General Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, January 20, 1864

(Confidential.)

 HEADQUARTERS, 20th January, 1864.

HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President Confederate States.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have delayed replying to your letter of the 4th until the time arrived for the execution of the attempt on New Berne. I regret very much that the boats on the Neuse and Roanoke are not completed. With their aid, I think, success would be certain. Without them, though the place may be captured, the fruits of the expedition will be lessened and our maintenance of the command of the waters in North Carolina uncertain. I think every effort should be made now to get them into service as soon as possible. You will see by the enclosed letters to Generals Pickett and Whiting the arrangements made for the land operations. The water expedition I am willing to trust to Colonel Wood. If he can succeed in capturing the gunboats, I think success will be certain, as it was by aid from the water that I expected Hoke to be mainly assisted.

In view of the opinion expressed in your letter, I would go to North Carolina myself; but I consider my presence here always necessary, especially now when there is such a struggle to keep the army fed and clothed. General Early is still in the Valley. The enemy there has been reinforced by troops from Meade's army and [by] calling down General Averell with his cavalry. I do not know what their intentions are. Report from General Early' yesterday stated that Averell with his cavalry had started from Morehead. I will, however, go to North Carolina if you think it necessary. General Fitz Lee brought out of Hardy no prisoners, 250 horses and mules, 27 wagons, and 460 head of cattle. He captured 40 wagons, but 13 turned over on the mountains and had to be abandoned. He had also to leave behind between 100 and 200 head of cattle. The difficulties he encountered were very great, owing to the extreme cold, ice, storms, etc. Nearly all his men were frost-bitten, some badly; many injured by the falling of their horses. He got within six miles of Paddytown, but could not cross the mountains, owing to the icy roads and the smoothness of his horses. He could take with him neither artillery nor wagons.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 324

General Robert E. Lee to Major General George Pickett, January 20, 1864

(Confidential.)

 HEADQUARTERS, January 20, 1864.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. PICKETT,

Commanding, etc., Petersburg, Va.

GENERAL: From all the information I have received, I think the garrison at New Berne can be captured, and I wish it tried, unless upon close examination you find it impracticable. You can use for that purpose Barton's, Kemper's, Corse's, and as much of Ranson's brigades as you can draw to that point. I shall send in addition Hoke's brigade from this army. General Hoke is familiar with the vicinity of New Berne, has recently returned from a visit to that country, and it is mainly upon his information that my opinion has been formed. He will hand you this letter and explain to you the general plan which at this distance appears to me the best. You can modify it according to circumstances developed by investigation and your good judgment. It is proposed that General Barton shall pass south of Trent River and attack the forces said to be stationed behind Brice's Creek, get possession of the railroad to Beaufort, cut off reinforcements from that quarter, and take the town in reverse. General Hoke will move down between the Trent and the Neuse, endeavor to surprise the troops on Bachelor's Creek, silence the guns in the star fort and batteries near the Neuse, and penetrate the town in that direction; Whitford's battalion, or such other force as may be designated, to move down north of the Neuse, occupy if they cannot capture Fort Anderson at Barrington Ferry, and endeavor to take in flank with the batteries the line south of the Neuse, so as to lighten Hoke's work. The night previous to the land attack Colonel Wood of the Navy with 200 men in boats will descend the Neuse and endeavor to surprise and capture the gunboats in that river, and by their aid drive the enemy from their guns. General Whiting will be requested on the day appointed for the attack to threaten Swansborough with the troops he has north of the Cape Fear, so as to fix the attention of the enemy at Morehead City, etc., and to cooperate otherwise in the general plan. Everything will depend upon the secrecy, expedition, and boldness of your movements. General Barton should move first, and be strong enough to resist any combination of the forces from New Berne and Beaufort. The cavalry had better accompany him to cut the telegraph and railroad, gain information, etc. General Hoke with his own brigade should move next, the force north of the Neuse to keep pace with him. Colonel Wood will attend to his part.

