Showing posts with label George W Getty. Show all posts
Showing posts with label George W Getty. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 26, 2017

Diary of 1st Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Monday, September 19, 1864 – Part 11

The following pertaining to Sheridan's battle of Winchester has been discovered since writing the foregoing. It will be answered in detail. Says Col. Aldace F. Walker in his “History of the Vermont Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, 1864,” pp. 91-100:

“Our movement commenced at 3 o'clock Monday morning, September 19th, Getty's Division having the advance, the Vermont Brigade being the last in the Division. Striking directly across the country, at first in the darkness, we presently reached the main road from Berryville to Winchester, and moved down it to the crossing of the Opequan. This stream is considerably below the level of the adjoining country, and the road on its further side keeps the low level of the stream for a mile or more, winding through a long, tortuous wooded ravine, our unobstructed passage whereof was for the time a mystery. It seems that Wilson's Division of cavalry had already cleared the way and was then holding desperately a position that it had gained with considerable loss, but which proved a most admirable one in which to deploy our line of battle.

“As we filed out of the ravine which toward the last was lined with wounded cavalrymen, we found Sheridan, his headquarters fixed on a conspicuous elevation, personally superintending from the commencement the operations of the day. It was to be our first battle under his command, as well as his first independent battle; the troops were hitherto destitute of all enthusiasm for him; fortunately, however, no impression save a favorable one had as yet been received, it being universally conceded that he had so far handled his army handsomely. And it was with great satisfaction that we found him in this early twilight at the very front, and under the fire of the enemy, carefully attending to details which we had been accustomed to see more celebrated commanders entrust to their staff.

“Our Division promptly relieved the cavalry and formed its line facing west, the Third Brigade which was in advance going to what was to be the extreme left of the infantry line, resting on Abraham Creek; the First Brigade following, took up its position on the right of the Third, and our own Brigade filled the remaining distance between the First and the road on which we had reached the battlefield. It had been intended to place us in two lines, but the unexpected extent of the ground we had to cover forbade that formation. We were just on the hither edge of a narrow fringe of wood that concealed us from the enemy; the Sixth Vermont was thrown forward as a skirmish line perhaps one hundred yards to the further side of the little forest, and at once engaged the enemy's skirmishers.”

About three regiments, I believe, of the First Brigade, Third Division, Sixth Corps, were to the left or south of the road, so the Vermont Brigade didn't reach to the pike.

“Near us in the road at our right was a rebel field work, taken by Wilson in the night. The hill on which it was situated commanded the country in both directions, and it was already occupied by a battery engaged in feeling the enemy, which was answered vigorously, many of the rebel shell plunging over into the troops as they successively came up the road.

“Our Division thus formed in a single line was the only Division on the south or left of the road. The Third Division, Ricketts’, followed us and prolonged the line across and on the north of the road, placing its two Brigades in two lines. The First Division, Russell's, came next, and was drawn up behind the Third as a third line or reserve, also somewhat overlapping the right of our Brigade.”

About three regiments or more of the Third Division, Sixth Corps, I believe, were south of the road, on the right of the Second Division. When General Russell's Division charged it was about two hundred yards to the right of the Tenth Vermont, or about seven hundred yards or more to the right of Col. Walker's brigade.

“Then to our surprise no more troops appeared, and our Corps was alone confronting the enemy. There were two or three anxious hours, but Early was engaged in hurrying up his detachment from Bunker Hill, which this delay gave him ample time to do, and made no assault. It was said that the Nineteenth Corps, being ordered to follow the Sixth, had filed into the road behind our wagon train, instead of keeping closed up on our column. It is certain that with this loss of time, from whatever reason it occurred, we lost the opportunity of attacking the enemy in detail, and gave him time to prepare for our reception. It was noon before the Nineteenth Corps had reached its place and was formed in three or four lines on the right of the Sixth.”

The Nineteenth Corps was formed in two lines on the right of the Sixth.

