June 18th, Tuesday morning, 7 A.M. — I continue my letter for a moment before breakfast. We are going
across the Potomac at nine—Tom and I and the two Lees. I dined with Seward
entirely enfamille, no one being present but his son and son's wife. . .
.
We had, among the
first acts of the new anti-slavery administration, agreed to do, what we have
been so freely reproached for not doing, when our Government was controlled by
an administration of which Jefferson Davis was a member, and we are met on the
threshold lby the declaration that his invitation to pirates of all nations is
sufficient to convert them into good, honest belligerents.1
Had the English
declaration been delayed a few weeks or even days, I do not think it would ever
have, been made, and I cannot help thinking that it was a most unfortunate
mistake. Nevertheless I am much less anxious about the relations between our
two countries than I was. Nobody really wishes a rupture on either side, and I
think that the natural love of justice and fair play which characterises
England will cause regret at the mistake which has been committed. Moreover,
there can hardly be much doubt, despite the misrepresentations of an
influential portion of the English press and of some public men, that the
English nation will understand the true position of the American Government in
this great crisis.
We have
circumscribed slavery, and prevented for ever its extension by one square inch
on this continent, and at the same time we mean to preserve our great republic
one and indivisible. It is impossible that so simple and noble a position as
this should fail to awaken the earnest sympathy of nine-tenths of the English
nation. To the question whether the task is beyond our strength, I can only
repeat that General Scott — than whom a better strategist or a more lofty-minded
and honourable man does not exist — believes that he can do it in a year; and
so far as I can make out his design, it is by accumulating so much force and by
making such imposing demonstrations everywhere, as to convince the rebels that
their schemes — already proved to have been false in all their calculations
founded on co-operations in the Free States — have become ridiculous. Thus
without any very great effusion of blood perhaps, the rebellion may be starved
out and broken to pieces. Mr. Seward says that the great cause of the revolt is
the utter misapprehension in the Slave States of the Northern character. It has
hitherto been impossible to make the sections thoroughly acquainted with each
other. Now they will be brought together by the electric shock of war. And they
will learn to know each other thus, which is better than not knowing each other
at all — and so on. I give you a brief idea of his schemes and hopes.
He read me a long
despatch which he is sending to-day to the French and English Governments. He
did this of course confidentially, and because, as he was pleased to say, I had
been fighting our battles so manfully in England, for he, like every one else,
praised warmly my Times' letter. I suppose ultimately this despatch will
be published; but I have only room now to say that I think it unobjectionable
in every way — dignified, reasonable, and not menacing, although very decided.
I said little in reply, and soon afterwards we went to the White House, in
order to fall upon Abraham's bosom. I found the President better- and
younger-looking than his pictures. He is very dark and swarthy, and gives me the
idea of a very honest, confiding, unsophisticated man, whose sincerity of
purpose cannot be doubted. I will say more of him in my next, for I am obliged
to close suddenly. By the way, let me correct one statement in another part of
my letter. Both the President and Seward tell me that, in Scott's opinion, an
attack by the rebels on the lines before Washington is not impossible. It would
be a desperate and hopeless venture. Maryland has just gone for the Union by a
very large majority, electing all members of Congress. Good-bye. God bless you
and my darlings!
Ever your affectionate
J. L. M.
_______________
1 Early in the administration of Mr. Lincoln,
the Government of the United States proposed to accede to the four articles in
regard to maritime warfare adopted at the Congress of Paris in 1856. The
British Government, however, wished to state that by the proposed convention
for such accession Great Britain did not mean to undertake any engagement
bearing upon the Civil War in America. The President decided that such a declaration
was inadmissible, as the United States could accede to the Articles only upon a
perfectly equal footing with all the other parties. The American Government was
aggrieved by the obstruction offered by Great Britain to its accession to the
four articles, especially as Great Britain was at the time secretly proposing
to the Confederate Government to accept but three of them. The exequatur of the
British Consul at Charleston, who had been the intermediary of the negotiations
of his Government with the Confederate authorities, was revoked by the
President.
SOURCE: George
William Curtis, editor, The Correspondence of John Lothrop Motley in
Two Volumes, Volume 1, p. 380-2
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