If successful, everything in New Berne should be sent back to a place of security. In that event, too, it is hoped that by the aid of the gunboats water transportation can be secured, the enemy driven from Washington, Plymouth, etc., and much subsistence for the army obtained. I wish you therefore to follow up your success. It will also have the happiest effect in North Carolina and inspirit the people. I propose Major Dearing for the command of the artillery of the expedition. With the two battalions of Longstreet's corps near Petersburg there should be twelve 10 pounder Parrotts and two 2O-pounder Parrotts; two 2O-pounder Parrotts will be sent from Richmond. At Kinston I understand there are four Napoleons and one 3-inch rifle. From Branch's battalion I hope you will get more rifle guns, of which, if possible, you should have about twenty and as many Napoleons as you desire. The guns and ammunition must be sent by railroad and the horses by common route. See that you have a sufficiency of ammunition and subsistence. I wish you also not to interrupt the general travel of the railroad, but to use the empty trains going south for the transportation of troops, etc. When the day of attack is fixed notify General Whiting. If you have to use the telegraph, merely say, "The day is ____;" name the day of the month — he will comprehend. Commit nothing to the telegraph that will disclose your purpose. You must deceive the enemy as to your purpose, and conceal it from the citizens. As regards the concentration of troops, you may put it on the ground of apprehension of an attack from New Berne. General Hoke will give out that he is going to arrest deserters and recruit his diminished regiments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 322-3

General Joseph E. Johnston to Brigadier General William H. C. Whiting, March 15, 1862 – 10:40 a.m.

RAPPAHANNOCK BRIDGE, March 15, 1862 – 10.40 a.m.

Brigadier-General WHITING:

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have just received the dispatches by Captain Randolph, duplicates of which were delivered yesterday by a courier, who bore a brief reply to General Holmes.

The depot at Fredericksburg, unless very small, should be broken up. A point well in rear should be chosen.

It was my intention in falling back to take a line on which the two bodies of troops could readily unite against the body of the enemy operating against either. The Government wishes us to be within reach, also, of the troops on the east and southeast of Richmond. The large force in the valley and the good roads hence to Culpeper Court-House and Gordonsville make it not impossible that McClellan, who seems not to value time especially, may repair this railroad and advance upon both routes, uniting the valley troops with his own. On every account we must be within supporting distance of each other. I can't understand why you should fight with the Rappahannock in your rear. You should, it seems to me, be on its south side. I cannot join you on the north side without crossing at Fredericksburg.

Stuart reported last night the enemy in heavy force at Cedar Run, 12 miles from here. He has made no report this morning. I am waiting for one. Should have moved to-day towards the Rapidan but for the necessity of sustaining him and avoiding the appearance to the men of falling back from the enemy.

I shall cross and be in condition to co-operate with you as soon as this railroad – worse than that at Harper's Ferry – will get off our stores.

Tell General H. not to have a depot at Fredericksburg. Depots should never be on a defensible frontier. Let him attend to that immediately.

Yours, truly,

 J. E. JOHNSTON.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 5 (Serial No. 5), p. 1101-2

William H. C. Whiting to Major Robert Anderson, April 15, 1861

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL FORCES, C. S. A.,

Charleston, April 15, 1861.

The commanding general directs that the commanding officer of the garrison of Fort Sumter will bury the unfortunate soldier who has been accidentally killed by explosion of misplaced powder while saluting his flag. He will be buried with all the honors of war in the parade of the fort.

By order of Brigadier-General Beauregard:

W. H. C. WHITING,

Adjutant and Engineer General.

Copy furnished to--

Major ROBERT ANDERSON, U. S., First Regiment of Artillery.

P. S. – The wounded will receive the best attention, and will be placed in the State hospital.

By order of General Beauregard:

 W. H. C. WHITING,

Adjutant and Engineer General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume I, Serial 1, p. 15-6

Contrasts & etc.

Contrasts --- Gen. McClellan --- Somebody Blundered at Williamsburg – Our Advance – Military Jealousies – The Commander, The President, and the Secretary of War – Battle of York River – Obstruction of the Pamunkey – Maps.

CAMP AT ELTHAM, NEW KENT CO., VA,

SUNDAY, May 11^th, 1862.

Last Sunday the army was convulsed with excitement. Thousands of armed men were plunging onward in pursuit of a flying enemy.  Away off in the distance there was a sound of angry tumult, arising from the swamps and forests.  To-day, how serene and placid the scene!  Beautiful fields arrayed in living green, a calm, blue May sky, fragrant breezes from the Sunny South cooling the heated atmosphere, and the voice of praise and of prayer rising from the midst of embattled hosts.  But all this is the calm which presages the dreadful storm. * * *  The word comes that Gen. McClellan is coming into camp, and there is a grand rush to see him.

GEN. M’CLELLAN HERE.

The General paid this army a flying visit, halting temporarily at Gen. Sedgwick’s headquarters.  The troops greeted him with the heartiest enthusiasm.  I believe I commit no impropriety in stating that I am satisfied that the great battle is almost at hand.  It may take place before this is printed.  The enemy have evacuated every point connecting with Richmond, for the purpose of giving battle on the Chickahominy.  Their central point is at Bottom Bridge and the Chickahominy, on the perimeter of a semicircle formed by the meandering of the stream.  They are supposed to be protected from blank attacks by the creeks and deep swamps.  General McClellan did not express an opinion respecting the numbers of the enemy, but remarked “they are on the Chickahominy in force.”  The lowest estimate of their numbers, by careful commanders, is one hundred and twenty five thousand, but there are sound reasons for placing the number at one hundred and fifty thousand – of whom, perhaps, fifty thousand are new conscripts.  Our videttes are already in close juxtaposition with their outposts.

