Diary of Adam Gurowski, September 1861

WILL McClellan display unity in conception, and vigor in execution? That is the question. He seems very energetic and active in organizing the army; but he ought to take the field very soon. He ought to leave Washington, and have his headquarters in the camp among the soldiers. The life in the tent will inspire him. It alone inspired Frederick II and Napoleon. Too much organization may become as mischievous as the no organization under Scott. Time, time is everything. The levies will fight well; may only McClellan not be carried away by the notion and the attempt to create what is called a perfect army on European pattern. Such an attempt would be ruinous to the cause. It is altogether impossible to create such an army on the European model, and no necessity exists for it. The rebel army is no European one. Civil wars have altogether different military exigencies, and the great tactics for a civil war are wholly different from the tactics, etc., needed in a regular war. Napoleon differently fought the Vendeans, and differently the Austrians, and the other coalesced armies. May only McClellan not become intoxicated before he puts the cup to his lips.

Fremont disavowed by Lincoln and the administration. This looks bad. I have no considerable confidence in Fremont's high capacities, and believe that his head is turned a little; but in this question he was right in principle, and right in legality. A commander of an army operating separately has the exercise of full powers of war.

The Blairs are not to be accused; I read the letter from F. Blair to his brother. It is the letter of a patriot, but not of an intriguer. Fremont establishes an absurd rule concerning the breach of military discipline, and shows by it his ignorance and narrow-mindedness. So Fremont, and other bungling martinets, assert that nobody has the right to criticise the actions of his commander.

Fremont is ignorant of history, and those around him who put in his head such absurd notions are a pack of mean and servile spit-lickers. An officer ought to obey orders without hesitation, and if he does not he is to be court-martialed and shot. But it is perfectly allowable to criticise them; it is in human nature—it was, is, and will be done in all armies; see in Curtius and other historians of Alexander of Macedon. It was continually done under Napoleon. In Russia, in 1812, the criticism made by almost all the officers forced Alexander I. to leave the army, and to put Kutousoff over Barclay. In the last Italian campaign Austrian officers criticised loudly Giulay, their commander, etc., etc.

Conspiracy to destroy Fremont on account of his slave proclamation. The conspirators are the Missouri slave-holders: Senator Brodhead, old Bates, Scott, McClellan, and their staffs. Some jealousy against him in the Cabinet, but Seward rather on Fremont's side.

McClellan makes his father-in-law, a man of very secondary capacity, the chief of the staff of the army. It seems that McClellan ignores what a highly responsible position it is, and what a special and transcendent capacity must be that of a chief of the staff—the more so when of an army of several hundreds of thousands. I do not look for a Berthier, a Gneisenau, a Diebitsch, or Gortschakoff, but a Marcy will not do.

Colonel Lebedeef, from the staff of the Emperor Alexander II., and professor in the School of the Staff at St. Petersburg, saw here everything, spoke with our generals, and his conclusion is that in military capacity McDowell is by far superior to McClellan. Strange, if true, and foreboding no good.

Mr. Lincoln begins to call a demagogue any one who does not admire all the doings of his administration. Are we already so far?

McClellan under fatal influences of the rampant pro-slavery men, and of partisans of the South, as is a Barlow. All the former associations of McClellan have been of the worst kind—Breckinridgians. But perhaps he will throw them off. He is young, and the elevation of his position, his standing before the civilized world, will inspire and purify him, I hope. Nay, I ardently wish he may go to the camp, to the camp.

McClellan published a slave-catching order. Oh that he may discard those bad men around him! Struggles with evils, above all with domestic, internal evils, absorb a great part of every nation's life. Such struggles constitute its development, are the landmarks of its progress and decline.

The like struggles deserve more the attention of the observer, the philosopher, than all kinds of external wars. And, besides, most of such external wars result from the internal condition of a nation. At any rate, their success or unsuccess almost wholly depends upon its capacity to overcome internal evils. A nation even under a despotic rule may overcome and repel an invasion, as long as the struggle against the internal evils has not broken the harmony between the ruler and the nation. Here the internal evil has torn a part of the constitutional structure; may only the necessary harmony between this high-minded people and the representative of the transient constitutional formula not be destroyed. The people move onward, the formula vacillates, and seems to fear to make any bold step.

