Delivered in the House of Representatives, March 23, 1854—the House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the Nebraska bill.
I propose, now, Mr. Chairman, to address a few observations to the committee upon the merits of the bill. The subject has been thoroughly discussed here and in the Senate, and I do not flatter myself that I shall be able to add new facts or develop new trains of thought. The elements of a correct judgment are already before the country, and the utmost that one now engaging in the discussion can hope, is to present some of them in lights and combinations worthy the attention of the House.
I shall not consume the time of the committee in discussing what I cannot but regard as the subordinate and accidental aspects of the subject; as, for example, the relations of individuals to the bill of the last Congress, the alleged change of position by newspaper presses, and other points which do not touch the heart of the subject, and cannot go into history in the permanent connexion with our action upon it; assuming, also—what I think has been abundantly demonstrated—that the interests of the country demanded the organization of these territories, and that the rights of the few Indians within their borders are protected by the bill, the only remaining question relates to the clauses respecting slavery.
Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and, denying both, I would vote for neither. I go further and express the opinion that a clause legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and the people, to expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories. It is proposed simply to take off this prohibition, but not to make an enactment in affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmatory effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the Territories dependent wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully against hones misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.
I propose, for the present, to argue the question only upon the compromises of 1820 and 1850. To those who may be called political abolitionists it is useless to address any arguments. They opposed both those settlements; they adhere to neither in good faith, but will appeal to them or reject them as may best promote their incendiary purposes.—But I do not consider this to be the position of the northern people. I believe that, generally, they, and their representatives here, desire to look at this subject calmly, and to do fairly and honestly whatever good faith demands. The American characteristic is well understood by the abolitionists in and out of Congress, and accordingly they clamorously proclaim that “plighted faith” is about to be violated by the breach of a compact which the North, they say, has faithfully kept on her part for more than thirty years. By their orators and presses, and from their pulpits, (for the Church is resolved to engage in the struggle,) the South is held up as a monster of perfidy, and the selectest vials of their wrath are poured on the heads of those northern statemen who always sustained their Missouri Compromise, while it had any remains of vitality, against the assaults of its new defenders.
What, then is the true nature and extent of the compromise of 1850? What of the former? What their relations? Are they consistent with each other? Which of them ought, in good faith, to be applied to the Territories contemplated by this bill? These are the questions to be decided, in good faith, by those who recognize compromises as somewhat more important and durable than ordinary acts of legislation. While for those who opposed them both, and who spurn all settlements touching slavery, the less that is said, either of compromises or of “plighted faith,” the better.
At the risk of treading on ground already occupied by others, let me say something of the origin and history of the Missouri Compromise, and of the relations of sections to it.
I have heard gentlemen here glorify Mr. Clay as the author of the act of 1820, prohibiting slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., and invoke his memory to resist its violation. They must invoke some other “spirit” than Mr. Clay’s, for he was not its author. My colleague [Mr. EWING] showed this not long ago, but the statement has been persistently repeated since. While again correcting this error, it may be well to notice the treatment this compromise received very soon after its birth.
The people of Missouri having applied for leave to form a State constitution, Congress, by the act of March 6, 1820, provided in the first section:
“That the inhabitants of that portion of the Missouri Territory included within the boundaries hereinafter designated be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State Government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper; and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted to the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.”
“That in all that territory ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, not included within the limits of the state contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited.”
This the compromise prohibiting slavery north of the 36 deg. 30 min.—the compromise to which gentlemen say our plighted faith is now due. There were two parties and two stipulations. Missouri was to form a constitution, and was to be admitted “upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.” This was the agreement on the one hand for the benefit of Missouri, and, if you choose, of the South. On the other hand, slavery was to be prohibited north of 36 deg. 30 min., and this was for the benefit of the North.—The terms and conditions on each side were clearly expressed; but with it Mr. Clay had nothing to do. He was a member of the House and the clause prohibiting slavery originated in the Senate, on the motion of Mr. Thomas, of Illinois. Mr. Clay has said publicly that he had no recollection even of voting for it.
