There has been fighting for two or three days at
Fredericksburg, and our troops were said to have crossed the river. The rumor
at the War Department — and I get only rumor — is that our troops have done
well, that Burnside and our generals are in good spirits; but there is
something unsatisfactory, or not entirely satisfactory, in this intelligence,
or in the method of communicating it. When I get nothing clear and explicit at
the War Department I have my apprehensions. They fear to admit disastrous
truths. Adverse tidings are suppressed, with a deal of fuss and mystery, a
shuffling over of papers and maps, and a far-reaching vacant gaze at something
undefined and indescribable.
Burnside is on trial. I have my fears that he has not
sufficient grasp and power for the position given him, or the ability to handle
so large a force; but he is patriotic, and his aims are right. It appears to me
a mistake to fight the enemy in so strong a position. They have selected their
own ground, and we meet them there. Halleck is General-in-Chief, but no one
appears to have any confidence in his military management, or thinks him able
to advise Burnside.
Just at this juncture a great force has been fitted out and
sent off under Banks. It has struck me as strange that Banks was not sent up
James River with a gunboat force. Such a movement would have caused a diversion
on the part of the Rebels and have thrown them into some confusion, by
compelling them to draw off from their strong position at Fredericksburg. But
to send an army up James River, from which he has just withdrawn McClellan,
against the remonstrance of that general and in opposition to the opinion of
many good officers, would, in the act itself, be a confession unpleasant to
Halleck. This is the aspect of things to me. A day or two will solve the
problem of this generalship and military management.
Assistant Secretary Fox had yesterday an invitation to dine
with Lord Lyons, and informed me before he went that he had an idea or
intimation there was a wish to learn what were my views of the recent slave
treaty. I told him there was no secret or ulterior purpose on my part, and that
my opinions were frankly stated in the correspondence with Seward. Returning in
the evening, Fox called at my house and said that the object was as I [sic] had
supposed. After hearing from Fox what my views were, Lord Lyons said he well
understood and rightly appreciated my position, and was inclined to believe I
was correct. Assured of that and that I would come into the measure, he would
assent to a declaratory or supplementary clause ratifying the matter, and make
the belligerent right of search and the treaty right of search compatible. I
requested Fox, as they had sought to get my opinion through him, to let Lord
Lyons and Secretary Seward both understand that I had no hidden purpose but
only the rights of the country in view.
This whole roundabout proceeding is one of Seward’s schemes
— and he thinks it a very cunning one — to get his mistake rectified without
acknowledging his error. Lord Lyons is no more blind to this trick than I am.
Wrote Naval Committee on Friday respecting the construction
of some large steamers for cruising, and, if necessary, offensive purposes
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864,
p. 191-3
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