Showing posts with label 36° 30'. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 36° 30'. Show all posts

Monday, April 18, 2022

Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States for the Annexation of Texas, March 1, 1845

[TWENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION]

Joint Resolution for annexing Texas to the United States

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress doth consent that the territory properly included within, and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas may be erected into a new State, to be call the State of Texas, with a republican form of government, to be adopted by the people of said republic, by deputies in convention assembled, with the consent of the existing government, in order that the same may be admitted as one of the States of this Union.

SEC. 2. And be it further resolved, that the foregoing consent of Congress is given upon the following conditions, and with the following guarantees, to wit: First. Said State to be formed, subject to the adjustment by this Government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other governments, and the constitution thereof, with the proper evidence of its adoption by the people of said Republic of Texas, shall be transmitted to the President of the United States, to be laid before Congress for its final action on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six. Second. Said State, when admitted into the Union, after ceding to the United States all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports, and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks, magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means pertaining to the public defence belonging to said Republic of Texas, shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind which may belong to or be due and owing said republic, and shall also retain all the vacant and unappropriated lands lying, within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts and liabilities of said Republic of Texas, and the residue of said lands, after discharging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may direct, but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the-Government of the United States. Third. New States, of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the Federal Constitution; and such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may desire; and in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited.

SEC. 3. And be it further resolved, That if the President of the United States shall 'in his judgment and discretion deem it most advisable, instead of proceeding to submit the foregoing resolution to the Republic of Texas, as an overture on the part of the United States for admission, to negotiate with that republic; then,

Be it resolved, That a State, to be formed out of the present Republic of Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two Representatives in Congress, until the next apportionment of representation, shall be admitted into the Union, by virtue of this act, on an equal footing with the existing States, as soon as the terms and conditions of such admission and the cession of the remaining Texan territory to the United States shall be agreed upon by the governments of Texas and the United States; and that the sum of one hundred thousand dollars be, and the same is hereby, appropriated to defray the expenses of missions and negotiations, to agree upon the terms of said admission and cession, either by treaty to be submitted to the Senate or by articles to be submitted to the two Houses of Congress, as the President may direct.

Approved, March 1, 1845.

SOURCE: Francis Newton Thorp, Editor, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies Now or Heretofore forming The United States of America, Vol. 6, p. 3544-6

Joint Resolution of the Congress of the Republic of Texas, June 23, 1845

Giving the consent of the existing Government to the annexation of Texas to the United States.

Whereas, the Government of the United States hath proposed the following terms, guarantees, and conditions, on which the People and Territory of the Republic of Texas may be erected into a new State, to be called the State of Texas, and admitted as one of the States of the American Union, to wit:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That, Congress doth consent that the Territory properly included within and rightfully belonging to the Republic of Texas may be erected into a new State, to be called the State of Texas, with a Republican form of Government, to be adopted by the people of said Republic, by deputies in Convention assembled, with the consent of the existing Government, in order that the same may be admitted as one of the States of this Union.


2. And be it further resolved, That, the foregoing consent of Congress is given upon the following conditions, and with the following guarantees, to wit:


First. Said State to be formed subject to the adjustment by this Government of all questions of boundary that may arise with other Governments, and the Constitution thereof, with the proper evidence of its adoption, by the people of said Republic of Texas, shall be transmitted to the President of the United States, to be laid before Congress for its final action, on or before the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six.


Second. Said State when admitted into the Union, after ceding to the United States all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks, magazines, arms, armaments and all other property and means pertaining to the public defence, belonging to the said Republic of Texas; shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes, and dues of every kind which may belong to or be due and owing said Republic; and shall also retain all the vacant and unappropriated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to the payment of the debts and liabilities of said Republic of Texas, and the residue of said lands, after discharging said debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may direct; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become a charge upon the Government of the United States.


Third. New States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the Federal Constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited.

And whereas, by said terms, the consent of the existing government of Texas is required— Therefore,

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Republic of Texas in Congress assembled, That, the Government of Texas doth consent, that the People and Territory of the Republic of Texas, may be erected into a new State, to be called the State of Texas, with a Republican form of Government, to be adopted by the People of said Republic, by Deputies in Convention assembled, in order that the same may be admitted as one of the States of the American Union, and said consent is given on the terms, guarantees and conditions set forth in the Preamble to this Joint Resolution.

SEC. 2. Be it further resolved, That, the Proclamation of the President of the Republic of Texas, bearing date May fifth, eighteen hundred and forty-five, and the election of Deputies to set in Convention, at Austin, on the fourth day of July next for the adoption of a Constitution for the State of Texas, had in accordance therewith, hereby receives the consent of the existing Government of Texas.

SEC. 3. Be it further resolved, That. the President of Texas is hereby requested immediately to furnish the Government of the United States, through their accredited Minister near this Government, with a copy of this Joint Resolution; also to furnish the Convention to assemble at Austin, on the fourth of July next, a copy of the same. And the same shall take effect from and after its passage.

JOHN M. LEWIS,        
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

K. L. ANDERSON,        
President of the Senate.
Approved, June 23, 1845.
ANSON JONES.        

SOURCE: Laws Passed by the Eighth Congress of the Republic of Texas, p. 4-6

Sunday, April 17, 2022

Enabling Act For Missouri, March 6, 1820

[SIXTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION.]

An Act to authorize the people of Missouri Territory to form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and to prohibit slavery in certain Territories.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the inhabitants of that portion of the Missouri Territory included within the boundaries hereinafter designated, be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper; and the said State, when formed, shall be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That the said State shall consist of all the territory included within the following boundaries, to wit: Beginning in the middle of the Mississippi River, on the parallel of thirty-six degrees of north latitude; thence west along that parallel of latitude to the Saint François River; thence up, and following the course of that river, in the middle of the main channel thereof, to the parallel of latitude of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes; thence west, along the same, to a point where the said parallel is intersected by a meridian-line passing through the middle of the mouth of the Kansas River, where the same empties into the Missouri River; thence from the point aforesaid north, along the said meridian-line, to the intersection of the parallel of latitude which passes through the rapids of the river Des Moines, making the said line to correspond with the Indian boundary-line; thence east, from the point of intersection last aforesaid, along the said parallel of latitude, to the middle of the channel of the main fork of the said river Des Moines; thence down and along the middle of the main channel of the said river Des Moines to the mouth of the same, where it empties into the Mississippi River; thence due east to the middle of the main channel of Mississippi River; thence down, and following the course of the Mississippi River, in the middle of the main channel thereof, to the place of beginning: Provided, The State shall ratify the boundaries aforesaid: And provided also, That the said State shall have concurrent jurisdiction on the river Mississippi, and every other river bordering on the said State, so far as the said rivers shall form a common boundary to the said State and any other State or States, now or hereafter to be formed and bounded by the same, such rivers to be common to both; and that the river Mississippi, and the navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, shall be common highways, and forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said State as to other citizens of the United States, without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor imposed by the said State.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That all free white male citizens of the United States, who shall have arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and have resided in said Territory three months previous to the day of election, and all other persons qualified to vote for representatives to the general assembly of the said Territory, shall be qualified to be elected, and they are hereby qualified and authorized to vote and choose representatives to form a convention, who shall be apportioned amongst the several counties as follows:

From the county of Howard, five representatives.

From the county of Cooper, three representatives.

From the county of Montgomery, two representatives.

From the county of Pike, one representative.

From the county of Lincoln, one representative.

From the county of Saint Charles, three representatives.

From the county of Franklin, one representative.

From the county of Saint Louis, eight representatives.

From the county of Jefferson, one representative.

From the county of Washington, three representatives.

From the county of Saint Genevieve, four representatives.

From the county of Madison, one representative.

From the county of Cape Girardeau, five representatives.

From the county of New Madrid, two representatives.

From the county of Wayne, and that portion of the county of Lawrence that falls within the boundaries herein designated, one representative.

And the election for the representatives aforesaid shall be holden on the first Monday and two succeeding days of May next, throughout the several counties aforesaid in the said Territory, and shall be in every respect held and conducted in the same manner and under the same regulations as is prescribed by the laws of the said Territory regulating elections therein for members of the general assembly, except that the returns of the election in that portion of Lawrence County included in the boundaries aforesaid shall be made to the county of Wayne, as is provided in other cases under the laws of said Territory.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That the members of the convention thus duly elected shall be, and they are hereby, authorized to meet at the seat of government of said Territory, on the second Monday of the month of June next; and the said convention, when so assembled, shall have power and authority to adjourn to any other place in the said Territory, which to them shall seem best for the convenient transaction of their business; and which convention, when so met, shall first determine, by a majority of the whole number elected, whether it be or be not expedient at that time to form a constitution and State government for the people within the said Territory, as included within the boundaries above designated; and, if it be deemed expedient, the convention shall be, and hereby is, authorized to form a constitution and State government; or, if it be deemed more expedient, the said convention shall provide by ordinance for electing representatives to form a constitution or frame of government; which said representatives shall be chosen in such manner, and in such proportion, as they shall designate, and shall meet at such time and place as shall be prescribed by the said ordinance; and shall then form for the people of said Territory, within the boundaries aforesaid, a constitution and State government: Provided, That the same, whenever formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; and that the legislature of said State shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to the bona-fide purchasers; and that no tax shall be imposed on lands the property of the United States; and in no case shall non-resident proprietors be taxed higher than residents.

Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That, until the next general census shall be taken, the said State shall be entitled to one Representative in the House of Representatives of the United States.

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That the following propositions be, and the same are hereby, offered to the convention of the said Territory of Missouri, when formed, for their free acceptance or rejection, which, if accepted by the convention, shall be obligatory upon the United States:

First. That section numbered sixteen in every township, and when such section has been sold, or otherwise disposed of, other lands, equivalent thereto and as contiguous as may be, shall be granted to the State for the use of the inhabitants of such township, for the use of schools.

Second. That all salt-springs, not exceeding twelve in number, with six sections of land adjoining to each, shall be granted to the said State, for the use of said State, the same to be selected by the legislature of the said State, on or before the first day of January, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-five, and the same, when so selected, to be used under such terms, conditions, and regulations as the legislature of said State shall direct: Provided, That no salt-spring, the right whereof now is, or hereafter shall be, confirmed or adjudged to any individual or individuals, shall, by this section, be granted to said State: And provided also, That the legislature shall never sell or lease the same, at any one time, for a longer period than ten years, without the consent of Congress.

Third. That 5 per cent. of the net proceeds of the sale of lands lying within the said Territory, or State, and which shall be sold by Congress, from and after the first day of January next, after deducting all expenses incident to the same, shall be reserved for making public roads and canals, of which three-fifths shall be applied to those objects within the State, under the direction of the legislature thereof; and the other two-fifths in defraying, under the direction of Congress, the expenses to be incurred in making of a road or roads, canal or canals, leading to the said State.

Fourth. That four entire sections of land be, and the same are hereby, granted to the said State, for the purpose of fixing their seat of government thereon, which said sections shall, under the direction of the legislature of said State, be located, as near as may be, in one body, at any time, in such townships and ranges as the legislature aforesaid may select, on any of the public lands of the United States: Provided, That such locations shall be made prior to the public sale of the lands of the United States surrounding such location.

