Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: July 1, 1863

The intelligence of the capture of Harrisburg and York, Pa., is so far confirmed as to be admitted by the officers of the Federal flag of truce boat that came up to City Point yesterday.

Of the movements of Hooker's army, we have the following information:

Headquarters, Cavalry Division,

June 27th, 1863.

general:— I took possession of Fairfax C. H. this morning at nine o'clock, together with a large quantity of stores. The main body of Hooker's army has gone toward Leesburg, except the garrison of Alexandria and Washington, which has retreated within the fortifications.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. B. Stuart, Major-General.

The Northern papers say that our cruiser Tacony, taken from them, has destroyed twenty-two of their vessels since the 12th inst.; but that our men burnt her at last. Her crew then entered Portland, Maine, and cut out the steam cutter Caleb Cushing, which they subsequently blew up, and then were themselves taken prisoner.

The President has decided that the obstructions below the city shall not be opened for the steam iron-clad Richmond to go out, until another iron-clad be in readiness to accompany her.

Capt. Maury, at Mobile, writes that the two iron-clads, Trent and Nashville, now ready for sea, might take New Orleans and keep it. The President directs the Secretary of War to consult the Secretary of the Navy, and if they agreed, the attempt should be made without loss of time. So, probably, we shall have news from that quarter soon.

The militia and Department Guard (soon to be called the National Guard, probably) were notified to day to be in readiness at a minute's warning. It is said positively that Dix is advancing toward the city. Well, let him come.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 366-7

John A. Andrew to Gideon Welles, July 16, 1863

Commonwealth Of Massachusetts,

Executive Department, Boston, July 16, 1863.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 11th instant, in reply to mine of the 1st. I should have answered you at once, but have been prevented from doing so until to-day by absorbing engagements arising from the outbreak here on the 14th instant.

I regret that any expression of mine should be regarded by you as unjust, and as the statement in question is not at all material to the substance of the letter I desire that it may be considered as withdrawn, but with the explanation that it was made upon the authority of municipal officers and citizens of Gloucester, the shipping of which town more than any other was affected by the Tacony, and that it was based by them upon the assurances of their own shipmasters that, after the Tacony first made her appearance in the neighborhood of the Vineyard Sound, four days passed, during which she burned numerous vessels, before Federal cruisers made their appearance there in pursuit of her. I am glad now to be able, on the authority of the Department, to assure my informants that, during these four days, more than twenty vessels of war, of which no less than fourteen were steamers, were engaged in one direction or another in such pursuit. It was not at all my intention to deny that any of these vessels had been sent out after the Tacony, for as to that the sources of information were not open to me. What I was, however, on the authority of intelligent shipmasters of Gloucester, induced to believe and to say was that no such armed vessels were sent along this coast for its protection until after the Tacony had swept the Vineyard Sound. But any discussion on this point is immaterial to the purpose of my letter of the 1st instant. It would be profitless to continue it. I am glad to infer from your statement of the great number of vessels sent in pursuit of the Tacony that some of them must have been chasing her near the Vineyard Sound during the four days in question, in which she captured and burned the Gloucester fishermen, and that therefore the Gloucester people were probably mistaken in their statements to me, and I beg that my remark may be considered as withdrawn.

The purpose of my letter of the 1st instant was to do my duty to the State over which I preside, by urging upon the Navy Department hereafter to guard against such raids as that of the Tacony by stationing armed vessels along this coast, and particularly within easy reach of the Vineyard Sound. My fruitless request in that behalf last February, at the time when the Alabama was reported as in this neighborhood, is perhaps within your recollection. I was then refused. Later in the year the effort was renewed by me, and I was assured on May 2 that, expressly for the protection of this coast, a fast cruiser should be stationed here always prepared for service. If the knowledge that cruisers are now along the coast is likely to prevent a repetition of such outrages as that of the Tacony, surely the same means, if they had been seasonably adopted, would have deterred the Tacony from appearing here at all. But I have no knowledge that during the six weeks which passed between the date of May 2 and the date of the appearance of the Tacony in Vineyard Sound, any fast cruiser was placed here according to the Department's assurance on the former date.

Believe me, sir, that I am deeply sensible of the difficulties as well as of the duties of the Navy Department. It is certainly a difficult duty to guard the Northern coast in addition to blockading the Southern coast, but certainly also the Department has the ability successfully to accomplish it and to prevent the recurrence of a day when, for fear of rebel cruisers, insurance shall be at the rate of 4½ per cent for freight from Philadelphia to Boston.

I beg in conclusion to forward to you copies of communications I have received from the selectmen of Provincetown while I have been writing this letter, and I have the honor to remain,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

John A. Andrew,

Governor of Massachusetts.

Hon. Gideon Welles,

Secretary of the Navy.

