Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 235. — Itinerary of the Army of Tennessee.

No. 235.

Itinerary of the Army of Tennessee.¹

November 14 to 20.—Army at Florence, Ala.

November 21.—Left Florence. Encamped to-night at Rawhide.

November 22.—Encamped to-night at the junction of the Waynesborough road with the old Nashville road.

November 23.—Encamped to-night at the iron-works, four miles from Waynesborough.

November 24.—Encamped to-night near Henryville.

November 25.—Moved to Mount Pleasant.

November 26.—Encamped to-night at Andrew Polk's.

November 27.—Crossed over to the Pulaski and Columbia pike and encamped.

November 28.—Part of the army entered Columbia this morning, which was evacuated last night.

November 29.—Army pursuing the enemy.

November 30.—Franklin was attacked at about 3 o'clock this evening. Fighting continued until about 9 o'clock at night. Thirteen general officers killed, wounded, or captured.

December 1.—Army entered Franklin, which was evacuated last night. Troops engaged to-day in burying the dead.

December 2.—Moved within four miles of Nashville and established our lines. Army headquarters at Colonel Overton's, on the Franklin pike.

December 3 to 14.—Army around Nashville. No fighting of importance. Forrest's cavalry and some infantry sent around to Murfreesborough. Some fighting around Murfreesborough, but no results. Two transports with some 300 mules captured on the Cumberland by Chalmers, but the boats were afterward recaptured.

December 15.—Enemy attacked and drove our left in some confusion. Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, and Stewart's corps gave way. Some guns captured by the enemy.

December 16.—Yankees charged our lines and were repulsed. About 3 o'clock the whole line gave way in confusion, losing guns and property, retreating in great disorder to Franklin.

December17.—Army falling back. Headquarters to-night near Spring Hill.

December 18.—Headquarters to-night at Columbia.

December 19.—Headquarters still at Columbia.

December 20.—Moved to Pulaski.

December 23.—Left Pulaski for Bainbridge.

December 24.—Some of the army reached Bainbridge to-day; the rest on the route.

December 25.—Army at and around Bainbridge.

December 26.—Pontoon bridge was completed today and the army commenced crossing. Headquarters at Bainbridge.

December 27.—Headquarters moved to Tuscumbia to-day.

December 28.—Headquarters at Tuscumbia.

December 29.—Moving on toward Corinth.

December 30.—Headquarters at Burnsville, Miss.

December 31.—Headquarters at Burnsville.

January 1, 1865.—Still at Burnsville.

January 2.—Moved to Corinth in the cars.

_______________

¹ Kept by Col. Edwin J. Harvie, assistant inspector-general, C. S. Army.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 675

Official Reports of the Campaign in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee, November 14, 1864-January 23, 1865: No. 234. — Journal of the Army of Tennessee.

No. 234.

Journal of the Army of Tennessee.¹

November 15, 1864.—Headquarters Army of Tennessee at Florence, Ala. Heavy rains in the last forty-eight hours.

November 16.—Headquarters Florence, Ala. In obedience to a general order from these headquarters, all military duties (except those that are absolutely necessary) will be suspended, this day having been set apart by the President as a day of fasting and prayer.

November 17.—Headquarters Army of Tennessee, Florence, Ala. Nothing of importance has transpired to-day.

November 18.—Headquarters Florence, Ala. General Beauregard moved his headquarters from Tuscumbia to Montgomery, Ala. General Stewart has been ordered to cross the Tennessee River with his corps to-morrow.

November 19.—Headquarters Florence, Ala. General Stewart's corps was unable to cross the river today in consequence of the bad weather and the slow progress made by the supply trains. General Lee's corps is ordered to take up line of march at 5 o'clock in the morning.

November 20.—Headquarters Florence, Ala. Stewart's corps crossed the river and moved out several miles on Lawrenceburg road. Lee's corps took up line of march at an early hour and bivouacked ten miles from this place, on road between Lawrenceburg and Waynesborough roads. The whole army will move at an early hour to-morrow.

November 21.—Cheatham's corps took up line of march at an early hour this a.m. and moved out on the Waynesborough road. Army headquarters moved at 10 a.m., and were established at 5 p.m. near Rawhide, on Waynesborough road, twelve miles north of Florence. Lee's corps, on the Chisem road, and Stewart's, on the Lawrenceburg road, resumed their march this morning.

November 22.—Cheatham's corps and army headquarters were in motion at sunrise, and after a march of eighteen miles, army headquarters were established near the intersection of the Natchez and Waynesborough roads. Cheatham's corps encamped one mile south of headquarters.

November 23.—Cheatham's corps and army headquarters took another early start this morning, and after a march of eighteen miles arrived and established headquarters at the Furnace No. 96, four miles north of Waynesborough, on the Mount Pleasant and Waynesborough road.

November 24.—Army headquarters nine miles south of Mount Pleasant, on the Waynesborough and Mount Pleasant road. Cheatham's corps continued the march on the Waynesborough and Mount Pleasant road, camping twelve miles south [of] Henryville, in the rear of Lee's corps, which came into Waynesborough and Mount Pleasant road from the Pinhook (a country road). Stewart's corps camped in rear of Cheatham's corps, having also come into Waynesborough and Mount Pleasant road from the Waterloo and Lawrenceburg road.

November 25.—Army headquarters at Mount Pleasant. Lee's corps camped just beyond town, on Columbia road; Cheatham's corps, five miles south of town, and Stewart's corps at Henryville.

November 26.—Army headquarters at Col. Andrew J. Polk's, five miles south of Columbia, on Mount Pleasant pike. Lee's corps continued the march on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia pike, going into position near Columbia, the right resting on the pike. Cheatham's corps followed Lee's, camping near army headquarters, between the Mount Pleasant and Columbia and the Pulaski pikes. Stewart's corps camped two miles beyond Mount Pleasant, on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia pike.