Fifth. That thirty-six sections, or one entire township, which shall be designated by the President of the United States, together with the other lands heretofore reserved for that purpose, shall be reserved for the use of a seminary of learning, and vested in the legislature of said State, to be appropriated solely for the use of such seminary by the said legislature: Provided, That the five foregoing propositions herein offered are on the condition that the convention of the said State shall provide, by an ordinance, irrevocable without the consent of the United States, that every and each tract of land sold by the United States, from and after the first day of January next, shall remain exempt from any tax laid by order or under the authority of the State, whether for State, county, or township, or any other purpose whatever, for the term of five years from and after the day of sale: And further, That the bounty-lands granted, or hereafter to be granted, for military services during the late war, shall, while they continue to be held by the patentees, or their heirs, remain exempt as aforesaid from taxation for the term of three years from and after the date of the patents respectively.

SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That in case a constitution and State government shall be formed for the people of the said Territory of Missouri, the said convention or representatives, as soon thereafter as may be, shall cause a true and attested copy of such constitution, or frame of State government, as shall be formed or provided, to be transmitted to Congress.

Sec. 8. And be it further enacted, That in all that territory ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes north latitude, not included within the limits of the State contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited: Provided always, That any person escaping into the same from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any State or Territory of the United States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or services as aforesaid.

APPROVED, March 6, 1820.

SOURCES: Benjamin Perley Poore, Compiler, The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States, Part 2, p. 1102-4

Thursday, March 31, 2022

Congressman Alexander Stephens: Speech on Nebraska and Kansas, February 17, 1854

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FEBRUARY 17, 1854.

The House being in the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union.

I was very anxious day before yesterday, Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. MEACHAM,] and the gentleman from New York, upon my left, [Mr. FENTON,] addressed the House upon the subject of the Nebraska bill, to make some remarks upon the same subject in reply to them. I desired to do so at the time, but the opportunity was not afforded me. And though I have lost some of the ardor of feeling which the occasion then excited, yet I think it important that these positions should be answered, and it is for that purpose that I rise to address the committee to-day. I assure you I shall be as brief as possible.

The gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. MEACHAM,] if I understood the train of his argument, opposed the Nebraska bill, as presented to the House, mainly upon the ground that it declares the eighth section of the act of 1820, preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union as a State, inoperative, because it is inconsistent with the principles of the acts of 1850, known as the compromise of that year. This eighth section of the act of 1820 is that clause which, without any relation to the State of Missouri, prohibits slavery forever from all that part of the territory acquired by the Louisiana cession outside of Missouri north of 36° 30' north latitude. The argument of the gentleman consisted of the following series of assumptions:

First, that that restriction or prohibition was in the nature of a compact, or contract, as he called it.

Secondly, that it had been continuously adhered to from that time to this.

Thirdly, that the measure now proposed would be a violation of that compact.

Fourthly, that this breach of good faith would be attended with disastrous consequences to the peace, quiet, and repose of the country.

This, sir, was the outline of his argument. Now I propose to take up these positions, and show to the House, if not to the gentleman himself, that in every particle they are untenable.

In the first place, I state that that eighth clause of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, restricting slavery north of 36° 30', never was a compact. It never had any of the requisites or characteristics of a compact. A compact between whom? Between the North and South?

Mr. MEACHAM. I used the word "contract,” not "compact."

Mr. STEPHENS. The gentleman from Vermont used the word “contract," as I said, but others have used the word "compact,” and, in this connection, they both mean about the same thing. But what I was about to affirm is, that that “great Missouri compromise” which Mr. Clay proposed, and with which his fame is identified, had nothing to do with this restrictive clause of the act of 1820. That compromise [Mr. CLAY's] was in the nature of a “compact." It was a "compact" between the general government and the State of Missouri. I am aware that the general opinion on this subject is very erroneous. This Mr. Clay fully explained in 1850. The common idea is, that Mr. Clay was the author of the prohibition of slavery north of 36° 30'. But such is not the fact. He did not even vote for it. That proposition came from a gentleman from Illinois. The compromise that Mr. Clay offered was afterwards. Its history is this: The people of Missouri, under the act of 6th March, 1820, went on and formed a State constitution, which contained a clause authorizing the legislature to pass a law to prevent the immigration of free negroes; and when application was made for admission as a State into the Union, Congress refused the admission, unless that clause should be expunged. It was then that Mr. Clay brought forward his measure. Here it is:

Resolution providing for the admission of Missouri into the Union on a certain condition, Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Missouri shall be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition that the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of the third article of the constitution, submitted on the part of the said State to Congress, shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen of either of the States in this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the United States: Provided, That the Legislature of the said State, by solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and transmit to the President of the United States, on or before the fourth Monday in November next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon the receipt whereof the President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any further proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State into this Union shall be considered as complete.

JOHN W. TAYLOR,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

JOHN GAILLARD,   

President of the Senate, pro tempore.

Approved, March 2 1821.

JAMES MONROE.

This proposition, when submitted to the people of Missouri, and acceded to by them, as it was, may very properly be called a “compact.” For there were parties to it—the general government on one side, and the people of Missouri on the other—both agreeing to it. But not so with the eighth section of the act referred to—there were no such parties to it—that was nothing but a law, with no greater sanction than any other statute that may give place to subsequent legislation. There was no compact about it. Missouri never gave her sanction to it. She could not have been any party to it. She had no right to the territory outside of her limits. She had no power or authority to make any compact concerning it.

But the gentleman argued as if he considered this eighth section of the act of 1820, fixing the line of 36° 30', north of which slavery should be forever excluded, and which is commonly called the “Missouri compromise line,” as a contract between the North and South, as the parties. How, then, stand the facts upon this point of view? How did this eighth section get into the bill of 1820? It was in this way—the North insisted upon a restriction against the admission of Missouri as a State, which required her to abolish slavery within her limits, as a condition precedent to her admission—the House passed a bill with such restriction to which the South were in mass opposed. In the Senate, on motion by Mr. Thomas, of Illinois, that clause containing a restriction on the State was stricken out, and this eighth section inserted in lieu of it. The South in mass were opposed to the State restriction, as I have said; but many of her members—a majority of two, I believe—voted for the substitute as the lesser evil of the two. In this way the substitute was carried as an amendment to the bill. This amendment was agreed to in the House by a vote of 134 to 42. Among these 42 noes are to be found the names of several of the most prominent men of the South. In this way this line of 36° 30' was incorporated in the bill of 1820, preparatory to the admission of Missouri as a State. And to this extent, and no other, can it be called a compromise, a contract, or compact. It was literally forced upon the South as a disagreeable alternative, by superior numbers, and in this way went upon your statute book as any other law passed by a majority of votes. So much, then, sir, for this "compact," or contract. Now let us see, in the second place, how it has been fulfilled or adhered to from that day to this.

The gentleman says it has been acquiesced in and conformed to for thirty years; and he asks, with much solemnity, if we are now about to violate and abrogate it? I have shown, sir, that the South was in no sense a party to this Congressional restriction north of 36° 30', except as a vanquished party, being outvoted on the direct question; protesting against it with all her might and power. Yet, sir, notwithstanding this, and not withstanding a large majority of her people from that day to this, as I think I may safely affirm, have held that clause of the Missouri act to be unconstitutional, as it was based upon the principle of a division of the common territory between the free States and slave States of the Union, for the sake of peace and harmony, the South did patriotically yield, and was willing for all time to come to abide by it. I say was, because of this “Missouri compromise," and the principles upon which it was founded, it may now be said “Illium fuit.

The issue I make with the gentleman upon this branch of his speech is, that this agreement or contract, as he argued it, between the North and the South as to the line of division between slave territory and free territory, has not remained undisturbed and inviolate for thirty years, as he affirms. It has been shamelessly disregarded by Congress repeatedly, and in principle was entirely superseded, as I shall show, by the principles established by your legislation in 1850.

But as much as the arrangement was originally obnoxious to the South, the charge of violation of it cannot justly be made against her. No, sir; no, sir; it was the North that refused to abide by her own bargain. This I affirm. Now let us see how the record stands upon the subject. The first time that this question came up afterward, was within twelve months from the date of the act itself and before the same Congress. It came up on the application of Missouri for admission, in pursuance of the provisions of the very act that contains the “covenant.” She had formed a State constitution in pursuance of it; she had violated none of its conditions. The whole South were for letting her be admitted, and the entire North nearly, were against it. Here is the vote rejecting her admission—the vote was 79 for it, and 93 against it—the North in mass, almost, against it. Why was this refusal? If they recognized the provisions of the act of March preceding as containing any section binding upon them in the nature of a "contract," or "compact," why did they refuse to fulfill it? The pretext assigned was, that the constitution of Missouri contained a clause empowering the legislature to pass a law to prevent the introduction of free persons of color, as I have stated. But this could have been nothing but a pretext, for at that very day Massachusetts had a similar law in actual force upon her statute book. The truth is, the North at that early day showed that she did not regard the provisions of the act of 1820 as at all obligatory upon them as any thing like a compact. The real objection to the final admission of Missouri as a State was, that slavery was tolerated within her limits by her constitution. It was the old question, which gave trouble before this “contract” of 1820 was made.

It was then that Mr. Clay's compromise was adopted. Twelve months, therefore, had not passed before the North repudiated this compact by refusing Missouri admission without another compromise.

Well, the next time this question arose was on the admission of Arkansas into the Union in 1836. This State was formed out of a part of the Louisiana purchase south of 36° 30'. By the terms of the Missouri “contract," the gentleman from Vermont admits that she was to come in as a slave State. Did the North then so recognize and act upon these terms? The gentleman from New York [Mr. FENTON] said that this division line had been approved by the North for thirty years. If so, I ask him when or whereDid they raise no objection when Arkansas applied for admission? Let us see; here is the record.

Mr. John Quincy Adams, in this House, June 13, 1836, moved an amendment so as to make a section of the bill for the admission of that State read thus:

“And nothing in this act contained shall be construed as an assent by Congress to the article in the constitution of the said State relating to slavery and to the emancipation of slaves, etc.

“Still harping on my daughter."

On a vote, the effect of which was to allow this amendment, there were eighty in favor of affording the opportunity. There were one hundred and nine on the opposite side, which prevented its being offered. Of these eighty votes, some were from the South. The object may have been to get a vote upon this distinct question of the recognition by the House of the line established in 1820. But after the amendment was ruled out on the direct vote for the admission of Arkansas with a constitution tolerating slavery, though she was south of 36° 30', there are fifty-two names under the lead of Mr. Adams, in the negative every one of them, I believe, from the North—I have the journal before me. And amongst these names I see Heman Allen, Horace Everett, Hiland Hall, Henry F. Jones, and William Slade. The entire delegation from Vermont, and the gentleman's [Mr. MEACHAM's] own predecessor upon this floor, or he who then represented a portion of the same constituency that that gentleman now does, recorded his vote against the admission of Arkansas. Did he or his colleagues have any other objection to it except that it was a slave State? If they regarded the line of 36° 30' as a solemn covenant between the North and South, why did they not give it their sanction at that time? The gentleman spoke of “honor”—

“I thank thee, Jew, for teaching me that word.”

Where was the "honor" of the representatives of Vermont on that occasion? In whose keeping was it placed? I suppose in the hands of their constituents, of whom the gentleman was one. The representatives from the gentleman's own State did then unanimously—most dishonorably, if he chooses so to characterize their conduct—repudiate that “contract” which the South never offered to disturb, until it was totally abandoned by an overwhelming majority at the North, as I shall presently show. I have shown that it was disregarded within twelve months after it was made, and refused to be sanctioned by the representatives of the gentleman's own State in 1836, the first time it came up again.

