Had a call last evening and again to-day from Senator
Sumner. Our conversation was chiefly on our foreign relations, the unfortunate
condition of public affairs, the inexcusable attitude of England, and the
question of letters of marque. On the latter subject he is much dissatisfied
with Mr. Seward. He informs me that he was opposed to the passage of the law at
the late session, and is, I am glad to see, quite sensitive on the subject. I
thought the law well enough as a precautionary measure, a warning to the
mischievous spirits abroad, an authorization to the President in case of
necessity, and especially as a weapon to coerce England into propriety. The
power granted was extraordinary and to be used with discretion, but Mr. Seward,
having obtained the authority, is disposed to exercise it. The merchants having
been loud and profuse in their complaints and promises, he has taken it for
granted that they would at once avail themselves of the law, and make a rush in
a random search for a couple of lean and hungry wolves that are abroad, which
would be difficult to catch and valueless when caught. I have questioned
whether he could beguile merchants into such an investment, and he begins to
feel uneasy that none have come forward as he expected.
In a letter
which I commenced some days since and finished Saturday night, I put upon paper
some of the suggestions, views, and doubts I have from time to time expressed
in our discussions. This letter I gave out to be copied, and it was on my table
for signature when I returned yesterday from Cabinet council. The English news
was such that I laid it aside unsigned, and it was lying on the table when
Sumner came in. He stated, among other things, he had been to the State
Department and that Seward had given him the substance of the last dispatches.
He asked if I had seen them. I answered that I had, and was so disgusted with
them that I had laid by a letter which I had prepared in opposition to the
current feeling which prevailed on the subject of letters of marque. He wished
to read it, and after doing so complimented the letter with emphasis, and begged
I would sign and send it.
Informed Admiral Foote that the Secretary of State desired
he should go to New York in the service of the State Department, on the subject
of letters of marque. He expressed his readiness to obey orders, but asked the
object of detailing him. I gave him an outline of proceedings and what appeared
to be the purpose of Mr. Seward, which was not very clear, or could not be
plainly stated. No doubt he believes it will give importance to the Secretary
of State to have a naval officer of the standing of Foote attached to the State
Department and acting under its orders.
The President called at my house this evening, chiefly to
see the letter which I had prepared concerning letters of marque. Senator
Sumner had gone directly from the Navy Department to him, and so made known his
gratification at my views and the manner in which I had stated them that the
curiosity of the President was excited and he desired to read the letter. I
informed him that the last thing I did before leaving the Department was to
sign and send it to the Secretary of State; that I perhaps should not have done
it, though, as he (the President) was aware, I had differed with him and others
on this subject and looked upon it as a dangerous step, but since reading the
last English dispatches, I was less opposed to the measure than I had been.
The opportunity being favorable and he disposed to converse
and apparently interested in my remarks, I took occasion to enlarge upon the
topic more fully than I had done in our Cabinet discussions. I started out with
the proposition that to issue letters of marque would in all probability
involve us in a war with England. [I said] that I had so viewed this question
from the beginning, though he and Mr. Seward had not; that I was not prepared
to deny that it might not be best for us to move promptly with that object in
view, though it had not yet been urged or stated; but that if we were to resort
to letters of marque we should do it understandingly and with all the
consequences before us. The idea that private parties would send out armed
ships to capture the Alabama and one, possibly two, other rovers of the Rebels
was too absurd to be thought of for a moment. If privateers were fitted out for
any purpose it would be to capture neutral vessels intended to run the blockade
or supposed to be in that service. It was not difficult for us to
foresee that such a power in private hands would degenerate into an abuse for
which this Government would be held responsible. The Rebels have no commerce to
invite private enterprise. So far as the Rebels were concerned, therefore, I
had been opposed to committing the Government to the measure. But the
disclosures recently made had given a different aspect to the question. There
was little doubt the British Government and British capital were encouraging
the rebellion; that that Government intended to interpose no obstacle to
prevent the sending out of privateers from British ports to depredate upon our
commerce; that these privateers, though sailing under the Confederate flag,
would be the property of British merchants; that the rich plunder would repay
the lawless English adventurer, knowing he had the sanction of his Government;
that this combination of British capital with Rebel malignity and desperation
would despoil our commerce and drive it from the seas. Our countrymen would not
quietly submit to these wrongs and outrages, and allow Englishmen to make war
upon us in disguise under the Rebel flag. We ought, therefore, to have an
immediate and distinct understanding with the English Government. It should be
informed in terms that could not be mistaken or misunderstood that if this
policy was persisted in we should in self-defense be under the necessity of
resorting to reprisals. In this view the law which authorized letters of marque
had appeared to me proper, and might be made useful as a menace and admonition
to England; and I repeated what I had said to the Secretary of State in reply to
a remark of his that we must make more extensive naval operations against the
Rebels by issuing letters of marque to annoy them, — that letters of marque,
instead of annoying them, destitute as they were of commerce, would aid them,
for that step would involve war with England. If the Secretary of State would
be less yielding and more decisive in asserting our rights with that power, it
would, I thought, be better for the country.
I then opened on the subject generally. England is taking
advantage of our misfortunes and would press upon us just as far as we would
bear to be pressed. She rejoiced in our dissensions and desired the
dismemberment of the Union. With this rebellion on our hands we were in no
condition for a war with her, and it was because we were in this condition that
she was arrogant and presuming. A higher and more decisive tone towards her
will secure a different policy on her part. A war with England would be a
serious calamity to us, but scarcely less serious to her. She cannot afford a maritime
conflict with us, even in our troubles, nor will she. We can live within
ourselves if worse comes to worse. Our territory is compact, facing both
oceans, and in latitudes which furnish us in abundance without foreign aid all
the necessaries and most of the luxuries of life; but England has a colonial
system which was once her strength, but is her weakness in these days and with
such a people as our countrymen to contend with. Her colonies are scattered
over the globe. We could, with our public and private armed ships, interrupt
and destroy her communication with her dependencies, her colonies, on which she
is as dependent for prosperity as they on her.
I was therefore in favor of meeting her face to face, asking
only what is right but submitting to nothing that is wrong.
If the late dispatches are to be taken as the policy she
intends to pursue, it means war, and if war is to come it looks to me as of a magnitude
greater than the world has ever experienced, — as if it would eventuate in the
upheaval of nations, the overthrow of governments and dynasties. The sympathies
of the mass of mankind would be with us rather than with the decaying dynasties
and the old effete governments. Not unlikely the conflict thus commenced would
kindle the torch of civil war throughout Christendom, and even nations beyond.
I desired no such conflict in my day, and therefore hoped and believed the
policy and tone of England might be modified, but it would require energy,
resolution, and a firm determination on our part to effect it.
The President listened, for I did most of the talking, as he
evidently wished, and showed much interest and accord in what I said. He
assented consequently to most that I uttered and controverted nothing. It was
evident I suggested some ideas that had not before occurred to him, and I am
not without hope that the tone of our foreign affairs, particularly with
England, may be different.
The President spoke, as he always has done with me,
doubtingly of Porter's schemes on the Mississippi, or rather the side movements
to the Yazoo on the east and Red River on the west. Said the long delay of Du
Pont, his constant call for more ships, more ironclads, was like McClellan
calling for more regiments. Thought the two men were alike, and said he was
prepared for a repulse at Charleston.
[The
letter referred to above was signed and sent with date of March 31.]
SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30,
1864, p. 251-9
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