November 27.—Army headquarters moved from Polk's residence, on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia pike, to Mrs. Warfield's, on the Pulaski pike, three miles south of Columbia. Lee's corps remained in same position it occupied last night. Cheatham's corps crossed over from Mount Pleasant and Columbia pike across the Pulaski pike, going into position with its right resting on Duck River and the left on the Pulaski pike. Stewart's corps continued the march on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia pike, going into position with its right on the Pulaski and its left on the Mount Pleasant and Columbia pikes.

November 28.—Army headquarters continued during the day at Mrs. Warfield's residence, on the Pulaski pike, three miles south of Columbia. The army occupied the same position as designated yesterday. The enemy abandoned Columbia last night and our troops took possession at daylight this morning. General Orders, No. 37, issued to-day, prohibiting plundering by the army of both private and public property, it having been reported to General Hood that Columbia had been “wantonly and disgracefully plundered.”

November 29.—General Hood, with Cheatham's and Stewart's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, flanked the enemy's force remaining opposite Columbia, crossing Duck River about three miles above the town, and moving by a country road to the Columbia and Franklin pike, struck the enemy (who, in the meantime, had begun to retire from Columbia) near Spring Hill, but without success. The command then went into camp near Spring Hill. Army headquarters for the night were at Doctor Thompson's, two and a half miles from Spring Hill and a little to the right of the Columbia and Franklin pike. General Lee, with Clayton's and Stevenson's divisions and the artillery and teams of the army, remained at Columbia.

November 30.—The march was resumed on the Columbia and Franklin pike, Lee coming up from Columbia with the remainder of his command and the artillery. Cheatham's and Stewart's corps went into position around the enemy's works at Franklin about 4.30 p.m., engaging the enemy almost immediately, Stewart on the right and Cheatham on the left. General Hood's headquarters were on the pike, about three-fourths of a mile in rear of the line of battle. The battle closed about 12 o'clock at night. Skirmishing was going on, however, till 3 a.m., when the enemy abandoned his position, and retired upon the Franklin and Nashville pike. Cheatham's and Stewart's corps and Johnson's division, of Lee's corps, were all engaged, Clayton's and Stevenson's divisions, of Lee's corps, and the artillery not having been brought into action.

December 1.—The army moved out from Franklin during the morning on the Franklin and Nashville pike, Lee in front, Stewart next, and Cheatham in the rear, all camping on the pike, a few miles from Franklin. Army headquarters for the night just across Harpeth River from Franklin.

December 2.—The army again in motion on Franklin and Nashville pike, marching in the same order as on yesterday. Late in the evening we took position in front of Nashville, Lee's corps in the center, with its center resting upon the Franklin pike, Stewart's forming on his left and Cheatham's on his right, Forrest's cavalry protecting either flank, our line extending, as near as possible, from the Cumberland, above the city, to the Cumberland, below the city, curving forward from General Lee's center. (See confidential circular of December 2, 1864.) Army headquarters at Mr. Overton's residence, five and a half miles from Nashville, and near the Franklin and Nashville pike.

December 3.—The army occupied the same position as yesterday, with slight alterations. Army headquarters remained at Mr. Overton's.

December 4.—The army occupies the same position around Nashville. The skirmish line was advanced on some portions of the line. The cavalry, under Chalmers, captured two transports seven miles below Nashville, on Cumberland River, and some 300 mules.

December 5.—Army headquarters at Mr. Overton's house. Our line remains pretty much the same. The enemy, in heavy line of battle, drove in General Cheatham's skirmishers across the Nashville and Murfreesborough railroad this morning, but retired without attacking our line. Sears' brigade, of French's division, and Brown's brigade, of Stevenson's division, with a battery each, were sent to the vicinity of Murfreesborough to report to General Forrest. General Bate, with the force under his command, was also directed to report to General Forrest. Circular issued to-day to corps commanders for information of the army announcing the capture of “the block-house and fort at La Vergne, with commissary stores, 100 prisoners, 2 pieces of artillery, 100 small-arms and ammunition, 20 wagons, and some teams by General Forrest, and that General Bate had burned three block-houses.” General Hood made a proposition to officer commanding U.S. forces at Nashville for an exchange of the prisoners in his hands for an equal number of Confederate prisoners.

December 6.—General Thomas, commanding U.S. forces, Nashville, in reply to General Hood's proposition for an exchange of prisoners, states “that such an arrangement is impracticable, all Confederate prisoners having been sent North, and consequently placed beyond his control.” General Hood asks by telegraph of both Generals Beauregard, commanding department, and Maury, commanding Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana, to have the Memphis and Charleston Railroad repaired to Decatur, Ala., to which point he hopes to have the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad running in a day or two.

(See telegrams and letter book, office assistant adjutant-general.) Our lines around Nashville about the same, perhaps with slight alteration by corps commanders, under revision of General Hood. Slight demonstration on our (Cheatham's) right by the enemy. General Forrest's command invests Murfreesborough. The enemy reported very strongly fortified there, and with 6,000 or 8,000 troops in his forts. It is not yet determined whether an assault will be made by our forces.

December 7.—Nothing new on our line immediately around Nashville. Captain Reid, commanding at Corinth, Miss., reports, under date of December 1, the following, which was repeated by General Hood to General Beauregard, Macon, Ga., with the request that all men belonging to this army, and any re-enforcements that could be spared, be sent forward as soon as possible:

Scouts from the vicinity of Memphis report that Steele, with 15,000 men, landed at that point on last Thursday and passed up the river Saturday.