Well, sir, in pursuance of this “Missouri Compromise,” the people of that Territory proceeded to form a constitution with which they presented themselves for admission as a State at the next session of Congress. Was the compact executed? The Senate promptly passed a bill for their admission “on an equal footing with the original States;” but in the House it was rejected by a strict sectional vote—the South for it, the North against it. The “compromise” being thus repudiated and rejected by the North, by refusing to Missouri and the South the equivalent (being her admission “on an equal footing with the original States”) for the slavery prohibition, the bargain was broken, and the act of 1820 lost the sacredness of a compromise. The pretest for this repudiation was, that Missouri had put a clause in her constitution prohibiting the immigration of the free negroes to the State. This she had a right to do, unless it was a violation of the federal constitution; and if a violation, it was simply void, and the clause of the latter which declares that:
“The Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”
And the proper tribunal to settle the fact was the federal judiciary; so that in either aspect there was no ground for breaking the bargain. But the Compromise of 1820 was thus broken, and for a long time there seemed to be no prospect that this State, coming with a republican constitution in her hand, could find admission. The whole question was at sea again, and so remained until Mr. Clay appeared in the House, on the 21st day of February, 1821, having been detained at home by sickness in his family. He soon offered a resolution for the purpose of raising a joint committee of the two houses to inquire whether Missouri should be remanded to the territorial condition, or admitted into the Union; and if the latter, upon what terms?
The committee asked for was raised, and on the 26th of February Mr. Clay reported from it the following condition of admission, which was adopted by Congress.
“That Missouri shall be admitted into this union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition that the 4th clause of the 25th section of the 3d article of the constitution submitted on the part of said State to Congress shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen of either of the States in this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United states; provided, That the legislature of the said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the President of the United States, on or before the first Monday in November next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon receipt whereof, the President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any further proceedings on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State into the Union shall be considered as complete.”
This was a new condition by which Missouri was to enter the Union; not by the Compromise of 1820, “on an equal footing with the original States,” as an equivalent for the prohibition of slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., but upon the “fundamental condition” that her legislature should pass an act declaring that the constitution of the State was not above the constitution of the United States! She accepted the condition; and thus, by an act of her legislature, in pursuance of the timely “fundamental condition” of a congressional resolution, happily saved the federal constitution!!
It is due to the memory of the illustrious author of this “fundamental condition” to say that no one could be more sensible than himself of the intense humbuggery of the whole proceeding; and in his celebrated speech of 1850, on his compromise resolutions, he jocularly reviewed and exposed it to the Senate.
This summary of the facts will not be denied here or elsewhere; but they show that the Compromise now invoked was made in 1820; that Missouri complied with her part of it; that it was repudiated by northern votes in 1821; and that the State was finally admitted into the Union, not upon the equivalent provided in the act of 1820, but by the express imposition on her of a new compromise and condition.
So much for the result, on the first occasion that offered, to test “plighted faith.”
Under these circumstances the act of 1820 might well have been regarded as a rejected compact, and the question of slavery might have been fought over again upon the organization of each new Territory. But the hope of having something to be regarded as final on this vexed subject, thought a mere geographical line, and that of doubtful constitutionality, prevailed in the country, and that act, under the name of the “Missouri Compromise,” was accepted as a settlement of the slavery controversy. The basis of the settlement was a division (though very unequal) of all the territory then possessed by the United States. Does any man doubt that if we had possessed more territory the same principle of division would have been applied to it? It was a division of common territory between slaveholding and non slave holding States, or rather it was the exclusive appropriation of all north of 36 deg. 30 min. to free institutions and an implied allowance only of southern institutions below that line. Whatever may be said of this arrangement in its relations to the constitution, or as a measure of statesmanship, it was a clear and simple adjustment. It was capable of easy application in all future time; and as such, the South accepted it in good faith, and struggled to maintain it, until it was finally and forever repudiated by our northern brethren.
Sir, the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. STEPHENS,] and others, have traced this compromise through our legislative history—they have shown how often it was repudiated, and repudiated by the North, and I do not propose to go over the same ground; but if falls within the line of my thoughts to fix your attention on a period when the Missouri Compromise was ratified; and that occasion is the more important because it carried the Compromise beyond the territory acquired from France, and thus leaves no excuse for denying that it was intended to be a rule of general application. I refer to the joint resolution of 1845 for the annexation of Texas, which contains the following provision:
“New States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to the said state of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which sall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri Compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri Compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited.”