[Enclosure.]

The inhabitants of Provincetown are extremely anxious for a vessel to be sent to Provincetown for the protection of that harbor, as it is very much exposed to rebel invasion, they having already threatened to burn the town. It being at the extreme end of Cape Cod, the harbor is large and commodious, easy of access, sufficient depth of water for any vessel; consequently, it at times has 300 or 400 sail of vessels there at one time; and should a pirate or privateer enter he could destroy the shipping, village, the Race light, [Long] Point light, and Highland light, as we have no means of defense whatever. Our harbor is generally known, as there are many fishermen belonging to British provinces sailing from our town, and have previously sailed from there, who may now be on board of those piratical vessels already to pilot them in. They have an inducement to do so, as we have a steam packet plying between Provincetown and Boston; also a bank from which they might demand $200,000, more or less.

We therefore pray some vessel of sufficient capacity to repel any rebel invasion may be sent to our harbor as early as possible, to give us protection, until some other means are adopted for our protection, by fortification or otherwise. And not only ours, but for the numerous vessels seeking shelter in that harbor from other places. The harbor is considered to be the key of Massachusetts Bay, and one of the best in the United States.

We also pray for 150 or 200 muskets, with the necessary equipment, that we may be prepared to meet any equal foe that may attempt to land on the back of our town; also two artillery pieces on carriages and ammunition sufficient for the same.

John Nickerson,

Robert Soper,

Committee from Provincetotm.

SOURCE: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebelion, Series I, Volume 2, p. 347-8

Gideon Welles to John A. Andrew, July 11, 1863

Navy Department, July 11, 1863.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 1st instant. The alarm created by the reckless depredations of the Tacony is not surprising. Similar dangers may not be immediate, but the Navy Department has, as you probably are informed, taken measures with a view to guard against a repetition.

Two steamers — the Aries and the Iron Age — and two sailing cruisers with formidable batteries — the brig Perry and the Ethan Allen — with perhaps one armed schooner, have been, or will be, ordered to the protection of the commerce and fisheries and coasts of New England. These vessels will have orders for permanent service on that coast during the fishing season, and other cruisers will be specially detailed in cases of emergency.

The shore defenses of the towns mentioned by you and of other places on the coast belong, perhaps, strictly to a Department other than this, but any aid that the demands will allow us to extend we desire to give, and the fact that there are cruisers on coast naval service will doubtless operate to some extent as a preventive against such craft, and also afford a sense of security. The necessity of additional cruisers on the seas, the demands of our squadrons for additional vessels, and the want of seamen to man them prevent the detailing of a larger force. It is deemed best that but one of the steamers detached should be stationed at an available point where intelligence can be promptly communicated and received in order to be at any moment available. I had thought that Boston would be the best place to be selected for this purpose, but if Provincetown, in the opinion of yourself and others, is a more suitable location, I certainly should be disposed to consult your views and wishes.

I regret to learn that some of the places enumerated by you have not a single gun for their defense. Although it is not strictly within the province of this Department to supply these wants, I shall, as you are already advised, be desirous to assist you, as we have done to some extent, with such naval ordnance as we can spare for temporary batteries to protect the points exposed. Besides the legitimate duties of blockading and cruising, the Navy has been efficient in capturing forts and batteries and protecting many places, until there seems to be a reliance upon and a demand for gunboats and ironclads that can not be met and is wholly incompatible with the imperative requirements of the service in its proper element.

I need not assure you that it will be, as it has ever been, my duty to render whatever assistance is in the power of the Department, consistent with other duties, to our fellow-citizens in Massachusetts, and to respond promptly at all times to impending danger. It was therefore with surprise and regret I read your statement that vessels “were not sent until the Tacony had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.”

To this very extraordinary statement in an official paper from the chief magistrate of Massachusetts I shall respond by stating the facts.

The Tacony was captured by Read and his crew on the 12th of June. Information of the fact was communicated to the Department on the evening of the 13th of June. Within thirty minutes thereafter orders were dispatched to send public vessels immediately after the Tacony, and additional orders were given the next morning (Sunday), as also subsequently, to charter and, if necessary, to seize vessels for that purpose.

Before 12 o'clock Saturday night, the 13th of June, the steamers Young Rover, Commodore Jones, and Western World had sailed from Hampton Roads in search of the Tacony. On the following day the Seminole, Tuscarora, Dai Citing, Adela, and Virginia, all steamers, left New York, and many others,, naval and chartered vessels, followed on the 15th and 16th.

On the 15th (Monday) three chartered steamers left Philadelphia, and the next day a chartered schooner followed in pursuit of the Tacony. On the 16th five chartered vessels, and on the 17th the steamer Montgomery and bark Trinity left Boston on the same errand. The steamer Cherokee also left the same day, but from some derangement in her compass returned again and departed the next day.

