Cabinet met, but neither the President nor Secretary of War
were present. Some conversation took place concerning Generals. Mr. F. W.
Seward (the Secretary of State being out of town) said nothing. All others
agreed that we needed a change in Commander of the Army. Mr. Blair referred to
the report [support?] he had constantly given McClellan, but confessed that he
now thought he could not wisely be trusted with the chief command. Mr. Bates
was very decided against his competency, and Mr. Smith equally so. Mr. Welles
was of the same judgment, though less positive in expression.
After some time, while the talk was going on, the President
came in, saying that not seeing much for a Cabinet meeting to-day, he had been
talking at the Department and Head Quarters about the War. The Secretary of War
came in. In answer to some inquiry, the fact was stated, by the President or
the Secretary that McClellan had been placed in command of the forces to defend
the Capital — or rather, to use the President's own words, he “had set him to
putting these troops into the fortifications about Washington,” believing that
he could do that thing better than any other man. I remarked that this could be
done equally well by the Engineer who constructed the Forts; and that putting
Genl. McClellan in command for this purpose was equivalent to making him second
in command of the entire Army. The Secretary of War said that no one was now
responsible for the defense of the Capital; — that the Order to McClellan was
given by the President direct to McClellan, and that Genl. Halleck considered
himself relieved from responsibility although he acquiesced, and approved the
Order; — that McClellan could now shield himself, should anything go wrong,
under Halleck, while Halleck could and would disclaim all responsibility for
the Order given. The President thought Genl. Halleck as much responsible as
before; and repeated that the whole scope of the Order was, simply, to direct
McClellan to put the troops in the fortifications and command them for the
defense of Washington. I remarked that this seemed to me equivalent to making
him Commander in Chief for the time being, and that I thought it would prove
very difficult to make any substitution hereafter, for active operations, — that
I had no feeling whatever against Genl. McClellan; — that he came to the
command with my most cordial approbation and support; — that until I became
satisfied that his delays would greatly injure our cause, he possessed my full
confidence; — that after I had felt myself compelled to withdraw that
confidence, I had (since the President, notwithstanding my opinion that he
should, refrained from putting another in command) given him all possible
support in every way, raising means and urging reinforcements;—that his
experience as a military commander had been little else than a series of
failures;—and that his omission to urge troops forward to the battles of Friday
and Saturday, evinced a spirit which rendered him unworthy of trust, and that I
could not but feel that giving the command to him was equivalent to giving
Washington to the rebels. This and more I said. Other members of the Cabinet
expressed a general concurrence but in no very energetic terms. (Mr. Blair must
be excepted but he did not dissent.)
The President said it distressed him exceedingly to find himself
differing on such a point from the Secretary of War and Secretary of the
Treasury; that he would gladly resign his plan; but he could not see who could
do the work wanted as well as McClellan. I named Hooker, or Sumner, or Burnside
— either of whom, I thought, would be better.
At length the conversation ended and the meeting broke up,
leaving the matter as we found it.
A few Tax Appointments were lying on the table. I asked the
President to sign them which he did, saying he would sign them just as they
were and ask no questions. I told him that they had all been prepared in
accordance with his directions, and that it was necessary to complete the appointments.
They were signed, and I returned to the Department.
SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical
Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 63-5
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