If the cause of the freemen of the North succumbs, then humanity is humiliated. This high-spirited exclamation belongs to Tassara, the Minister from Spain. Not the diplomat, but the nobly inspired man uttered it.

But for the authoritative influence of General Scott, and the absence of any foresight and energy on the part of the administration, the rebels would be almost wholly without military leaders, without naval officers. The Johnsons, Magruders, Tatnalls, Buchanans, ought to have been arrested for treason the moment they announced their intention to resign.

Mr. Seward has many excellent personal qualities, besides his unquestionable eminent capacity for business and argument; but why is he neutralizing so much good in him by the passion to be all in all, to meddle with everything, to play the knowing one in military affairs, he being in all such matters as innocent as a lamb? It is not a field on which Seward's hazarded generalizations can be of any earthly use; but they must confuse all.

Seward is free from that coarse, semi-barbarous know-nothingism which rules paramount, not the genuine people, but the would-be something, the half-civilized gentlemen. Above all, know-nothingism pervades all around Scott, who is himself its grand master, and it nestles there par excellence in more than one way. It is, however, to be seen how far this pure American—Scott military wisdom is something real, transcendent. Up to this day, the pure Americanism, West Point schoolboy's conceit, have not produced much. The defences of Washington, so much clarioned as being the product of a high conception and of engineering skill,—these defences are very questionable when appreciated by a genuine military eye. A Russian officer of the military engineers, one who was in the Crimea and at Sebastopol, after having surveyed these defences here, told me that the Russian soldiers who defended Sebastopol, and who learned what ought to be defences, would prefer to fight outside than inside of the Washington forts, bastions, defences, etc., etc., etc.

Doubtless many foreigners coming to this country are not much, but the greatest number are soldiers who saw service and fire, and could be of some use at the side of Scott's West Point greenness and presumption.

If we are worsted, then the fate of the men of faith in principles will be that of Sisyphus, and the coming generation for half a century will have uphill work.

If not McClellan himself, some intriguers around him already dream, nay, even attempt to form a pure military, that is, a reckless, unprincipled, unpatriotic party. These men foment the irritation between the arrogance of the thus-called regular army, and the pure abnegation of the volunteers. Oh, for battles! Oh, for battles!

Fremont wished at once to attack Fort Pillow and the city of Memphis. It was a bold move, but the concerted civil and military wisdom grouped around the President opposed this truly great military conception.

Mr. Lincoln is pulled in all directions. His intentions are excellent, and he would have made an excellent President for quiet times. But this civil war imperatively demands a man of foresight, of prompt decision, of Jacksonian will and energy. These qualities may be latent in Lincoln, but do not yet come to daylight. Mr. Lincoln has no experience of men and events, and no knowledge of the past. Seward's influence over Lincoln may be explained by the fact that Lincoln considers Seward as the alpha and omega of every kind of knowledge and information.

I still hope, perhaps against hope, that if Lincoln is what the masses believe him to be, a strong mind, then all may come out well. Strong minds, lifted by events into elevated regions, expand more and more; their "mind's eye" pierces through clouds, and even through rocks; they become inspired, and inspiration compensates the deficiency or want of information acquired by studies. Weak minds, when transported into higher regions, become confused and dizzy. Which of the two will be Mr. Lincoln's fate?

The administration hesitates to give to the struggle a character of emancipation; but the people hesitate not, and take Fremont to their heart.

As the concrete humanity, so single nations have epochs of gestation, and epochs of normal activity, of growth, of full life, of manhood. Americans are now in the stage of manhood.

Col. Romanoff, of the Russian military engineer corps, who was in the Crimean war, saw here the men and the army, saw and conversed with the generals. Col. R. is of opinion that McDowell is by far superior to McClellan, and would make a better commander.

It is said that McClellan refuses to move until he has an army of 300,000 men and 600 guns. Has he not studied Napoleon's wars? Napoleon scarcely ever had half such a number in hand; and when at Wagram, where he had about 180,000 men, himself in the centre, Davoust and Massena on the flanks, nevertheless the handling of such a mass was too heavy even for his, Napoleon's, genius.

