Diary of Edward Bates, December 31, 1861 – Second Entry

Since last date the weather has been and is remarkably fine. Mr. Eads⁶⁷ has been here, bringing his wife, Miss Genevieve and little Mattie — He has returned, by way of N.[ew] Y.[ork] to St Louis (leaving Genevieve with us, untill [sic] his return again in a few weeks)[.] He was sadly disappointed about gitting [sic] money, and went away in no good humor with Q.[uarter] M.[aster] G[eneral] Meigs.⁶⁸ I hope it will be all right soon.

I think he has made a very favorable impression upon the Navy Dept, especially with Mr. Fox,⁶⁹ asst. Sect: He will probably contract for the building of 4 of the 20 iron ships ordered for the Navy, at $500,000 a piece — perhaps a little more.⁷⁰

Mr. Gibson⁷¹ shewed me to day a letter from Gov Gamble⁷² in very low spirits — Genl Halleck⁷³ rules out the malitia [sic]. The goods sent from here—those clothes and blanketts [sic] —expressly for Gambles malitia [sic] are taken and transfer[r]ed to other troops, this is too bad.

< [Note.] Jany 3 Mr. Gibson read me another letter from Gov Gamble in much better spirits. He thinks, in the main that Halleck is doing very well[.>]

Genl McClellan and his chief of staff, Genl Marcey [sic], are both very sick — Said to be typhoid fever — and this is making much difficulty.

The Genl: it seems, is very reticent. Nobody knows his plans. The Sec of war and the President himself are kept in ignorance of the actual condition of the army and the intended movements of the General — if indeed they intend to move at all — In fact the whole administration is lamentably deficient in the lack of unity and coaction[.] There is no quarrell [sic] among us, but an absalute [sic] want of community of intelligence, purpose and action.

In truth, it is not an administration but the separate and disjointed action of seven independent officers, each one ignorant of what his colle[a]gues are doing.

To day in council, Mr. Chase stated the condition of things in sorrowful plainness; and then, as usual, we had a “bald, disjointed chat” about it, coming to no conclusion.

It seemed as if all military operations were to stop, just because Genl McClellan is sick! Some proposed that there should be a council of war composed of Maj: Genls, in order that somebody besides the Genl in chief, may know something about the army; and be able to take command in case Genl McC[lellan] should die or continue sick.

I differed, and told the President that he was commander in chief, and that it was not his privilege but his duty to command; and that implied the necessity to know the true condition of things.

That if I was in his place, I would know; and if things were not done to my liking, I would order them otherwise. That I believed he could get along easier and much better by the free use of his power, than by this injurious deference to his subordinates [.]

I said, the Sec of War is but the Adjutant Genl. and the Sec of the Navy the Admiral of the commander in chief, and through them, he ought to know all that is necessary to be known about the army and Navy. And I urged upon him (as often heretofore) the propriety of detailing at least two active and skillful officers to act as his aid[e]s, to write and carry his orders, collect his information, keep his military books and papers, and do his bidding generally in military affairs.

But I fear that I spoke in vain. The Prest. is an excellent man, and, in the main wise; but he lacks will and purpose, and, I greatly fear he, has not the power to command.

__________

⁶⁷ Supra, Jan. 28, 1860, note 38.

⁶⁸ Montgomery C. Meigs : West Point graduate of 1836 ; officer in the Artillery and Engineering Corps ever since; commander of the expedition to Fort Pickens which had saved that fort; quartermaster-general with the rank of brigadier-general, 1861-1882.

⁶⁹ Supra, March 9, 1861, note 40.

⁷⁰ He did actually contract for seven armor-plated gunboats of 600 tons each to be finished in sixty-five days. He and Mr. Bates had suggested these gunboats for the Mississippi, and, before the War ended, he had built fourteen armored gunboats, seven “tin-clad” transports, and four heavy mortar boats, and had added several new ordnance Inventions of his own to them.

⁷¹ Supra, April 27, 1859, note 27.

⁷² Supra, July 23, 1859, note 39.

⁷³ Supra, Nov. 13, 1861, note 37.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, The Diary of Edward Bates, published in The Annual Report Of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930 Volume 4, p. 219-20

Major General William T. Sherman to Senator John Sherman, December 29, 1863

LANCASTER, OHIO, Dec. 29, 1863.

My Dear Brother:

 . . . I hear you have gone on to New York, and therefore I must go off without seeing you. I have been off the line of communication since leaving Memphis, save a few hours at Bridgeport, during which I had hardly time to put my official signature to papers demanding my hand. I have made a report of our movements up to the return to Bridgeport and enclose it with this, a copy which I brought here, and which you may keep, only, of course, under the confidence of absolute secrecy until the War Department thinks proper to make the original public. . . .

I suppose you will read this report, and I invite attention to the part referring to the assault on Tunnel Hill. I know that Grant in his report will dwell on this same part. I was provoked that Meigs, looking at us from Chattanooga, should report me repulsed, and that Mr. Stanton should publish his letter as semi-official. Meigs apologized to me for using Thomas's name instead of mine throughout, which he charged to a copyist, but made no amends for the repulse. The whole philosophy of the battle was that I should get, by a dash, a position on the extremity of the Missionary Ridge, from which the enemy would be forced to drive me, or allow his depot at Chickamauga station to be in danger. I expected Bragg to attack me at daylight, but he did not, and to bring matters to a crisis quickly, as time was precious, for the sake of Burnside in East Tennessee, Grant ordered me to assume the offensive. My report contains the rest. Again, after the battle, Granger was ordered to push for Knoxville, but his movements were so slow that Grant, impatient, called on me, and my move was the most rapid of the war and perfectly successful. I could have gone on after Longstreet, but Burnside ranked me, and it was his business, not mine. So I reinforced him all he asked, and returned.