I will now go on, and show the gentleman and the House, when it came up again, and when finally it was utterly repudiated by the almost entire North

Mr. MEACHAM (interrupting). I would inquire of the gentleman if the senators from Vermont did not vote for it?

Mr. STEPHENS. For what? Mr. MEACHAM. For the admission of Missouri.

Mr. STEPHENS. I am not speaking of the Senate, but of the House I have none but the House records before me. I am dealing with members in this body, or those who preceded us here. If the gentleman desires, he can answer for his predecessors from the State of Vermont on this floor,

The next time any thing was said in our legislation about the "Missouri line of 36° 30%," was on the annexation of Texas. That measure was carried with that line in it, but not by northern votes. It was the South, still willing to abide it, that carried it then. There were one hundred and twenty-five northern votes given on that occasion. Of these, only fifty-one were for the annexation with this line established in it; while there were seventy-four-a large majority-who refused to give it their sanction. I do not mean to say that all who voted against that measure were opposed to that line of settlement. Many of them had other reasons. And I know full well, for I was here, that of those fifty-one northern men who voted for it, many of them would not have voted for the recognition of that line if the question had come up by itself. But those resolutions of annexation were so presented that they had to be taken as a whole, or not at all. I allude to this vote, merely because it was the next time in order when the question came up, and the vote certainly fails to show that the North, or even a majority of them, gave it their sanction. For that reason only I allude to it.

I come down now to another step of our progress to the period from the year 1847 to 1850. The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. MEACHAM] had a map for illustration, which he exhibited to us. He pointed out to us the boundary of the Louisiana purchase. It commenced at the mouth of the Sabine, ran up that river to the 32° of north latitude; thence due north to the Red river; thence up that river to the 100° of west longitude from Greenwich; thence due north to the Arkansas river, and up that river to the 42° of north latitude, and thence due west to the South seas or the Pacific ocean. By this map, and his demonstrations from it, it appears that we had a title ceded to us from France to territory extending to the Pacific ocean. Well, that of course included Oregon—that is, according to the gentleman's map, we derived title to Oregon under the cession from France in 1803, and that territory was part of the Louisiana purchase. Mr. Jefferson so considered it, and sent Lewis and Clarke to explore the country.

Well, then, how did the South act toward this "solemn compact," as it is now called—the line of 36° 30'—when we came to organize a territorial government for Oregon in 1847? The southern boundary was the 42° of north latitude, and of course the whole of it lay north of 36° 30'. At this time (in 1847) we were in a war with Mexico, and it was well understood to be the policy of the administration to acquire territory from that government, which, in all probability, would, to some extent, be south of the line 36° 30'. From the votes of the House, upon what was well known as the “Wilmot proviso," the South had just reasons to apprehend that it was the fixed determination of a majority of the North to disregard entirely what is now called the “sacred covenant of 1820.” When, therefore, the bill to organize a territorial government for Oregon came up in this House on the 15th of January, 1847, Mr. Burt, of South Carolina, to take the sense of the North directly upon the question of abiding by this line of 36° 30', moved, as an amendment to that clause in the bill which excluded slavery forever from the territory, these words:

“inasmuch as the whole of said territory lies north of 36° 30' north latitude, known as the line of the Missouri compromise."

The object of this amendment was to put a direct test to the North whether they intended to recognize the principle upon which the controversy on the subject of slavery in the territories was disposed of in 1820 or not. Sir, the North understood the question fully and clearly, and they met it promptly their response was, that they did not. Here is the vote upon this question: there were in this House then 82 votes for Mr. Burt's amendment, and 113 against it! Of these noes, every man was from the North. Every southern man in the House voted for it. And of the 82 who voted to adhere to the principle of that adjustment, not as something too sacred to be touched, but for the sake of peace and quiet, there were, I believe, but six from the whole North—they were Douglas and Robert Smith, from Illinois; Cunningham and Parish, from Ohio; Charles J. Ingersoll, of Pennsylvania, and Hastings, of Iowa. Every man from Vermont and New York voted against it.

In the face of this record the gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. MEACHAM,] and the gentleman from New York, [Mr. FENTON,] in their places upon this floor, two days ago, declared that this "Missouri compromise" had met the approval of the North for thirty years. The South, in this instance, proposed it unanimously as a "peace offering,” and it was almost as unanimously rejected by the North. “Honor,” I think, the gentleman said. They rejected it over territory to which we derived title by the very cession alluded to in the act of 1820. And so thoroughly opposed were they to giving it their approval, and so bent upon its total abrogation, that they refused to affirm the principle when they got all by the affirmation. “Honor! indeed! But sir, to proceed. This bill was defeated in the Senate, I believe. It did not become a law. The question came up again in 1848. Another bill was brought forward to establish a territorial government for Oregon. The Senate put in the following amendment:

“That the line of 36° 30' of north latitude, known as the Missouri compromise line, as defined by the eighth section of an act entitled ‘An, act to authorize the people of the Missouri territory to form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of such State into the Union, on an equal footing with the original States, and to prohibit slavery in certain territories,’ approved March 6, 1820, be, and the same is hereby, declared to extend to the Pacific ocean; and the said eighth section, together with the compromise therein effected, is hereby revived, and declared to be in full force and binding for the future organization of the territories of the United States, in the same sense and with the same understanding with which it was originally adopted.”

It came up for action in this House on the 11th of August, 1848. On the question to concur with the Senate in this amendment, the yeas were 82, and the nays 121. I have the vote before

This was a proposition to revive and declare in force a provision which is now claimed to have been held all the time as a sacred compact—almost as sacred as the constitution itself; and it was rejected by an overwhelming majority in this House-rejected, sir, by the North. The South was again unanimous for it. From the North at this time, I think, there were but four votes for it-Birdsall, from New York; Charles Brown, Charles J. Ingersoll, and Brodhead, from Pennsylvania. Here is the Journal. This proposition in the Senate was moved by Mr. Douglas. It received every southern vote in that body, and was opposed by every northern vote, except Douglas, Dickinson, Bright, Cameron, Hannegan, Sturgeon, and Fitzgerald. The vote on the adoption of it in that body was 33 to 21. Mr. Calhoun, who was well known to be opposed to the principle on which it was founded, gave it his support.

But upon the rejection of this amendment by the House, and a disagreement between the two Houses upon it, the amendment was lost, and the Oregon bill passed, and received the sanction of the President without this recognition of the Missouri compromise, but in the face of its open repudiation and abrogation by the North. This, sir, is the truth of history, and so let it be written. And with what sort of face can gentlemen, with these facts before them, rise up here and say that this compromise has been undisturbed and acquiesced in for thirty years? But, sir, there is still another chapter in this history.

At the close of the war with Mexico extensive territories, as was expected, were acquired-territories extending south as well as north of the line of 36° 30'—constituting a public domain of hundreds of thousands of square miles, purchased by the common blood and common treasure of the people of the South as well as the North. The policy of the advocates of the “Wilmot proviso," from the beginning, had been to appropriate the whole of this immense region exclusively to the North. Hence their uniform hostility to the Missouri compromise, because that was founded upon the principle of division. Their determination was to have all. The South was still willing to divide, notwithstanding the policy which she ever advocated was to leave all the territories open for the occupancy and colonization of the people of the whole country, from whatever section they might emigrate, with the liberty of forming such institutions, upon a republican basis, as they might deem most conducive to their happiness, interest, and prosperity, without any congressional restriction or dictation whatever. This was always the doctrine maintained at the South. She was willing to divide, only as an alternative between that and a greater evil. To an entire exclusion, by act of Congress, she had made up her mind never to submit, let consequences be what they might. This was the state of things upon the assembling of the Thirty-first Congress. The events of that Congress are too recent and vivid upon the recollection of all to need a rehearsal. The majority of the North still proclaimed their determination to appropriate the whole of the public domain to themselves. Both sections stood in hostile array against each other. The strife became so embittered and fierce that legislation was paralyzed, and every thing seemed to threaten confusion and anarchy. The South again repeatedly proposed a settlement upon the Missouri line. The proposition was made in this House, on the part of the South, for the last time, on the 13th day of June, 1850. It was in these words:

Provided, however, That it shall be no objection to the admission into the Union of any State which may hereafter be formed out of the territory lying south of the parallel of latitude of 36° 30', that the constitution of said State may authorize or establish African slavery therein."

This proposition was rejected in committee of the whole upon a count by tellers ayes 78, noes 89. It was the last time, sir, it was ever offered. When the North had again, and again, and again, for three years, refused to abide by it, the South, driven to the wall upon it, was thrown back upon her original rights under the constitution. Her next position was, that territorial restriction by Congress should be totally abandoned, not only south of 36° 30', but north of that line too! Upon this ground she planted herself on the 15th day of June—the debates in this House on that day were more exciting, perhaps, than ever upon any day since the beginning of the government. It was upon that day I put the question directly to a distinguished gentleman then here from Ohio, [Mr. VINTON,] whether he would vote for the admission of any slave State into the Union, and he refused to say that he would. The determination, as manifested by the votes of the majority of the North, was to apply legislative restriction over the whole of the common territory, in open and shameless disregard of the principles of the so-called Missouri compromise, notwithstanding the gentleman from Vermont says that it has been adhered to and held inviolate for thirty years. It was on that day, sir, that a distinguished colleague of mine, [Mr. Toombs,] then on this floor, now in the other wing of the Capitol, made that speech which has become somewhat famous in our State, in which he said, with eloquence seldom heard within these walls:

“We do not oppose California on account of the anti-slavery clause in her constitution." It was her right, and I am not even prepared to say that she acted unwisely in its exercise that is her business; but I stand upon the great principle that the South has a right to an equal participation in the territories of the United States."


*          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *          *


“Deprive us of this right and appropriate this common property to yourselves it is then your government, not mine. Then I am its enemy; and I will then, if I can, bring my children and my constituents to the altar of liberty, and, like Hamilcar, I would swear them to eternal hostility to your foal domination. Give us our just rights, and we are ready, as ever heretofore, to stand by the Union, every part of it, and its every interest; refuse it, and, for one, I will strike for independence."

It was then, when the North had refused all compromise, and went into the contest for “the whole or none,” that the South took up the gauge, planted herself upon her original ground, armed, as she conceived, in the panoply of truth; and her representatives boldly meeting those arrayed, not only against her rights, but a great principle of free government, face to face, said:

Lay on, Macduff;

And damn'd be he that first cries, Hold, enough!"

The grounds she then took were, that there should be no settlement of this territorial controversy, but upon the recognition of her original principles, which were, that all congressional restrictions upon this subject were wrong, and should be totally abandoned. This was the basis of her ultimatum, as then proclaimed. It was offered in this House on the 15th day of June, 1850. No decision was had on it. It was offered two days after in the Senate to the then pending compromise bill in the Senate. This proposition was in these words:

And when the said territory, or any portion of the same, shall be admitted as a State, it shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution may prescribe at the time of admission.”

The whole question of slavery or no slavery was to be left to the determination of the people of the territories, whether north or south of 36° 30', or any other line. The question was to be taken out of Congress, where it had been improperly thrust from the beginning, and to be left to the people concerned in the matter to decide for themselves. This, I say, was the position originally held by the South, when the Missouri restriction was at first proposed. The principle upon which that position rests lies at the very foundation of all our republican institutions; it is that the citizens of every distinct and separate community or State should have the right to govern themselves in their domestic matters as they please, and that they should be free from intermeddling restrictions and arbitrary dictation on such matters, from any other power or government in which they have no voice.

