Showing posts with label Lewis A Grant. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lewis A Grant. Show all posts

Wednesday, August 19, 2015

Official Reports of the Mine Run (Virginia) Campaign: No. 77. Report of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

No. 77.

Report of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U. S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

Headquarters Sixth Army Corps,
December 4, 1863.
Brigadier-General S. Williams,
A.A.G., Army of the Potomac.

General:

I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of this corps from November 26 to December 3:

In obedience to the orders of the commanding general, the corps commenced its march on the morning of the 26th at 6 o'clock, and moved to Brandy Station, where it halted in readiness to follow the Third Corps as directed in the order of march. The road was not cleared until 11 a.m. At that hour the march was resumed and continued with many interruptions, owing to the crowded condition of the roads, until late at night. The column reached the Rapidan after dark, well closed on the Third Corps, crossed, and went into bivouac with the exception of the trains, the artillery, and the rear guard, consisting of Upton's brigade. The artillery and trains were ordered to Germanna Ford. The batteries crossed at that point during the night and rejoined the corps the following morning.

On the morning of the 27th, Upton's brigade having crossed the river, the corps was placed under arms at daylight and drawn out in order of march, ready to follow and support Major-General French, as directed. The head of the column continued closed on the Third Corps, but made no progress until 3 p.m., at which time the firing in the front having increased I rode forward to General French's headquarters and found him deploying to resist a serious attack upon his advance. I immediately moved forward two divisions, the First and Second, and as the engagement progressed advanced Ellmaker's brigade upon the right and Neill's and Upton's brigades upon the left to support General French's line, and held Torbert's and Grant's brigades in rear as a reserve. The Third Division remained near the river, in obedience to the order of the commanding general, to cover the bridges and trains at Germanna Ford. The artillery could not be made available, owing to the wooded character of the country, and was massed in rear of the reserve. None of the troops of my command became engaged. They bivouacked on the field until midnight, at which time, in obedience to an order received at 11 p.m., I marched in the direction of the turnpike to form a junction with General Warren. At daylight I took position, with my entire command, on the right of the Second Corps.

At 7.40 a.m. I received the order of the commanding general to attack the enemy, in conjunction with the other corps. I advanced at once in the execution of this order, and discovered that the enemy had retired during the night. I then moved forward on the turnpike in rear of the Second Corps, and took position on its right in front of the line taken up by the enemy on Mine Run, and advanced a line of skirmishers to the stream. The movements of this day were much embarrassed by the rain and the troops suffered extremely.

On the following day the Third Division, Brigadier-General Terry, and Martin's battery were detached, by the order of the commanding general, to report to General Warren. With the other divisions I remained in position holding the right of the line. The enemy's position in my front was one of great natural strength and extensively intrenched.

At 2 a.m. on the morning of the 30th, having been placed in command of the Fifth and Sixth Corps, I moved about 2 miles to the right, leaving two brigades and the batteries to hold the lines which the two corps had occupied. It was the intention of the general commanding to make a sudden and determined attack upon the enemy's left, under a concentrated fire from our batteries. The movement of the troops had been carefully concealed from the enemy, and at the appointed time, 8 a.m., I opened fire from six batteries, and prepared to move promptly upon the enemy's position at 9 a.m., the hour fixed for the assault. The enemy replied promptly from several batteries. At 8.45 I received the order of the commanding general to suspend my attack until further orders. This was accordingly done. The batteries ceased firing upon both sides, and the enemy proceeded to make the alterations in his line and the character of his defenses which the threatened attack from the direction of his left rendered essential to his safety. During the day I was ordered back with my command to my former position, and executed the movement as soon as it was dark.

On the following day, December 1, I remained in position. The condition of the supplies of forage and subsistence, and the impossibility of replenishing in our then position rendering all further offensive movements impracticable, and a return to our base of supplies being, in my opinion, a matter of necessity, I made the necessary preparations for a night movement to the river. During the night, in obedience to orders, I recrossed the Rapidan with the rest of the army, and halted near Stevensburg on the morning of the 2d instant. On the 3d instant, I resumed the march to the vicinity of Wellord's Ford, and re-occupied my former camp.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
John Sedgwick,
Major-General.


[Inclosure.]

List of Casualties in the Sixth Army Corps during the movements of the Army of the Potomac to the south side of the Rapidan, November 26- December 2.

Enlisted men wounded:         
Third Division
14
Artillery Brigade
2
Total*
16
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*See revised statement, p. 685

SOURCE: George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 162-6; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 29, Part 1 (Serial No. 48), p. 796-7

Thursday, July 30, 2015

Official Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg: No. 223. Reports of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U.S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

No. 223.