News of our forces in neighborhood of Murfreesborough being driven back by the enemy received to-night. Col. B. J. Hill, with his cavalry command, was ordered to-day to Bedford, Giles, and Marshall Counties, Tenn., “to break up and destroy the home guards, to conscribe men liable to military duty, and to protect the mills in the neighborhood of Shelbyville” (See dispatch to General Forrest, field dispatch book.)

December 8.—Lieutenant-General Lee made a demonstration on his extreme left to-day, driving in the enemy's pickets without any show of resistance, and establishing his own line in the pits from which he had driven the pickets of the enemy. General Forrest was ordered to drive the enemy back to Murfreesborough, and then give him an opportunity to leave the town in the direction of Lebanon, if he chose. He was also directed to return Bate's division and Sears' brigade to the army, keeping Palmer's (Brown's old) brigade and Mercer's, which was ordered to him to-day, and what artillery he might deem necessary, another division to be sent to him to supply the place of Bate's when the latter shall have joined the army.

December 9.—All quiet in front. General Forrest advised by General Hood that another division would not be sent him to supply the place of Bate's [division] and Sears' brigade, other dispositions being made to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing Murfreesborough, and in the event of evacuation to secure his defeat. Palmer's and Mercer's brigades ordered to strongly fortify themselves on Stewart's Creek, or at La Vergne, as General Forrest might deem best, "to constitute a force in observation of the enemy," and a brigade of cavalry to picket in the neighborhood of Lebanon.

December 10.—Generals Stewart's and Lee's corps retired their lines a short distance for the purpose of convenience to wood. No change otherwise. Reports received of the concentration of the enemy's cavalry at Edgefield, and General Forrest directed to meet and drive them back should the force attempt to cross the Cumberland River above. Circular issued to corps commanders directing the construction of self-supporting detached works—General Stewart to select all good points in rear of his left; General Cheatham, all good points in rear of his right; and General Lee, all good points in rear both of his right and left flanks, for the construction of these works.

December 11.—No change in the lines.

December 12.—No change to report. General Hood telegraphed to General Beauregard  "for all available cavalry to be sent to this army as soon as Sherman completes his raid."

December 13 and 14.—No change in the line.

December 15.—The enemy attacked both of our flanks this morning about the same time, and was repulsed with heavy loss on our right, but toward evening he succeeded in driving in our infantry outposts on the left.

December 16.—A general attack was commenced early this morning on our entire line, and all the enemy's assaults repulsed with heavy loss, till 3.30 p.m., when our line suddenly gave way to the left of the center, causing in a few moments our lines to give way at all points, our troops retreating rapidly and in some confusion down the Franklin pike. The army camped all along the pike from Brentwood to and including Franklin. Army headquarters at Mrs. Maney's, near Franklin. General Forrest was advised through a staff officer (Captain Cooper) of the retreat of the army, and directed to make disposition of his troops for protecting it.

December 17.—The march was continued toward Columbia--Stewart in front, Cheatham next, and Lee in the rear, with Chalmers' and Buford's cavalry. General Lee's rear harassed considerably by the enemy's cavalry near Spring Hill. Lieutenant-General Lee slightly wounded. The army camped between Franklin and Spring Hill in the order of march. Army headquarters at Spring Hill.

December 18.—Stewart's corps marched in front to-day, camping in line of battle on Duck River. Cheatham camped on Rutherford's Creek, and General Lee between the creek and Franklin. Army headquarters at Mr. Vaught's, Columbia.

December 19.—Army headquarters still at Mr. Vaught's. The army, and such trains and artillery as were not crossed over yesterday, occupied the day in crossing Duck River—Lee first, Cheatham next, and then Stewart. The enemy's cavalry appeared on opposite side of Rutherford's Creek.

December 20.—Everything over the river this morning. The march was resumed on the Pulaski pike—Lee in front (Stevenson commanding), Cheatham next, and General Stewart in rear. General Forrest, with his cavalry and a division of infantry under command of Major-General Walthall (composed of Ector's, Strahl's, Maney's, Granbury's, and Palmr's brigades), directed to oppose the advance of the enemy's cavalry.² General Stevenson's corps camped within two miles of Pulaski, and the other two corps in his rear, and in order of march. Army headquarters at Mr. Jones', Pulaski.

December 21.—Army headquarters still at Mr. Jones', Pulaski. Stevenson's corps marched across Richland Creek and went into camp; Cheatham's and Stewart's corps camped on this side.

December 22.—Army headquarters at Pulaski. Stevenson's corps was directed to move forward on the Lamb's Ferry road, in rear of the pontoon train, and camped about eight miles from Pulaski. General Stewart's corps camped in rear of Stevenson's about six miles from Pulaski, and General Cheatham's on Richland Creek, in the immediate vicinity of town. The wagon train ordered to move at daylight toward Bainbridge, by the Powell road.

December 23.—Army headquarters on Powell's Ferry road, six miles from Lexington, Ala. The army, after the day's march, camped as follows: Stevenson's corps at the intersection of the Lamb's Ferry road with the Powell road, four miles from Lexington; General Stewart in rear, on the Lamb's Ferry road; General Cheatham moved on the Lawrenceburg road.

December 24.—Army headquarters at Mr. Joiner's, eleven miles from Bainbridge, on the main Bainbridge road. Stevenson's corps reached and camped on Shoal Creek and Stewart's in his rear. General Cheatham not yet come into the main road from the Powell road.

December 25.—Army headquarters at Bainbridge, on the Tennessee River. The pontoon was being laid across the river as rapidly as the arrival of the boats would allow. General Cheatham came into the main road this morning, and in rear of Stevenson's corps moved to the river, where a line covering the bridge was formed, Cheatham occupying the right and Stevenson the left. General Stewart's corps, upon arriving at the point where Cheatham's corps came into the main road, was put into position so as to protect both roads.

