Athens, Ga., Dec. 31st, 1847.
Dr. Sir: I
avail myself of a leisure moment to reply to your communication of the1
——. Your favor in sending to this office the National Intelligencer is duly
appreciated, in as much as the editor of the Union admits that his reports of
the proceedings of Congress, thus far, have not been accurate. I find this to
be the case particularly in regard to Mr. Giddings's instructions to the
Judiciary Committee relative to the slave trade in the District of Columbia.
These instructions as reported in the Intelligencer open up the whole question
of property in slaves; and the double vote of Mr. Winthrop, in first deciding
the tie vote against the South, and afterwards upon the correction of the
Journal repeating his position, is peculiarly unfortunate for the Southern
Whigs. It is also an unlucky omen for them that Northern Democrats were
the only members from the non-slaveholding states, voting against the agitation
of the question. In the other wing of the Capitol a similar mishap seems to
have befallen them almost at the same time upon the movement of John P. Hale on
the same subject, in the disposition of which I observe all the Northern
democratic Senators voting with the entire South to lay the question of
reception on the table, and all the Northern Whigs voting against it.
Previous to this conclusive demonstration by the Northern
Democrats in both Houses came the resolutions by Mr. Dickinson of New York,
which assume the same ground taken by Mr. Dallas in Pennsylvania last summer.
Satisfactory as this position must be to us in all respects (leaving out the
absolute monomania of the Calhoun faction) it becomes us to ascertain, before
we adopt it as the basis of our action in the next campaign, whether the
Northern Democracy will rally to its support? This is the all important
preliminary question to be decided before we can properly solve that other
question, whether we should take the basis of Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Dallas. I
perceive in your letter the expression of a belief that our Northern friends
will come to the support of Dallas and Dickinson and Cass ground. By the bye,
this is the first and most gratifying intimation that we have here of Gen.
Cass's position. Resuming the question which of these two propositions, leaving
the matter to be settled by the Territories or adopting the Missouri basis,
will best unite the Northern Democracy, I can only say at this distance you
have a better opportunity of judging than I can possibly have as to the actual
state of things North. If our friends there are of the opinion that they can
stand better upon one of these propositions than the other, of course we should
let them have their own way. They are certainly better judges than we can be of
what they may be able to effect. It is needless to say to you that the Southern
Democrats will be satisfied with either position.
You will however agree with me that great caution should be
observed by us in weighing the evidences of the state of Northern feeling.
Buchanan, Dallas, Cass are all for the Presidency; and may not the fact that
Mr. Buchanan having broken ground on the Missouri basis have operated upon the
other two to vary their positions from his, and thus mislead us? Both of the
latter have numerous friends who will adhere to their positions, and could we
be assured they were sufficiently numerous to give tone to the Northern
Democracy, the question would be settled. But I apprehend that the surer data of
conjecture on our part should be laid deeper in the nature of things than the
mere personal or immediate political attachments to individuals, however
prominent they may be.
Upon a survey of the whole ground, I must express to you my
strong apprehension that our Northern friends can not be brought to any other
position with half the strength that they would rally to the Missouri basis.
You will perceive that I treat it alone as a practical question. Let me now
assign you a few reasons. First, the Herkimer men in New York will not yield to
Mr. Dickinson's or Dallas's ground. Their pride, their passions, are all
enlisted against it. Secondly, the Democrats of New Hampshire occupy the same
ground as the Radicals of New York. If we adopt the Missouri basis may we not
yet hope that both of these States will yet be saved? The ground of my hopes
may be found in Clingman's speech. It is difficult to convince our Northern
friends that Congress has not the complete control of this question. You know
how they stood in relation to the constitutional power over the District. The
Missouri basis will enable them to retain their constitutional prepossessions
and yet to seek refuge from an unjust, unequal or destructive exercise of the
power.
The South on the other hand may retain its constitutional
opinions and yet yield to the Missouri basis for the sake of peace and harmony.
This idea that constitutional questions may not be compromised is all
fallacious. In Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Cartwright on the powers of the state
and federal governments, speaking of questions of this nature he says, “if they
can neither be avoided or compromised,” etc.
There is however another and more conclusive view in favor
of occupying the compromise ground to which I ask your attention. Henry Clay
holds the card in his hand which he is yet to play upon this subject. He
will wait for us to shew our hands. If he finds we have adopted Mr. Dickinson's
ground — he will himself trump us with the Missouri Compromise, and win the
game m spite of us! Clingman's speech shews how easily it could be
done. Mr. Clay is the father (if I mistake not) of that Compromise. He will
rally his party to it and kill us with the word Union. We might struggle
in vain. The Democratic party of Georgia is already committed, in the
convention of last spring. Our press, with but one exception, are committed
also. Virginia is committed, South Carolina even is now committed by a
unanimous vote to abide the Missouri line. Leading politicians all through the
South are committed. We can not war against a position which we have already
sanctioned." If the issue should be formed by the two parties in this
manner, Mr. Clay would sweep through the non-slaveholding States with
irresistible power, and find none but a partial check, at least in the South. I
am therefore of the opinion that, strengthened as the Compromise has been by
the recent developments in the South, and strong as it must be in the nature of
things North, that we should never relinquish it. We must occupy it in the Baltimore
Convention or the Whigs will, and kill us off at the South with our men
weapons. You will have observed also in the recent democratic meeting at
the Museum in Philadelphia that the Missouri line was adopted. This is at least
evidence of the state of feeling and opinion among our Northern friends. It was
unanimously adopted.
The Herkimer men will send delegates to the convention. So
will the Conservatives. Both delegations should be admitted. The Ultras will
eventually find so strong a current against them, that they would fain compromise.
But if that word is not to be known in the Convention, they will return
home enemies to the party. This will probably be the case with the N. Hampshire
delegation also. It may also be the case with Maine and Rhode Island. Besides,
the Compromise is so intimately blended with the idea of preserving the
Union that hosts of men of all parties, North and South, will follow
the banner upon which it may be inscribed. If we do not write it upon ours, the
Whigs will upon theirs, and we must fall under its influence.
P. S. — The Ultras, North, says that Dallas's proposition
virtually excludes Union. That's their feeling—we must respect it, though
erroneous. Exclusion either way would weaken the bonds of Union, and
thus our own shaft would recoil upon us.
_______________
1 Blank in the original.
SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The
Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p.
91-4
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