Here the Missouri Compromise was distinctly applied to territory clearly outside of the specific boundaries of the act of 1820, and it is no answer to say that Texas was a part of the Louisiana purchase—first, because this was a matter of dispute and conflicting claims with Spain; and next, because in 1819 we exchanged to Spain our claims to Texas for Florida, by which Texas became foreign territory, and relieved from the constitution and laws of the United States, so that, upon her return, she came as free from the operation of the Missouri Compromise as Utah, New Mexico, or the British Islands. It follows, that in extending that compromise to the portion of Texas lying north of 36 deg. 30 min., the Congress on that occasion recognized it as a rule upon the question of slavery, as a basis of settlement, to be applied to as well to new territory as to that acquired from France. It will be remembered that the whole of Texas was slaveholding territory, and the effect of the resolution was to make a large part of it free. But this was assented to by the South; and now I ask the fair-minded representatives of the people if the Missouri Compromise meant that it should be recognized and extended when the South was to be excluded, and repudiated, when it might work to her advantage?
This practical construction of the Missouri line obliged the North, by every obligation of honor and good faith, to carry it through all territory afterwards acquired, if any virtue at all was to be conceded to that compromise.
But, while the line was extended as long as it worked out free-soil territory, it was ignored and trampled under foot the moment their fair application of it might have resulted to benefit of both Sections. Witness the result in 1848, you gentlemen who talk of “plighted faith.” We had acquired from Mexico a large territory, lying on both sides of the line of 36 deg. 30 min. Three years before, the line had been extended through Texas, by which a large slaveholding territory had been made free-soil; and yet when, in 1848, on motion of the distinguished senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS,] a resolution passed in the Senate to “extend the Missouri-Compromise line” through the recently-acquired territory, it was rejected in this House by the united northern against the united southern vote.
Sir, how can an honest man get over these facts? How, in the face of them, can an honest man charge the friends of this bill with disregard of “plighted faith” and “solemn compacts?” I need not recur in detail to the occasions, so often referred to in this debate, when the Missouri line was offered by the South during the great struggle which ended in the Compromise of 1850, and was rejected by the North. It is enough to say that the record of those transactions will preserve for history the fact that the Missouri Compromise line of 36 deg. 30 min. was steadily repudiated by northern votes as a basis for the settlement of the slavery controversy. Why was this sir?
The reason is obvious. The anti-slavery feeling at this time ruled the councils of the North, and accordingly she left the ground of compromise, and planted herself on the ground of power. She rejected the principle of division. Glorying in her conscious strength, she came to obliterate geographical lines, and to appropriate to herself the whole of the territory acquired from Mexico. Her rallying cry was no longer “the Missouri Compromise line,” but the “Wilmot proviso.” Old things had passed away; old bargains were rejected, and the question took a new form.
The issue made up was, (and it went back of all divisions and patched-up settlements, and to the very bottom of the subject,) shall slavery be prohibited in all the Territories of the Untied States by act of Congress, or shall it be left to the people who inhabit them, subject only to the federal constitution; and on this was fought the great battle of 1850. The slaveholding States said: We have exhausted every scheme of adjustment; we have offered the old line; it is contemptuously refused; you claim all; very well, then, we united with you in burying the past; we accept the broad issue of intervention or non-intervention; we demand that all the citizens of the United States be allowed to enter the common territory with the constitution alone in their hands. If that instrument protects the title of the master to his slave in this common territory, you cannot complain; and if it does not protect his title, we ask no help from Congress; and the relations of the constitution to the subject we are willing to have decided by the courts of the United States. We do not ask Congress to interfere for us, and we will resist all legislative interference against us.
The whole country saw that here was a great struggle of opposing principles; and the excitement was in proportion to the magnitude of the question. If the result had depended on a purely sectional vote, the “Wilmot proviso” would have triumphed; but a large portion of the North, under the lead of the distinguished senator from Michigan [Mr. Cass] and others, repudiated the “proviso.”—Governments were formed for New Mexico and Utah without that odious restriction, leaving them free to form their own institutions, and enter the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution should prescribe.