It was out of a violation of this very principle, to a great extent, that the war of the Revolution sprung. The South was always on the republican side of this question, while the North—no; or, at least, I will not say the entire North, for there have always been some of them with the South on this question; but I will say, while a majority of the North, under the free-soil lead of that section, up to the settlement of the contest in 1850—were on the opposite side.

The doctrine of the restrictionists or free-soilers, or those who hold that Congress ought to impose their arbitrary mandates upon the people of the territories in this particular, whether the people be willing or unwilling, is the doctrine of Lord North and his adherents in the British Parliament toward the colonies during his administration. He and they claimed the right to govern the colonies "in all cases whatsoever," notwithstanding the want of representation on their part. The doctrine of the South upon this question has been, and is, the doctrine of the whigs in 1775 and 1776. It involves the principle that the citizens of every community should have a voice in their government. This was the doctrine of the people of Boston in 1775, when the response was made throughout the colonies, “The cause of Boston is the cause of us all.” And if there be any here now who call themselves whigs arrayed against this great principle of republican government, I will do toward them as Burke did in England; I will appeal from “the new to the old whigs.”

I say nothing of the constitutional view of the question. When I have been asked if Congress does not possess the power to impose restrictions or to pass the “Wilmot proviso," I have waived that issue; I never discuss it. On that point I have told my constituents, and I tell you, I treat it as Chatham treated it in the British Parliament, when the question of power to tax the colonies without representation was raised there. That question Chatham would not discuss; but he told those who were so unjustly exercising it, that if he were an American he would resist it. The question of power is not the question; the question is, is it right thus to exercise it? Is it consistent with representative republican government to do it? That is the question. Where do you new latter-day whigs from the North stand on this question? Will you take the side of Lord North and the British tories, and maintain that it is the duty of this great government, with its superior wisdom, to legislate for the freemen of this country, as free-born as yourselves, who quit your State jurisdictions and seek new homes in the West?

And where do you, calling yourselves democrats from the North, stand upon this great question of popular rights? Do you consider it democratic to exercise the high prerogative of stifling the voice of the adventurous pioneer and restricting his suffrage in a matter concerning his own interest, happiness, and government, which he is much more capable of deciding than you are? As for myself and the friends of the Nebraska bill, we think that our fellow-citizens who go to the frontier, penetrate the wilderness, cut down the forests, till the soil, erect school-houses and churches, extend civilization, and lay the foundation of future States and empires, do not lose by their change of place, in hope of bettering their condition, either their capacity for self-government or their just rights to exercise it, conformably to the constitution of the United States.

We of the South are willing that they should exercise it upon the subject of the condition of the African race amongst them, as well as upon other questions of domestic policy. If they see fit to let them hold the same relation to the white race which they do in the southern States, from the conviction that it is better for both races that they should, let them do it. If they see fit to place them on the same footing they occupy in the northern States, that is, without the rights of a citizen or the protection of a master, outcasts from society, in worse condition than Cain, who, though sent forth as a vagabond, yet had a mark upon him that no man should hurt him—I say, if they choose to put this unfortunate race on that footing, let them do it. That is a matter that we believe the people there can determine for themselves better than we can for them. We do not ask you to force southern institutions or our form of civil polity upon them; but to let the free emigrants to our vast public domain, in every part and parcel of it, settle this question for themselves, with all the experience, intelligence, virtue, and patriotism they may carry with them. This, sir, is our position. It is, as I have said, the original position of the South, It is the position she was thrown back upon in June, 1850. It rests upon that truly national and American principle set forth in the amendment offered in the Senate on the 17th of June, which I have stated; and it was upon the adoption of this principle that that most exciting and alarming controversy was adjusted. This was the turning point; upon it every thing depended, so far as that compromise was concerned.

I well recollect the intensity of interest felt upon the fate of that proposition in the Senate. Upon its rejection in the then state of the public mind depended consequences which no human forecast could see or estimate. The interest was enhanced from the great uncertainty and doubt as to the result of the vote. Several northern senators, who had before yielded the question of positive, restriction—that is, the “Wilmot Proviso”—had given no indication of how they would act upon this clear declaration that the people of the territories might, in the formation of their State constitutions, determine this question for themselves. Among these was Mr. Webster. Just before the question was put, and while anxiety was producing its most torturing effects, this most renowned statesman from New England arose to address the Senate. An immense crowd was in attendance. The lobby, as well as the galleries, were full. All eyes were instantly turned toward him, and all ears eager to catch every word that should fall from his lips upon this, the most important question, perhaps, which had ever been decided by an American Senate. His own vote, even, might turn the scale. That speech I now have before me. In it he declared himself for the amendment. His conclusion was in these words:

“Sir, my object is peace-my object is reconciliation. My purpose is not to make up a case for the North, or to make up a case for the South. My object is not to continue useless and irritating controversies. I ain against agitators North and South; I am against local ideas North and South, and against all narrow and local contests. I am an American, and I know no locality in America. That is my country. My heart, my sentiments, my judgment, demand of me that I should pursue such a course as shall promote the good, and the harmony, and the union of the whole country. This I shall do, God willing, to the end of the chapter."

The reporter says:

[“The honorable Senator resumed his seat amidst the general applause from the gallery.”]

Yes, sir; he did. I was there, and witnessed the scene; and no one, I fancy, who was there, can ever forget that scene.

Every heart beat easier. The friends of the measure felt that it was safe. The vote was taken the amendment was adopted. The result was soon communicated from the galleries, and, finding its way through every passage and outlet to the rotunda, was received with exultation by the crowd there; with quick steps it was borne through the city; and in less than five minutes, perhaps, the electric wires were trembling with the gladsome news to the remotest parts of the country. It was news well calculated to make a nation leap with joy, as it did, because it was the first step taken toward the establishment of that great principle upon which this territorial question was disposed of, adjusted, and settled in 1850. It was a new step in our governmental history. From the beginning, nothing had been the cause or source of so much sectional feeling and strife as this question of slavery in the territories—a question so nearly allied in principle to the old controversy between the colonies and the mother country.

With the colonies the question was not so much the amount of taxation; it was not the small duty on team that was far from being oppressive—but it was the principle on which it was placed; it was the principle asserted and maintained in the “preamble,” that our forefathers resisted by arms. And Mr. Webster well said, on some occasion, that the American Revolution was “fought against a preamble.” That preamble asserted the right, or power, of the home government to govern the colonies in all cases. It was against that principle the war was commenced.

The cause of right in which the men of '76 engaged, was vindicated in the success of the revolution and the disruption of the British empire. And, as a coincidence worthy to be noted, it so happened that this kindred principle of the proper and just rights of the people of our territories, or colonies, made its first step toward ultimate success on the anniversary of the battle of Bunker Hill. It was on the ever memorable 17th day of June. It was on that day (1775) the blow was struck, by the colonists at Boston, against the unwise, unjust, and arbitrary policy of Lord North And it was on the same day, just seventy-five years after, that the unwise, unjust, and arbitrary policy, to say no more of it, of this general government attempting to compel the people of our territories to adopt such institutions as may please a majority of Congress, without consulting the rights, interests, or wishes of those immediately concerned-was, for the first time, abandoned by the American Senate without a blow. It is fortunate for us, and fortunate for millions that shall come after us, that it was abandoned without a blow. Had the restrictionists of this country held out as Lord North's ministry did in their policy, it might have ended in consequences most disastrous to our common well-being, and the hopes of mankind. But they did not. The Power of truth prevailed. Patriotism trampled over faction. And as soon as this great American principle I so call it because it lies at the foundation of all our republican institutions-was vindicated in the Senate, the House did not again resume the subject. We waited until the bills came from the Senate. The same provision as that I have read was put in the New Mexico bill. That swept away the restriction that had been put in the Texas annexation resolutions over all that part of Texas lying north of 36° 30', included in the present territory of New Mexico. The House took up these bills, after they were passed by the Senate with these amendments, with this new principle incorporated in them, and gave them their sanction.

This, sir, is what is called the compromise of 1850, so far as this territorial question is concerned. It was adopted after the policy of dividing territory between the two sections, North and South, was wholly abandoned, discarded, and spurned by the North. It was based upon the truly republican and national policy of taking this disturbing element out of Congress, and leaving the whole question of slavery in the territories to the people, there to settle it for themselves. And it is in vindication of that new principle then established for the first time in the history of our government—in the year 1850, the middle of the nineteenth century that we, the friends of the Nebraska bill, whether from the North or South, now call upon this House and the country to carry out in good faith, and give effect to the spirit and intent of those important measures of territorial legislation. The principle of those territorial acts was utterly inconsistent with every thing like Congressional restriction. This is what we wish to declare[.] And this principle, carried out in good faith, necessarily renders all antecedent legislation inconsistent with it inoperative and void. This, also, we propose to declare.

The restriction imposed by the eighth section of the act of 1820—thrown into that act out of place and without any legitimate connection with it, like a fifth wheel to a wagon—is just such antecedent legislation. The principle on which it was based has been abandoned, totally abandoned, as I have shown, by those who now contend for it, and superseded by another, a later, a better, and a much more national and republican one.

We do not propose to repeal "any compact,” or to violate faith in any sense—we only invoke you to stand upon the territorial principle established by what is known as the compromise of 1850. That has already received the sanction of an overwhelming majority of the American people, as I doubt not it always will receive when fairly presented. I have seen it suggested, that if a proposition should be made to extend the provisions of this bill to the guarantee to the South in the Texas annexation resolutions for the admission of slave States from Texas south of 36° 30', that such proposition would certainly defeat it. By no means, sir; those who reason thus show nothing so clearly as how little they understand the real merits of the question.

That guarantee, secured in the Texas resolutions, so far as the character of the institutions of such States, hereafter to be formed, is concerned—that is, whether they be slave or free—is, itself, in perfect accordance with the present provisions of this bill. That guarantee was not that those new States should be slave States, but that the people there might do as they please upon the subject. The reason that the guarantee was important, at the time, was, because the policy of Congressional restriction had not then been abandoned. The South never asked any discrimination in her favor from your hands. All that the South secured by those resolutions, so far as the character of the States is concerned, was, simply, that they should be admitted at a proper time, “either with or without slavery," as the people may determine. As to the number of States, that is a different question. So that if you should repeal that so called guarantee for slave States, by extending this bill to that country, you would only erase to fill again, with the same words. We ask no discrimination in our favor. And all we ask of you men of the North is, that you make none in your own. And, why should you? Why should you even have the desire to do it? Why should you not be willing to remove this question forever from Congress, and leave it to the people of the territories, according to the compromise of 1850? You have greatly the advantage of us in population. The white population of the United States is now over twenty millions. Of this number, the free States have more than two to one, compared with the South. There are only a little over three millions of slaves.

If immigration into the territories, then, should be assumed to go on in the ratio of population, we must suppose that there would be near seven white persons to one slave at least; and of these seven, two from the free States to one from the South. This is without taking into the estimation the immense foreign immigration. With such an advantage are you afraid to trust this question with your own people?—men reared under the influence of your own boasted superior institutions? With all the prejudices of birth and education against us, are you afraid to let them judge for themselves? Are your  free-born” sons, who never “breathed the tainted air of slavery,” such nincompoops that they cannot be “trusted out without their mothers' leave?” It must be so, or else another inference is legitimate and clear; and that is, that notwithstanding all your denunciations of the "hated and accursed institution,” you have an inward consciousness that it is not so bad after all, and that the only way you can keep wise, intelligent, and Christian men, even from New England itself, from adopting it, is to set yourselves up as self-constituted guardians and lawmakers for them. I consider your policy and the tenacity with which you hold to it, as the fullest and amplest vindication of the institutions of the South against all your misrepresentations, abuse, and billingsgate about them.