The country is—to use an Americanism—in a pretty fix, if this McClellan turns out to be a mistake. I hope for the best. 600 guns! But 100 guns in a line cover a mile. What will he do with 600? Lose them in forests, marshes, and bad roads; whence it is unhappily a fact that McClellan read only a little of military history, misunderstood what he read, and now attempts to realize hallucinations, as a boy attempts to imitate the exploits of an Orlando. It is dreadful to think of it. I prefer to trust his assertion that, once organized, he soon, very soon, will deal heavy and quick blows to the rebels.

I saw some manœuvrings, and am astonished that no artillery is distributed among the regiments of infantry. When the rank and file see the guns on their side, the soldiers consider them as a part of themselves and of the regiment; they fight better in the company of guns; they stand by them and defend them as they defend their colors. Such a distribution of guns would strengthen the body of the volunteers. But it seems that McClellan has no confidence in the volunteers. Were this true, it would denote a small, very small mind. Let us hope it is not so. One of his generals—a martinet of the first class—told me that McClellan waits for the organization of the regulars, to have them for the defence of the guns. If so, it is sheer nonsense. These narrow-minded West Point martinets will become the ruin of McClellan.

McClellan could now take the field. Oh, why has he established his headquarters in the city, among flunkeys, wiseacres, and spit-lickers? Were he among the troops, he would be already in Manassas. The people are uneasy and fretting about this inaction, and the people see what is right and necessary.

Gen. Banks, a true and devoted patriot, is sacrificed by the stupidity of what they call here the staff of the great army, but which collectively, with its chief, is only a mass of conceit and ignorance few, as General Williams, excepted. Banks is in the face of the enemy, and has no cavalry and no artillery; and here are immense reviews to amuse women and fools.

Mr. Mercier, the French Minister, visited a considerable part of the free States, and his opinions are now more clear and firm; above all, he is very friendly to our side. He is sagacious and good.

Missouri is in great confusion—three parts of it lost. Fremont is not to be accused of all the mischief, but, from effect to cause, the accusation ascends to General Scott.

Gen. Scott insisted to have Gen. Harney appointed to the command of Missouri, and hated Lyon. If, even after Harney's recall, Lyon had been appointed, Lyon would be alive and Missouri safe. But hatred, anxiety of rank, and stupidity, united their efforts, and prevailed. Oh American people! to depend upon such inveterate blunderers!

Were McClellan in the camp, he would have no flatterers, no antechambers filled with flunkeys; but the rebels would not so easily get news of his plans as they did in the affair on Munson's Hill.

The Orleans are here. I warned the government against admitting the Count de Paris, saying that it would be a deliberate breach of good comity towards Louis Napoleon, and towards the Bonapartes, who prove to be our friends; I told that no European government would commit itself in such a manner, not even if connected by ties of blood with the Orleans. At the start, Mr. Seward heeded a little my advice, but finally he could not resist the vanity to display untimely spread-eagleism, and the Orleans are in our service. Brave boys! It is a noble, generous, high-minded, if not an altogether wise, action.

If a mind is not nobly inspired and strong, then the exercise of power makes it crotchety and dissimulative in contact with men.

To my disgust, I witness this all around me.

The American people, its institutions, the Union—all have lost their virginity, their political innocence. A revolution in the institutions, in the mode of life, in notions begun—it is going on, will grow and mature, either for good or evil. Civil war, this most terrible but most maturing passion, has put an end to the boyhood and to the youth of the American people. Whatever may be the end, one thing is sure that the substance and the form will be modified; nay, perhaps, both wholly changed. A new generation of citizens will grow and come out from this smoke of the civil war.

The Potomac closed by the rebels! Mischief and shame! Natural fruits of the dilatory war policy—Scott's fault. Months ago the navy wished to prevent it, to shell out the rebels, to keep our troops in the principal positions. Scott opposed; and still he has almost paramount influence. McClellan complains against Scott, and Lincoln and Seward flatter McClellan, but look up to Scott as to a supernatural military wisdom. Oh, poor nation!

In Europe clouds gather over Mexico. Whatever it eventually may come to, I suggested to Mr. Seward to lay aside the Monroe doctrine, not to meddle for or against Mexico, but to earnestly protest against any eventual European interference in the internal condition of the political institutions of Mexico.

Continual secondary, international complications, naturally growing out from the maritime question; so with the Dutch cheesemongers, with Spain, with England - all easily to be settled; they generate fuss and trouble, but will make no fire.