“Our men during the forenoon had been resting, sitting or lying on the ground. When at last the disposition was completed and the signal gun was fired, they sprang to the ranks, and the line advanced. Particular instructions had been received to the effect that the road was to give the direction of attack, and that the guiding regiment was to be the left regiment of the Third Division, just across the road from our right.”

The guiding regiments were the Tenth Vermont and Fourteenth New Jersey, on the right of the First Brigade, about the center of the Third Division.

“In passing through the bit of trees in our front, which was filled with underbrush, our line was necessarily thrown somewhat into confusion. When we emerged from the wood and the ground over which we must make our attack was developed, the prospect was appalling. The hill gradually sloped away before us, for a quarter of a mile, to a long ravine, irregular in its course, but its windings extending either way as far as we could see. The ascent beyond it was in most places sharp, and the enemy held its crest in force, perfectly commanding with musketry and artillery the long slope down which we must pass, though the acclivity on the further side of the hollow was so steep as to actually present a cover from their fire—if it could once be reached.

“When this fearful prospect opened the line involuntarily halted, and the men threw themselves on the ground as was their wont when under fire. Our own Brigade was properly waiting for the movement of the guiding regiment which lay across the road a little to our rear, and which could not be prevailed upon to stir. To add to the peril of the situation, the road, instead of continuing straight on, as seems to have been expected, here made a bend to the left so that our original orders could not be obeyed without an amount of obliquing that would have resulted in demoralization; from this cause our own Brigade was soon afterwards thrown into temporary confusion, and the Third Division was presently so disorganized as to be unable to resist a counter-charge made against it by the enemy.”

The whole line in front of the enemy's infantry in the ravine in front of the Third Division halted after through the narrow belt of timber behind which we had formed, as the trees, brush and terrible shelling had broken the lines and the advanced men where I was laid down to avoid the storm of shells which filled the air till the men got together, which they soon largely did. It was here found the Second Brigade on my right had excusably gone to pieces, the ground in its front being untenable, which caused some delay; but soon we advanced alone without that Brigade, as did the Nineteenth Corps. This was why the Tenth Vermont or guiding regiment, at this time where I was, didn't move forward sooner. The bend to the left in the road is largely a myth. The line of battle wasn't formed at right angles with it which, as the line advanced led to some confusion, as our colors had to be kept on the pike. There was no counter charge in front of where I was in the Tenth Vermont or disorganization, except in the Second Brigade, but what was soon remedied. The enemy could do more effective work by remaining in cover with little loss, which it did.

“At length the commander of the Brigade at our right crossed to our side of the road and urged us to set his men the example. Col. Warner took the responsibility, brought the Brigade to its feet, corrected the alignment, and gave the command to advance, which was promptly obeyed. The Third Division followed and the line was again in motion. But our point of direction was lost, for we were in advance of our guides, and when it was seen that owing to a curve in the ravine before us the cover on its further side could be reached much sooner by obliquing sharply to the left, we took that direction almost by common consent, and left the road-side.”

Why shouldn't Col. Warner with virtually no enemy in his immediate front be able to set an example of advancing his line when the Third Division was up against the real thing, it being confronted with overwhelming numbers of the enemy's infantry in the ravine and artillery back of it in our immediate front pretty much all that confronted the army in that midday assault? The situation in front of our lines is fully explained in this work elsewhere, and an alleged “bend” in the road or a “curve” in the ravine will not suffice to excuse the troops on our immediate left for not at once helping to flank the enemy's infantry from in front of us in the ravine, at once when on high ground across the ravine instead of running off on the field on a comparatively useless easy task and then have to come back. Where was there any infantry of any amount except in the ravine in front of the Third Division? Why not give the Third Division its due? The killed and wounded tell the story. Didn't our Division have about as many killed and wounded as both the First and Second Divisions together, although smaller than either? No fair-minded soldier or person can study the illustrations even, in this work, and fail to see the facts.