December 26 to January 2, 1865, inclusive.—The pontoon was completed by daylight on the 26th instant, and the army was occupied two days in crossing—Lee's and Cheatham's corps on the 26th, and Stewart's and the cavalry on the 27th. On the 28th the pontoon was withdrawn. The march was resumed, upon striking the Memphis and Charleston railroad, immediately down the road, in the order of crossing the river, to Burnsville, Miss., where, on the 31st, a circular was issued to corps commanders, directing further movements, as follows: "Lee's corps to move to Rienzi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, Cheatham's corps to move to Corinth, and Stewart's corps to remain at Burnsville until further orders." Cheatham's corps arrived and established camps at Corinth on January 1, and Lee's and Stewart's corps at their respective destinations on January 2, 1865. Army headquarters were at Tuscumbia from the 26th to the 28th of December, inclusive. On the 29th General Hood, with Colonel Mason and his personal staff, remained during the day at the terminus of the railroad near Tuscumbia, awaiting the train, which did not arrive until late at night. He reached Burnsville on the evening of the 30th, remained there until the morning of the 2d of January, and from thence came by cars to Corinth.

January 3.—Lee's and Stewart's corps ordered to continue the march to Tupelo, Miss., from their respective bivouacs, Rienzi and Burnsville, all wheels not necessary with the troops and artillery carriages to be sent to Columbus, to report upon arrival to Major-General Elzey.

January 4.—No further orders regulating movements of the troops.

January 5.—Army headquarters established at Tupelo, Miss.

January 6.—Generals Stewart and Stevenson (commanding Lee's corps) were ordered to work the road where it was bad on their march. January 7.—Lee's corps arrived at Tupelo and went into camp.

January 8.—No orders of importance issued with reference to further movements.

January 9.—Stewart's corps arrived at Tupelo and went into camp.

January 10.—Cheatham's corps ordered to move from Corinth to Tupelo.

January 11.—No orders of importance.

January 12.—Cheatham's corps arrived at Tupelo. All stores reported moved away from Corinth to Tupelo.

January 13.—No orders of importance.

January 14.—General Beauregard arrived at Tupelo, on visit to t, he army, late at night.

January 15.—A system for furloughing the troops established. (See General Orders, No. 1, 1865, and circular letter to corps commanders, field dispatches, N. 542.)

January 16.—The army still in same camp at and near Tupelo.

_______________

¹ See explanatory foot note, Vol. XXXIX, Part I, p.804.

² But see composition of infantry rear guard as given by Walthall, p. 726.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 45, Part 1 (Serial No. 93), p. 669-74

Diary of Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, Sunday, December 4, 1864

A fine day. All talk is of Sherman and Georgia or Hood and Tennessee. This week is likely to inform us of their movements and so determine our own. Will Early on hearing that the Sixth Corps has left visit us?

SOURCE: Charles Richard Williams, editor, Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Volume 2, p. 543

Major-General William T. Sherman to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, December 24, 1864

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,     

In the Field, Savannah, Ga., December 24, 1864.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff, Washington City, D.C.:

GENERAL: I had the pleasure to receive your two letters of the 16th and 18th instant to-day, and I feel more than usually flattered by the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, which is now complete by the occupation of Savannah. I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind about embarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make the broad swath you describe through South and North Carolina, and still more gratified at the news from Thomas in Tennessee, because it fulfills my plan, which contemplated his being fully able to dispose of Hood in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River; so I think, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis' disappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a Moscow disaster. I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and have explained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from the Ogeechee over to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made by the enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance, &c., to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and in remodelling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans and purposes. I have also laid down the programme of a campaign which I can make this winter, and put me in the spring on the Roanoke, in direct communication with him on the James River. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster the city of Savannah, and to sally forth, with my army resupplied, cross the Savannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between, breaking en route the Charleston and Augusta Railroad, also a large part of that front Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, and then rapidly moving to some point of the railroad from Charleston to Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, I would turn upon Wilmington or Charleston according to the importance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroad communications are broken. I take it for granted the present movement on Wilmington will fail, because I know that gun-boats cannot take a fort, and Butler has not the force or the ability to take it. If I should determine to take Charleston I would turn across the country, which I have hunted over many a time, from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wing on the peninsula between Ashley and Cooper. After accomplishing one or other of these ends I would make a bee-line for Raleigh, or Weldon, when Lee would be forced to come out of Richmond or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by the use of the Danville railroad, throw himself rapidly between me and Grant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would not alarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and I would force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under the supposition that Grant would be on his heels; and if the worst came to the worst I could fight my way down to Albemarle Sound or New Berne.

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldest moves, and my experience is that they are easier of execution than more timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them — as for instance, my recent campaign. I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain point, as the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can be brought to bear in any one battle; and I don't believe any one general can handle more than 60,000 men in battle. I think my campaign of the last month, as well as every step I take from this point northward, is as much a direct attack upon Lee's army as though I were operating within the mound of his artillery. I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his successes to the very uttermost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Miss., or Selma, Ala., both of which lie in districts of country which I know to be rich in corn and meat. I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy's country, because this war differs from European wars in this particular. We are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostile people, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that this recent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effect in this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lying papers into the belief that we were being whipped all the time, realized the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of the same experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people under a pretty good state of discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken in Georgia; and I think before we are done, South Carolina will not be quite so tempestuous. I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and don't think salt will be necessary. When I move the Fifteenth Corps will be on the right of the Right Wing, and their position will bring them, naturally, into Charleston first; and if you have watched the history of that corps you will have remarked that they generally do their work up pretty well. The truth is the whole army is burning with an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all that seems in store for her. Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go to South Carolina, and when I answered that I was en route for that State the invariable reply was, “Well, if you will make those people feel the severities of war, we will pardon you for your desolation of Georgia.” I look upon Columbia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt if we shall spare the public buildings there, as we did at Milledgeville. I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my official report, and think I had better wait until I get my subordinate reports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearly, not only the reasons for every step, but the amount of execution done, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; for we marched the whole distance in tour or more columns, and, of course, I could only be present with one, and generally that one engaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction was performed better than usual, because I had an engineer regiment provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Such bars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroad line can be reconstructed across Georgia will be to make a new road from Fairburn Station, twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta, to Madison, a distance of 100 miles; and before that can be done I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, which is a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed at Hardee's escape from me, but really am not to blame. I moved as quick as possible to close up the “Union Causeway,” but intervening obstacles were such that before I could get my troops on the road Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were in Savannah will be lost, in a measure, to Jeff. Davis; for the Georgia troops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in South Carolina, and have gone north en route for Augusta, and I have reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone to Wilmington — in other words, they are scattered. I have reason to believe that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of its evacuation, and I think he and Hardee are now in Charleston, doubtless making preparations for what they know will be my next step.

