Very much of the new we reprint from the rebel journals we
interpret by the rule of contraries, so that their averment that Beauregard has
gone to New Orleans, of instance, persuades us that he will soon turn up a good
way from that city. Still, we are inclined
to believe their late story that Jeff. Davis has set out for the South West,
because, many reasons concur in designating that as his most desirable
locality. We believe the Rebels will not
meet our great Potomac Army in open battle, but will [wait] for opportunities
to attack portions of it in superior force, as lately as Winchester; but should
no such be afforded them, they will gradually retire as our main body advances,
hoping only to detain it in Virginia until the season is too far advanced and
the heat too fervid for offensive operations in the Cotton States. Such seems to be the general purpose of the
present Rebel strategy in Virginia.
On the other hand, we see much that indicates a
determination on the part of Secession chiefs to strike a sudden and heavy blow
in the South-West. They are evidently
concentrating their forces at Corinth or some other point near the south line
of Tennessee, with intent to hurl the great mass of them suddenly on an exposed
detachment of ours, thus repeating the lesson of Bull Run, Wilson’s Creek, and
Lexington. We Trust they are to be
baffled in this game by the cautious energy of Gen. Halleck; and, if they
should not be able to fight at the advantage they meditate, we believe they
will make a virtue of necessity, and fight a desperate battle any how, hoping
by success to recover Tennessee, or at any rate protect “the South proper” form
invasion and restoration to the Union.
The vigor and skill of our generals are quite likely to interfere with
these calculations; but we are satisfied that, if left to their own devices,
the Rebel chiefs will not soon fight
a great battle in Virginia, but will
fight one in the South-West.
The “Anaconda” plan of surrounding and crushing a rebellion
exposes those who adopt it to great and obvious hazards. Since Napoleon’s early campaign, every tyro
in the art of war understands that the first canon is, “Be strongest at the
point of actual and decisive conflict, no matter how weak everywhere else.” The rebels profited by their fidelity to this
rule at Bull Run, and in most of their triumphs, as we have since done at Fort
Donelson, Roanoke Island, &c. To
comprehend the value and importance of this rule is easy enough; to obey and
profit by it requires a mastery of the military art. But the rebels, holding the inferior position
and operating upon much the shorter lines of communication, can conform to it
more easily than the Unionists who confront them. And only a most resolute offensive on all
points can prevent an army engaged in active operations, as has been recently
witnessed. And their advantage of
position is so fairly counterbalanced by our command of the seas and our superiority
in both gunboats and transports on the Western rivers, that it should not, and
probably will not, be allowed to prove of much avail.
– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye,
Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, April 5, 1862, p. 3
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