General Robert E. Lee to Lieutenant-General James Longstreet, February 22, 1865

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES,

February 22, 1865.

Lieut. Gen. J. LONGSTREET,

Commanding, &c.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 14th instant is received. It arrived during my absence in Richmond, and has not been overlooked. I agree with you entirely in believing that if we had gold we could get sufficient supplies for our army, but the great difficulty is to obtain the gold. It is not in the coffers of the Government or the banks, but in principally hoarded by individuals throughout the country, and is inaccessible to us. I hope under the reorganization of the Commissary Department, if we can maintain possession of our communications, that the army will be better supplied than heretofore, and that we can accumulate some provisions ahead. As regards the concentration of our troops near the capital, the effect would be to produce a like concentration of the enemy, and an increase of our difficulties in obtaining food and forage. But this, whether for good or evil, is now being accomplished by the enemy, who seems to be forcing Generals Beauregard and Bragg in this direction. If Sherman marches his army to Richmond, as General Beauregard reports it is his intention to do, and General Schofield is able to unite with him, we shall have to abandon our position on the James River, as lamentable as it is on every account. The want of supplies alone would force us to withdraw when the enemy reaches the Roanoke. Our line is so long, extending nearly from the Chickahominy to the Nottoway, and the enemy is so clone upon us that if we are obliged to withdraw, we cannot concentrate all our troops nearer than some point on the line of railroad between Richmond and Danville. Should a necessity therefore arise I propose to concentrate at or near Burkeville. The route for the troops north of James River would have to be through Richmond, on the road to Amelia Court-House, the cavalry passing up the north branch of the river and crossing at some point above Richmond. Pickett's division would take the route through Chesterfield Court-House, crossing the Appomattox at Goode's Bridge. With the army concentrated at or near Burkeville, our communications north and south would be by that railroad and west by the South Side Railroad. We might also seize the opportunity of striking at Grant, should he pursue us rapidly, or at Sherman, before they could unite.

I wish you to consider this subject, and give me your views. I desire you also to make every preparation to take the field at a moment's notice, and to accumulate all the supplies you can. General Grant seems to be preparing to move out by his left flank. He is accumulating near Hatcher's Run depots of supplies, and apparently concentrating a strong force in that quarter. Yesterday and to-day trains have passed from his right to his left loaded with troops, which may be the body of 8,000 which you report having left Signal Hill yesterday. I cannot tell whether it is his intention to maintain his position until his other columns approach nearer, or to anticipate any movement by us which he might suppose would then become necessary. I wish you would watch closely his movements on the north side of the river, and try and ascertain whether he is diminishing his force. If he makes the move which appearances now indicate he may draw out his whole force, abandoning his lines of defense, or hold them partially and move with the remainder of his troops.

I should like very much to confer with you on these subjects, but I fear it will be impossible for me to go north of James River, and I do not know that it will be convenient for you to come here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

P. S. – Can you not return Pickett's brigade to him in order that I may withdraw Grimes' brigade from his line, its division having been ordered to our right.

R. E. L.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 46, Part 2 (Serial No. 96), p. 1250-1; James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 643-4

General Robert E. Lee to Lieutenant-General Richard H. Anderson, June 16, 1864

June 16, 1864.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON,

Commanding Longstreet’s Corps:

GENERAL, — I take great pleasure in presenting to you my congratulations upon the conduct of the men of your corps. I believe that they will carry anything they are put against. We tried very hard to stop Pickett's men from capturing the breastworks of the enemy, but could not do it. I hope his loss has been small.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General,

SOURCE: James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, p. 639

General Robert E. Lee to John C. Breckinridge, April 1, 1865

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

April 1, 1865.

HON. SEC. OF WAR, RICHMOND.