Please say to the President that I received his kind message through Colonel Markland, and feel thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want of zeal or love to the cause. Of you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for the future, which may enable me to correct errors before it is too late. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friends no chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage.

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN,    

Major-General.

[Indorsement.]

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff of the Army:

GENERAL: This letter was brought by Lieutenant Dunn, of my staff, with the request that I would open and read it, as it contained one or two points which his letter addressed to me does not contain.

Respectfully,

U.S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 798-800

In the Review Queue: The Tennessee Campaign of 1864

The Tennessee Campaign of 1864

Edited by Steven E. Woodworth and Charles D. Grear

Contributors include Stewart Bennett, Andrew S. Bledsoe, John J. Gaines, John R. Lundberg, Jennifer M. Murray, Paul L. Schmelzer, Brooks D. Simpson, Timothy B. Smith, Scott L. Stabler, Jonathan M. Steplyk, D. L. Turner, and William Lee White.

Few American Civil War operations matched the controversy, intensity, and bloodshed of Confederate general John Bell Hood’s ill-fated 1864 campaign against Union forces in Tennessee. In the first-ever anthology on the subject, The Tennessee Campaign of 1864, edited by Steven E. Woodworth and Charles D. Grear, fourteen prominent historians and emerging scholars examine the three-month operation, covering the battles of Allatoona, Spring Hill, and Franklin, as well as the decimation of Hood’s army at Nashville.

Contributors explore the campaign’s battlefield action, including how Major General Andrew J. Smith’s three aggressive divisions of the Army of Tennessee became the most successful Federal unit at Nashville, how vastly outnumbered Union troops held the Allatoona Pass, why Hood failed at Spring Hill and how the event has been perceived, and why so many of the Army of Tennessee’s officer corps died at the Battle of Franklin, where the Confederacy suffered a disastrous blow. An exciting inclusion is the diary of Confederate major general Patrick R. Cleburne, which covers the first phase of the campaign. Essays on the strained relationship between Ulysses S. Grant and George H. Thomas and on Thomas’s approach to warfare reveal much about the personalities involved, and chapters about civilians in the campaign’s path and those miles away show how the war affected people not involved in the fighting. An innovative case study of the fighting at Franklin investigates the emotional and psychological impact of killing on the battlefield, and other implications of the campaign include how the courageous actions of the U.S. Colored Troops at Nashville made a lasting impact on the African American community and how preservation efforts met with differing results at Franklin and Nashville.

Canvassing both military and social history, this well-researched volume offers new, illuminating perspectives while furthering long-running debates on more familiar topics. These in-depth essays provide an expert appraisal of one of the most brutal and notorious campaigns in Civil War history.

ISBN 978-0809334520, Southern Illinois University Press, © 2016, Hardcover, 280 pages, Photographs, Maps, Notes at the end of each essay & Index. $34.50.  To purchase this book click HERE.

Diary of Mary Boykin Chesnut: December 2, 1864

Isabella and I put on bonnets and shawls and went deliberately out for news. We determined to seek until we found. Met a man who was so ugly, I could not forget him or his sobriquet; he was awfully in love with me once. He did not know me, but blushed hotly when Isabella told him who I was. He had forgotten me, I hope, or else I am changed by age and care past all recognition. He gave us the encouraging information that Grahamville had been burned to the ground.

When the call for horses was made, Mrs. McCord sent in her fine bays. She comes now with a pair of mules, and looks too long and significantly at my ponies. If I were not so much afraid of her, I would hint that those mules would be of far more use in camp than my ponies. But they will seize the ponies, no doubt.

In all my life before, the stables were far off from the house and I had nothing to do with them. Now my ponies are kept under an open shed next to the back piazza. Here I sit with my work, or my desk, or my book, basking in our Southern sun, and I watch Nat feed, curry, and rub down the horses, and then he cleans their stables as thoroughly as Smith does my drawing-room. I see their beds of straw comfortably laid. Nat says, “Ow, Missis, ain't lady's business to look so much in de stables.” I care nothing for his grumbling, and I have never had horses in better condition. Poor ponies, you deserve every attention, and enough to eat. Grass does not grow under your feet. By night and day you are on the trot.

To-day General Chesnut was in Charleston on his way from Augusta to Savannah by rail. The telegraph is still working between Charleston and Savannah. Grahamville certainly is burned. There was fighting down there to-day. I came home with enough to think about, Heaven knows! And then all day long we compounded a pound cake in honor of Mrs. Cuthbert, who has things so nice at home. The cake was a success, but was it worth all that trouble?

As my party were driving off to the concert, an omnibus rattled up. Enter Captain Leland, of General Chesnut's staff, of as imposing a presence as a field-marshal, handsome and gray-haired. He was here on some military errand and brought me a letter. He said the Yankees had been repulsed, and that down in those swamps we could give a good account of ourselves if our government would send men enough. With a sufficient army to meet them down “there, they could be annihilated.” “Where are the men to come from?” asked Mamie, wildly. “General Hood has gone off to Tennessee. Even if he does defeat Thomas there, what difference would that make here?”