Nothing in this discussion has surprised me more than the assertion, in respectable quarters, that the provisions touching slavery in the New Mexico and Utah bills were not intended to establish any principle for the future action of Congress upon that subject. I cannot but regard this as a narrow and unstatesman like view. Such was not the sense in which that great compromise was accepted by the American people. They well knew that it did not abolish slavery; they knew, too, that past territories yet remained within the Union to be settled, and that still vaster regions were to be acquired in the progress of our inevitable expansion. As to all these, the question of slavery, they knew, would present itself at each successive step in the extension of American institutions and laws. If the settlement of 1850 was but an ordinary act of legislation, and contained no principle of agreement of broader application than the strips of territory embraced in those laws, for what had the Union been shaken to its centre? To what end had our most eminent statesmen devoted their highest efforts? What has been gained—a lasting peace? No, sir; but, by this view, only a deceitful truce; a suspension of hostilities; the suppression of a symptom, not the eradication of the disease. It make this compromise not a final adjustment, on principle, of the distracting subject of slavery, but a delusion, an expedient, a catch, a humbug. It brings it down to the level of a mere temporary legislative contrivance; it leaves its great authors shorn of the renown the world supposed it to confer and reduces them to the condition of mere political jobbers. But, by the other construction, it was, indeed, a “final settlement”—a settlement which makes its authors immortal, which removes from the federal theatre the only question that can disturb our domestic tranquility, and leaves Congress in the future nothing to do in connexion with it, except to apply the established principle as the occasions arise. No, sir; whatever some gentlemen by say now, the people were not guilty of the folly imputed to them by the opponents of this bill. Their patriotic acclamations went up to Heaven over an act of healing statesmanship, not over a political job. They accepted those measures, not as a truce to faction, but as a bond of lasting concord.
Mr. Chairman, in great collisions of opinion, especially among an enlightened people, and upon questions of a continuing character, the particular issue usually involves the general principle—and this happens with a certainty proportioned to the magnitude of the questions at stake. History is full of illustrations to the point. When our heroic ancestors threw the British tea into Boston harbor and the whole country rose to sustain the act, it went far deeper than a question of a tax on tea, and involved the great principle that we would submit to no taxation without representation. When John Hampden resisted the illegal imposition of ship money by Charles I, and carried the point up to all the judges of England, though the immediate issue was whether he should pay the paltry sum of twenty shillings, the great question involved was the claim of the King to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. So, the circumstance connected with the legislation giving governments to Utah and New Mexico must control and explain the effect and principle of those laws. After events so recent, need I say that, in 1850, the manner in which the new Territories should be organized led to a thorough discussion as to the policy to be adopted respecting slavery? Is it not notorious that the Missouri Compromise line was considered and deliberately rejected? Did not the non-slaveholding States (generally) insist that the true policy was the prohibition of slavery in the territories of the Union by act of congress, and, by consequence, insist upon applying this principle to Utah and New Mexico? Did not the slaveholding States, on the contrary, planting themselves on the ground of Federal non-intervention, resist this policy, and, by consequence, its adoption and application to those Territories? And after a long and fearful struggle, did not the latter doctrine prevail, and was it not carried into law (or compact, if you choose) in the New Mexico and Utah acts? Did not the public, the press, conventions, and States, hail the result as a “final settlement, in principle and substance,” of the subject of slavery? And are we to be told now that the Compromise of 1850 was an adjustment to broader than those two territories? Are we to have a new struggle, a new bargain, a new basis of settlement on the organization of each new territory? Who, then, are the agitators?—who are faithful to the Compromise of 1850?
If my conclusions are correct as to the relations of the Compromise of 1820 to that of 1850, and as to the true nature and extent of the latter, it follows that the former has no claim resting on good faith; but that “plighted faith” to the Compromise of 1850 demands the removal of the Missouri prohibition. I do not contend that the eighth section of the act of 1820 was, in terms, repealed by the adjustment of 1850; it yet remains on the statute-book, and if constitutional, is still operative. But if non-intervention by Congress be the principle that underlies the Compromise of 1850, then the prohibition of 1820, being inconsistent with that principle, should be removed, and perfect non-intervention thus be established by law.
Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and denying both, I would vote for neither. So go further, and express the opinion that a clause legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and to the people, to expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories. It is proposed simply to take of this prohibition, but not to make an enactment in the affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmative effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the Territories depended wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully against honest misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.
“That the constitution, and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the United States; except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March, 1820, which being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories as recognized by the legislation of 1820, (commonly called the compromise measures,) is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which my have existed prior to the act of March, 1820, either protecting, establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery.”
This should be satisfactory to all candid men; but if any one shall persist in attempting to mislead the people, the best answer will be to impale him before them on the very words of the bill.
It will be observed that the right of the people to regulate in their own way all their domestic institutions is left wholly untouched, except whatever is done must be in accordance with the constitution—the supreme law for us all; and the right of property, under the constitution, as well as legislative action, is properly left to the decision of the federal judiciary. This voids a contested issue which it is hardly in the competency of Congress to decide, and refers it to the proper tribunal.