SIR: After my dispatch of last night I received a report from General Pickett, who with three of his own brigades and two of General Johnston's supported the cavalry under Gen. Fitz Lee near Five Forks on the Road from Dinwiddie Court House to the Southside road. After considerable difficulty, and meeting resistance from the enemy at all points, General Pickett forced his way to within less than a mile of Dinwiddie Court House. By this time it was too dark for further operations, and General Pickett resolved to return to Five Forks to protect his communications with the railroad. He inflicted considerable damage upon the enemy, and took some prisoners. His own loss was severe, including a good many officers. General Terry had his horse killed by a shell, and was disabled himself. Gen. Fitz Lee's and Rosser's divisions were heavily engaged, but their loss was slight. Gen. W. H. F. Lee lost some valuable officers. General Pickett did not retire from the vicinity of Dinwiddie Court House until early this morning, when his left flank being threatened by a heavy force, he withdrew to Five Forks, where he took position with Gen. W. H. F. Lee on his right, Fitz Lee and Rosser on his left, with Robert's brigade on the White Oak road, connecting with General Anderson.

 The enemy attacked General Roberts with a large force of cavalry, and after being once repulsed drove him back across Hatcher's Run.

 A large force of infantry, believed to be the Fifteenth Corps with other troops, turned General Pickett's left, and drove him back on the White Oak road, separating him from Gen. Fitz Lee, who was compelled to fall back across Hatcher's Run. General Pickett's present position is not known. Gen. Fitz Lee reports that the enemy is massing his infantry heavily behind the cavalry in his front. The infantry that engaged General Anderson yesterday has moved from his front toward our right, and is supposed to participate in the operations above described. Prisoners have been taken today from the Twenty-fourth Corps, and it is believed that most of the corps is now south of the James. Our loss today is not known. A report from Staunton represents that the Eighth Corps passed over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from the 20th to the 25th ult. General Hancock is at Harper's Ferry with 2,000 men. One division of the Tenth Corps is at Winchester with about 1,000 cavalry. The infantry at Winchester have marching orders, and all these troops are said to be destined for General Grant's army.

The enemy is also reported to have withdrawn all his troops from Wolf Run Shoals and Fairfax Station, and to have concentrated them at Winchester.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

 

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 362-3

General Robert E. Lee to General Braxton Bragg, April 16, 1864

HEADQUARTERS, April 16, 1864.

GEN. BRAXTON BRAGG,

Commanding Armies C. States.

GENERAL: I received last evening your letter of the 14th instant by the hands of Major Parker. I trust that the expedition in North Carolina will be attended with success, and that the troops in the department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida may be made available to oppose the combined operations of the enemy in Virginia. No attack of moment can be made upon Charleston or the southern coast during the summer months, and I think General Johnston can draw with impunity some troops from Mobile to him. Buckner's force, too, might be made available in some way; I fear, as he stands now, it will be lost to us. At present my hands are tied. If I were able to move with the aid of Longstreet and Pickett, the enemy might be driven from the Rappahannock and be obliged to look to the safety of his own capital instead of the assault upon ours. I cannot even draw to me the cavalry or artillery of the army, and the season has arrived when I may be attacked any day. The scarcity of our supplies gives me the greatest uneasiness. All travel should be suspended on the railroad until a sufficiency is secured. I can have a portion of the corn ground into meal for the army if it is sent to me. I do not know whether all can be furnished. The mills are mostly on the Rapidan, and consequently exposed if any movement takes place. It will also increase the hauling, which at this time I should like to avoid if possible. If the meal can be prepared in Richmond, it will be more convenient at this time. If it cannot, we can at least grind part of the corn if sent to us. If we are forced back from our present line, the Central Railroad, Charlottesville, and all the upper country will be exposed, and I fear great injury inflicted on us.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 332-3

General Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, February 18, 1864

HEADQUARTERS, February 18, 1864.

 HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President Confederate States, Richmond.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have received the dispatch forwarded to me today from General Longstreet requesting 10,000 men to insure the capture of Knoxville. I have no information of the practicability of the plan. I think it may be assumed that its defenses are stronger now than when it was last attacked, and an attempt to capture it by assault would not only be hazardous, but attended with great loss of life. To reduce it by approaches would require time, and, it seems to me at this distance, render necessary an army sufficient to defeat a relieving force that, now the railroad to Chattanooga has been opened, could be quickly sent from Grant's troops. If a movement could be made to cut off supplies from Knoxville, it would draw out the garrison; and this appears to me the wiser course. Could supplies be sent if troops were? For without the former the latter would be unavailing. I wrote today to the Secretary of War suggesting that Pickett's division be sent to him in the spring, and that a brigade of Buckner's now at Dalton be returned to its division at once. . . .

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 326

General Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, January 20, 1864

(Confidential.)

 HEADQUARTERS, 20th January, 1864.

HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President Confederate States.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have delayed replying to your letter of the 4th until the time arrived for the execution of the attempt on New Berne. I regret very much that the boats on the Neuse and Roanoke are not completed. With their aid, I think, success would be certain. Without them, though the place may be captured, the fruits of the expedition will be lessened and our maintenance of the command of the waters in North Carolina uncertain. I think every effort should be made now to get them into service as soon as possible. You will see by the enclosed letters to Generals Pickett and Whiting the arrangements made for the land operations. The water expedition I am willing to trust to Colonel Wood. If he can succeed in capturing the gunboats, I think success will be certain, as it was by aid from the water that I expected Hoke to be mainly assisted.

In view of the opinion expressed in your letter, I would go to North Carolina myself; but I consider my presence here always necessary, especially now when there is such a struggle to keep the army fed and clothed. General Early is still in the Valley. The enemy there has been reinforced by troops from Meade's army and [by] calling down General Averell with his cavalry. I do not know what their intentions are. Report from General Early' yesterday stated that Averell with his cavalry had started from Morehead. I will, however, go to North Carolina if you think it necessary. General Fitz Lee brought out of Hardy no prisoners, 250 horses and mules, 27 wagons, and 460 head of cattle. He captured 40 wagons, but 13 turned over on the mountains and had to be abandoned. He had also to leave behind between 100 and 200 head of cattle. The difficulties he encountered were very great, owing to the extreme cold, ice, storms, etc. Nearly all his men were frost-bitten, some badly; many injured by the falling of their horses. He got within six miles of Paddytown, but could not cross the mountains, owing to the icy roads and the smoothness of his horses. He could take with him neither artillery nor wagons.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 324

General Robert E. Lee to Major General George Pickett, January 20, 1864

(Confidential.)

 HEADQUARTERS, January 20, 1864.

MAJ.-GEN. GEO. PICKETT,

Commanding, etc., Petersburg, Va.

GENERAL: From all the information I have received, I think the garrison at New Berne can be captured, and I wish it tried, unless upon close examination you find it impracticable. You can use for that purpose Barton's, Kemper's, Corse's, and as much of Ranson's brigades as you can draw to that point. I shall send in addition Hoke's brigade from this army. General Hoke is familiar with the vicinity of New Berne, has recently returned from a visit to that country, and it is mainly upon his information that my opinion has been formed. He will hand you this letter and explain to you the general plan which at this distance appears to me the best. You can modify it according to circumstances developed by investigation and your good judgment. It is proposed that General Barton shall pass south of Trent River and attack the forces said to be stationed behind Brice's Creek, get possession of the railroad to Beaufort, cut off reinforcements from that quarter, and take the town in reverse. General Hoke will move down between the Trent and the Neuse, endeavor to surprise the troops on Bachelor's Creek, silence the guns in the star fort and batteries near the Neuse, and penetrate the town in that direction; Whitford's battalion, or such other force as may be designated, to move down north of the Neuse, occupy if they cannot capture Fort Anderson at Barrington Ferry, and endeavor to take in flank with the batteries the line south of the Neuse, so as to lighten Hoke's work. The night previous to the land attack Colonel Wood of the Navy with 200 men in boats will descend the Neuse and endeavor to surprise and capture the gunboats in that river, and by their aid drive the enemy from their guns. General Whiting will be requested on the day appointed for the attack to threaten Swansborough with the troops he has north of the Cape Fear, so as to fix the attention of the enemy at Morehead City, etc., and to cooperate otherwise in the general plan. Everything will depend upon the secrecy, expedition, and boldness of your movements. General Barton should move first, and be strong enough to resist any combination of the forces from New Berne and Beaufort. The cavalry had better accompany him to cut the telegraph and railroad, gain information, etc. General Hoke with his own brigade should move next, the force north of the Neuse to keep pace with him. Colonel Wood will attend to his part.

