pounds of gunpowder to go into the air at once! I had considered
all I had read about explosions and had concluded it would make little noise
and be very circumscribed in its effects. Others, however, thought it might be
a sort of earthquake, overturn trees, etc., which idea was founded on the fact
that even a dozen pounds confined would pretty nearly blow a house down.
However, we were something like a mile away and would not be likely to get the worst
of it. General Burnside with his Staff had gone to the front. Presently
General Grant arrived, I think after four o'clock. He said, “What is the matter
with the mine?” General Meade shrugged his shoulders and said, “I don't know —
guess the fuse has gone out.” Which was a true guess. Where the fuse was
spliced, it stopped burning; upon which Colonel Pleasants coolly went into the
gallery and fired the new end! At ten minutes before five there was a distant,
dull-sounding explosion, like a heavy gun, far away; and, in an instant, as if
by magic, the whole line of batteries burst forth in one roar, and there was
nothing but the banging of the guns and the distant hum of the shells! My back
was turned at the moment, but those that had a good view say that a mass of
earth about 50 feet wide and 120 long was thrown some 130 feet in the air,
looking like the picture of the Iceland geysers. The explosion made a crater
some 120 feet long, 50 feet wide, and 25 deep (so it was described to me). The
mine blew up about under the bastion and rather on one side of it.
[The description of what followed, is copied from Lyman's
"Journal."]
So astounded was the enemy and so covered was their position
by our augmented artillery, that their reply was weak indeed and was soon
almost silenced. Meantime, after incomprehensible delay (usually described as
at least twenty minutes), the assaulting column moved forward, in a loose
manner. This was Marshall's brigade of Ledlie's division, a brigade composed of
dismounted cavalry and demoralized heavy artillery (!), the whole good for
nothing, over which Marshall, a severe, courageous man, had been put, in the
vain hope of beating in some discipline! Burnside, with inconceivable fatuity,
allowed the troops for leading the assault to be selected by lot! The
Corps was enough run down to make it hard to get a good forlorn hope with the
most careful picking. Then no gap had been made in the parapet, which, next the
mine, was at least eight feet high — all in disobedience to orders. All this
time there was more or less cannon and musketry. Orders were sent to take the
crest: to push on at once! But plainly there was a hitch! Colonel de Chanal,
who was standing with me, was frantic over this loss of precious moments. “Mais,
cette perte de temps!” he kept saying. In fact Marshall's brigade had gone into
the crater and had filled it, and now were utterly immovable and sullen! The
supports, brought up by the flank in bad order, crowded into the crater and the
neighboring bomb-proofs and covered ways. There was some fighting, and the
Rebel breastworks for 200 or 300 yards were taken, with a few prisoners; but
advance to the crest the men would not. Our own covered ways were jammed with
supporting troops that could do no good to anyone. 7 A.M. A lull. At a few
minutes after 8 A.M. the troops of the 18th Corps and the black division of the
9th attempted a charge. Sanders, who saw it, said the troops would not go up
with any spirit at all. The negroes came back in confusion, all mixed with the
whites in and about the crater. Their officers behaved with distinguished
courage, and the blacks seem to have done as well as whites — which is faint
praise. This attack was over three hours after the springing of the mine.
Meanwhile, of course, the enemy had strained every nerve to hold their
remaining works and had made all preparations to retake the lost ground. They
got guns in position whence they could play on the assailants without fear of
getting silenced; and they brought a heavy musketry to bear in the same
direction. The space between our line and the crater now was swept by a heavy
fire, and made the transit hazardous. 9.15 A.M. or thereabouts; a charge by a
brigade of the 18th Corps and a regiment of blacks; a part of one white
regiment got to, or nearly to, the crest, but of course could not stay. During
the morning a despatch had come, by mistake, to General Meade. It was from
Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Loring, Inspector of 9th Corps, who reported that the
troops jammed in the crater and could not be made to advance. Loring had
himself gone into the crater. This was the first news from the spot that showed
Meade the hitch in affairs; because Burnside's despatches had been of a general
and a favorable character. Hereupon Meade telegraphed Burnside that he wanted
the full state of the case, which B. took to mean that he had not told the
truth! and at once flew into one of his singular fits of rage. Grant
mounted his horse and rode down towards the Taylor Battery to try and see
something. Meade remained, receiving despatches and sending orders. Grant is
very desirous always of seeing, and quite regardless of his own exposure. 10.30
A.P. Burnside and Ord came in. The former, much flushed, walked up to General
Meade and used extremely insubordinate language. He afterwards said he could
advance, and wished of all things to persist; but could not show how he would
do it! Ord was opposed to further attempts. Meade ordered the attack suspended.
As Ord and Burnside passed me, the latter said something like: “You have 15,000
men concentrated on one point. It is strange if you cannot do something with
them.” Ord replied angrily, flourishing his arms: “You can fight if you have an
opportunity; but, if you are held by the throat, how can you do anything?”
Meaning, I suppose, that things were so placed that troops could not be used.
Burnside said to one of his Staff officers: “Well, tell them to connect, and
hold it.” Which was easy to say, but they seem to have had no provision of
tools, and, at any rate, did not connect with the old line. Poor Burnside
remarked, quite calmly: “I certainly fully expected this morning to go into
Petersburg!”1 At 11.30 A.M. Headquarters mounted and rode sadly to
camp. 3.30 P.M. Harwood, of the Engineers, said to me: “They have retaken that
point and captured a brigade of our people!” Indeed, the Rebels had made a bold
charge upon the huddled mass of demoralized men and retaken the crater, killing
some, driving back others, and capturing most. And so ended this woeful affair!
If you ask what was the cause of this failure to avail of one of the best
chances a besieging army could ask for, I could answer with many reasons from
many officers. But I can give you one reason that includes and
over-rides every other — the men did not fight hard enough.
_______________
1 “All Bumside's baggage was packed, ready to
go into Petersburg!” —
Lyman's Journal.
SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s
Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness
to Appomattox, p. 196-201
