John Hay to Abraham Lincoln, April 10, 1863

[Stono] River, S. C,

April 10,1863.

MY DEAR SIR:

I went yesterday morning to Charleston Harbor to deliver to Admiral Dupont the despatches with which the Navy Department had charged me. I found the Admiral on board the “Ironsides,” which, with the rest of the Monitor fleet, was lying inside the bar, at the point where they had anchored after the engagement of Tuesday. I delivered my despatches, and, while he was reading them, I had some conversation with Capt. Rodgers, fleet captain of the [South Atlantic Blockade] Squadron. He said that although the attack had been unsuccessful and the failure would of course produce a most unhappy effect upon the country, which had so far trusted implicitly in the invincibility of the Monitors, all the officers of the Navy, without exception, united in the belief that what they had attempted was impossible, and that we had reason for congratulation that what is merely a failure had not been converted into a terrible disaster. The matter has now been fairly tried. With favoring circumstances, with good officers, with good management, the experiment has completely failed. We sailed into the harbor not sanguine of victory. We fought only about forty minutes, and the unanimous conclusion of the officers of the Navy is that an hour of that fire would have destroyed us. We had reached and touched the obstructions. To have remained there long enough to have removed them would have ensured the destruction of some of the vessels. If the others had gone by the fort they would still have been the target of the encircling batteries. There was no sufficient land force to have taken possession of the city. There was no means of supplying them with ammunition and provision, for no wooden ship could live ten minutes in that fire. The only issue would have been the capture of the surviving and the raising of the sunken vessels. This would have lost us the command of the coast, an irremediable disaster. So the Admiral took the responsibility of avoiding the greater evil by saving the fleet, and abandoning an enterprise which we think has been fairly proved impossible.

The Admiral, who. had been listening and assenting to the latter portion of what Rodgers had been saying, added: — “And as if we were to have a visible sign that an Almighty hand was over us for our good, the orders you have given me show how vast was the importance of my preserving this fleet, whose power and prestige are still great and valuable, for the work which I agree with the President in thinking most momentous, the opening of the control of the Mississippi River. After a fight of forty minutes we had lost the use of seven guns. I might have pushed some of the vessels past Fort Sumter, but in that case we ran the enormous risk of giving them to the enemy, and thus losing the control of the coast. I could not answer for that to my conscience.”

The perfect approval of their own consciences which these officers evidently felt, did not prevent their feeling the deepest grief and sorrow for the unhappy results of the enterprise. Their whole conversation was as solemn as a scene of death. At one time I spoke of the estimation in which they were held by the government and the country, which, in my opinion, rendered it impossible that blame should be attached to them, and their eyes suddenly filled with tears. A first repulse is a terrible thing to brave and conscientious men accustomed only to victory.

I was several times struck by the identity of opinion and sentiment between Admiral Dupont and yourself. You had repeatedly uttered, during my last week in Washington, predictions which have become history.

When I left the harbor, they were preparing the torpedo raft for the destruction of the sunken Keokuk.

I have taken the liberty of writing thus at length, as I thought you should know the sentiments of these experienced officers in regard to this unfortunate matter. I hope, however, the news may be received that due honor may be given to those who fought with such bravery and discretion the losing fight.

Yours very respectfully,

[JOHN HAY.]

SOURCES: Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 75-8; Michael Burlingame, Editor, At Lincoln’s Side: John Hay’s Civil War Correspondence and Selected Writings, p. 34-6 where the entire letter appears.

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, December 24, 1862

Congress has adjourned over until the 5th of January. It is as well, perhaps, though I should not have advised it. But the few real business men, of honest intentions, will dispatch matters about as well and fast without as with them. The demagogues in Congress disgrace the body and the country. Noisy and loud professions, with no useful policy or end, exhibit themselves daily.

Most of the Members will go home. Dixon says the feeling North is strong and emphatic against Stanton, and that the intrigue against Seward was to cover and shield Stanton. Others say the same. Doolittle, though less full and explicit, has this opinion. Fox tells me that Grimes declares his object was an onslaught on Stanton. If so, it was a strange method. Grimes went over the whole debate in caucus with F.; said he believed opposition manifested itself in some degree towards every member of the Cabinet but myself; that towards one or two only slight exhibitions of dislike appeared, and most were well sustained. All who spoke were complimentary of me and the naval management, but Hale, while he uttered no complaint, was greatly annoyed with the compliments of myself and the quiet but efficient conduct of the Navy.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 1: 1861 – March 30, 1864, p. 206

Gideon Welles to William H. Aspenwall & John M. Forbes, March 16, 1863

New York, March 16,1863.

Mem^o. Instructions from the Navy Department to Messrs. W. H. Aspinwall and J. M. Forbes.

You will receive credits from the Treasury Department, which will enable you to use for the purposes of these orders £1,000,000 sterling. This, or any part of it, you will use at your discretion, to buy any vessels, or a majority interest therein, built or building in England or elsewhere, for war purposes. Your first object will be to secure such vessels as are most likely to be used by the insurgents and to be most dangerous in their hands. Your next object will be to get such as will be most useful to us, whenever it becomes possible and expedient to get them to some home port or friendly port where we can get possession of them. If in your opinion clearly expedient, you may send such vessels to such points, but you will endeavor to avoid establishing a precedent that may embarrass our minister when urging the British government to stop the sailing of vessels belonging to the rebels.

You will note that there may be vessels building, which, without being perfectly adapted to war purposes, are still so fast and have such capacity for a moderate armament, that they threaten to become dangerous to our commerce. In such cases, you must use your best judgment as to purchasing any of them. It may in some cases be expedient to secure a majority interest or a lien upon vessels instead of buying the whole, provided you feel sure that you can thus prevent their being fitted out by the rebels.

You may also be obliged to hold your title to all the vessels by a lien. Our main object is to prevent the rebels using these vessels, rather than the expectation of getting much valuable service from the vessels at present.

You will use your discretion as to how long you will pursue this experiment, and will relinquish it whenever you think no further good likely to come of it, or when directed by the Navy Department.

You will have letters of introduction to the consuls at Liverpool and London, and will get every information from them, but will finally use your own judgment upon the merits of each case.

Gideon Welles, Secretary.

J. M. F.

W. H. A.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 2, p. 5-7

Gustavus V. Fox to John M. Forbes, December 19, 1862

Navy Department, December 19, 1862.

Dear Sir, — I have yours of 17th inst. I fancy there can be no ironclads for the rebels put into the water before May. But they require strict watching and ample measures to guard against their coming over here. Mr. Seward is of the opinion that the English government are very anxious for us to come into their market for the purchase of vessels, that we may be put upon an equal footing with the South. The reclamations in the matter of the Alabama have disturbed them very much. With this view of the matter, Mr. Welles rather inclines to some doubt about making any purchases. I think you and Mr. Upton better come on after the holidays; it would be good to discuss that and other matters.

When a superintending Providence deprives us of all means of recruiting our armies, I believe we will call upon those who, at least, will, by their desertion, paralyze the rebels. The President remarked to me the other night that he was very anxious to have us take Sumter, and that he would man it with negroes. When the Nahant leaves, we shall have the number of ironclads fixed upon as the least number to go into Charleston. That vessel will not probably leave before the first of January.

There is a good deal of depression felt at the repulse at Fredericksburg, and the President is exceedingly disturbed; but it seems to me that, looking over the whole ground, the movements contemplated West, and the probability of getting possession of the remaining ports South, we should hardly deserve success if we allowed our faith to waver now. It is a matter of regret, however, that the whole military force of the country is not used to expel the enemy from Virginia.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 1, p. 342-3