I think, sir, I have shown conclusively that the line of 36° 30', known as the Missouri compromise line, never was a “compact,” in any proper sense of that term. And even if it was that it has been disregarded, broken, and trampled under foot by the parties who have lately so signalized themselves as its champions and defenders. I have shown, that while the South was opposed to the policy by which it was adopted, and took it as a disagreeable alternative, yet she never offered to disturb it, but was willing to abide by it for the sake of peace and harmony. I have shown, also, that the present measure is no “breach of faith,” but that its object is to carry out and give effect to the great territorial principle established in 1850.

It remains for me now to say something upon the last part of the speech of the gentleman from Vermont; and that is, the great excitement that this measure is likely to produce. The country was in peace and quiet, says the gentleman, until this bill was introduced. Well, sir, who raises any excitement now? Whence does the opposition come? And what are the reasons for it? The North, it is said, is to be excited. And excited about what? Why, because Congress, when this bill passes, will have recognized the territorial principle established in 1850, and declared all antecedent legislation over the territories of Kansas and Nebraska inconsistent with that principle inoperative and void. And what is the harm or mischief to be done? Why, nothing, but extending to the freeman of Kansas and Nebraska that privilege which ought to be the birthright of every American citizen—to have a voice in forming the institutions, and passing the laws under which he is to live. That is all. Who, then, is to be agitated at this monstrous outrage? Why, nobody but those who wish to impose an unjust restriction upon a freeman's franchise; nobody but those who deny to a portion of their fellow-citizens a fitness or capacity for republican government. Nobody but those who would maintain the same policy on the part of the general government toward the people of the territories which Lord North and his tory confederates, on the part of England, held toward the colonies. That there may be, and that there are, some such bodies, I do not doubt. But who are they, and what is their force? They are nothing but the fragments of the old “Wilmot proviso," "Free-Soil," and “Abolition Phalanx,” attempting to rally their broken and routed columns by this hypocritical cry about the sacredness of compacts. Whoever expected to see the New York Tribune and the Evening Post, and such newspapers, pouring forth their invocations in behalf of the "sanctity of the Missouri compromise?” The men who thus cry aloud now are the very same who denounced every man at the North who voted to maintain that line, while the question was open, as a “dough face” and “traitor.” They thought then that they had the world in a swing, and would have every thing their own way; not satisfied to have " the Wilmot” fixed upon all territory north of 36° 30', they determined to have it fixed upon the whole of the public domain. With this spirit they went into the contest. And so far from getting it fixed where it was not, they came out of the contest with the establishment of a principle, which took it off where it was fixed before. Like the man that failed properly to use his talent, they had taken away from them “even that which they had.” They went a “wooling," and came back thoroughly “fleeced” themselves--hence their desperation. That such men may rail, and rave, and rage, may be expected. Let them rage on. Had they, and men of like opinions before them, never thrust their unjust and anti-republican territorial policy in the halls of Congress, there never would have been sectional strife within these walls. Whatever of party conflicts we might have had growing out of questions of legislation for so vast a country as ours is, with all its complicated and diversified interests, we should have been saved from this lamentable quarrelling about State institutions, which threatened such fearful consequences in 1850.

But, sir, we are told that discord once reigned in heaven. The evil spirit of pride and ambition, craving powers and prerogatives not proper or legitimate, entered the breasts of those admitted even to the presence of the Most High; jealousy, envy, and hate produced not only words, but blows, between archangels ministering round his throne.

Long time in even scale

The battle hung."

These unholy conflicts, so unsuited to that place, were never composed until Heaven's First-Born, clothed in the majesty of divine power, arose and hurled the factious hosts from the empyrean battlements to the bottomless pit below.

“Nine days they fell; confounded chaos roared,

And felt tenfold confusion, in their fall,

Through his wild Anarchy: so huge a rout

Encumber'd him with ruin. Hell, at last,

Yawning, received them whole, and on them closed:

Hell, their fit habitation, fraught with fire

Unquenchable, the house of woe and pain.

Disburden d Heaven rejoiced, and soon repaired

Her mural breach, returning whence it rolled."

From that profound deep, below which there was no lower deep, they still sent up much cursing, wailing, howling, and hissing.

So, sir in these halls, sacred to national purposes, and those objects for which the government was formed, we have had peace-destroying feuds and unseemly conflicts engendered and instigated by the fell demon of "Restriction," or " Wilmot proviso," which once stalked with insolent brow, in our very midst. These scenes lasted until the Genius of our country rose in its might, on the 17th of June, 1850, armed with the great American principle of self-government, which had borne our fathers through the struggle of the revolution, and drove the hideous monster, with all his impious crew, from the Capitol-cast them out and hurled them downward to that low deep from which their plaintive howls now ascend.

These convocations at the Tabernacle and at Chicago and elsewhere—the ravings of the infidel preacher, Theodore Parker, and all his weaker followers-are but the repetition of the pandemonium scenes; there consultations were held, and grave debate had, how the banished fiends should regain their lost estate, “Whether by open war or covert guile.” These manifestations may be expected. We have had them before—yea, and much more violent, too. When the compromise of 1850 was passed, these same men declared open war against its provisions. “Repeal!” “Repeal!” was blazoned upon their banners; mobs were got up in Boston, in Syracuse, and at Christiana; blood was shed by these resisters of the law. The spirit of the North was appealed to in fanatic accents. That spirit answered in prompt and patriotic tones of popular reprobation at the ballot-box, just as it will do again. These threats of what will be the fate of, and “political graves” of, northern men who vote for this bill, can fright nobody but old women and timid children. They are worse than ghost stories—we have heard them before.

I recollect well with what eloquence a gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Root] some years ago, in this House, spoke of the deep degradation that awaited every man at the North who should dare to vote against the Wilmot proviso. No patronage of the government could save him; no land office, ever so remote, could keep him from being hunted down, ferreted out, and held up to the just scorn of an indignant constituency. But his prophetic warning came far short of becoming history. Northern men did abandon the proviso. In doing so they acted wisely, justly, nobly, and patriotically; and so far from digging their political graves by the act, they have but planted themselves deeper and firmer in the hearts, love, affection, and admiration of their countrymen.

The same “scare-crow” was held up to northern men who occupied national ground on the admission of Missouri. It was said then that they would find “their graves" in the ground where they stood. And some pretend now to say that such was the fact. But in the record I have before me, I see, among the very few from the North who did then stand up for the right against the huge clamor that was raised against them, the names of Baldwin, from Pennsylvania; Holmes, of Massachusetts; and Storrs, of New York; and Southard, of New Jersey. Where did Southard find his grave? Mr. Baldwin was afterwards one of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Holmes, when Maine was admitted as a State, was elected to the Senate, and held that highly honorable post, for aught I know, as long as he wanted it.

Mr. Storrs, who was a man of great talents, never lost the confidence of his constituents. Had he not been cut down by death at an early age, he might, and most probably would, have attained the highest honors of the country, not excepting the chief magistracy itself. These statesmen found “political graves” where many of those who now rail so fiercely would, doubtless, be very willing to find theirs. But of those who espoused the side of the restrictionists at that time I do not see the name of a single man who ever attained high political distinction in this country. Their very memories, in most instances, have passed away, and their "graves,” if they have any, would be about as hard to find as that “of Moses in the wilderness."

So much, then, for these threats. They are but the "ravings," and "howlings," and "hissings" of the beaten and routed ranks of the factionists and malcontents. They are the wailings of the politically condemned, coming up from the bottom of that deep pit where they have been hurled by a patriotic people for the good, the peace, quiet, and harmony of the whole country. We need not expect to silence them the friends and advocates of the compromise of 1850 did not expect or look for that at the time. That would have been a forlorn hope; and though many of the enemies of the compromise, of the North, who were beaten in the great battle of 1852, have since seemingly surrendered and begged for quarters, pretending to be ready to acquiesce, I must be permitted to say on this occasion, without any wish to push myself in the New York contest, I have very little confidence in the integrity of their professions. They fought the compromise as long as there was any prospect of making any thing by fighting it. When whipped, routed, and beaten, then, like craven and mercenary captives, they turned to power, to see if any thing could be made there by subserviency and sycophancy. I have no faith in their conversion-never have had any. Warmed into life again by the genial rays of executive patronage, I have always thought, and still think, that they will only become the more formidable whenever the occasion offers for their real principles to manifest themselves. Hydrophobia can never be cured-it will break out on the changes of the moon. And so with the disease of negromania. Sir, the viper will hiss and even sting the bosom that nurtures and fosters it. Whether I am right in this anticipation, or whether this administration is right in its present policy, we shall see.

But we who stood by the compromise of 1850, and intend to stand by it now, and carry it out in good faith, are not to be moved by any clamor got up by its old enemies; nor are we to be shaken in our purpose by any mistaken appeals in behalf of the "sanctity of compacts," coming from a source even as respectable as that of the National Intelligencer. That paper, in a late article, seems to consider the line of 36° 30' almost as binding as the constitution—the bare “suggestion” for a departure from which should arouse the friends of the constitution everywhere. If so, why did not that paper raise the alarm in 1836, when Mr. Adams, in this House, backed by fifty-two northern votes, made something more than a “suggestion” to depart from it?

In 1845, when a majority of the North voted against the annexation of Texas with this line in it, why was not its voice again raised? In 1847 and 1848, when it was completely set at naught and trampled upon by the North, as I have shown, why was it not then raised? Then the contest was fierce and hot between those who stood by that line and those who were for its total obliteration. For three long years when this contest raged, why did the Intelligencer never say one word in behalf of its maintenance and preservation? That was certainly the time for any one who regarded it as imbued with “sanctity” and “sacredness” to speak. It is too late now. The old principle in our territorial policy has passed away, and we have in its stead a new one. We are not, therefore, to be shaken in our purpose to carry out this new principle by any such clamor or appeals. Our purpose is fixed, and our course is onward. What little agitation may be got up in Congress, or out of it, while this debate lasts, will speedily subside, as soon as this new principle is once more vindicated. Why do you hear no more wrangling here about slavery and freedom in Utah and New Mexico? Because by this new principle, the irritating cause was cast out of Congress, and turned over to the people, who are most capable of disposing of it for themselves. Pass this bill—the sooner the better—and the same result will ensue. This shows the wisdom and statesmanship of those by whom this principle was adopted as our settled policy on this subject in 1850. A cinder in the eye will irritate and inflame it, until you get it out; a thorn in the flesh will do the same thing. The best remedy is to remove it immediately. That is just what the compromise of 1850 proposes to do with this slavery question in the territories whenever it arises. Cast it out of Congress, and leave it to the people, to whom it very properly and rightfully belongs.