SOURCES: Mary Boykin Chesnut, Edited by Isabella D. Martin and Myrta Lockett Avary, A Diary From Dixie, p. 336-7

Captain Theodrick (Tod) Carter Plaque: The Carter House, Franklin, Tennessee

CAPTAIN THEODRICK (TOD) CARTER

20th Tennessee Volunteer Infantry Smith’s Brigade

Bate’s Division, Cheatham’s Corps,

Army of Tennessee

C.S.A.

Born at the Carter House March 24, 1840 and educated at Harpeth Academy.  He was an attorney-at-law and Master Mason.  Tod enlisted in Co. H, 20th Tenn. Infantry May 1, 1862.  Appointed Assistant Quarter Master on Oct. 24, 1862 and served as war correspondent for the Chattanooga “Daily Rebel” using the name “Mint Julep”.

Capt. Carter Participated in Most of the Army of Tenn. Battles.  He was captured at Chattanooga on Nov. 25, 1863, but escaped from a prison train in Pennsylvania Feb. 1864.  He retured to the army in March 1864 serving in the Atlanta and Ten. Campaigns.  Mortally wounded 200 yards Southwest of his home on Nov. 30, 1864 in the Battle of Franklin and died at the Carter House Dec. 2, 1864.

“Rest soldier rest, you are not forgotten, For you did not die in vain.”

Plaque donated by Compatriot G. Daniel Clark the Tod Carter Camp #854, sons of Confederate Veterans.

SOURCE: Interpretive Marker, just outside the back door of The Carter House Visitor Center, The Carter House, Franklin, Tennessee

Brigadier-General Thomas Kilby Smith to Eliza Walter Smith, January 1, 1865

Near Paducah, January 1, 1865.

My Dear Mother:

I am waiting to coal and for a convoy and soon shall be with my command, I hope. I am mortified to learn here, within a few moments, that Hood has succeeded with the remnant of his army in crossing the Tennessee upon the shoals; we disabled two of his guns and captured a portion of his pontoons, but for a while he has escaped, and this may materially disarrange the plan of our campaign.

The weather continues very pleasant, and we are well provided with food.

SOURCE: Walter George Smith, Life and letters of Thomas Kilby Smith, p. 374-5

General Pierre G. T. Beauregard to General John Bell Hood, November 20, 1864 – 10 a.m.

WEST POINT, November 20, 1864 – 10 a.m.

General J. B. HOOD:

Push on active offensive immediately. Colonel Brent informs me first order for movement one of Jackson's brigades to Wheeler has been suspended by you. It is indispensable; it should be sent by best and quickest route to Newnan, to cut off communications of enemy with Kingston, and to protect construction of telegraph lines and railroad to Augusta via Atlanta. I have appealed to people of Georgia to defend their homes.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

General.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 872; John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 281

General Pierre G. T. Beauregard to Jefferson Davis, December 6, 1864

AUGUSTA, GA., December 6, 1864.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President of the Confederate States:

SIR: Your letter of the 30th ultimo, acknowledging the receipt of my telegram of 24th of November, was received by me on the road from Macon to this place. With the limited reliable means at our command I believe that all that could be has been done, under existing circumstances, to oppose the advance of Sherman's forces toward the Atlantic coast. That we have not thus far been more successful none can regret more than myself, but he will doubtless be prevented from capturing Augusta, Charleston, and Savannah, and he may yet be made to experience serious loss before reaching the coast.

On the 16th of November, when about leaving Tuscumbia, Ala., on a tour of inspection to Corinth, Miss., I was informed by General Hood of the report just received by him that Sherman would probably move from Atlanta into Georgia I instructed him at once to repeat his orders to General Wheeler to watch closely Sherman's movements, and should he move as reported, to attack and harass him at all favorable points. I telegraphed to Lieutenant-General Taylor, at Selma, Ala, to call on Governor Watts, of Alabama, and Governor Clark, of Mississippi, for all the State troops that they could furnish, and with all the available movable forces of his department to keep himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice to the assistance of Maj. Gens. Howell Cobb and G. W. Smith, who were then at or about Griffin, Ga., threatening Atlanta. I also telegraphed to General Cobb to call upon Governor Brown, of Georgia, and Governor Bonham, of South Carolina, for all the State troops that could be collected. I made all necessary preparations to repair forthwith to Georgia in the event of Sherman's executing his reported movement.

On my arrival at Corinth, on the 18th of November, having been informed that Sherman had commenced his movement, I issued all necessary orders to meet the emergency, including an order to General Hood to send one division of cavalry (Jackson's) to re-enforce Wheeler, but this order was suspended by him, his objection being that his cavalry could not be reduced without endangering the success of his campaign in Tennessee, and that General Wheeler already had thirteen brigades under his command. I finally instructed him to send only one brigade, if he contemplated taking the offensive at once, as had already been decided upon. I then left Corinth for Macon, where I arrived on 24th of November.

I did not countermand the campaign into Tennessee to pursue Sherman with Hood's army for the following reasons:

First. The roads and creeks from the Tennessee to the Coosa Rivers across Sand and Lookout Mountains had been, by the prevailing heavy rains, rendered almost impassable to artillery and wagon trains.

Second. General Sherman, with an army better appointed, had already the start of about 275 miles, on comparatively good roads. The transfer of Hood's army into Georgia could not have been more expeditious by railway than by marching through the country, on account of the delays unavoidably resulting from the condition of the railroads.

Third. To pursue Sherman the passage of the Army of Tennessee would necessarily have been over roads with all the bridges destroyed, and through a devastated country, affording no subsistence or forage, and, moreover, it was feared that a retrograde movement on our part would seriously deplete the army by desertions.