If successful, everything in New Berne should be sent back to a place of security. In that event, too, it is hoped that by the aid of the gunboats water transportation can be secured, the enemy driven from Washington, Plymouth, etc., and much subsistence for the army obtained. I wish you therefore to follow up your success. It will also have the happiest effect in North Carolina and inspirit the people. I propose Major Dearing for the command of the artillery of the expedition. With the two battalions of Longstreet's corps near Petersburg there should be twelve 10 pounder Parrotts and two 2O-pounder Parrotts; two 2O-pounder Parrotts will be sent from Richmond. At Kinston I understand there are four Napoleons and one 3-inch rifle. From Branch's battalion I hope you will get more rifle guns, of which, if possible, you should have about twenty and as many Napoleons as you desire. The guns and ammunition must be sent by railroad and the horses by common route. See that you have a sufficiency of ammunition and subsistence. I wish you also not to interrupt the general travel of the railroad, but to use the empty trains going south for the transportation of troops, etc. When the day of attack is fixed notify General Whiting. If you have to use the telegraph, merely say, "The day is ____;" name the day of the month — he will comprehend. Commit nothing to the telegraph that will disclose your purpose. You must deceive the enemy as to your purpose, and conceal it from the citizens. As regards the concentration of troops, you may put it on the ground of apprehension of an attack from New Berne. General Hoke will give out that he is going to arrest deserters and recruit his diminished regiments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

 R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 322-3

General Robert E. Lee to Jefferson Davis, January 2, 1864

HEADQUARTERS, January 2, 1864.

HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS,

President Confederate States, Richmond.

MR. PRESIDENT: The time is at hand when, if an attempt can be made to capture the enemy's forces at New Berne, it should be done. I can now spare troops for the purpose which will not be the case as spring approaches. If I have been correctly informed, a brigade from this army with Barton's brigade, Pickett's division, now near Kinston, will be sufficient if the attack can be secretly and suddenly made. New Berne is defended on the land side by a line of intrenchments from the Neuse to the Trent. A redoubt near the Trent protects that flank while three or four gunboats are relied upon to defend the flanks on the Neuse. The garrison has been so long unmolested and experiences such a feeling of security that it is represented as careless. The gunboats are small and indifferent, and do not keep up a head of steam. A bold party could descend the Neuse in boats at night, capture the gunboats, and drive the enemy by their aid from the works on that side of the river, while a force should attack them in front. A large amount of provisions and other supplies are said to be at New Berne, which are much wanted for this army, besides much that is reported in the country that will thus be made accessible to us. The gunboats, aided by the ironclads building on the Neuse and Roanoke, would clear the waters of the enemy and capture their transports, which could be used for transportation. I have not heard what progress is making in the completion of the ironclads or when they will be ready for service. A bold naval officer will be required for the boat expedition, with suitable men and officers to man the boats and serve the gunboats when captured. Can they be had?