Gen. Scott's partisans complain that McClellan is very disrespectful in his dealings with Gen. Scott. I wonder not.. McClellan is probably hampered by the narrow routine notions of Scott. McClellan feels that Scott prevents energetic and prompt action; that he, McClellan, in every step is obliged to fight Gen. Scott's inertia; and McClellan grows impatient, and shows it to Scott.

SOURCE: Adam Gurowski, Diary from March 4, 1861, to November 12, 1862, pp. 92-103

George B. McClellan to William T. Sherman, October 23, 1859

Illinois Central Railroad Company,

Vice President's Office, Chicago, Oct. 23, 1859.

My DEAR SIR: I regret exceedingly that I have so long delayed replying to yours of the 30th, ult. I hope this will reach you at Baton Rouge in time to serve your purposes, and must beg you to consider my rather multifarious duties as my excuse for the delay; in truth I was desirous of taking some little pains with my reply, and it has been difficult for me to find the time.

I think with you that the blue frock coat, and felt hat with a feather, with perhaps the Austrian undress cap, will be the most appropriate uniform, the grey coatee is rather behind the age.

If the academy is in the Pine Barrens, it would seem that the period from September 1 to June 20, with the two examinations you speak of, would answer every purpose. It would be almost impossible to have an encampment, I should suppose, yet you might in a very few days teach them how to pitch tents, and the more important parts of camp duty, such as guard duty, construction of field kitchens and ovens, huts for pioneers, etc.

You will find in Captain Marcy's new book The Prairie Traveller a great deal of invaluable information in reference to camps, taking care of animals, etc., on the prairies. I think you would find it worth while, if not to make it a text book, to require or advise to students to procure copies. It is a book they will read with great interest and profit — it fills a vacuum of no little importance.

I think I have at home the plates belonging to the French “Instruction pour l'enseignement de la Gymnastique.” This will give you all the information you need as to the appliances required for a gymnasium. The title is Instruction pour l'enseignement de la Gymnastique dans les corps de troupes et les etablissements militaire (Paris, I. Dumaine).

If my copy is lost I would advise you to import it. There is also a very good little work published by Dumaine, called Extrait de I'Instruction pour l'enseignement de la Gymnastique, etc., par le Capitaine C. d'Argy.

In addition to the regular instruction in the infantry and artillery manuals, I would by all means have daily practice in the gymnasium, or fencing with the foil and bayonet, and the same exercise at least half an hour a day ought to be devoted to this.

With regard to the course of instruction necessary to lay the foundation for a thorough knowledge of engineering, I do not think that the general course at West Point can be materially improved upon. We have all felt the want of practical instruction on certain points when we left West Point — e.g. in the actual use of instruments, both surveying and astronomical, topography and field sketches, railway engineering, etc. — but it is impossible to do everything in a limited time, and I would suggest that you follow in the main the West Point course, retrenching a little from some of the higher branches and adding a little to the practical instruction.

I know of no complete work on the construction of railways, it is thus far essentially a practical business. Collum and Holley's work on European Railways contains some valuable information. Lardner on the Steam Engine, Parbour on the Locomotive and Steam Engine, Collum on the Locomotive are all useful. Borden's Formula for the Location and Construction of Railroads, Haupt on Bridge construction, Moseley's Mechanical Engineering, Edwin Clarke on the Brittania and Conway Tubular Bridges, Arolis series of Rudimentary treatise on Engineering, etc., are all of value.

I regret that I am rather pushed for time tonight, as I would have liked to write more fully, but I start for St. Paul in the morning and must do the best I can in a limited time. If I can give you any further information it will afford me great pleasure to do so at any time. With my best wishes for your success in Louisiana,

I am very truly yours,

Geo. B. McCLELLAN.

SOURCE: Walter L. Fleming, Editor, General W.T. Sherman as College President, p. 40-2

Diary of John Hay: September 9, 1863

Dined with Wise.  Met Hooker, Butterfield and Fox. Hooker was in fine flow. Before dinner we talked about Halleck and his connection with Hooker’s resignation. He says he was forced to ask to be relieved by repeated acts which proved that he was not to be allowed to manage his army as he thought best, but that it was to be manoeuvred from Washington. He instanced Maryland Heights, whose garrison he was forbidden to touch, yet which was ordered to be evacuated by the very mail which brought his (H 's) relief. And other such many.”