Reports of Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, U.S. Army, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
Warrenton, Va., August 8, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of the Sixth Corps in the engagements near Gettysburg and since:

This command arrived on the field of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2, after a march of more than 30 miles.

Wheaton's and Eustis' brigades, of the third Division, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Wheaton, and Bartlett's brigade, of Wright's division, went into action about 5 p.m. on the left center, between divisions of the Fifth Corps, and assisted in repulsing the assault of the enemy. Russell's and Torbert's brigades, of Wright's division, were held in reserve that night. Neill's brigade, of Howe's division, was sent to the right of the line, reporting to Major-General Slocum, and Grant's brigade, of the same division, was posted on the extreme left of the general line. Shaler's brigade, of Wheaton's division, was held in reserve near the left center. The artillery of the corps was placed under the orders of the chief of artillery of the Army of the Potomac.

On the next morning and subsequently the following changes were made in the positions stated above: Russell's brigade was sent to the extreme left of the line, General Wright taking command of the troops of this corps there stationed. Subsequently it was returned to the left center, and on the following day it was placed in position, relieving a brigade of the Fifth Corps. Torbert's brigade was sent to the center, reporting to Major-General Newton, and remained in position until the morning of the 5th. Eustis' brigade was sent to the right center, also reporting to Major-General Newton. Shaler's brigade was also ordered to the left, and then to the right, and subsequently returned to the left center, and held in reserve.

During these movements the troops were more or less exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, but, with the exception of the evening of July 2, they were at no time seriously engaged.

On July 5, Wright's division, supported by the rest of my command, was sent forward to determine the position of the enemy, who was discovered to be in retreat through Fairfield in the direction of Hagerstown. The rear of the column was shelled for a short time in the morning, and in the evening a brisk artillery fire was opened upon his wagon trains in the vicinity of Fairfield, while the infantry pursued the rear guard, which was posted to protect the passage of the trains; 250 prisoners were captured during the day.

On the following day the enemy continued his retreat through the mountain pass, with a strong rear guard well posted, with artillery in position.
During the night the corps marched to Emmitsburg, with the exception of Neill's brigade, which was detached and sent in pursuit of the retreating column. From Emmitsburg I marched by way of Hamburg to Middletown, and thence to Boonsborough, Md.

On July 11, the enemy was posted near Funkstown, Md., and the corps moved up and took position, after crossing Beaver Creek. The Vermont Brigade (Grant's, of the Second Division) were deployed as skirmishers, covering a front of over 2 miles, and during the afternoon repulsed three successive attacks made in line of battle. The remarkable conduct of the brigade on this occasion deserves high praise.

On July 13, my command was placed in the general line of battle in the vicinity of Hagerstown, connecting with the Eleventh Corps on the right and the Fifth Corps on the left, and continued in this position, with occasional sharp skirmishing, until the enemy retired from the front and during the night recrossed the Potomac. He was closely followed to the river by Wright's division and the rest of the command.

On the day following the retreat of the enemy, I moved by way of Boonsborough and Middletown to Berlin, and crossed the river in rear of the army, and continued my march by way of Union, Rectortown, and Barbee's Cross-Roads to Manassas Gap, and thence by way of Barbee's Cross-Roads to Warrenton.

During the operations herein reported, the conduct of the troops was admirable. The marches were very severe, and the hardships undergone were greater than in any previous campaign.
The casualties of the corps were as follows.* A nominal list has been already forwarded.

Very respectfully,
 JOHN SEDGWICK,
 Major-General, Commanding Sixth Army Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

* Embodied in revised statement, p. 182.
_______________

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
September 12, 1863.

GENERAL: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 227, Paragraph III, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, August 24, 1863, I respectfully report that no guns were captured by or captured from my command during the recent operations in Maryland and Pennsylvania.

I am, general, very respectfully,

 JOHN SEDGWICK,
 Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.
_______________

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
October 8, 1863.

GENERAL: I respectfully report that the number of Confederates buried by this command at Gettysburg was 4 officers and 91 enlisted men; total, 95.