Yesterday afternoon two of our gunboats ascended the Pamunkey to White House, some seventeen miles above this camp, and about seven above and to the right of New Kent Court House, at the point, I am informed, where the Richmond and York River Railway crosses the Pamunkey.

OUR ADVANCE.

Gen. Stoneman also advanced to that point last night, meeting and driving before him a considerable force of rebels, killing five, wounding a number, and taking some prisoners, two of his men being killed and three wounded. – Our troops have gone forward to-day, and the whole army is disposed within supporting distance of the front.  This general fact would be presupposed.  I state it to calm any apprehensive inquiry that might be made.  I may say, likewise, that the General seems cheerful and confident, and since the battle of Williamsburg, he relies upon his volunteers to obey orders and emulate their leaders.

CABALS.

In infer from certain mysterious expressions among military men, that somebody blundered at Williamsburg, but the utterances are so cabalistic that I doubt the propriety of venturing an opinion.  Decision of character and consistency of purpose seem to have been the deficiencies of which compliant is made.  I am not competent to decide whether such insinuations are justifiable or whether they are the utterances of military cabals.  I sometimes fear that Old West Point and Young West Point do not agree.  As Young West Point has done so well, generally, in this war, my predictions are rather favorable to them.  Yet, I would rather not know so much about military collisions among our own officers.  While I dwell upon this point the reader will pardon me for submitting that the Secretary of War does not appear to be sustaining Gen. McClellan as he ought, otherwise he would not send exhausted or incompetent Brigadiers to the Commander, when he deserves a more vigorous and better qualified class of officers.  Just here, I would also remark that the special friends of Gen. McClellan are striving to widen the breach between the Secretary of War and himself, by representing that it was the former who subdivided the army into corps, for the purpose of crippling the latter.  Now, I think that my authority for saying that this was President Lincoln’s work is indisputable.  You will have observed, probably, that the N. Y. Herald is prone to couple the President and General McClellan as fides achate, and to mention the latter and the War Secretary as bitterly antagonistic.  Here are wheels within wheels.  I shall not be accused of an attempt to widen any breach or of puffing anybody who does not merit praise, but I shall be as just as I can to all concerned, no matter who is hurt.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

I do not know whether the casualty list at Williamsburg will be published or not, but I know that our loss was about 2,500.  The rebel loss was greater.  They captured some of our pieces, and we recaptured all but four of them, and some of theirs, leaving a handsome balance in our favor.  This bloody victory ought to satisfy the public that the evacuation of Yorktown was a fortunate event for us, and that the rebels are not irretrievably demoralized.  The truth is not always agreeable but in the long run it is the best principle.

THE BATTLE OF YORK RIVER.

There are further developments about the affair of Wednesday last.  It appears that Gen. Gustavus Smith was in command of the rebels and that Gen. Whiting led his own brigade. – Gen. Joe Johnston was also on the field and had a powerful force in reserve.  We were not fast enough to accomplish all we desired and intended, and our troops made a lucky escape.  Had the rebels pushed us, they might have destroyed an entire division.  The risk was too great, however, and they could not know how far to venture.  Readers who have followed my sketch of the siege of Yorktown will have observed that it has cost our army at least 3,000 brave men to clear the peninsula.  It has cost the rebels more, if that is any satisfaction, besides stores and a hundred pieces of artillery, large and small.

OBSTRUCTION OF THE PAMUNKEY.

Officers of the gunboats report that thirty five schooners were sunk in Pamunkey by the rebels to obstruct the transit of our flotilla, but they proved inefficient, our boats passing them as easily as if no obstructions had been planted.  If James river is blockaded in a similar manner the city of Richmond may be approached in a similar manner, the city of Richmond may be approached by boats drawing eight feet of water.

MAPS.

The popular war maps, including Lloyd’s railway map, mislead all who refer to them for geographical information.  In the latter the Richmond and York River Railroad is laid south of the Pamunkey, running through the town of New Kent Court House.  The road really runs north of the river from West Point to White House, seven miles beyond Kent C. H., where it crosses the river.  The turnpike runs almost due west from West Point to Richmond, but whether the army will march on that line is a question which I cannot determine.   W. D. B.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, May 24, 1862, p. 2