In behalf of this principle, Mr. Chairman, I would to-day address this House, not as partisans—neither as whigs or democrats, but as Americans. I do not know what you call me, or how you class me, whether as whig or democrat, in your political vocabulary, nor do I care. Principles should characterize parties, and not names. I call myself a republican, and I would invoke you, one and all, to come up and sustain this great republican American policy, established in 1850, for the permanent peace, progress, and glory of our common country. If any of you are convinced of its propriety and correctness, but are afraid that your constituents are not equally convinced, follow the example of Mr. Webster, after his 7th of March speech, when the doors of Faneuil Hall were closed against him. Meet your constituents, if need be in the open air, and, face to face, tell them they are wrong, and you are right. I think, sir, that great man, on no occasion of his life, ever appeared to greater advantage in the display of those moral qualities which mark those entitled to lasting fame, than he did in the speech he made in an open barouche before the Revere House, in Boston, to three thousand people who had assembled to hear what reason he had to give for his course in the Senate. He stood as Burke before the people of Bristol, or as Aristides before the people of Athens, when he told them above all things to be "just.” In that speech Mr. Webster told the people of Boston, You have conquered an inhospitable climate; you have conquered a sterile and barren soil; you have conquered the ocean that washes your shores; you have fought your way to the respect and esteem of mankind, but you have yet to "conquer your prejudices. That was indeed speaking "vera pro gratis.” And that was a scene for the painter or sculptor to perpetuate the man in the exhibition of his noblest qualities far more worthy than the occasion of his reply to Mr. Hayne, or his great 7th of March speech. Imitate his example—never lose the consciousness that “Truth is mighty and will ultimately prevail.” The great “truth" as to the right principle of disposing of this slavery question in the territories, was first proclaimed by the Congress of the United States in 1850. It was as oil upon the waters. It gave quiet and repose to a distracted country. Let it be the pride of us all in this Congress to re-affirm the principle—make it coextensive with your limits inscribe it upon your banners make it broad as your constitution-proclaim it everywhere, that the people of the common territories of the Union, wherever the flag floats, shall have the right to form such republican institutions as they please. Let this be our pride; and then with a common feeling in the memories and glories of the past, we can all, from every State, section, and territory, look with hopeful anticipations to that bright prospect in the future which beckons us on in our progress to a still higher degree of greatness, power, and renown.

SOURCE: Henry Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, in Public and Private, p. 394-416

Tuesday, March 22, 2022

Speech of Congressman John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, March 23, 1854

Delivered in the House of Representatives, March 23, 1854—the House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the Nebraska bill.

I propose, now, Mr. Chairman, to address a few observations to the committee upon the merits of the bill. The subject has been thoroughly discussed here and in the Senate, and I do not flatter myself that I shall be able to add new facts or develop new trains of thought. The elements of a correct judgment are already before the country, and the utmost that one now engaging in the discussion can hope, is to present some of them in lights and combinations worthy the attention of the House.

I shall not consume the time of the committee in discussing what I cannot but regard as the subordinate and accidental aspects of the subject; as, for example, the relations of individuals to the bill of the last Congress, the alleged change of position by newspaper presses, and other points which do not touch the heart of the subject, and cannot go into history in the permanent connexion with our action upon it; assuming, also—what I think has been abundantly demonstrated—that the interests of the country demanded the organization of these territories, and that the rights of the few Indians within their borders are protected by the bill, the only remaining question relates to the clauses respecting slavery.

Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and, denying both, I would vote for neither. I go further and express the opinion that a clause legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and the people, to expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories. It is proposed simply to take off this prohibition, but not to make an enactment in affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmatory effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the Territories dependent wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully against hones misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.

I propose, for the present, to argue the question only upon the compromises of 1820 and 1850. To those who may be called political abolitionists it is useless to address any arguments. They opposed both those settlements; they adhere to neither in good faith, but will appeal to them or reject them as may best promote their incendiary purposes.—But I do not consider this to be the position of the northern people. I believe that, generally, they, and their representatives here, desire to look at this subject calmly, and to do fairly and honestly whatever good faith demands. The American characteristic is well understood by the abolitionists in and out of Congress, and accordingly they clamorously proclaim that “plighted faith” is about to be violated by the breach of a compact which the North, they say, has faithfully kept on her part for more than thirty years. By their orators and presses, and from their pulpits, (for the Church is resolved to engage in the struggle,) the South is held up as a monster of perfidy, and the selectest vials of their wrath are poured on the heads of those northern statemen who always sustained their Missouri Compromise, while it had any remains of vitality, against the assaults of its new defenders.

What, then is the true nature and extent of the compromise of 1850? What of the former? What their relations? Are they consistent with each other? Which of them ought, in good faith, to be applied to the Territories contemplated by this bill? These are the questions to be decided, in good faith, by those who recognize compromises as somewhat more important and durable than ordinary acts of legislation. While for those who opposed them both, and who spurn all settlements touching slavery, the less that is said, either of compromises or of “plighted faith,” the better.

At the risk of treading on ground already occupied by others, let me say something of the origin and history of the Missouri Compromise, and of the relations of sections to it.

I have heard gentlemen here glorify Mr. Clay as the author of the act of 1820, prohibiting slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., and invoke his memory to resist its violation. They must invoke some other “spirit” than Mr. Clay’s, for he was not its author. My colleague [Mr. EWING] showed this not long ago, but the statement has been persistently repeated since. While again correcting this error, it may be well to notice the treatment this compromise received very soon after its birth.

The people of Missouri having applied for leave to form a State constitution, Congress, by the act of March 6, 1820, provided in the first section:

“That the inhabitants of that portion of the Missouri Territory included within the boundaries hereinafter designated be, and they are hereby, authorized to form for themselves a constitution and State Government, and to assume such name as they shall deem proper; and the said state, when formed, shall be admitted to the Union upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.”

 And in the eight section:

“That in all that territory ceded by France to the United States, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, not included within the limits of the state contemplated by this act, slavery and involuntary servitude, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the parties shall have been duly convicted, shall be, and is hereby, forever prohibited.”

This the compromise prohibiting slavery north of the 36 deg. 30 min.—the compromise to which gentlemen say our plighted faith is now due. There were two parties and two stipulations. Missouri was to form a constitution, and was to be admitted “upon an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever.” This was the agreement on the one hand for the benefit of Missouri, and, if you choose, of the South. On the other hand, slavery was to be prohibited north of 36 deg. 30 min., and this was for the benefit of the North.—The terms and conditions on each side were clearly expressed; but with it Mr. Clay had nothing to do. He was a member of the House and the clause prohibiting slavery originated in the Senate, on the motion of Mr. Thomas, of Illinois. Mr. Clay has said publicly that he had no recollection even of voting for it.

Well, sir, in pursuance of this “Missouri Compromise,” the people of that Territory proceeded to form a constitution with which they presented themselves for admission as a State at the next session of Congress. Was the compact executed? The Senate promptly passed a bill for their admission “on an equal footing with the original States;” but in the House it was rejected by a strict sectional vote—the South for it, the North against it. The “compromise” being thus repudiated and rejected by the North, by refusing to Missouri and the South the equivalent (being her admission “on an equal footing with the original States”) for the slavery prohibition, the bargain was broken, and the act of 1820 lost the sacredness of a compromise. The pretest for this repudiation was, that Missouri had put a clause in her constitution prohibiting the immigration of the free negroes to the State. This she had a right to do, unless it was a violation of the federal constitution; and if a violation, it was simply void, and the clause of the latter which declares that:

“The Constitution, and laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.”

And the proper tribunal to settle the fact was the federal judiciary; so that in either aspect there was no ground for breaking the bargain. But the Compromise of 1820 was thus broken, and for a long time there seemed to be no prospect that this State, coming with a republican constitution in her hand, could find admission. The whole question was at sea again, and so remained until Mr. Clay appeared in the House, on the 21st day of February, 1821, having been detained at home by sickness in his family. He soon offered a resolution for the purpose of  raising a joint committee of the two houses to inquire whether Missouri should be remanded to the territorial condition, or admitted into the Union; and if the latter, upon what terms?

The committee asked for was raised, and on the 26th of February Mr. Clay reported from it the following condition of admission, which was adopted by Congress.

“That Missouri shall be admitted into this union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition that the 4th clause of the 25th section of the 3d article of the constitution submitted on the part of said State to Congress shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by which any citizen of either of the States in this Union shall be excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United states; provided, That the legislature of the said State, by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the President of the United States, on or before the first Monday in November next, an authentic copy of the said act; upon receipt whereof, the President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact; whereupon, and without any further proceedings on the part of Congress, the admission of the said State into the Union shall be considered as complete.”

This was a new condition by which Missouri was to enter the Union; not by the Compromise of 1820, “on an equal footing with the original States,” as an equivalent for the prohibition of slavery north of 36 deg. 30 min., but upon the “fundamental condition” that her legislature should pass an act declaring that the constitution of the State was not above the constitution of the United States! She accepted the condition; and thus, by an act of her legislature, in pursuance of the timely “fundamental condition” of a congressional resolution, happily saved the federal constitution!!

It is due to the memory of the illustrious author of this “fundamental condition” to say that no one could be more sensible than himself of the intense humbuggery of the whole proceeding; and in his celebrated speech of 1850, on his compromise resolutions, he jocularly reviewed and exposed it to the Senate.

This summary of the facts will not be denied here or elsewhere; but they show that the Compromise now invoked was made in 1820; that Missouri complied with her part of it; that it was repudiated by northern votes in 1821; and that the State was finally admitted into the Union, not upon the equivalent provided in the act of 1820, but by the express imposition on her of a new compromise and condition.

So much for the result, on the first occasion that offered, to test “plighted faith.”

Under these circumstances the act of 1820 might well have been regarded as a rejected compact, and the question of slavery might have been fought over again upon the organization of each new Territory. But the hope of having something to be regarded as final on this vexed subject, thought a mere geographical line, and that of doubtful constitutionality, prevailed in the country, and that act, under the name of the “Missouri Compromise,” was accepted as a settlement of the slavery controversy. The basis of the settlement was a division (though very unequal) of all the territory then possessed by the United States. Does any man doubt that if we had possessed more territory the same principle of division would have been applied to it? It was a division of common territory between slaveholding and non slave holding States, or rather it was the exclusive appropriation of all north of 36 deg. 30 min. to free institutions and an implied allowance only of southern institutions below that line. Whatever may be said of this arrangement in its relations to the constitution, or as a measure of statesmanship, it was a clear and simple adjustment. It was capable of easy application in all future time; and as such, the South accepted it in good faith, and struggled to maintain it, until it was finally and forever repudiated by our northern brethren.

Sir, the gentleman from Georgia, [Mr. STEPHENS,] and others, have traced this compromise through our legislative history—they have shown how often it was repudiated, and repudiated by the North, and I do not propose to go over the same ground; but if falls within the line of my thoughts to fix your attention on a period when the Missouri Compromise was ratified; and that occasion is the more important because it carried the Compromise beyond the territory acquired from France, and thus leaves no excuse for denying that it was intended to be a rule of general application. I refer to the joint resolution of 1845 for the annexation of Texas, which contains the following provision:

“New States of convenient size, not exceeding four in number, in addition to the said state of Texas, and having sufficient population, may hereafter, by the consent of said State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which sall be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that portion of said territory lying south of 36 deg. 30 min. north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri Compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission may desire. And in such State or States as shall be formed out of said territory north of said Missouri Compromise line, slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be prohibited.”

Here the Missouri Compromise was distinctly applied to territory clearly outside of the specific boundaries of the act of 1820, and it is no answer to say that Texas was a part of the Louisiana purchase—first, because this was a matter of dispute and conflicting claims with Spain; and next, because in 1819 we exchanged to Spain our claims to Texas for Florida, by which Texas became foreign territory, and relieved from the constitution and laws of the United States, so  that, upon her return, she came as free from the operation of the Missouri Compromise as Utah, New Mexico, or the British Islands. It follows, that in extending that compromise to the portion of Texas lying north of 36 deg. 30 min., the Congress on that occasion recognized it as a rule upon the question of slavery, as a basis of settlement, to be applied to as well to new territory as to that acquired from France. It will be remembered that the whole of Texas was slaveholding territory, and the effect of the resolution was to make a large part of it free. But this was assented to by the South; and now I ask the fair-minded representatives of the people if the Missouri Compromise meant that it should be recognized and extended when the South was to be excluded, and repudiated, when it might work to her advantage?