I am, general, very respectfully,
JOHN SEDGWICK,
Major-General, Commanding Sixth Corps.
 Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Potomac.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43),  p. 663-4; George William Curtis, Correspondence of John Sedgwick, Major-General, Volume 2, p. 138-42

Saturday, January 3, 2015

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, June 23, 1864

June 23, 1864

All were up at an early hour and ready for an advance, which had been ordered. On the right, towards the Gregory house, we were already against them, and I suppose my friend there, Major Crow, had seen us under more hostile circumstances.  . . . By 4.30 General Meade started for General Wright's Headquarters at the Williams house, where he ordered me to stay, when he left at seven.  . . . I rode about with General Wright, who visited his line, which was not straight or facing properly. That's a chronic trouble in lines in the woods. Indeed there are several chronic troubles. The divisions have lost connection; they cannot cover the ground designated, their wing is in the air, their skirmish line has lost its direction, etc., etc. Then General Meade gets mad with the delay. The commanders say they do as well as they can, etc. Well, Ricketts ran one way and Russell another; and then the 2d Corps — how did that run? and were the skirmishers so placed as to face ours? and what would General Birney do about it? How long was the line? could it advance in a given direction, and, if so, how? All of which is natural with a good many thousand men in position in a dense wood, which nobody knows much about. All this while the men went to sleep or made coffee; profoundly indifferent to the perplexities of their generals; that was what generals were paid for. When General Wright had looked a great deal at his line, and a great deal more at his pocket compass, he rode forth on the left to look at the pickets, who were taking life easy like other privates. They had put up sun-shades with shelter-tents and branches, and were taking the heat coolly. . . .

About this time a Vermont captain (bless his soul!) went and actually did something saucy and audacious. With eighty sharpshooters he pushed out boldly, drove in a lot of cavalry, and went a mile and a quarter to the railroad, which he held, and came back in person to report, bringing a piece of the telegraph wire.  . . . Some time in the morning, I don't exactly know when, the signal officers reported a large force, say two divisions, marching out from the town, along the railroad, whereof we heard more anon. At noon there still had been no advance, and General Wright went to General Birney to arrange one. There was General Meade, not much content with the whole affair. They all pow-wowed a while, and so we rode back again, through the dreary woods, through which fires had run. It was after two when we returned. Now then — at last — all together — skirmishers forward! And away they go, steadily. Oh, yes! but Rebs are not people who let you sit about all the day and do just as you like; remember that always, if nothing else. There are shots away out by the railroad — so faint that you can scarce hear them. In comes a warm sharpshooter: “They are advancing rapidly and have driven the working party from the railroad.” Here come the two divisions, therefore, or whatever they are. “Stop the advance,” orders General Wright. “General Wheaton, strengthen that skirmish line and tell them to hold on." The remainder of Wheaton's division is formed on the flank, and begins making a breastwork; more troops are sent for. The fire of the skirmishers now draws nearer and gets distinct; but, when the reinforcement arrives, they make a stout stand, and hold them.  . . . All the while the telegraph is going: “Don't let 'em dance round you, pitch into them!” suggests General Meade (not in those exact words). “Don't know about that — very easy to say — will see about it,” replies the cautious W.; etc., etc. Pretty soon the cavalry comes piling in across the Aiken oat-field; they don't hold too long, you may be certain. This exposes the flank of the picket line, which continues to shoot valiantly. In a little while more, a division officer of the day gallops in and says they have broken his skirmishers and are advancing in line of battle. But the Rebels did not try an approach through the open oat-field: bullets would be too thick there; so they pushed through the woods in our rear. I could hear them whooping and ki-yi-ing, in their peculiar way. I felt uncomfortable, I assure you. It was now towards sunset. Our position was right in the end of the loop, where we should get every bullet from two sides, in event of an attack. General Grant, of the Vermont Brigade, walked up and said, in his quiet way: “Do you propose to keep your Headquarters here?” “Why not?” says Ricketts. “Because, when the volleys begin, nothing can live here.” To which Ricketts replied, “Ah?” as if someone had remarked it was a charming evening, or the like. I felt very like addressing similar arguments to General Wright, but pride stood in the way, and I would have let a good many volleys come before I would have given my valuable advice. A column of attack was now formed by us, during which the enemy pushed in their skirmishers and the bullets began to slash among the trees most spitefully; for they were close to; whereat Wright (sensible man!) vouchsafed to move on one side some seventy yards, where we only got accidental shots. And what do you think? It was too dark now for us to attack, and the Rebs did not — and so, domino, after all my tremendous description! Worse than a newspaper isn't it? I was quite enraged to be so scared for no grand result.1
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1 “I look on June 22d and 23d as the two most discreditable days to this army that I ever saw! There was everywhere, high and low, feebleness, confusion, poor judgment. The only person who kept his plans and judgment clear was General Meade, himself. On this particular occasion Wright showed himself totally unfit to command a corps.” — Lyman's Journal.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 173-6