November 16,
1864
They have made Sheridan a Major-General in the Regular Army.
I think he deserves it for that remarkable battle of Cedar Creek. Those of
Opequon and of Fisher's Hill were joyous occasions; but he ought to have
won those, because his forces were probably at least as two to one, and his
cavalry immeasurably superior; but this last battle was the thing that brought
out his high merit. The language of the order is not to be commended, as it
makes Sheridan a cat's-paw to give McClellan an insulting hit. It is hard on
Meade, and I think he feels it; during a long campaign, in many respects
unprecedented in military history for its difficulties and its grandeur, he has
handled an army, which has at times considerably exceeded 100,000 men; and that
too under circumstances very trying to a man who has had a chief command; that
is to say, obliged to take the orders and tactics of a superior, but made
responsible for all the trying and difficult performance, which indeed is more
than one half the game of war.
1 undertake to say that his handling of his troops, when a
mistake would be the destruction of the entire plan, has been a wonder: without
exaggeration, a wonder. His movements and those of Lee are only to be compared
to two exquisite swordsmen, each perfectly instructed, and never erring a hair
in attack or in defence. Of course, it is idle to tell such facts to people at
large; they don't understand, or care, or believe anything about it. It is
true, the army has played what seems its destined ro1e, to kill and to be
killed without decisive actions, until both sides pause from mere exhaustion;
but do people reflect what a tremendous effect all this has on the Rebels? that
by wearing ourselves, we have worn them down, until they are turning
every teamster into the ranks and (of all things) are talking of arming the
negroes. Suppose there had been no army capable of clinging thus for months in
a death-grapple, and still clinging and meaning to cling; what would have
become of Sherman and his great work?1 The record of General Meade
is a remarkably clear one. He has risen from a brigadier of volunteers to all
the higher commands, by hard fighting and an experience that dates from the
first days of McClellan. He has done better with the Army of the Potomac than
McClellan, Pope, Burnside, or Hooker; and — I will add boldly and without
disparagement to the Lieutenant-General — better than Grant! and you would
agree with me did you know what power and what men Grant has had to command.
Meade's great virtue is, that he knows when to fight, and when not to
fight. Taking up an army on the march, he fought and won the greatest battle of
this war — Gettysburg — 100,000 men against 110,000 — a battle that saved
Baltimore, Washington, and Philadelphia, and nobody knows what besides. He
wouldn't fight (assault) Lee at Williamsport, and immediately he was “timid,
timid, timid!” Now look here: we assaulted at Spotsylvania, at Cool
Arbor, at Petersburg, and were repulsed with perfect slaughter; after all
that, if Lee had assaulted us in position what would, what would have
become of him? Why, we would have used him up so, that he wouldn't have known
himself. Just turn this about and apply it to Gettysburg and reflect how “the
people” are frequently semi-idiotic! He followed Lee to the Rappahannock and
got orders to stop. In September he was to move and attack Lee on the Rapid
Ann; the day before this move they took 20,000 men from him and sent West: it
couldn't be done to Grant. Then Lee marched on Centreville; Meade beat him and
got there first; Lee wouldn't fight and retreated (he also knows when
not to fight). It was in just such a move that Pope was smashed all to pieces
and driven into Washington. Then Meade forced the Rappahannock, and drove Lee
in haste over the Rapid Ann. The Mine Run expedition followed; we did not go
fast enough — that was unfortunate; but it would have been more unfortunate to
have left 10,000 men on the slopes there. If Meade had lacked the great moral
courage to say “retreat,” after having been called “timid” by the papers, and
having been hounded on by Halleek and Stanton to “do something,” he would not
only have got a disastrous defeat, but would have destroyed the plan of
re-enlistments by which we obtained the very backbone of our army for this
campaign. His “timidity” lies in this, that he will not try to build a house
without enough of tools and timber. Lately, they have turned round, 180
degrees, and now call him “butcher”; but that does just as well — blow hot,
blow cold. This is a fair statement. I don't say he is Napoleon, Caesar and
Alexander in one; only that he can handle 100,000 men and do it easy — a rare
gift! Also, as Sherman and Sheridan, commanding the two other great armies,
have been made regular Major-Generals, he too, who is doing his part, and has
fought more than both of them put together, ought to have equal rank.2
General Grant, as far as I can hear, thinks everything of General Meade, and it
is said will have him promoted like the others. I believe it will turn out that
Sherman is our first military genius, while Sheridan is most remarkable as a “field
fighter,” when the battle is actually engaged. Bless my soul! quelle lecture on
my commanding General! Never mind, variety is the spice of life.
_______________
1 Sherman was just leaving Atlanta in his march
to the sea.
2 Meade was then a Major-General of Volunteers.
SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s
Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness
to Appomattox, p. 270-3
