Had a long talk this
afternoon with the President on the condition of affairs and especially in
regard to the proposed national convention. He does not like the composition of
the Cabinet, yet does not, in my opinion, perceive the most questionable feature
in it. Harlan and Speed, he does not conceal from me, are in the way. The
course and position of Dennison do not suit him. Dennison, like others, has
been drawn into the Radical circle against his better judgment, is committed to
the Republican Party, and is appointing extreme Radicals to the local
post-offices, carrying out the views of the Radical Members and strengthening
them by displacing friends of the President. In this I do not think D. intends
antagonism to the President, although it is that and nothing else. But he does
not permit himself to believe that the President and the Party, which is now a
mere machine of Thad Stevens, are not identical.
Seward knows the distinction
and yet contrives to persuade the President to acquiesce, while favoring the
Radicals. It is curious, but by no means pleasant, to witness this proceeding.
The President, usually sagacious, seems not to discern the management and
ultimate purpose of the Secretary of State, who is prompted by Stanton, one of
the Radical chiefs. Stanton has an assumed frankness, but his coarse manner
covers a good deal of subtle duplicity. Seward never differs with the
President. If he has taken an opposite view from or with others, or before the
President's opinion is known, it disappears forever when the sentiments of the
latter are ascertained. His knowledge and estimate of men are weak and
erroneous in the extreme.
The President
understands the political dexterity of Seward and yet does not apprehend that
it may ever operate adverse to himself, nor does Seward intend to antagonize
his chief. Some recent proceedings, connected with the schemes of the Radicals,
are to me inexplicable, and in our talk I so informed the President. I could
not understand how all the Republican Members from New York, a considerable
portion of whom are under the influence of Seward and Weed, should vote
steadily with the Radicals and against him, if Seward and Weed are his true
friends.
The New York Times,
Raymond's paper controlled by Weed, declared that the President and Radicals
were pretty much reconciled on the Constitutional changes, and by this
representation multitudes were entrapped into the measure. Seward, hastily and
without consulting the President, hastened to send certified copies of the
Amendment by the first mail to the State Executives. These and other things I
alluded to as very singular, and that I could hardly reconcile them to sincere
and honest friendship. The President was puzzled; said it was strange.
I told him I could
account for these proceedings readily, if it were to build up and sustain the
Weed and Seward party in New York, but it certainly was not strengthening the
Administration.
Raymond and Seward
knew of the movements for the convention, and the Times in
advance spoke of it as a move to unite the Republican Party while it would
certainly injure the Administration. The effect was, when the call appeared, to
cause distrust among Democrats, and to repel the World, the Herald,
etc. It looks like design or stupidity. I knew they were not fools.
My efforts to
incorporate with the call a clause adverting to the proposed Constitutional
changes which made a convention advisable were resisted and defeated by the
tools of Seward, because it would be agreeable to the Democrats and opposed to
the Radicals. His friends were committed on that subject. They had adopted it
and were, therefore, antagonistic to Johnson, yet they succeeded through the
assistance of Radicals who care little for principles.
SOURCE: Gideon
Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and
Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, pp. 543-5
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