A special Cabinet-meeting. The subject was the Proclamation
for emancipating the slaves after a certain date, in States that shall then be
in rebellion. For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the
President says never lost sight of. When it was submitted, and now in taking up
the Proclamation, the President stated that the question was finally decided,
the act and the consequences were his, but that he felt it due to us to make us
acquainted with the fact and to invite criticism on the paper which he had
prepared. There were, he had found, not unexpectedly, some differences in the
Cabinet, but he had, after ascertaining in his own way the views of each and
all, individually and collectively, formed his own conclusions and made his own
decisions. In the course of the discussion on this paper, which was long,
earnest, and, on the general principle involved, harmonious, he remarked that
he had made a vow, a covenant, that if God gave us the victory in the
approaching battle, he would consider it an indication of Divine will, and that
it was his duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation. It might be
thought strange, he said, that he had in this way submitted the disposal of
matters when the way was not clear to his mind what he should do. God had
decided this question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was right,
was confirmed and strengthened in his action by the vow and the results. His
mind was fixed, his decision made, but he wished his paper announcing his
course as correct in terms as it could be made without any change in his
determination. He read the document. One or two unimportant amendments
suggested by Seward were approved. It was then handed to the Secretary of State
to publish to-morrow. After this, Blair remarked that he considered it proper
to say he did not concur in the expediency of the measure at this time, though
he approved of the principle, and should therefore wish to file his objections.
He stated at some length his views, which were substantially that we ought not
to put in greater jeopardy the patriotic element in the Border States, that the
results of this Proclamation would be to carry over those States en masse to
the Secessionists as soon as it was read, and that there was also a class of
partisans in the Free States endeavoring to revive old parties, who would have
a club put into their hands of which they would avail themselves to beat the
Administration.
The President said he had considered the danger to be
apprehended from the first objection, which was undoubtedly serious, but the
objection was certainly as great not to act; as regarded the last, it had not
much weight with him.
The question of power, authority, in the Government to set
free the slaves was not much discussed at this meeting, but had been canvassed
by the President in private conversation with the members individually. Some
thought legislation advisable before the step was taken, but Congress was
clothed with no authority on this subject, nor is the Executive, except under
the war power, — military necessity, martial law, when there can be no
legislation. This was the view which I took when the President first presented
the subject to Seward and myself last summer as we were returning from the
funeral of Stanton's child, — a ride of two or three miles from beyond
Georgetown. Seward was at that time not at all communicative, and, I think, not
willing to advise, though he did not dissent from, the movement. It is momentous
both in its immediate and remote results, and an exercise of extraordinary
power which cannot be justified on mere humanitarian principles, and would
never have been attempted but to preserve the national existence. The slaves
must be with us or against us in the War. Let us have them. These were my
convictions and this the drift of the discussion.
The effect which the Proclamation will have on the public
mind is a matter of some uncertainty. In some respects it would, I think, have
been better to have issued it when formerly first considered.
There is an impression that Seward has opposed, and is
opposed to, the measure. I have not been without that impression myself,
chiefly from his hesitation to commit himself, and perhaps because action was
suspended on his suggestion. But in the final discussion he has as cordially
supported the measure as Chase.
For myself the subject has, from its magnitude and its consequences,
oppressed me, aside from the ethical features of the question. It is a step in
the progress of this war which will extend into the distant future. A favorable
termination of this terrible conflict seems more remote with every movement,
and unless the Rebels hasten to avail themselves of the alternative presented,
of which I see little probability, the war can scarcely be other than one of
emancipation to the slave, or subjugation, or submission to their Rebel owners.
There is in the Free States a very general impression that this measure will
insure a speedy peace. I cannot say that I so view it. No one in those States
dare advocate peace as a means of prolonging slavery, even if it is his honest
opinion, and the pecuniary, industrial, and social sacrifice impending will
intensify the struggle before us. While, however, these dark clouds are above
and around us, I cannot see how the subject can be avoided. Perhaps it is not
desirable it should be. It is, however, an arbitrary and despotic measure in
the cause of freedom.
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 142-5
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