At dinner he spoke of our army. He says: “It was the finest on the planet. He would like to see it fighting with foreigners. It gave him an electric feeling to be with it. It was far superior to the Southern army in everything but one. It had more valor, more strength, more endurance, more spirit; the rebels are only superior in vigor of attack. The reason of this is that, in the first place our army came down here capable of everything but ignorant of everything. It fell into evil hands — the hands of a baby, who knew something of drill, little of organisation, and nothing of the morale of the army. It was fashioned by the congenial spirit of this man into a mass of languid inertness destitute of either dash or cohesion. The Prince de Joinville, by far the finest mind I have ever met with in the army, was struck by this singular, and as he said, inexplicable contrast between the character of American soldiers as integers and in mass. The one active, independent, alert, enterprising; the other indolent, easy, wasteful and slothful. It is not in the least singular. You find a ready explanation in the character of its original General. Stoneman is an instance of the cankerous influence of that staff. I sent him out to destroy the bridges behind Lee . He rode 150 miles and came back without seeing the bridges he should have destroyed. He took with him 4,000 men; he returned with 4,500. His purposeless ride had all the result of a defeat. He claimed to have brought in an enormous train of negroes and other cattle. He brought 30 contrabands and not a man or a mule. He is a brave, good man, but he is spoiled by McClellan.

“After the battle of Malvern and after the battle of Fair Oaks we could have marched into Richmond without serious resistance, yet the constitutional apathy of this man prevented.”

Says Butterfield: — “On the night of the battle of Malvern I saw the red lights of Meyer's signal officer, blazing near me, and I went to him to gain information. He told me he had just received a despatch from Gen'l McClellan asking where was Gen'l F. J. Porter, he wanted news. I volunteered a despatch: — ‘We have won a glorious victory, and if we push on and seize our advantage, Richmond is ours.’ The day of Gaines' Mills, I had taken my position when Porter ordered me out of it into a hollow where I was compelled to assume a strictly defensive position. I once or twice terribly repulsed the enemy, but my orders peremptorily forbade pursuit. I had to keep up the spirits of the men by starting the rumor that McClellan was in Richmond. I am sure I thought he would be there that day. In the night, going to Gen'l McClellan's head-quarters, he asked me what about our Corps. I told him that with a few strong divisions we could attack and drive the enemy. He said he hadn't a man for us.”

[Fox] said that the night before the evacuation of Yorktown he staid in McClellan's tent. McC. said he expected to bag 78,000 of them. “You won't bag one,” replied Tucker. And he didn't.

Hooker says:— “Marcy sometimes sent important orders which McClellan never saw. On one occasion when I had advanced my pickets very near Richmond I received an order through Heintzelman, — “Let Gen^l Hooker return from his brilliant reconnoissance. We cannot afford to lose his division.” I did not see how my division could be lost, as in that country there was no cutting me off. I started back, however, and soon met McClellan himself who asked me what it meant, my withdrawal. I showed him his own order. He said he had never seen it, and I ordered my men back. I returned over the swamp, and held my position for weeks afterwards.”

Hooker and Butterfield both agree as to the terrible defeat the rebels suffered at Malvern and the inefficiency which suffered them to escape without injury. They say there was a Corps, fresh and unharmed, which might have pursued the rebels and entered Richmond in triumph (Franklin’s).

. . . . Hooker drank very little, not more than the rest, who were all abstemious, yet what little he drank made his cheek hot and red, and his eye brighter. I can easily understand how the stories of his drunkenness have grown, if so little affects him as I have seen. He was looking very well to-night. A tall and statuesque form— grand fighting head and grizzled russet hair— red-florid cheeks and bright blue eye, forming a fine contrast with Butterfield, who sat opposite. A small, stout, compact man, with a closely chiselled Greek face and heavy black moustaches, like Eugene Beauharnais. Both very handsome and very different. . . .

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 95-9; For the whole diary entry see Tyler Dennett, Editor, Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and letters of John Hay, p. 84-6.

Major-General John A. Dix to Colonel Randolph B. Marcy, October 21, 1861

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Baltimore, Md., October 21, 1861.

Col. R. B. MARCY, Inspector-General, Army of the Potomac:

COLONEL: It has occurred to me that it might be interesting to you to know the system adopted in Baltimore to secure the inhabitants from annoyance by the bad conduct of our soldiers and to keep our men within their encampments.

A few days after I took command, the latter part of July, some 300 of our men had escaped from their regiments, and were disgracing the service by their drunkenness and disorderly conduct in the city, where most of them were secreted. I immediately issued an order to the police to arrest all soldiers found in Baltimore without passes signed by the captains of the companies and the colonels of the regiments to which they belonged, and I adopted very stringent rules in regard to permits to soldiers to leave their camps. In about ten days the absentees were all hunted up in the streets and in their hiding places and brought back to their regiments. Since that time there has been no repetition of these disorderly scenes. All soldiers arrested in the city are taken to the exterior stations of the police, and guards are sent for them every morning and evening. During the month of September, of about 7,000 men in and around the city, only 140 were taken in custody by the police, and of this number 59 belonged to the Second Regiment Maryland Volunteers, which was recruited in Baltimore.

The city has never been so free from disorder, disturbance, and crime as it has been during the last sixty days, and during the whole time not a single soldier has been employed in aid of the police. Much is no doubt due to the presence of a military force, and it is due to the regiments under my command to say that the orderly conduct both of officers and men has produced an improved feeling among large numbers of citizens who have been exceedingly hostile to the Government. I may say this most emphatically of the Sixth Regiment Michigan Volunteers and the eighth ward, the most disloyal in the city, within which the regiment is stationed, at the McKim mansion.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN A. DIX,

Major-General, Commanding.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 5 (Serial No. 5), p. 623-4; Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 33-4

Randolph B. Marcy to Brigadier General George G. Meade, September 17, 1862 – 3:10 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

September 17, 1862 – 3.10 [p.m.].

General MEADE:

GENERAL: The commanding general directs that you at once take command of the army corps which was under the command of General Hooker this morning. This order is given without regard to rank, and all officers of the corps will obey your orders. The commanding general also directs me to say that you will be held responsible for this command as herein assigned to you.

Very respectfully,

R. B. MARCY,

Chief of Staff.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 19, Part 2 (Serial No. 28), p. 315

Diary of Edward Bates, December 31, 1861 – First Entry

Ever since last date, the weather has been mild and beautiful. . . .

I do wonder at the slowness of our military movements. Byrnside's expedition has not yet sailed.⁵⁷ He says he is ready, he says he is ready and yet he does not go — And the Naval men say that they are ready, and yet they do not go—

And just so with Butler's expedition⁵⁸ — It does not go. Meanwhile, all this charming weather is lost, and I fear that, at last, they will start just in time to catch the storms of winter.

I hear that a Reg[imen]t. of Caval[r]y has been sent to Sherman, in S. Carolina.⁵⁹

[Marginal Note.] Jan.y. 4 [1862]. I hear today, that Gen Sherman has taken a point on the Charleston and Savanna[h] R. R. near to Charleston[.]

We are expecting daily important news from the West. A great battle is imminent, near Bowling Green K.y. between the insurgents under A. S. Johns[t]on⁶⁰ and Buckner⁶¹ and our army under Buell.⁶² If Halleck⁶³ can only cooperate, and simultaneously, move upon Columbus, we may [stand] to win advantages decisive of the war. But I fear that their arrangements are not as perfect as they ought to be.

There is an evident lack of system and concentrated intelligence — Of course, I did not expect exact system and method in so large an army raised so suddenly, but surely, many of the deficiencies ought before now, to have been corrected.

For months past (and lately more pressingly) I have urged upon the President to have some military organization about his own person — appoint suitable aid[e]s — 2 — 3 — or 4 — to write and carry his orders, to collect information, to keep the needful papers and records always at hand, and to do his bidding generally, in all Military and Naval affairs. I insisted that, being “Commander in chief” by law, he must command — especially in such a war as this. The Nation

requires it, and History will hold him responsible.

In this connexion, it is lementable [sic] that Gen McClellan — the General in chief, so called — is, and for some time has been incapacitated by a severe spell of illness (and Genl. Marcy,⁶⁴ his chief of Staff — and father in law, is sick also[)]. It now appears that the Genl. in chief has been very reticent — kept his plans absolutely to himself, so that the strange and dangerous fact exists, that the Sec of War and the Prest. are ignorant of the condition of the army and its intended operations!

I see no reason for having a Genl. in chief at all. It was well enough to call the veteran Lieut. Genl. Scott so, when we had no enemies in the [sic] in the field, and no army but a little nucleus

of 15.000 men. But now that we have several mighty armies and active operations spreading over half a continent, there seems to me no good sense in confiding to one general the command of the whole; and especially, as we have no general who has any experience in the handling of large armies — not one of them ever commanded 10.000 under fire, or has any personal knowledge of the complicated movements of a great army.

If I were President, I would command in chief — not in detail, certainly — and I would know what army I had, and what the high generals (my Lieutenants) were doing with that army.⁶⁵

As to the Slidell and Mason affair, see my notes, elsewhere, at large.⁶⁶

__________

⁵⁷ See supra, Nov. 29, 1861.

⁵⁸ See loc. cit.

⁵⁹ See supra, Nov. 13, 1861.

⁶⁰ Albert S. Johnston, West Point graduate of 1826 who had served in the U. S. Army, 1826-1834, in the Texas Army, 1836-1837, in the Mexican War, and again in the U. S. Army from 1849 until he resigned when Texas seceded. He served with distinction in high command in the Confederate Army until he was killed in battle on April 6, 1862. At this time he was commanding in Kentucky.

⁶¹ Simon B. Buckner of Kentucky, West Point graduate of 1844, had served in the Army in Mexico and on the frontier, but had resigned in 1855. He had organized an effective Kentucky militia in 1860-1S61 and commanded Kentucky's troops during the period of her neutrality. He tried to keep both Confederate and Union forces out of Kentucky, but when this failed he threw in his lot with the Confederates, became a brigadier-general, and at this time was fighting under Johnston.

⁶² Don Carlos Buell of Indiana: West Point graduate of 1841 who had served in Mexico; officer in the Army, 1841-1861; brigadier-general of volunteers in 1861. He had been sent by McClellan to command the Army of the Ohio and to organize the Union forces in Kentucky. He marched on Bowling Green on February 6, 1862, and drove the Confederates temporarily back into Tennessee.

⁶³ Supra, Nov. 13, 1861, note 37.

⁶⁴ Randolph B. Marcy, West Point graduate of 1832 who had served In Mexico, on the frontier, and in Florida. He was McClellan's chief-of-staff until McClellan was displaced and then he was sent to the West on inspection duty.

⁶⁵ For an interesting study of this problem of the assumption of supreme military command by Lincoln see Sir Frederick Maurice's Robert E. Lee, the Soldier, 73-75, 223-224, and his Statesmen and Soldiers of the Civil War, 59-117.

⁶⁶ Supra, Nov. 16, Nov. 27, Dec. 25, 1861.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, The Diary of Edward Bates, published in The Annual Report Of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930 Volume 4, p. 217-9

Diary of Edward Bates, December 31, 1861 – Second Entry

Since last date the weather has been and is remarkably fine. Mr. Eads⁶⁷ has been here, bringing his wife, Miss Genevieve and little Mattie — He has returned, by way of N.[ew] Y.[ork] to St Louis (leaving Genevieve with us, untill [sic] his return again in a few weeks)[.] He was sadly disappointed about gitting [sic] money, and went away in no good humor with Q.[uarter] M.[aster] G[eneral] Meigs.⁶⁸ I hope it will be all right soon.

I think he has made a very favorable impression upon the Navy Dept, especially with Mr. Fox,⁶⁹ asst. Sect: He will probably contract for the building of 4 of the 20 iron ships ordered for the Navy, at $500,000 a piece — perhaps a little more.⁷⁰

Mr. Gibson⁷¹ shewed me to day a letter from Gov Gamble⁷² in very low spirits — Genl Halleck⁷³ rules out the malitia [sic]. The goods sent from here—those clothes and blanketts [sic] —expressly for Gambles malitia [sic] are taken and transfer[r]ed to other troops, this is too bad.

< [Note.] Jany 3 Mr. Gibson read me another letter from Gov Gamble in much better spirits. He thinks, in the main that Halleck is doing very well[.>]

Genl McClellan and his chief of staff, Genl Marcey [sic], are both very sick — Said to be typhoid fever — and this is making much difficulty.

