Saturday, January 17, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Sunday August 3, 1862


Genl. Shields came to breakfast and to visit the Ohio men of his command in the Cliffburne Hospital. He told me he desired greatly to have a command of 5000 men and be allowed to dash as he could, breaking the lines and communications of the enemy. My daughters went with him to the Hospital.

Soon after they left, I received a summons to a Cabinet meeting. The President spoke of the Treaty said to have been formed between the Cherokees and Confederates, and suggested the expediency of organizing a force of whites and blacks, in separate Regiments, to invade and take possession of their country. Statistics of the Indians were sent for, from which it appeared that the whole fighting force of the Cherokees could hardly exceed 2500 men. Mr. Usher, Assistant Secretary of the Interior was not in favor of the expedition. He thought it better to deal indulgently with deluded Indians, and make their deluders feel the weight of the Federal authority. Most, on the whole, seemed to concur with him.

Mr. Usher mentioned a report that the Louisville Democrat had come out openly for disunion, saying that it was now manifest that the Government was in the hands of the Abolitionists. The President said, this was equivalent to a declaration of hostility by the entire Douglas Party of Kentucky, and manifested much uneasiness.

There was a good deal of conversation on the connection of the Slavery question with the rebellion. I expressed my conviction for the tenth or twentieth time, that the time for the suppression of the rebellion without interference with slavery had passed; that it was possible, probably, at the outset, by striking the insurrectionists wherever found, strongly and decisively; but we had elected to act on the principles of a civil war, in which the whole population of every seceding state was engaged against the Federal Government, instead of treating the active secessionists as insurgents and exerting our utmost energies for their arrest and punishment; — that the bitternesses of the conflict had now substantially united the white population of the rebel states against us;—that the loyal whites remaining, if they would not prefer the Union without Slavery, certainly would not prefer Slavery to the Union; that the blacks were really the only loyal population worth counting; and that, in the Gulf States at least, their right to Freedom ought to be at once recognized, while, in the Border States, the President's plan of Emancipation might be made the basis of the necessary measures for their ultimate enfranchisement; — that the practical mode of effecting this seemed to me quite simple; — that the President had already spoken of the importance of making of the freed blacks on the Mississippi, below Tennessee, a safeguard to the navigation of the river; — that Mitchell, with a few thousand soldiers, could take Vicksburgh; — assure the blacks freedom on condition of loyalty; organize the best of them in companies, regiments etc. and provide, as far as practicable for the cultivation of the plantations by the rest; — that Butler should signify to the slaveholders of Louisiana that they must recognize the freedom of their workpeople by paying them wages; — and that Hunter should do the same thing in South-Carolina.

Mr. Seward expressed himself as in favor of any measures likely to accomplish the results I contemplated, which could be carried into effect without Proclamations; and the President said he was pretty well cured of objections to any measure except want of adaptedness to put down the rebellion; but did not seem satisfied that the time had come for the adoption of such a plan as I proposed.

There was also a good deal of conversation concerning the merits of Generals. I objected pretty decidedly to the policy of selecting nearly all the highest officers from among men hostile to the Administration, and continuing them in office after they had proved themselves incompetent, or at least not specially competent, and referred to the needless defeat of McClellan and the slowness of Buell. Seward asked what I would do. I replied, Remove the men who failed to accomplish results, and put abler and more active men in their places. He wished to know whom I would prefer to Buell. I answered that if I were President, or Secretary of War authorized to act by the President, I would confer with the General in Chief; require him to name to me the best officers he knew of; talk the matter over with him; get all the light I could; and then designate my man.

As much as any thing, the clearing of the Mississippi by the capture of Vicksburgh was discussed. I reminded the President that after the evacuation of Corinth it would have been an easy matter to send down a few thousand men and complete our possession of the river; and of his own plan of putting Genl. Mitchell at the head of his own division and Curtis' army, and sending him to take Vicksburgh, almost adopted more than two weeks ago. Mr. Usher suggested that since Genl. Halleck had decided against this plan, on the ground that Mitchell's division could not be spared from Buell's command, and Curtis' army was needed to prevent a foray from Arkansas into Missouri, it might be well to raise a special force by volunteering for this one object of taking Vicksburgh, opening the Mississippi and keeping it open. I heartily seconded this idea and it was a good deal talked over.

At length, the President determined to send for Genl. Halleck and have the matter discussed with him. The General came, and the matter was fully stated to him both by Gov. Seward and myself. He did not absolutely reject the idea, but thought the object could be better accomplished by hastening the new levies; putting the new troops in the position now occupied by the old regiments; and setting the last to the work of opening the Mississippi. He expressed the strongest convictions as to the importance of the work, and his desire to see it accomplished at the earliest possible period. At this moment, however, the necessary troops could not be spared for the purpose. Taking into consideration the delay incident to raising a special force, equal, perhaps, to that demanded by Genl. Halleck's plan, and the other disadvantages it was thought best to drop the idea.

In connection with this subject, Genl. Halleck spoke of the distribution of troops in the West. He said that Hardee had broken up his camp south of Corinth, and transferred his army to Chattanooga, where he now had probably 40 or 50,000 men; that Price had attempted to cross the river into Arkansas, but had as yet failed to accomplish his purpose; that a considerable force was, however, advancing northward into Missouri; and that he had sent a division and brigade, say 7,000 men, to Curtis (making his whole force about 17,000) and instructed him to prevent the invasion of Missouri; that he had also detached from Grant about 15,000 men, say three divisions, to take position at Decatur to support Buell if necessary; that Grant had still under his command about 43,000, of whom 7,000 under Jackson had been ordered to the to watch Price; that Buell had 60,000, with which force he was approaching Chattanooga. These numbers give the whole force in the West, exclusive of troops occupying St. Louis and various Posts and Camps north of the Ohio; — Buell, 60,000 — Grant including detachments, except Curtis', 58,000 — Curtis, 17,000 — in all, 135,000 men, excellent troops. He stated McClellan's army at present and fit for duty at 88,000; absent on leave 33,000; absent without leave, 3,000; present but sick, 16,000 — in all, say, 140,000. Another statement makes the number fit for duty 91,000, and the total 143,000.

The President read a communication from Genl. H. proposing that 200,000 militia should be drafted for 9 months, and that the 300,000 men to fill old and form new regiments should be obtained without delay; and to prevent the evil of hasty and improper appointments and promotions, that a Board of Officers should be organized, to which all proposed action of that sort should be referred. The General condemned, respectfully but as decidedly, the inconsideration which has hitherto marked the action of the Government in this respect, and stated one case where a Colonel had been tried and convicted of gross misconduct and was on the point of being dismissed, when he came on to Washington and returned with a Brigadier's Commission.

The General commanded my sincere respect by the great intelligence and manliness he displayed, and excited great hopes by his obvious purpose to allow no lagging and by his evident mastery of the business he had taken in hand. I cannot agree with him as to the expediency of retaining Buell and McClellan in their important commands; and I was sorry to hear him say, in reply to a question of the President, as to what use could be made of the black population of the borders of the Mississippi, “I confess, I do not think much of the negro.”

Neither Mr. Stanton nor Mr. Blair were present at the meeting to-day.

When the Cabinet Council broke up, I proposed to Mr. Usher, who made a most favorable impression on me, to ride home in my carriage but he was called back by the President, and I finding my carriage had not come, rode home with Mr. Bates.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 53-7

No comments: