Sunday, June 14, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase, Thursday, September 11, 1862

Two weeks since Hooker drove Ewell at Bristow Station — and what weeks! Ten days of battle, and then such changes, — changes in which it is difficult to see the public good! How singularly all our worst defeats have followed Administrative co—no, blunders! McDowell defeated at Bull Run, because the Administration would not supercede Patterson by a General of more capacity, vigor and devotion to the cause. McClellan defeated at Richmond, because the Administration recalled Shields and forced Fremont to retire from the pursuit of Jackson, in order that McDowell's force might be concentrated at Manassas to be sent to McClellan before Richmond. Pope defeated at Bull Run because the Administration persisted in keeping McClellan in command of the Army of the Potomac, after full warning that, under his lead and influence, that army would not cooperate effectively with Pope.

After breakfast this morning Mr. Hamilton took leave of me, and I prepared to go to Fairfax Seminary to visit Butterfield, who, according to the papers, is sick there. Before starting, however, I thought best to send Bannister to the War Department to learn if any-thing of importance had occured. He returned with a note to the effect that nothing important had come from the army but that an important question was for consideration and decision, and if I would come up he would send for Genl. Halleck and the President. Went up immediately. It rained. On arriving at the War Department, found Genl. Wright, of Penna., there, with a request from Gov. Curtin to call into active service all the able bodied men of the State. The President, Gen. Halleck and Mr. Stanton submitted the question, “What answer shall be returned to Gov. Curtin?” — Gen. H. thought the important thing was to mass all the force possible on this side the enemy, and defeat him; and that a general arming of Pennsylvania would not be sufficiently available to warrent the vast expenses sure to be incurred. — Mr. Stanton expressed no-opinion as to defeat of the enemy from this side, but thought Gov. Curtins proposal too large to be entertained, and stated that the arms for a general arming could not be furnished.

I asked Gen. H., “What force, in your opinion, has the enemy?” — “From the best evidence I have — not satisfactory, but the best — I reckon the whole number in Maryland and the vicinity of Washington, at 150,000.” — “How many in Maryland?” “Two-thirds probably, or 100,000.” — “What in your judgment as a soldier, are the designs of the enemy?” — “Impossible to judge with certainty. Suppose he will do what I would do if in his place — rest, recruit, get supplies, augment force, and obtain all possible information; and then strike the safest and most effectual blow he can — at Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. If not strong enough to strike a blow, he will, after getting all he can, attempt to cross into Virginia.” — “You think, there is no probability of an advance into Pennsylvania at present.” —  “None, unless a raid.” —Upon these statements, I expressed the opinion, that, considering the situation of our troops sent out to attack the rebel army, it was not impossible that a raid, at least, would be attempted into Pennsylvania, and that Gov. Curtin was wise in making provision for it; that the proposition to arm the whole people was, however, too broad; and that I thought it would be well to authorize the Governor to call out as many troops as could be armed with the arms he reported himself as having — say 30,000. The President said he was averse to giving the order, on the score of expense; but would think of it till to-morrow.

The President and Secy. Stanton having left the room, I took occasion to ask Gen. Halleck what, in his judgment, were the causes of the demoralization of the troops. He replied, there were several causes; first, the incapacity of officers from inexperience, or want of ability or character; second, the want of proper discipline; third, — a political cause, the action of the late Congress in its abolition and confiscation measures, which were very distasteful to the army of the West, and, as he understood, also to the army of the Potomac. I expressed my conviction that the influence of the last was exaggerated, and dropped the subject. I abandoned the idea of visiting Butterfield and returned to the Department, where I transacted usual routine business.

In the evening, called to enquire for Mrs. Douglas, taking some—

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 74-5

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