The Genl: it seems, is very reticent. Nobody knows his plans. The Sec of war and the President himself are kept in ignorance of the actual condition of the army and the intended movements of the General — if indeed they intend to move at all — In fact the whole administration is lamentably deficient in the lack of unity and coaction[.] There is no quarrell [sic] among us, but an absalute [sic] want of community of intelligence, purpose and action.

In truth, it is not an administration but the separate and disjointed action of seven independent officers, each one ignorant of what his colle[a]gues are doing.

To day in council, Mr. Chase stated the condition of things in sorrowful plainness; and then, as usual, we had a “bald, disjointed chat” about it, coming to no conclusion.

It seemed as if all military operations were to stop, just because Genl McClellan is sick! Some proposed that there should be a council of war composed of Maj: Genls, in order that somebody besides the Genl in chief, may know something about the army; and be able to take command in case Genl McC[lellan] should die or continue sick.

I differed, and told the President that he was commander in chief, and that it was not his privilege but his duty to command; and that implied the necessity to know the true condition of things.

That if I was in his place, I would know; and if things were not done to my liking, I would order them otherwise. That I believed he could get along easier and much better by the free use of his power, than by this injurious deference to his subordinates [.]

I said, the Sec of War is but the Adjutant Genl. and the Sec of the Navy the Admiral of the commander in chief, and through them, he ought to know all that is necessary to be known about the army and Navy. And I urged upon him (as often heretofore) the propriety of detailing at least two active and skillful officers to act as his aid[e]s, to write and carry his orders, collect his information, keep his military books and papers, and do his bidding generally in military affairs.

But I fear that I spoke in vain. The Prest. is an excellent man, and, in the main wise; but he lacks will and purpose, and, I greatly fear he, has not the power to command.

__________

⁶⁷ Supra, Jan. 28, 1860, note 38.

⁶⁸ Montgomery C. Meigs : West Point graduate of 1836 ; officer in the Artillery and Engineering Corps ever since; commander of the expedition to Fort Pickens which had saved that fort; quartermaster-general with the rank of brigadier-general, 1861-1882.

⁶⁹ Supra, March 9, 1861, note 40.

⁷⁰ He did actually contract for seven armor-plated gunboats of 600 tons each to be finished in sixty-five days. He and Mr. Bates had suggested these gunboats for the Mississippi, and, before the War ended, he had built fourteen armored gunboats, seven “tin-clad” transports, and four heavy mortar boats, and had added several new ordnance Inventions of his own to them.

⁷¹ Supra, April 27, 1859, note 27.

⁷² Supra, July 23, 1859, note 39.

⁷³ Supra, Nov. 13, 1861, note 37.

SOURCE: Howard K. Beale, Editor, The Diary of Edward Bates, published in The Annual Report Of The American Historical Association For The Year 1930 Volume 4, p. 219-20

From New York

NEW YORK, May 9.

Gen. Marcy telegraphs the following:

WILLIAMSBURG, May 8.

Gen. McClellan, on the 6th inst., had a most decisive victory.  Only about 30,000 of our troops were engaged against 50,000 of the best rebel troops.  Our men fought most valiantly, and used  the bayonet freely which the rebels couldn’t stand.  They fought well until they felt the cold steel, when they took to their heels and ran like hounds, leaving their dead, wounded and sick upon our hands.  Joe Johnson [sic] lead them in person.  They have lost several of their best officers.

The Herald’s correspondence gives the following graphic account of the magnificent charge of Hancock’s brigade on the rebels:  “Scarcely a hundred yards were between the rebels and the guns, when our skirmish fire became silent.  The lines of the 5th Wisconsin and the 3d New York formed up in close order to the right of the battery; the long range of musket barrels came to one level, and one terrible volley tore through the rebel line; moment more, and the same long range of muskets came to another level, and the order to charge with the bayonet was given, and away went the two regiments with one glad cheer.  Gallant as our foes were, they could not meet that.  But few brigades mentioned in history would have done better than this did.  For a space which was generally estimated at three quarters of a mile they advanced under fire of a splendidly served battery, and with a cloud of skirmishers stretched across their front, whose fire was very destructive, and if after that the rebels had not the nerve to meet a line of bayonets that came towards them like the spirit of destruction, it need not be wondered at when they broke and fled in complete panic.  145 were taken prisoners, and nearly 500 were killed and wounded.”

– Published in The Davenport Daily Gazette, Davenport, Iowa, Saturday Morning, May 10, 1862, p. 2