Hopkins Holsey to Howell Cobb, December 31, 1847

Athens, Ga., Dec. 31st, 1847.

Dr. Sir: I avail myself of a leisure moment to reply to your communication of the¹ ——. Your favor in sending to this office the National Intelligencer is duly appreciated, in as much as the editor of the Union admits that his reports of the proceedings of Congress, thus far, have not been accurate. I find this to be the case particularly in regard to Mr. Giddings's instructions to the Judiciary Committee relative to the slave trade in the District of Columbia. These instructions as reported in the Intelligencer open up the whole question of property in slaves; and the double vote of Mr. Winthrop, in first deciding the tie vote against the South, and afterwards upon the correction of the Journal repeating his position, is peculiarly unfortunate for the Southern Whigs. It is also an unlucky omen for them that Northern Democrats were the only members from the non-slaveholding states, voting against the agitation of the question. In the other wing of the Capitol a similar mishap seems to have befallen them almost at the same time upon the movement of John P. Hale on the same subject, in the disposition of which I observe all the Northern democratic Senators voting with the entire South to lay the question of reception on the table, and all the Northern Whigs voting against it.

Previous to this conclusive demonstration by the Northern Democrats in both Houses came the resolutions by Mr. Dickinson of New York, which assume the same ground taken by Mr. Dallas in Pennsylvania last summer. Satisfactory as this position must be to us in all respects (leaving out the absolute monomania of the Calhoun faction) it becomes us to ascertain, before we adopt it as the basis of our action in the next campaign, whether the Northern Democracy will rally to its support? This is the all important preliminary question to be decided before we can properly solve that other question, whether we should take the basis of Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Dallas. I perceive in your letter the expression of a belief that our Northern friends will come to the support of Dallas and Dickinson and Cass ground. By the bye, this is the first and most gratifying intimation that we have here of Gen. Cass's position. Resuming the question which of these two propositions, leaving the matter to be settled by the Territories or adopting the Missouri basis, will best unite the Northern Democracy, I can only say at this distance you have a better opportunity of judging than I can possibly have as to the actual state of things North. If our friends there are of the opinion that they can stand better upon one of these propositions than the other, of course we should let them have their own way. They are certainly better judges than we can be of what they may be able to effect. It is needless to say to you that the Southern Democrats will be satisfied with either position.

You will however agree with me that great caution should be observed by us in weighing the evidences of the state of Northern feeling. Buchanan, Dallas, Cass are all for the Presidency; and may not the fact that Mr. Buchanan having broken ground on the Missouri basis have operated upon the other two to vary their positions from his, and thus mislead us? Both of the latter have numerous friends who will adhere to their positions, and could we be assured they were sufficiently numerous to give tone to the Northern Democracy, the question would be settled. But I apprehend that the surer data of conjecture on our part should be laid deeper in the nature of things than the mere personal or immediate political attachments to individuals, however prominent they may be.

Upon a survey of the whole ground, I must express to you my strong apprehension that our Northern friends can not be brought to any other position with half the strength that they would rally to the Missouri basis. You will perceive that I treat it alone as a practical question. Let me now assign you a few reasons. First, the Herkimer men in New York will not yield to Mr. Dickinson's or Dallas's ground. Their pride, their passions, are all enlisted against it. Secondly, the Democrats of New Hampshire occupy the same ground as the Radicals of New York. If we adopt the Missouri basis may we not yet hope that both of these States will yet be saved? The ground of my hopes may be found in Clingman's speech. It is difficult to convince our Northern friends that Congress has not the complete control of this question. You know how they stood in relation to the constitutional power over the District. The Missouri basis will enable them to retain their constitutional prepossessions and yet to seek refuge from an unjust, unequal or destructive exercise of the power.

The South on the other hand may retain its constitutional opinions and yet yield to the Missouri basis for the sake of peace and harmony. This idea that constitutional questions may not be compromised is all fallacious. In Mr. Jefferson's letter to Mr. Cartwright on the powers of the state and federal governments, speaking of questions of this nature he says, “if they can neither be avoided or compromised,” etc.

There is however another and more conclusive view in favor of occupying the compromise ground to which I ask your attention. Henry Clay holds the card in his hand which he is yet to play upon this subject. He will wait for us to shew our hands. If he finds we have adopted Mr. Dickinson's ground — he will himself trump us with the Missouri Compromise, and win the game m spite of us! Clingman's speech shews how easily it could be done. Mr. Clay is the father (if I mistake not) of that Compromise. He will rally his party to it and kill us with the word Union. We might struggle in vain. The Democratic party of Georgia is already committed, in the convention of last spring. Our press, with but one exception, are committed also. Virginia is committed, South Carolina even is now committed by a unanimous vote to abide the Missouri line. Leading politicians all through the South are committed. We can not war against a position which we have already sanctioned." If the issue should be formed by the two parties in this manner, Mr. Clay would sweep through the non-slaveholding States with irresistible power, and find none but a partial check, at least in the South. I am therefore of the opinion that, strengthened as the Compromise has been by the recent developments in the South, and strong as it must be in the nature of things North, that we should never relinquish it. We must occupy it in the Baltimore Convention or the Whigs will, and kill us off at the South with our men weapons. You will have observed also in the recent democratic meeting at the Museum in Philadelphia that the Missouri line was adopted. This is at least evidence of the state of feeling and opinion among our Northern friends. It was unanimously adopted.