The Fifteenth Corps, now Logan's, and Dodge's division of the Sixteenth Corps are now at work on the railroad from Nashville to Decatur, and from Decatur to Stevenson, thus making a triangle of railroad which it is estimated will relieve the great difficulty of supplies which has paralyzed the Army of the Cumberland. This will take five weeks. I leave my headquarters at Huntsville, and go in person down the Mississippi to strike some lateral blows, to punish the country for allowing guerillas to attack the boats. I go on Friday to Cincinnati, and thence to Cairo, where with Admiral Porter I will concert measures to produce the result. I expect to send one expedition up the Yazoo, and go myself with another up Red River, levying contributions to make good losses to boats, and punish for deaths and wounds inflicted. I think we can make people feel that they must actually prevent guerillas from carrying out their threats that though we have the river, it will do us no good. My address will be Memphis, for a month, and Huntsville after. We can hardly fashion out the next campaign, but it looks as though we should have to move from the Tennessee River. I should prefer to take Mobile and the Alabama as well as the Chattahoochee, and move east from Montgomery and Columbus, Miss.

I wish you would introduce a bill in Congress increasing the number of cadets on this basis — one from each congressional district per annum. In districts not represented, vest the appointments in the Secretary of War out of boys not over eighteen in the armies in the field, to be selected in any manner that may be prescribed by law, or by the regulation of the President. This would hold out to young fellows the prospect of getting a cadetship. Last summer we were called on to recommend candidates, and I was amazed to find so many worthy applicants. All who came forward for examination preferred West Point to a commission. The great want of the army is good subordinate officers. The army is a good school, but West Point is better. It is useless to deny that a special preliminary education is necessary to the military officers, and the cheapest school is now at West Point and is susceptible of infinite increase. . . .

I think the President's proclamation unwise. Knowing the temper of the South, I know that it but protracts the war by seeming to court peace. It to them looks like weakness. I tell them that as they cool off, we warm to the work. That we are just getting ready for the war, and I know the effect is better than to coax them to come back into the Union. The organization of a Civil Government but complicates the game. All the Southern States will need a pure military Government for years after resistance has ceased. You have noticed the debate in Richmond, on the President's proclamation. That is a true exhibit of the feeling South. Don't fall into the error that the masses think differently. Of course property-holding classes South deplore the devastation that marks the progress of their own and our armies, but the South is no longer consulted. The Army of the Confederacy is the South, and they still hope to worry us out. The moment we relax, they gain strength and confidence. We must hammer away and show such resistance, such bottom that even that slender hope will fail them.

I still am opposed to all bounties. The draft pure and simple, annual, to fill vacancies in the ranks. Pay of men in the front increased to even forty dollars a month, and that of men at depots and to the rear diminished to a bare maintenance if not less. Four hundred dollars bounty is an absurd commentary where two-thirds draw bounty and remain absent from their rank and are discharged for disability without hearing a shot. Deal with the army as you would if you were hiring men for special work. Pay those who do the work high; those who are sick, unfortunate, or shirking, pay little or nothing. The same of officers from the major-general to lieutenant. The President must make vacancies for the rising officers, the "creations" of the war. I am willing to quit if a younger and better man can be found for my place. . . .

Your affectionate brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

SOURCE: Rachel Sherman Thorndike, Editor, The Sherman Letters: Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, p. 216-9

The Railroad Meeting in Washington

WASHINGTON, Feb. 20. – Delegates from most of the principal railroad companies of the loyal States met this A. M. at Williard’s in pursuance to a public invitation of the Secretary of War with a view to make arrangements for the transportation of troops and military supplies on uniform terms.  The Convention was very largely attended.  After the meeting had organized by the election of Mr. Corning as President and Messers. Barlow and Kimber as Secretaries, the Chairman deputized Judge Jewett and Mr. Wm. DeLewis to invite the attendance of the Secretary of War, who shortly after arrived, accompanied by Gens. McClellan and Meigs.

Mr. Stanton laid before the Convention the object of his call, which was to throw upon the Railroad companies themselves, through an efficient organization, the arrangement and responsibility of the measures necessary, at this juncture, for conducting the transportation of the Government, both of troops and supplies, together with the establishment of a fixed, moderate rate by which such transportation shall be conducted on all Railroads of the loyal states.

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, February 22, 1862, p. 3

Seizure of Railroads

WASHINGTON, May 25 – Ordered by virtue of the authority vested in act of Congress the President took military possession of all the railroads in the United States from and after this date until further ordered.  And directs that the respective railroad companies their officers and servants, shall hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of troops, munitions of war, &c., as may be ordered by military authorities, to the exclusion of all other business.

By order of the Secretary of War.

(Signed.)

M. C. MEIGS

– Published in The Burlington Weekly Hawk-Eye, Burlington, Iowa, Saturday, May 31, 1862, p. 4