When I went to
Cabinet-meeting only Seward was there with the President. I was prompt to time;
Seward was in advance. Directly on entering, the President handed me a message
which he had prepared, with an accompanying letter from Seward, relative to the
proposed Constitutional changes which Congress had requested him to forward to
the State Executives. The whole was very well done. As Seward had sent off
authenticated copies to the Governors, the ready, officious act was very well
gotten over by a declaration in the message that it was a ministerial act which
was not to be understood as giving the sanction of the Executive or of the
Cabinet to the proceeding.
I made a
complimentary remark on the message, with my regret that there had not been
more time and consideration in sending off copies to the States. Seward was
annoyed by the remark and said he had followed the precedent of 1865, but the
President was, I saw, not at all displeased with my criticism.
Subsequently, when
all the Cabinet were present except Stanton and Speed, the message and papers
were read. McCulloch expressed his approval of the message and said he should
have been glad to have had it more full and explicit. In this I concurred.
Dennison took
exception, which served to show that he had been consulted by the Radicals and
had advised or consented to the course previously adopted. He and Seward each
made some remarks, and Dennison showed much indignation because Seward had used
the word "trick" on the part of Congress in sending this resolution
to the President. Seward disclaimed the word and denied he had used it. I was
not aware he had done so.
Dennison proceeded
to say that Bingham had introduced, or been the means of introducing, the
resolution; had consulted with him; that his object was pure; that he approved
it; that although the proposed Amendment was not in the precise shape he
wished, he, nevertheless, gave it his support; that it had been approved by the
Republicans of Ohio, and were he at home in October, he should vote for
candidates who favored it.
I assured him that
therein he and I differed, for that I would not vote for the Amendment, nor
knowingly vote for any man who supported it.
Seward said he had
no doubt that the Republicans of the Auburn district would oppose it very
generally, and that if he was at home in November he expected to vote for men
who would oppose it.
I took higher
ground. I cared not what parties favored or what parties opposed it, my
convictions and opinions were in my own keeping, and I would vote for no man of
any party who favored that Amendment.
Dennison said that
with the explanations of Mr. Seward he took no exceptions, but he expected to
act with the Union Party of Ohio.
Harlan said he
thought the views of each would be reconciled. I doubted if we were a unit.
Party seemed to have a stronger hold than country.
When the others had
left, the President told McCulloch and myself that he had struck from the
message the concurrence of his Cabinet. This I regretted, but he said
Dennison's assent, even with his explanation, was not full and gave him an
opportunity to evade, if convenient hereafter; he, therefore, chose to stand uncommitted,
or trammeled by others. Before sending off the message, which he had done while
we were there, he had erased the words referred to.
Dennison has
evidently been tampered with and has made up his mind to go with his party,
though aware that the party organization is being committed against measures of
the Administration. He certainly does not yet anticipate leaving the Cabinet on
that account, but will soon come to it. How the President is to get along with
such a Cabinet I do not see. McCulloch spoke of it and said there were four in
opposition. "Yes," said the President, "from what we now see of
Dennison, and if we count Stanton after his patched-up speech; but it is
uncertain where he wishes to place himself." There is no uncertainty on
the part of any but the President. Speed and Harlan should, from a sense of
propriety and decent self-respect, resign. This the President has repeated to
me many times. Why he should cling to Stanton, who is working insidiously
against him, and to Seward, who works with and shields Stanton, either doing
more against him than the two feeble men of whom he speaks so freely, I do not
understand. Stanton he knows is not in accord with him, though he does not avow
it, and if Seward is presumably friendly, the fact that all the influence which
he can exercise is dumb or hostile is notorious.
SOURCE: Gideon
Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and
Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 535-8
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