Fourth. To have sent off the most or the whole of the Army of Tennessee in pursuit of Sherman would have opened to Thomas' forces the richest portion of the State of Alabama, and would have made nearly certain the capture of Montgomery, Selma, and Mobile, without insuring the defeat of Sherman.

Fifth. In October last, when passing through Georgia to assume command of the Military Division of the West, I was informed by Governor Brown that he could probably raise, in case of necessity, about 6,000 men, which I supposed might be doubled in a levy en masse. General Cobb informed me, at the same time, that at Augusta, Macon, and Columbus he had about 6,500 local troops, and that he hoped shortly to have collected at his reserve and convalescent camps near Macon 2,500 more. Of these 9,000 men he supposed about one-half, or 5,000, could be made available as movable troops for an emergency.

To oppose the advance of the enemy from Atlanta the State of Georgia would thus have probably 17,000 men, to which number must be added the thirteen brigades of Wheeler's cavalry, amounting to about 7,000 men. The troops which could have been collected from Savannah, South Carolina, and North Carolina before Sherman's forces could reach the Atlantic coast would have amounted, it was supposed, to about 5,000 men.

Thus it was a reasonable supposition that about 29,000 or 30,000 men could be collected in time to defend the State of Georgia and insure the destruction of Sherman's army, estimated by me at about 36,000 effectives of all arms, their cavalry, about 4,000 strong, being included in this estimate.

Under these circumstances, after consultation with General Hood, I concluded to allow him to prosecute with vigor his campaign into Tennessee and Kentucky, hoping that by defeating Thomas' army, and such other forces as might hastily be sent against him, he would compel Sherman, should he reach the coast of Georgia or South Carolina, to repair at once to the defense of Kentucky, and perhaps Ohio, and thus prevent him from re-enforcing Grant. Meanwhile supplies might be sent to Virginia from Middle and East Tennessee, thus relieving Georgia from the present constant drain upon its limited resources.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 G. T. BEAUREGARD,

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 44 (Serial No. 92), p. 931-3; John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat, p. 278-80

Colonel Datus E. Coon

THIRD COLONEL, SECOND CAVALRY.

Datus E. Coon is a native of New York State, and is thirty-four years of age. He was, in the summer of 1861, a resident of Mason City, Cerro Gordo county, Iowa. He entered the service as captain of Company I, 2d Iowa Cavalry, and, on the 14th of September of the same year, was promoted to a majority in that regiment. If he ever held the lieutenant-colonelcy of his regiment, I have failed to learn it. He was commissioned colonel of the 2d Iowa Cavalry on the 1st day of May, 1864. Much of the time since promoted to his present rank, he has been in command of the 2d Brigade, 5th Cavalry Division, the command of General Edward Hatch. He is reputed a gallant and efficient officer.

The point of chief interest in the history of the 2d Iowa Cavalry, during the colonelcy of Colonel Coon, is that which relates to the Fall and Winter Campaign against General Hood, in Tennessee. The time covered by these operations embraces fully three months; for the advance of Forest into Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, late in September, 1864, may be regarded as a part of Hood's grand flanking campaign. From the 30th of September to the 5th of December, the skirmishes and engagements of the 2d Cavalry are enumerated as follows: Shoal Creek, Alabama, November 9th, 1864; Aberdeen, Alabama, November 17th; Butler Creek, Alabama, November 19th; Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, November 22d; Campbellville, Tennessee, November 24th; Linnville, Tennessee, November 24th; Mount Cannel, Tennessee, November 29th and New Franklin, Tennessee, November 30th.

At the time Forest crossed into Tennessee, as above stated, the 2d Cavalry was stationed at White's Station, and at once marched with its brigade for Clifton, on the Tennessee River. Arriving there, it found General Washburne, who had come by boat from Memphis, and was directed by him to start in pursuit of the raider. From this time till the 18th of October, the regiment was on the scout, but failed to find the enemy. Returning then to Clifton, it remained a few days in camp and then started again on the scout; and thus its time was passed until the advance of Hood made its appearance opposite Florence, Alabama.

The brigade command of Colonel Coon, to which was attached the 2d Iowa, took a distinguished part in the operations to resist Hood's advance into Tennessee, and also in driving the rebel army from the State. The skirmishes and engagements, which I have given above, were fought while Hood was marching on Nashville. For the part taken by the 2d Iowa in the battles of the 15th, 16th, and 17th of December I refer to the official report of Major C. C. Horton, who was in command of the regiment. After first stating that his regiment with its brigade moved out from camp and took up its position on the right of General A. J. Smith's Corps, the Major says:

"Their main line was found some four miles from town, occupying formidable works on a commanding hill. By continually swinging to the left, our brigade struck their left flank.

"The division battery (I, of the 2d Illinois) now galloped into position in an open field and opened on the works, evidently much to their annoyance, as the guns of both forts were immediately turned upon the battery and my regiment, which had been formed to the left and rear as support. Remained lying in this position, exposed to a galling fire from both forts for nearly an hour, losing two men killed and one wounded, when I received orders to move forward and join in an assault upon the first fort. The regiment moved steadily forward under a severe fire until within three hundred yards of the works, when the order to 'charge and take that fort' from General Hatch, rang along the line. With a shout the men sprang forward, and with a shout the fort was carried. Company G, Lieutenant Budd commanding, having been thrown out as skirmishers, were nearest the works, and consequently the first to enter. One man was knocked down by a blow from a musket just as he was scaling the works. One of General Smith's batteries shelled the fort after it was captured, six shells bursting in and over it after we had entered. Captured here four brass Napoleons and sixty prisoners. Thirty killed and wounded rebels were found lying in the fort. Leaving a guard with the guns, I pressed forward after the retreating enemy, capturing many prisoners.