It is contended on one hand, upon the idea of the equality of the States under the constitution and common property in the Territories, that the citizens of the slaveholding States may remove to them with their slaves, (and that the local legislature cannot exclude slavery, while in the territorial condition; but it is to concede that the people may establish or prohibit it when they come to exercise the power of a sovereign State;) on the other hand, it is said that slavery, being in derogation of common right, can exist only by force of positive law; and it is denied that the constitution furnishes this law for the Territories; and it is further claimed that the local legislature my establish or exclude it any time after government is organized. As both parties appeal to the constitution, and base their respective arguments on opposite constructions of that instrument, the bill wisely refuses to make a question for judicial construction the subject of legislative conflict, and properly refers it to the tribunal created by the constitution itself, for the very purpose of deciding “all cases in law and equity” arising under it.
Then, sir, neither the purpose nor effect of the bill is to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas; but its effect is to sweep away this vestige of Congressional dictation on this subject, to allow the free citizens of this Union to enter the common territory with the constitution and the bill alone in their hands, and to remit the decision of their rights under both to the courts of the country. Who can go before his constituents refusing to stand on the platform of the constitution? Who can make a case to them of refusing to abide the decision of the courts of the Union?
I have argued the subject hitherto chiefly upon the question of “plighted faith;” and have consumed more of my limited time that properly belongs to that aspect of the case, because diligent efforts have been made to excite the northern mind against the friends of this bill representing them as the violators of the public honor. Anxious as I am for its passage, I readily admit that no benefit it could confer upon the country would atone for a deliberate violation of the public faith; but I am for its passage, not only because I believe that it embodies the true principle, but because, also, I sincerely believe that it carries out the true spirit and intent of our last great compromise, which is my judgment, covered the whole subject of slavery.
The clock admonishes me that I must hurry on and omit some views I would like to present, if time allowed. But, Mr. Chairman, apart from the historical argument, this contested feature in the bill is right in itself, for it rests on the foundation principle of American government. Without entering the wilderness of discussion in regard to the relations of the federal government to the territories as political communities, I offer one or two thoughts as to the proper limitations upon the power of Congress, according to the true theory of our government. Political power in the Territories is nowhere expressly granted in the constitution. The existence, therefore, and the extent of its exercise, must be derived by implication; and implied powers are to be exercised with more caution and strictness that express grants. Let it be conceded that political power over the Territories exists in Congress, and it is no matter whether it be implied from the power to acquire territory, or from any other source in the constitution; and the question arises whether it is an uncontrolled and despotic power, or whether it is limited by the nature of the federal government.
The States are supreme as to all subjects not granted to the common government. They establish their own institutions, at their own pleasure; they regulate within themselves all the relations of society; and they are now complete, self-sustaining, political communities; and they created the federal government, not to fix for them and their posterity the relations of society and the various elements that make up a complete social and political community, but to execute for the common good certain specified grants of power. The territories belong to the States in their united character; they are to enter the Union on an equal footing with the original States; and, in the meantime, they are to be settled and occupied by citizens of the existing States. What is the pretest for the act of 1820 “forever” prohibiting American citizens, on American soil, from establishing their own local, social and political condition? You have no express power to do so in constitution, and surely you can find none in the analogies of our political system. Can you dictate a particular from of society and government for them one moment after they become States? If not, why mock reason, and blot the statue book with this prohibition?
The power of Congress over the Territories is either absolute, or it has constitutional limitations. Let me illustrate further my idea of the limitations on the power of Congress over the Territories and districts growing out of the character and objects of the federal system. Congress, by an express provision of the constitution, may exercise “exclusive legislation” in the District of Columbia.—This is a far stronger and broader grant of power than any to be implied from that instrument in relation to the Territories, and yet it does not confer absolute power in this District; for it must be observed that there is wide distinction between “exclusive” and absolute power of legislation. Will any man contend that Congress may establish a free port of entry in this District, while a general tariff law applies to other ports? And yet the language of the constitution is:
“No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.”
So Congress has “exclusive legislation” over “all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful building,” but it will not be said that congress may admit foreign goods duty free at one of these points on the sea-board, while impost laws are in force at other ports. Nor will an advocate be found for the power to discriminate against the people of this District, by taxing articles exported from it, though the limitation of the constitution is: “No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.