The Herkimer men will send delegates to the convention. So will the Conservatives. Both delegations should be admitted. The Ultras will eventually find so strong a current against them, that they would fain compromise. But if that word is not to be known in the Convention, they will return home enemies to the party. This will probably be the case with the N. Hampshire delegation also. It may also be the case with Maine and Rhode Island. Besides, the Compromise is so intimately blended with the idea of preserving the Union that hosts of men of all parties, North and South, will follow the banner upon which it may be inscribed. If we do not write it upon ours, the Whigs will upon theirs, and we must fall under its influence.

P. S. — The Ultras, North, says that Dallas's proposition virtually excludes Union. That's their feeling—we must respect it, though erroneous. Exclusion either way would weaken the bonds of Union, and thus our own shaft would recoil upon us.

_______________

¹ Blank in the original.

SOURCE: Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Editor, The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911, Volume 2: The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb, p. 91-4

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: May 10, 1861

The ladies are postponing all engagements until their lovers have fought the Yankees. Their influence is great. Day after day they go in crowds to the Fair ground where the 1st S. C. Vols, are encamped, showering upon them their smiles, and all the delicacies the city affords. They wine them and cake them — and they deserve it. They are just from taking Fort Sumter, and have won historic distinction. I was introduced to several of the privates by their captain, who told me they were worth from $100,000 to half a million dollars each. The Tribune thought all these men would want to be captains! But that is not the only hallucination the North labors under, judging from present appearances; by closing our ports it is thought we can be subdued by the want of accustomed luxuries. These rich young men were dressed in coarse gray homespun! We have the best horsemen and the best marksmen in the world, and these are the qualities that will tell before the end of the war. We fight for existence — the enemy for Union and the freedom of the slave. Well, let the Yankees see if this “new thing” will pay.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 33

Samuel Gridley Howe to John M. Forbes, August 19, 1861

Boston, August 19,1861.

. . . The public need something, or somebody, some word, or some blow, to magnetize them, or else they will be fearfully demoralized in a month. The word must be emancipation, and war upon slaveholders as such — as a distinct class — as the authors of all the present ills.

Can you not confer with the governor about this? You cannot keep up public interest, much less public enthusiasm, about an abstraction (at least of a worldly and temporal nature), and Union is a mere abstraction now; it touches not, and cannot touch, the public heart.

As one blow, I suggest what I vainly suggested last spring, an expedition to land in or about Albemarle Sound, composed mainly of blacks, who would go into the Dismal and other swamps and raise the thousands of refugees there to go out and make sallies and onslaughts upon the enemy; and so make a diversion.

It would at least cause a worse than Bull Run panic. There are plenty of men in Canada, resolute and intelligent refugees, who would enlist in such an enterprise. It cannot, however, be done by private means. Can any other be had, think you?

I have mentioned the matter of expedition to the Dismal Swamp to the governor, but to him only. Please not speak of it to any one else.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 238

William H. Seward to Abraham Lincoln, April 1, 1861

SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT’S CONSIDERATION.

April 1, 1861.

1. We are at the end of a month‘s Administration, and yet without a policy either domestic or foreign.

2. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

3. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies, for both domestic and foreign affairs, would not only bring scandal on the Administration, but danger upon the country.

4. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

5. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and, perhaps, not sufficiently explained. My system is built on this idea, as a ruling one, namely: that we must change the question, before the public, from one upon Slavery, or about Slavery, for a question upon Union or Disunion. In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question to one of Patriotism or Union.

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not, in fact, a slavery or party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by Union men in the South. I would, therefore, terminate it, as a safe means of changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last Administration created the necessity.

For the rest, I would simultaneously defend all the forts in the Gulf, and have the Navy recalled from foreign stations, to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.

This will raise distinctly the question of Union or Disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically, at once. I would seek explanation from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to reuse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention, and if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, would convene Congress, and declare war against them.

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. For this purpose, it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it, incessantly.

Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree, and abide. It is not my especial province; but I neither seek to evade, nor assume responsibility.

SOURCE: Frederick W. Seward, Seward at Washington, as Senator and Secretary of State, p. 535