I have not the means of knowing what day the Tacony entered the Vineyard Sound, but on the 20th of June she captured the Isaac Webb, bound for New York, the first capture in that vicinity reported to the Department. But the Department had sent out more than twenty vessels in pursuit of the Tacony prior to the capture of the Webb. Many had been then six days cruising for her.

Within two days from the time the Tacony was captured and appropriated to piratical purposes the Department had issued orders to send vessels in pursuit, and those orders were promptly carried into effect. Not only public vessels were dispatched, but private vessels were chartered, and orders were given to seize vessels, if necessary, for this service.

Yet your Excellency has thought proper to say no vessels were sent until the “Tacony had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.” It is not for me to reconcile your statement with these facts. I am unwilling to believe that you would have made the assertion had yon known what measures the Department had taken, and regret that you did not ascertain the facts before making it. It is not often that I devote a moment to controvert or correct even undeserved censure or misrepresentation, but this, in an official communication, seemed so wholly gratuitous and unjust that I could not, when answering your letter, omit some allusion to it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Gideon Welles,

Secretary of the Navy.

His Excellency Jno. A. Andrew,

Governor of Massachusetts, Boston.

SOURCE: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebelion, Series I, Volume 2, p. 345-6

John A. Andrew to Gideon Welles, July 1, 1863

Commonwealth Of Massachusetts,

Executive Department, Boston, July 1, 1863.

Sir: I am receiving representations daily, both oral and written, from towns and cities along the Massachusetts coast, setting forth their defenseless condition, concerning which the recent exploits of the Tacony have caused additional apprehension.

A swift war steamer stationed at Provincetown would, in my opinion, be the most effectual means under existing circumstances to promote their security. Without such a guard for the coast, a rebel vessel, manned by as daring a crew as that of the Tacony, might burn half the towns along Cape Cod, and might even lay, for a few hours such ports as Salem, Marblehead, Beverly, Gloucester, Rockport, and Newburyport, under contribution, none of which are defended by a single gun. Such a steamer as the Alabama or the Florida could, I believe, do this without so great risk as such an enterprise ought to involve. The ignorance of the rebels as to our defenseless condition is our most effectual protection in the absence of action by the Navy Department. For the present moment the Navy has cruisers all along this coast, but they are only temporarily here, and were not sent until the Tacony had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days. The presence of a swift war steamer at Provincetown, or in its neighborhood, guarding from that position both the mouths of Massachusetts Bay and of the Vineyard Sound, would probably have prevented the Tacony from venturing here at all.

I have had the honor previously to address this same request to the Department. I beg you to believe that it is only my clear sense of its importance which induces me to urge it again upon your consideration.

I have the honor to remain, sir, obediently, yours,

John A. Andrew,

Governor of Massachusetts.

Hon. Gideon Welles,

Secretary of the Navy.

SOURCE: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebelion, Series I, Volume 2, p. 340

Diary of Gideon Welles: Saturday, July 18, 1863

Have a letter from Governor Andrew, who in a matter misrepresented me; claims to have been led into error by the “Gloucester men,” and is willing to drop the subject.¹ I shall not object, for the Governor is patriotic and zealous as well as somewhat fussy and fanatical.

General Marston and others, a delegation from New Hampshire with a letter from the Governor, wanted additional defenses for Portsmouth. Letters from numerous places on the New England coast are received to the same effect. Each of them wants a monitor, or cruiser, or both. Few of them seem to be aware that the shore defenses are claimed by and belong to the War, rather than the Navy, Department, nor do they seem to be aware of any necessity for municipal and popular effort for their own protection.

Two delegations are here from Connecticut in relation to military organizations for home work and to preserve the peace. I went to the War Department in their behalf, and one was successful, perhaps both.

There is some talk, and with a few, a conviction, that we are to have a speedy termination of the war. Blair is confident the Rebellion is about closed. I am not so sanguine. As long as there is ability to resist, we may expect it from Davis and the more desperate leaders, and when they quit, as they will if not captured, the seeds of discontent and controversy which they have sown will remain, and the social and political system of the insurrectionary States is so deranged that small bodies may be expected to carry on for a time, perhaps for years, a bushwhacking warfare. It will likely be a long period before peace and contentment will be fully restored. Davis, who strove to be, and is, the successor of Calhoun, without his ability, but with worse intentions, is ambitious and has deliberately plunged into this war as the leader, and, to win power and fame, has jeopardized all else. The noisy, gasconading politicians of the South who figured in Congress for years and had influence have, in their new Confederacy, sunk into insignificance. The Senators and Representatives who formerly loomed up in Congressional debate in Washington, and saw their harangues spread before the country by a thousand presses, have all been dwarfed, wilted, and shriveled. The “Confederate Government,” having the element of despotism, compels its Congress to sit with closed doors. Davis is the great “I am.”