Why is this, and what is the limit? At the beginning it was thought best that the seat of government should not be within the limit of any State, and accordingly a separate territory was carved out for it, where the Federal Government might exercise its few and limited powers, and over this territory “exclusive legislation” was granted to Congress, but the reasons and objects of the grant both of the Territory and power, and the nature and purposes of the common Government, must control this exclusive legislation. Accordingly, Congress may not establish a despotism here, nor rob American citizens in regard to their local and domestic affairs, nor deprive them of their property, nor violate uniformity of taxation, nor discriminate for or against their ports. Out of this view, too, grows the argument against the power to abolish slavery in the district without the consent of the people. And though upon this point opposite opinions have been expressed, yet the argument has so far prevailed that no serious attempt has been made to interfere with their rights in this respect.
The argument in regard to the Territories is far stronger. I have already said that the Constitution nowhere expressly grants political power over the Territories. Let us bear in mind, then, that it can only be an implied power—to be exercised by a limited government—over a region the common property of the States which created this limited government; and the inference is irresistible that it must be exercised in the spirit of the political system out of which this limited government springs. It would follow if the power were expressly granted, but follows with greater force since it is only derivative. What, then, is the spirit of the system? I answer, the equality of the States—local sovereignty in all matters of interior and domestic concern, embracing the great mass of powers that belong to government; as if, for example, fixing the relations of parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant-regulating the general rights of property, the course of inheritance, and the innumerable conditions that grow out of the social and political state. Hence it never has been pretended that Congress may invade them to control their free action on these and other kindred subjects. It is apart from the objects for which the States made the Federal Government, and prescribed the orbit in which it should move. Carry the idea to the Territories. What are they? to whom do they belong? who are to inhabit them? and what are to be their political relations to the rest of the Confederacy? They are regions of country acquired by the common efforts and treasure of all the States; they belong, therefore, to the States for common use and enjoyment; the citizens of the States are to inhabit them; and when the population shall be sufficient, they are to become equal members of the Union.
I might run out of illustrations on this point to an indefinite extent. Could Congress admit foreign goods duty free into the Union through the ports of a Territory, in violation of the general revenue laws, or lay a tax on articles exported from a Territory? The power will not be claimed—certainly its exercise will never be attempted; and yet I have shown that the limitation of the constitution in these and other respects apply in terms only to the States; and the only arguments against the power are, first, that it has not been expressly granted; and, next, that it cannot be fairly deduced from the spirit of the analogies of our political system.—Sir, if the constitutional limitations for which I contend do exist, then congress cannot discriminate against any of the States by depriving them of equal enjoyment of the common territory; but if these limitations do not exist, then the power of legislation is absolute and Congress may as readily set up a monarchy as a republic. Gentlemen my revolt at the conclusion, bit it flows with inevitable certainty from this doctrine of intervention and uncontrolled political powers over the Territories. The germ of congressional despotism is to be found in this Missouri prohibition; for if the question of slavery may be determined for the Territories by Congress, every other social and political question may in like manner be settled for them by the same authority, and this would reduce them to the most abject colonial vassalage. You cannot escape this conclusion by saying that slavery is anti-republican, and congress must exclude it under the obligation to provide a republican form of government, for slavery has already existed in many of the States, and yet the constitution declares that Congress shall secure to each State a republican form of government; hence it is a settled principle of our system that the institution is not inconsistent with republicanism.
Sir, I care not for refined distinctions or the subtleties of verbal criticism. I repeat the above and plain proposition, that if Congress may intervene on this subject, it may intervene on any other; and having thus surrendered the principle, and broken away from constitutional limitations, you are drawn into the very lap of arbitrary power. By this doctrine you may erect a despotism under the American system. The whole theory is a libel on our institutions. It carries us back to the abhorrent principles of British colonial authority, against which we made the issue of independence. I have never acquiesced in this odious claim, nor will I believe that it can abide the test of public scrutiny. The bill on our table repudiates it, and only wants fearless advocates to make it thoroughly odious. The political Abolitionists think they can ride the storm of anti-slavery fanaticism; but I tell them, they have encountered here an element more powerful still. They must obliterate the memory of the principles on which our Government was founded; they must undo the very texture of American mind; they must substitute in the popular heart the dogmas of despotism for the doctrine of American liberty, before they can triumph over the principles of this bill. The South insists on it as embodying the doctrine of State equality, on which her very existence depends; but it should commend itself equally to all sections, because the underlying principle is not Northern or Southern, but American. It is true, that the subject of slavery happens to be the one at issue; but it is there as the representative of every other social and political right. The freedom of these new countries to establish their own institutions ought, therefore, to be as dear to the man from Maine as to the man from Florida.
