Diary of Salmon P. Chase, Monday, July 21, 1862.

Early this morning, Count Gurowski called and told me that yesterday, at a great dinner at Mr. Tassarft's — the only Americans present being Governor Seward and Senator Carlile — Governor Seward remarked that he had lately begun to realize the value of a Cromwell, and to appreciate the coup d'etat; and that he wished we had a Cromwell or a coup d'etat for our Congress. The Count said that the diplomats present were very much disgusted, and that the language of Governor Seward injured the administration much in the estimation of all intelligent foreigners.

After the Count left, I received a notice to attend a Cabinet meeting, at 10 o'clock. It has been so long since any consultation has been held that it struck me as a novelty.

I went at the appointed hour, and found that the President had been profoundly concerned at the present aspect of affairs, and had determined to take some definitive steps in respect to military action and slavery. He had prepared several Orders, the first of which contemplated authority to Commanders to subsist their troups in the hostile territory — the second, authority to employ negroes as laborers — the third requiring that both in the case of property taken and of negroes employed, accounts should be kept with such degrees of certainty as would enable compensation to be made in proper cases — another provided for the colonization of negroes in some tropical country.

A good deal of deal of discussion took place upon these points. The first Order was universally approved. The second was approved entirely; and the third, by all except myself. I doubted the expediency of attempting to keep accounts for the benefit of the inhabitants of rebel States. The Colonization project was not much discussed.

The Secretary of War presented some letters from Genl. Hunter, in which he advised the Department that the withdrawal of a large proportion of his troups to reinforce Genl. McClellan, rendered it highly important that he should be immediately authorized to enlist all loyal persons without reference to complexion. Messrs. Stanton, Seward and myself, expressed ourselves in favor of this plan, and no one expressed himself against it. (Mr. Blair was not present.) The President was not prepared to decide the question but expressed himself as averse to arming negroes. The whole matter was postponed until tomorrow.

After the meeting of the Cabinet, Messrs. Speed, Holloway and Casey — the first, a distinguished lawyer of Louisville, a state senator, and now Postmaster of the city; the second, a large slaveholder in South-western Kentucky; the third, M. C. from the South-western District — called at the Department. Messrs. Speed and Casey were decided in favor of the most decided measures in respect to Slavery and the employment of negroes in whatever capacity they were fitted for. Messrs. Speed and Casey assured me that Mr. Holloway (although a large slaveholder) was in favor of every measure necessary for success and that he held no sacrifice too great to insure it. He would cheerfully give up slavery if it became necessary or important.

Mr. Casey, Mr. Horton and Genl. Pope dined with me. Mr. Horton condemned severely the conduct of the campaign at the Peninsula and the misrepresentations made to the public in regard to it. Genl. Pope expressed himself freely and decidedly in favor of the most rigorous measures in the prosecution of the war. He believed that, in consequence of the rebellion, Slavery must perish, and with him it was only a question of prudence as to the means to be employed to weaken it. He was in favor of using every instrument which could be brought to bear against the enemy; and while he did not speak in favor of a general arming of the slaves as soldiers, he advocated their use as laborers, in the defence of fortifications, and in any way in which their services could be made useful without impairing the general tone of the service. He said he was now waiting, by request of the President, the arrival of Genl. Halleck; and he regarded it as necessary for the safety and success of his operations that there should be a change in the command of the Army of the Potomac. He believed that Genl. McClellan's incompetency and indisposition to active movements were so great, that if, in his operations, he should need assistance, he could not expect it from him. He had urged upon the President the importance of superseding Genl. McClellan before the arrival of Halleck, representing the delicacy of Halleck's future position, and the importance of having the field clear for him when he assumed the general command. The President, however, had only promised that he (Genl. Pope) should be present at his interview with Genl. Halleck, when he would give the latter his opinion of McClellan.

SOURCE: Robert B. Warden, An Account of the Private Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, p. 437-8; Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 45-7.