In the late military operations of the Rebels he has differed with Lee, and failed to heartily sustain that officer. It was Lee's plan to uncover Washington by inducing Hooker to follow him into Pennsylvania. Hooker fell into the trap and withdrew everything from here, which is surprising, for Halleck's only study has been to take care of himself and not fall into Rebel hands. But he felt himself safe if Hooker and the army were between him and Lee.

From the interrupted dispatches and other sources, it is ascertained that Lee's plan was the concentration of a force of 40,000 men at Culpeper to rush upon Washington when our army and the whole Potomac force was far away in the Valley of the Cumberland. But Davis, whose home is in Mississippi and whose interest is there, did not choose to bring Beauregard East. The consequence has been the frustration of Lee's plans, which have perished without fruition. He might have been disappointed, had he been fairly seconded. Davis has undoubtedly committed a mistake. It hastens the end. Strange that such a man as Davis, though possessing ability, should mislead and delude millions, some of whom have greater intellectual capacity than himself. They were, however, and had been, in a course of sectional and pernicious training under Calhoun and his associates, who for thirty years devoted their time and talents to the inculcation first of hate, and then of sectional division, or a reconstruction of the federal government on a different basis. Nullification was an outgrowth. When Calhoun closed his earthly career several men of far less ability sought to wear his mantle. I have always entertained doubts whether Calhoun intended a dismemberment of the Union. He aimed to procure special privileges for the South, — something that should secure perpetuity to the social and industrial system of that section, which he believed, not without reason, was endangered by the increasing intelligence and advancing spirit of the age. Many of the lesser lights — shallow political writers and small speech-makers — talked flippantly of disunion, which they supposed would enrich the South and impoverish the North. “Cotton is king,” they said and believed, and with it they would dictate terms not only to the country but the world. The arrogance begotten of this folly led to the great Rebellion.

Davis is really a despot, exercising arbitrary power, and the people of the South are abject subjects, demoralized, subdued, but frenzied and enraged, with little individual independence left, — an impoverished community, hurrying to swift destruction. “King Cotton” furnishes them no relief. Men are not permitted in that region of chivalry to express their views if they tend to national unity. Hatred of the Union, of the government, and of the country is the basis of the Confederate despotism. Hate, sectional hate, is really the fundamental teaching of Calhoun and his disciples. How is it to be overcome and when can it be eradicated? It has been the growth of a generation, and abuse of the doctrine of States' rights, — a doctrine sound and wholesome in our federal system when rightly exercised. But when South Carolina in 1832 assumed the sovereign right of nullifying the laws of the government of which she was a member, — defeating by State action the federal authority and setting it at defiance, — claiming to be a part of the Union but independent of it while yet a part, her position becomes absolutely contradictory and untenable. Compelled to abandon the power and absolute right of a State to overthrow the government which she helped to create, or destroy federal jurisdiction, the nullifiers, still discontented, uneasy, and ambitious, resorted to another expedient, that of withdrawing from the Union, and, by combining with other States, establishing power to resist the government and country. Sectionalism or a combination of States was substituted for the old nullification doctrine of States' rights. If they could not remain in the Union and nullify its laws, they could secede and disregard laws and government. Can it be extinguished in a day? I fear not. It will require time.

It is sad and humiliating to see men of talents, capacity, and of reputed energy and independence, cower and shrink and humble themselves before the imperious master who dominates over the Confederacy. Political association and the tyranny of opinion and of party first led them astray, and despotism holds them in the wrong as with a vise. The whole political, social, and industrial fabric of the South is crumbling to ruins. They see and feel the evil, but dare not attempt to resist it. There is little love or respect for Davis among such intelligent Southern men as I have seen.

Had Meade done his duty, we should have witnessed a speedy change throughout the South. It is a misfortune that the command of the army had not been in stronger hands and with a man of broader views, and that he had not a more competent superior than Halleck. The late infirm action will cause a postponement of the end. Lee has been allowed to retreat — to retire — unmolested, with his army and guns, and the immense plunder which the Rebels have pillaged. The generals have succeeded in prolonging the war. Othello's occupation is not yet gone.

_______________

1 This refers to the statement, in a letter of July 1, from Governor Andrew to Secretary Welles, that the Navy Department had sent no vessels to the defense of the Massachusetts coast till after the Confederate cruiser Tacony “had rioted along the Vineyard Sound for four days.” The Secretary, under date of July 11, showed the incorrectness of this allegation, and Governor Andrew, in his letter of the 16th, withdrew it and explained that it was made “upon the authority of municipal officers and citizens of Gloucester.”

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 375-9