But again: cannot the North, with her overwhelming numbers, compete with us on these new theaters in the race of settlement and civilization—and must she not only violate the constitution by shutting out half the States, common property-holders with her—but in the name of liberty outrage liberty by erecting a despotism over the Territories Sir, we never will submit to it—we will resist it to the last; and in this struggle of principle against passion, of reason and right against fanaticism, are we defenceless? No, sir; no sir.—It is true, New England, with a few noble exceptions, has arrayed herself against the principle of the bill; yet even there the cause is not lost. Her choicest sons are unmoved by the clamors that surround them, and New Hampshire, the little Switzerland of the North, is unbroken by the frantic rush of the agitators. She has the elements around which to rally her hereditary principles.
But New England is not the Union. Observe what different tokens come from East and West. Did you hear of the infuriated mob that basely hung the author of this bill in effigy, on Boston Common? But did you note soon after the cheering tones of approval the west wind brought from his prairie State? Remember, Gentlemen, in the midst of your exultation, that the political power of this country is now climbing the summits of the Allegany mountains, and before this decade closes will have pursued its unreturning course far into the valley of the Mississippi—that vast region richer than the delta of the Nile, and whose millions and ever-increasing millions are destined to a political unity as lasting as civilization and commerce, bound forever together by the double tie of interest and affection. What, then, if Boston Chooses to betray the principles that made her own origin illustrious—what if New England Chooses to turn her back on the doctrines that marked her early history, and, after winning political liberty for herself, proposes to deny it to others—still we are not defenceless. True spirits in every eastern state will stand by the flag of republican equality until it waves the people back beneath its folds. Pennsylvania, that fine old Commonwealth, too often neglected in the piping times of peace, but always appealed to, and never in vain, in ever crises of the constitution, will stand upon the bill. But even if no support could be found in the scenes of our early civilization, we would gather up this inestimable principle, and turn to the West—the young, and growing, and vigorous West—whose hardy sons, having just laid for themselves the foundations of society, will never aid in robbing their fellow-citizens of the same sacred privilege. Sir, in two years from this time you will not be able, in my opinion, to find a man in the West who will dare to go before the people in opposition to the principle of this bill.
My time is so nearly exhausted that I shall be obliged to omit observations I had intended to offer as to the importance of action on this subject. By keeping it an open question, nobody is to be benefitted except the abolitionists and their sympathizers. Those who take the responsibility of throwing it before the county as an apple of discord may themselves perish in the storm they aid to arouse. The final triumph of the truth would not be doubtful, but the immediate effect would be to furnish food for abolition excitement.
Mr. Davis, of Rhode Island. If you do pass the bill it will.
Mr. Breckinridge. That gentleman is an enemy of the bill. He is sincere, no doubt; but deceives himself. As he is a political abolitionist, I remark, with great respect, that he would desire the passage of the bill if he thought it would promote the anti-slavery movement. [Laughter.]
No, sir; if we reject the bill, we open up the waters of bitterness, to be sealed again in time, but not until these agitators shall have rioted awhile in the confusion of the country; we blow high the flames to furnish habitations for these political salamanders, who can exist only in the fires of domestic strife. But, if it passes, the question will be removed forever from the halls of Congress, and deposited with the people, who can settle it in a manner answerable to their own views of interest and happiness. The occupation of federal agitators will be gone, and a barrier will be erected against which the rampant spirit of modern fanaticism may rave in vain, and before which it will receive its signal overthrow.
In the excitement of debates upon this subject heretofore, threats have been made on both sides. I have none to make, sir. I come from a state which is not in the habit of making threats. I believe that once, and only once, she utters a political threat. That was in 1798, when the old federal party struck at the vitals of the constitution. On that occasion, her warning voice and firm attitude contributed to save our political system. If my time allowed I believe I could prove that this Missouri prohibition was a bantling of the same federal party scotched but not killed in former conflicts.
I believe that the sentiments I have expressed are those of the people I represent. I believe they are the sentiments of the Commonwealth of Kentucky—a State which has never taken an extreme political position; a State which, lying in the centre of the Union, has always extended one hand to the North and the other to the South, to draw them together in bonds of amity, and ever pulsation of those great heart sends the warm life-blood of affection to the remotest extremities of the confederacy.