I have sent General Early with two brigades of infantry and two of cavalry under Fitz Lee to Hardy and Hampshire counties, to endeavor to get out some cattle that are reported within the enemy's lines. But the weather has been so unfavorable that I fear he will not meet with much success. The heavy rain-storms will swell all the streams beyond fording and the cold weather and snow in the mountains will present other obstacles. Many of the infantry are without shoes and the cavalry worn down by their pursuit of Averell. We are now issuing to the troops a fourth of a pound of salt meat, and have only three days' supply at that rate. Two droves of cattle from the West that were reported to be for this army have, I am told, been directed to Richmond. I can learn of no supply of meat on the road to the army, and fear I shall be unable to retain it in the field. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE,

General.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 319-20

General Robert E. Lee to Brigadier General G. W. Custis Lee, April 30, 1864

CAMP, 30th April, 1864.

MY DEAR CUSTIS:

Nothing of much interest has occurred during the past week. The reports of scouts all indicate large preparations on the part of the enemy, and a state of readiness for action. The Ninth Corps is reported to be encamped (or rather was on the 27th) on the O. & A. R. R., between Fairfax Ct. H. and Alexandria.

This is corroboration of information sent the President yesterday, but there may be some mistakes as to the fact or number of corps. All their troops north of the Rappahannock have been moved south, their guards called in, etc. The garrisons, provost guards, etc., in Northern cities have been brought forward and replaced by State troops. A battalion of heavy artillery is said to have recently arrived in Culpeper, numbering 3,000.

I presume these are the men stated in their papers to have been drawn from the forts in N. Y. Harbor. I wish we could make corresponding preparations. If I could get back Pickett, Hoke, and B. R. Johnson, I would feel strong enough to operate.

I have been endeavoring for the last eight or ten days to move Imboden against the B. & O. R. R. in its unprotected state, but have not been able. I presume he has his difficulties, as well as myself. I am afraid it is too late now. I cannot yet get the troops together for want of forage, and am looking for grass.

Endeavor to get accurate information from the Peninsula, James River, etc. My scouts have not returned from Annapolis, and may get back too late.

Your affectionate father,

R. E. LEE.

GEN. G. W. CUSTIS LEE.

SOURCE: John William Jones, Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee: Soldier and Man, p. 305

Diary of John Beauchamp Jones: Tuesday, July 7, 1863

It appears that the fighting near Gettysburg began on Wednesday, July 1st, continued until Sunday, the 5th, and perhaps longer. Up to Friday the Northern papers claim the advantage.

This morning at 1 P.M. [sic] another dispatch was received from the same (unofficial) source, stating that on Sunday the enemy made a stand, and A. P. Hill's corps fell back, followed by the enemy, when Longstreet's and Ewell's corps closed in their rear and captured 40,000 prisoners — who are now guarded by Pickett's division. It states that the prisoners refused to be paroled. This might possibly be true.

This account is credited. Col. Custis Lee, from the President's office, was in my office at half-past two P.M. to-day, and said nothing had been received from his father yet — but he did not deny that such accounts might be substantially true.

The President still keeps his eye on Gen. Beauregard. A paper from the general to Gen. Cooper, and, of course, referred to the President, in relation to the means of defense in his department, and a call for more guns, was sent back to-day, indorsed by the President, that by an examination of the report of Gen. Huger, he thought some discrepancies would appear in the statements of Gen. [Beauregard]. Thus, it would seem, from a repetition of similar [imputations], the President has strong doubts of Gen. [Beauregard's] accuracy of statements. He is quick to detect discrepancies.

Gen. D. H. Hill sends in a characteristic letter. He says the rivers are all swollen, and he can make no movement to-day in pursuit of Dix's army of the Pamunky — or rather "the monkey amy." He says that the Brooke Pike outer defenses are so defective in design, that a force there could be driven off in five minutes by the enemy's sharpshooters. He wants them amended, and a certain grove cut down — and recommends that engineers be put to work, with orders to leave their "kid gloves behind."  He thinks more is to be apprehended from an attack on Petersburg than Richmond; and requests that Gen. Wise be ordered to march thither from Chaffin's Bluff, on the first alarm. He had not heard of the reported victory of Lee.

SOURCE: John Beauchamp Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital, Volume 1, p. 371-2