"Orders were now received from Colonel Coon to move by the right flank and charge the second fort, situated some seven hundred yards to our right on a high, conical hill. The men were so eager in the pursuit of the fugitives from the first fort, that I was able to rally only two hundred of them: with these I joined the brigade in the assault. The fort was defended with a stubbornness and gallantry seldom surpassed — the enemy only ceasing to use their artillery after the works were scaled. A short but desperate hand-to-hand struggle ensued after the works were entered. My colors, borne by the gallant Sergeant Hartman, Company P, were the first to float from the fort. The Sergeant fell mortally wounded while in the act of planting the colors on one of the guns. Seizing my hand as I bent over him, he exclaimed, 'Major, tell my friends I died doing my duty.' .

"In this fort were captured two guns, with caissons; one battery-wagon, and nearly one hundred prisoners. Notwithstanding my colors were the first to enter the works, it would be unjust to claim the guns or prisoners as my particular prize, as the different regiments of the brigade entered so nearly at the same time. Lieutenants Watson and Griffith, Companies I and D, who, not having heard the order to rally in time to join in the assault on the fort, moved by the right and charged on our left flank, attacking and repulsing a force of rebels who were endeavoring to reinforce the fort, now reported with some sixty prisoners each. Quartermaster-Sergeant Beason, with my bugler, Anderson, and two mounted orderlies (Truesdale and Winn) charged with the sabre, killing and wounding several, and taking some seventy prisoners. Number of prisoners captured during the day, two hundred and fifty. Regiment lost, while supporting the battery and charging the two forts, six men killed, and two commissioned officers and eighteen men wounded.

"December 16th. — Moved with the brigade, early in the morning, again taking a position on the right of General Smith's Infantry: slight skirmishing during the morning. About 2 o'clock P. M., in compliance with orders from General Hatch, I sent Captain Bandy with the 3d Battalion to draw one gun of Battery I up a steep hill, utterly impassable for horses. The gun was dragged to the top of the hill and planted in such a position that it commanded a battery which had greatly annoyed our infantry lines during the day. In a few moments the rebel battery was silenced, and their infantry wavering and falling back. Colonel Coon then ordered the brigade forward, and poured volley after volley into their retiring columns. I now received orders to remain with the battery, assist in taking the gun down the hill, and then join the brigade. Lost during the day, one commissioned officer slightly wounded.

"December 17th. — Moved again at day-light on the Franklin pike, General Hammond having the advance: found the enemy in strong force, occupying a line of hills on ' Little Harpeth,' four miles south of Franklin. General Hatch moved his division to the front; formed on the right of General Hammond, 2d Iowa on the extreme right. The line moved at a walk for some three hundred yards: then the trot, and finally the charge was sounded. At the signal, all sprang forward; but the centre found it impossible to carry the position on account of the steep and rocky hill-side. They halted here, dismounted, and engaged the enemy on foot. Not receiving the order to halt, and having better ground in front, I pressed forward, charged up the hill and through a thick wood, until we reached the enemy's left and rear, who now opened on me with grape and canister from the batteries. Wheeling the regiment to the left, I ordered the charge upon the battery to our left; but the horses were poor and so much blown that they could only raise a slow trot, perceiving which the enemy charged us in turn, but were handsomely repulsed with the carbine. A strong column of rebels were now reported passing through the gap between my regiment and the balance of the brigade. The fact that the day was dark and rainy, and that they wore rubber ponchos, and were many of them dressed in blue, had led my men to believe them to be our own troops, so that they were nearly in the rear of the 3d Battalion before the mistake was discovered. Company K, Sergeant John Coulter commanding, were nearly surrounded, and were compelled to cut their way out with the sabre. Sergeant Coulter, with Corporal Heck and Privates Black and Anderson, charged the rebel color-guard, and after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, in which Heck and Black were killed and Coulter and Anderson badly wounded, the colors of Rosse's Brigade were captured, and borne triumphantly off by the sergeant. Eight dead rebels, lying within the space of a few yards, attest the desperate nature of the conflict. After a few moment's close fighting, in which the sabre and butts of guns were freely used, the rebels fell back. * * * My loss during the engagement was seven killed, eight wounded, and thirteen captured. Several others were captured, but made their escape, in some instances returning with their guards as prisoners. The regiment captured in all some fifty prisoners.

On the 19th instant, the 2d Iowa met and engaged the enemy at Rutherford Creek, and, on the 25th, near Pulaski. But they continued their flight rapidly southward, and succeeded in crossing the Tennessee in detatchments. Many officers of the 2d Cavalry are mentioned in the highest terms for their conduct during this campaign, and among others are Major Schnitger, Captains Foster and Bandy, and Adjutant Sydenham.

After the above operations had closed, Generals Smith, Schofleld, and Wilson were ordered to concentrate their respective commands at Eastport, on the Tennessee River, preparatory to a renewal of the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama; little more was done in this quarter, for Schofleld was soon after summoned to North Carolina to co-operate with Sherman, and Thomas ordered to Tennessee to "assume general control of the defenses of our line of communication in the rear of the Army of the Mississippi." The results of the campaign are thus summed up by General Thomas:

"There were captured from the enemy during the various actions of which the foregoing report treats, thirteen thousand, one hundred and eighty-nine prisoners of war, including seven general officers and nearly one thousand other officers of all grades, seventy-two pieces of artillery, and – battle-flags. During the same period over two thousand deserters from the enemy were received, and to whom the oath was administered. Our own losses will not exceed ten thousand in killed, wounded and missing."

With the above campaign, closes the interesting portion of the 2d Cavalry's history. It did not march with Wilson on his celebrated march through Alabama to Macon, Georgia.

SOURCE: Addison A. Stuart, Iowa Colonels and Regiments, p. 577-82