This practical construction of the Missouri line obliged the North, by every obligation of honor and good faith, to carry it through all territory afterwards acquired, if any virtue at all was to be conceded to that compromise.

But, while the line was extended as long as it worked out free-soil territory, it was ignored and trampled under foot the moment their fair application of it might have resulted to benefit of both Sections. Witness the result in 1848, you gentlemen who talk of “plighted faith.” We had acquired from Mexico a large territory, lying on both sides of the line of 36 deg. 30 min. Three years before, the line had been extended through Texas, by which a large slaveholding territory had been made free-soil; and yet when, in 1848, on motion of the distinguished senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS,] a resolution passed in the Senate to “extend the Missouri-Compromise line” through the recently-acquired territory, it was rejected in this House by the united northern against the united southern vote.

Sir, how can an honest man get over these facts? How, in the face of them, can an honest man charge the friends of this bill with disregard of “plighted faith” and “solemn compacts?” I need not recur in detail to the occasions, so often referred to in this debate, when the Missouri line was offered by the South during the great struggle which ended in the Compromise of 1850, and was rejected by the North. It is enough to say that the record of those transactions will preserve for history the fact that the Missouri Compromise line of 36 deg. 30 min. was steadily repudiated by northern votes as a basis for the settlement of the slavery controversy. Why was this sir?

The reason is obvious. The anti-slavery feeling at this time ruled the councils of the North, and accordingly she left the ground of compromise, and planted herself on the ground of power. She rejected the principle of division. Glorying in her conscious strength, she came to obliterate geographical lines, and to appropriate to herself the whole of the territory acquired from Mexico. Her rallying cry was no longer “the Missouri Compromise line,” but the “Wilmot proviso.” Old things had passed away; old bargains were rejected, and the question took a new form.

The issue made up was, (and it went back of all divisions and patched-up settlements, and to the very bottom of the subject,) shall slavery be prohibited in all the Territories of the Untied States by act of Congress, or shall it be left to the people who inhabit them, subject only to the federal constitution; and on this was fought the great battle of 1850. The slaveholding States said: We have exhausted every scheme of adjustment; we have offered the old line; it is contemptuously refused; you claim all; very well, then, we united with you in burying the past; we accept the broad issue of intervention or non-intervention; we demand that all the citizens of the United States be allowed to enter the common territory with the constitution alone in their hands. If that instrument protects the title of the master to his slave in this common territory, you cannot complain; and if it does not protect his title, we ask no help from Congress; and the relations of the constitution to the subject we are willing to have decided by the courts of the United States. We do not ask Congress to interfere for us, and we will resist all legislative interference against us.

The whole country saw that here was a great struggle of opposing principles; and the excitement was in proportion to the magnitude of the question. If the result had depended on a purely sectional vote, the “Wilmot proviso” would have triumphed; but a large portion of the North, under the lead of the distinguished senator from Michigan [Mr. Cass] and others, repudiated the “proviso.”—Governments were formed for New Mexico and Utah without that odious restriction, leaving them free to form their own institutions, and enter the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution should prescribe.

Nothing in this discussion has surprised me more than the assertion, in respectable quarters, that the provisions touching slavery in the New Mexico and Utah bills were not intended to establish any principle for the future action of Congress upon that subject. I cannot but regard this as a narrow and unstatesman like view. Such was not the sense in which that great compromise was accepted by the American people. They well knew that it did not abolish slavery; they knew, too, that past territories yet remained within the Union to be settled, and that still vaster regions were to be acquired in the progress of our inevitable expansion. As to all these, the question of slavery, they knew, would present itself at each successive step in the extension of American institutions and laws. If the settlement of 1850 was but an ordinary act of legislation, and contained no principle of agreement of broader application than the strips of territory embraced in those laws, for what had the Union been shaken to its centre? To what end had our most eminent statesmen devoted their highest efforts? What has been gained—a lasting peace? No, sir; but, by this view, only a deceitful truce; a suspension of hostilities; the suppression of a symptom, not the eradication of the disease. It make this compromise not a final adjustment, on principle, of the distracting subject of slavery, but a delusion, an expedient, a catch, a humbug. It brings it down to the level of a mere temporary legislative contrivance; it leaves its great authors shorn of the renown the world supposed it to confer and reduces them to the condition of mere political jobbers. But, by the other construction, it was, indeed, a “final settlement”—a settlement which makes its authors immortal, which removes from the federal theatre the only question that can disturb our domestic tranquility, and leaves Congress in the future nothing to do in connexion with it, except to apply the established principle as the occasions arise. No, sir; whatever some gentlemen by say now, the people were not guilty of the folly imputed to them by the opponents of this bill. Their patriotic acclamations went up to Heaven over an act of healing statesmanship, not over a political job. They accepted those measures, not as a truce to faction, but as a bond of lasting concord.

Mr. Chairman, in great collisions of opinion, especially among an enlightened people, and upon questions of a continuing character, the particular issue usually involves the general principle—and this happens with a certainty proportioned to the magnitude of the questions at stake. History is full of illustrations to the point. When our heroic ancestors threw the British tea into Boston harbor and the whole country rose to sustain the act, it went far deeper than a question of a tax on tea, and involved the great principle that we would submit to no taxation without representation. When John Hampden resisted the illegal imposition of ship money by Charles I, and carried the point up to all the judges of England, though the immediate issue was whether he should pay the paltry sum of twenty shillings, the great question involved was the claim of the King to levy taxes without the consent of Parliament. So, the circumstance connected with the legislation giving governments to Utah and New Mexico must control and explain the effect and principle of those laws. After events so recent, need I say that, in 1850, the manner in which the new Territories should be organized led to a thorough discussion as to the policy to be adopted respecting slavery? Is it not notorious that the Missouri Compromise line was considered and deliberately rejected? Did not the non-slaveholding States (generally) insist that the true policy was the prohibition of slavery in the territories of the Union by act of congress, and, by consequence, insist upon applying this principle to Utah and New Mexico? Did not the slaveholding States, on the contrary, planting themselves on the ground of Federal non-intervention, resist this policy, and, by consequence, its adoption and application to those Territories? And after a long and fearful struggle, did not the latter doctrine prevail, and was it not carried into law (or compact, if you choose) in the New Mexico and Utah acts? Did not the public, the press, conventions, and States, hail the result as a “final settlement, in principle and substance,” of the subject of slavery? And are we to be told now that the Compromise of 1850 was an adjustment to broader than those two territories? Are we to have a new struggle, a new bargain, a new basis of settlement on the organization of each new territory? Who, then, are the agitators?—who are faithful to the Compromise of 1850?

If my conclusions are correct as to the relations of the Compromise of 1820 to that of 1850, and as to the true nature and extent of the latter, it follows that the former has no claim resting on good faith; but that “plighted faith” to the Compromise of 1850 demands the removal of the Missouri prohibition. I do not contend that the eighth section of the act of 1820 was, in terms, repealed by the adjustment of 1850; it yet remains on the statute-book, and if constitutional, is still operative. But if non-intervention by Congress be the principle that underlies the Compromise of 1850, then the prohibition of 1820, being inconsistent with that principle, should be removed, and perfect non-intervention thus be established by law.

Among the many misrepresentations sent to the country by some of the enemies of this bill, perhaps none is more flagrant than the charge that it proposes to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas. Sir, if the bill contained such a feature, it could not receive my vote. The right to establish involves the co-relative right to prohibit, and denying both, I would vote for neither. So go further, and express the opinion that a clause legislating slavery into those Territories could not command one Southern vote in this House. It is due to both sections of the country, and to the people, to expose this groundless charge. What then, is the present condition of Nebraska and Kansas? Why, sir, there is no government, no slavery, and very little population there, (for your federal laws, exclude your citizens,) but a law remains on the statute-book forever prohibiting slavery in those Territories. It is proposed simply to take of this prohibition, but not to make an enactment in the affirmance of slavery there. Now, in the absence of any law establishing slavery in that region previous to the prohibitory act, it is too clear for dispute that the repeal of the prohibitory act, has not the affirmative effect of fixing slavery in that country. The effect of the repeal, therefore, is neither to establish nor to exclude, but to leave the future condition of the Territories depended wholly on the action of the inhabitants, subject only to such limitations as the federal constitution may impose. But, to guard fully against honest misconstruction, and even against malicious perversion, the language of the bill is perfectly explicit on this point.

“That the constitution, and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory of Nebraska as elsewhere within the United States; except the eighth section of the act preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union, approved March, 1820, which being inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories as recognized by the legislation of 1820, (commonly called the compromise measures,) is hereby declared inoperative and void; it being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to revive or put in force any law or regulation which my have existed prior to the act of March, 1820, either protecting, establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery.”

This should be satisfactory to all candid men; but if any one shall persist in attempting to mislead the people, the best answer will be to impale him before them on the very words of the bill.

It will be observed that the right of the people to regulate in their own way all their domestic institutions is left wholly untouched, except whatever is done must be in accordance with the constitution—the supreme law for us all; and the right of property, under the constitution, as well as legislative action, is properly left to the decision of the federal judiciary. This voids a contested issue which it is hardly in the competency of Congress to decide, and refers it to the proper tribunal.

It is contended on one hand, upon the idea of the equality of the States under the constitution and common property in the Territories, that the citizens of the slaveholding States may remove to them with their slaves, (and that the local legislature cannot exclude slavery, while in the territorial condition; but it is to concede that the people may establish or prohibit it when they come to exercise the power of a sovereign State;) on the other hand, it is said that slavery, being in derogation of common right, can exist only by force of positive law; and it is denied that the constitution furnishes this law for the Territories; and it is further claimed that the local legislature my establish or exclude it any time after government is organized. As both parties appeal to the constitution, and base their respective arguments on opposite constructions of that instrument, the bill wisely refuses to make a question for judicial construction the subject of legislative conflict, and properly refers it to the tribunal created by the constitution itself, for the very purpose of deciding “all cases in law and equity” arising under it.

Then, sir, neither the purpose nor effect of the bill is to legislate slavery into Nebraska and Kansas; but its effect is to sweep away this vestige of Congressional dictation on this subject, to allow the free citizens of this Union to enter the common territory with the constitution and the bill alone in their hands, and to remit the decision of their rights under both to the courts of the country. Who can go before his constituents refusing to stand on the platform of the constitution? Who can make a case to them of refusing to abide the decision of the courts of the Union?

I have argued the subject hitherto chiefly upon the question of “plighted faith;” and have consumed more of my limited time that properly belongs to that aspect of the case, because diligent efforts have been made to excite the northern mind against the friends of this bill representing them as the violators of the public honor. Anxious as I am for its passage, I readily admit that no benefit it could confer upon the country would atone for a deliberate violation of the public faith; but I am for its passage, not only because I believe that it embodies the true principle, but because, also, I sincerely believe that it carries out the true spirit and intent of our last great compromise, which is my judgment, covered the whole subject of slavery.

The clock admonishes me that I must hurry on and omit some views I would like to present, if time allowed. But, Mr. Chairman, apart from the historical argument, this contested feature in the bill is right in itself, for it rests on the foundation principle of American government. Without entering the wilderness of discussion in regard to the relations of the federal government to the territories as political communities, I offer one or two thoughts as to the proper limitations upon the power of Congress, according to the true theory of our government. Political power in the Territories is nowhere expressly granted in the constitution. The existence, therefore, and the extent of its exercise, must be derived by implication; and implied powers are to be exercised with more caution and strictness that express grants. Let it be conceded that political power over the Territories exists in Congress, and it is no matter whether it be implied from the power to acquire territory, or from any other source in the constitution; and the question arises whether it is an uncontrolled and despotic power, or whether it is limited by the nature of the federal government.

The States are supreme as to all subjects not granted to the common government. They establish their own institutions, at their own pleasure; they regulate within themselves all the relations of society; and they are now complete, self-sustaining, political communities; and they created the federal government, not to fix for them and their posterity the relations of society and the various elements that make up a complete social and political community, but to execute for the common good certain specified grants of power. The territories belong to the States in their united character; they are to enter the Union on an equal footing with the original States; and, in the meantime, they are to be settled and occupied by citizens of the existing States. What is the pretest for the act of 1820 “forever” prohibiting American citizens, on American soil, from establishing their own local, social and political condition? You have no express power to do so in constitution, and surely you can find none in the analogies of our political system. Can you dictate a particular from of society and government for them one moment after they become States? If not, why mock reason, and blot the statue book with this prohibition?

The power of Congress over the Territories is either absolute, or it has constitutional limitations. Let me illustrate further my idea of the limitations on the power of Congress over the Territories and districts growing out of the character and objects of the federal system. Congress, by an express provision of the constitution, may exercise “exclusive legislation” in the District of Columbia.—This is a far stronger and broader grant of power than any to be implied from that instrument in relation to the Territories, and yet it does not confer absolute power in this District; for it must be observed that there is wide distinction between “exclusive” and absolute power of legislation. Will any man contend that Congress may establish a free port of entry in this District, while a general tariff law applies to other ports? And yet the language of the constitution is:

“No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.”

So Congress has “exclusive legislation” over “all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful building,” but it will not be said that congress may admit foreign goods duty free at one of these points on the sea-board, while impost laws are in force at other ports. Nor will an advocate be found for the power to discriminate against the people of this District, by taxing articles exported from it, though the limitation of the constitution is: “No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State.

Why is this, and what is the limit? At the beginning it was thought best that the seat of government should not be within the limit of any State, and accordingly a separate territory was carved out for it, where the Federal Government might exercise its few and limited powers, and over this territory “exclusive legislation” was granted to Congress, but the reasons and objects of the grant both of the Territory and power, and the nature and purposes of the common Government, must control this exclusive legislation. Accordingly, Congress may not establish a despotism here, nor rob American citizens in regard to their local and domestic affairs, nor deprive them of their property, nor violate uniformity of taxation, nor discriminate for or against their ports. Out of this view, too, grows the argument against the power to abolish slavery in the district without the consent of the people. And though upon this point opposite opinions have been expressed, yet the argument has so far prevailed that no serious attempt has been made to interfere with their rights in this respect.

The argument in regard to the Territories is far stronger. I have already said that the Constitution nowhere expressly grants political power over the Territories. Let us bear in mind, then, that it can only be an implied power—to be exercised by a limited government—over a region the common property of the States which created this limited government; and the inference is irresistible that it must be exercised in the spirit of the political system out of which this limited government springs. It would follow if the power were expressly granted, but follows with greater force since it is only derivative. What, then, is the spirit of the system? I answer, the equality of the States—local sovereignty in all matters of interior and domestic concern, embracing the great mass of powers that belong to government; as if, for example, fixing the relations of parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant-regulating the general rights of property, the course of inheritance, and the innumerable conditions that grow out of the social and political state. Hence it never has been pretended that Congress may invade them to control their free action on these and other kindred subjects. It is apart from the objects for which the States made the Federal Government, and prescribed the orbit in which it should move. Carry the idea to the Territories. What are they? to whom do they belong? who are to inhabit them? and what are to be their political relations to the rest of the Confederacy? They are regions of country acquired by the common efforts and treasure of all the States; they belong, therefore, to the States for common use and enjoyment; the citizens of the States are to inhabit them; and when the population shall be sufficient, they are to become equal members of the Union.

I might run out of illustrations on this point to an indefinite extent. Could Congress admit foreign goods duty free into the Union through the ports of a Territory, in violation of the general revenue laws, or lay a tax on articles exported from a Territory? The power will not be claimed—certainly its exercise will never be attempted; and yet I have shown that the limitation of the constitution in these and other respects apply in terms only to the States; and the only arguments against the power are, first, that it has not been expressly granted; and, next, that it cannot be fairly deduced from the spirit of the analogies of our political system.—Sir, if the constitutional limitations for which I contend do exist, then congress cannot discriminate against any of the States by depriving them of equal enjoyment of the common territory; but if these limitations do not exist, then the power of legislation is absolute and Congress may as readily set up a monarchy as a republic. Gentlemen my revolt at the conclusion, bit it flows with inevitable certainty from this doctrine of intervention and uncontrolled political powers over the Territories. The germ of congressional despotism is to be found in this Missouri prohibition; for if the question of slavery may be determined for the Territories by Congress, every other social and political question may in like manner be settled for them by the same authority, and this would reduce them to the most abject colonial vassalage. You cannot escape this conclusion by saying that slavery is anti-republican, and congress must exclude it under the obligation to provide a republican form of government, for slavery has already existed in many of the States, and yet the constitution declares that Congress shall secure to each State a republican form of government; hence it is a settled principle of our system that the institution is not inconsistent with republicanism.

Sir, I care not for refined distinctions or the subtleties of verbal criticism. I repeat the above and plain proposition, that if Congress may intervene on this subject, it may intervene on any other; and having thus surrendered the principle, and broken away from constitutional limitations, you are drawn into the very lap of arbitrary power. By this doctrine you may erect a despotism under the American system. The whole theory is a libel on our institutions. It carries us back to the abhorrent principles of British colonial authority, against which we made the issue of independence. I have never acquiesced in this odious claim, nor will I believe that it can abide the test of public scrutiny. The bill on our table repudiates it, and only wants fearless advocates to make it thoroughly odious. The political Abolitionists think they can ride the storm of anti-slavery fanaticism; but I tell them, they have encountered here an element more powerful still. They must obliterate the memory of the principles on which our Government was founded; they must undo the very texture of American mind; they must substitute in the popular heart the dogmas of despotism for the doctrine of American liberty, before they can triumph over the principles of this bill. The South insists on it as embodying the doctrine of State equality, on which her very existence depends; but it should commend itself equally to all sections, because the underlying principle is not Northern or Southern, but American. It is true, that the subject of slavery happens to be the one at issue; but it is there as the representative of every other social and political right. The freedom of these new countries to establish their own institutions ought, therefore, to be as dear to the man from Maine as to the man from Florida.

But again: cannot the North, with her overwhelming numbers, compete with us on these new theaters in the race of settlement and civilization—and must she not only violate the constitution by shutting out half the States, common property-holders with her—but in the name of liberty outrage liberty by erecting a despotism over the Territories Sir, we never will submit to it—we will resist it to the last; and in this struggle of principle against passion, of reason and right against fanaticism, are we defenceless? No, sir; no sir.—It is true, New England, with a few noble exceptions, has arrayed herself against the principle of the bill; yet even there the cause is not lost. Her choicest sons are unmoved by the clamors that surround them, and New Hampshire, the little Switzerland of the North, is unbroken by the frantic rush of the agitators. She has the elements around which to rally her hereditary principles.

But New England is not the Union. Observe what different tokens come from East and West. Did you hear of the infuriated mob that basely hung the author of this bill in effigy, on Boston Common? But did you note soon after the cheering tones of approval the west wind brought from his prairie State? Remember, Gentlemen, in the midst of your exultation, that the political power of this country is now climbing the summits of the Allegany mountains, and before this decade closes will have pursued its unreturning course far into the valley of the Mississippi—that vast region richer than the delta of the Nile, and whose millions and ever-increasing millions are destined to a political unity as lasting as civilization and commerce, bound forever together by the double tie of interest and affection. What, then, if Boston Chooses to betray the principles that made her own origin illustrious—what if New England Chooses to turn her back on the doctrines that marked her early history, and, after winning political liberty for herself, proposes to deny it to others—still we are not defenceless. True spirits in every eastern state will stand by the flag of republican equality until it waves the people back beneath its folds. Pennsylvania, that fine old Commonwealth, too often neglected in the piping times of peace, but always appealed to, and never in vain, in ever crises of the constitution, will stand upon the bill. But even if no support could be found in the scenes of our early civilization, we would gather up this inestimable principle, and turn to the West—the young, and growing, and vigorous West—whose hardy sons, having just laid for themselves the foundations of society, will never aid in robbing their fellow-citizens of the same sacred privilege. Sir, in two years from this time you will not be able, in my opinion, to find a man in the West who will dare to go before the people in opposition to the principle of this bill.

My time is so nearly exhausted that I shall be obliged to omit observations I had intended to offer as to the importance of action on this subject. By keeping it an open question, nobody is to be benefitted except the abolitionists and their sympathizers. Those who take the responsibility of throwing it before the county as an apple of discord may themselves perish in the storm they aid to arouse. The final triumph of the truth would not be doubtful, but the immediate effect would be to furnish food for abolition excitement.

Mr. Davis, of Rhode Island.  If you do pass the bill it will.

Mr. Breckinridge.  That gentleman is an enemy of the bill. He is sincere, no doubt; but deceives himself. As he is a political abolitionist, I remark, with great respect, that he would desire the passage of the bill if he thought it would promote the anti-slavery movement. [Laughter.]

No, sir; if we reject the bill, we open up the waters of bitterness, to be sealed again in time, but not until these agitators shall have rioted awhile in the confusion of the country; we blow high the flames to furnish habitations for these political salamanders, who can exist only in the fires of domestic strife. But, if it passes, the question will be removed forever from the halls of Congress, and deposited with the people, who can settle it in a manner answerable to their own views of interest and happiness. The occupation of federal agitators will be gone, and a barrier will be erected against which the rampant spirit of modern fanaticism may rave in vain, and before which it will receive its signal overthrow.

In the excitement of debates upon this subject heretofore, threats have been made on both sides. I have none to make, sir. I come from a state which is not in the habit of making threats. I believe that once, and only once, she utters a political threat. That was in 1798, when the old federal party struck at the vitals of the constitution. On that occasion, her warning voice and firm attitude contributed to save our political system. If my time allowed I believe I could prove that this Missouri prohibition was a bantling of the same federal party scotched but  not killed in former conflicts.

I believe that the sentiments I have expressed are those of the people I represent. I believe they are the sentiments of the Commonwealth of Kentucky—a State which has never taken an extreme political position; a State which, lying in the centre of the Union, has always extended one hand to the North and the other to the South, to draw them together in bonds of amity, and ever pulsation of those great heart sends the warm life-blood of affection to the remotest extremities of the confederacy.

SOURCES: “Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge of Kentucky,” Nashville Union and American, Nashville, Tennessee, Wednesday, April 5, 1854, p. 2, which was continued the following day in “Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge of Kentucky,” Nashville Union and American, Nashville, Tennessee, Thursday, April 6, 1854, p. 2