“Our whole Brigade, every man at the top of his speed, making for the coveted protection of the hill beyond us, plunged pell mell into the hollow. The troops at our right and left were lost sight of. The ravine was of some considerable width and its bottom was marshy, being the head waters of a little branch of Abraham Creek. The steep slope on its further side was covered with evergreens six or eight feet high. To our intense consternation, as we reached its swampy bottom, we saw at our right, at short pistol range, at least a full regiment of the enemy drawn up in line near the point where the road crosses the hollow, in anticipation of our taking precisely the course we did, and firing coolly, as rapidly as they could load, directly along our line, thus enfilading us completely. Its position is indicated on the plan. The slaughter was for a few moments murderous. We could not retreat, for we should again enter the fire that had been mowing us down in the charge, now cut off by the hill before us. We therefore floundered on, our coherence entirely lost, entered the clusters of evergreens through which the cruel bullets whistled fearfully, and at last, a confused mass at best, those of us who escaped unhurt reached comparative safety under the very crest of the hill, and high above the deadly hollow.”

The probabilities are that old soldier-like seeing or suspecting the true situation, the men intuitively or purposely obliqued away to an easier place of attack; at any rate they did it. Yes, the rebel regiment which was seen in the ravine was in front of the left of our brigade, but crossed to the north side of the pike to my front early in the fight leaving no rebel force in the ravine south of the pike in front of the Second Division on the left of ours.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 180-6

Sunday, March 13, 2016

Major-General John A. Dix to A. R. Admiral Samuel P. Lee, July 7, 1863

Confidential.

Head-quarters, Department of Virginia, Seventh Army Corps,
White House, Va., July 7,1863.

A. R. Admiral S. P. Lee,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron:

Admiral, — I have just received your confidential letter of the 6th instant. I have been under orders for several days to send to Washington all my force, except such as is absolutely necessary to defend Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and the new line of intrenchments near Norfolk. I have sent off three regiments to-day, and am only waiting for transports to send more. General Getty returned this morning. He could not destroy the Fredericksburg Railroad bridge over the South Anna, but he destroyed some six miles of the track between the bridge and Richmond, and the depot at Ashland. General Lee's communications with Richmond are cut off by the two railroads running north from that city, so that the valley of the Shenandoah can only be reached by way of Dansville, Lynchburg, and Charlottesville.

Unless I have other orders I shall move from this place to-morrow morning with my whole force. It pains me to do so, but I cannot remain long, if authorized, without re-enforcements, as the term of seventeen of my regiments is about expiring — several of them as early as next week. I mentioned in an unofficial letter last week that I wished to see you. I intended to propose to you a joint attack on Fort Powhattan, but it is now too late, as I am to be reduced so low in my numbers as to be able merely to hold a few prominent points.

If I evacuate this position to-morrow your gun-boats will be disposable for any purpose you may have in view, as I shall withdraw the troops from West Point also.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

John A. Dix, Major-general

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 67-8

Friday, January 22, 2016

Major-General John A. Dix to Major General Henry Halleck, Received July 18, 1863

HDQRS. DEPT. OF VIRGINIA, SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
Fort Monroe, Va., July –, 1863.
(Received July 18.)

GENERAL: On the 14th of June, I received from you the following dispatch by telegraph:

Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley. All your available force should be concentrated to threaten Richmond by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible. If you cannot accomplish this, you can at least occupy a large force of the enemy. There can be no serious danger of an attack on Norfolk now.

I had at the time this dispatch was received a force of about 5,000 men moving up the Peninsula. The advance was near the left bank of the Chickahominy, above Diascund Bridge. I had also a considerable force on the Blackwater. These movements had been made to prevent the enemy from sending re-enforcements to General Lee from this department:

At the same time all the transports in the department had been ordered to Aquia Creek, to remove the sick and convalescent of the Army of the Potomac and the public property to Washington. On the 15th, I had not a single transport left. I went on the evening of the 14th to Suffolk, and ordered General Peck to have his command in readiness to move.

On the 17th, transports returned, and were sent to Norfolk to receive Wistar's brigade, which had been ordered there from Suffolk. I advised you on the 18th that part of this brigade went up the York River that morning. The transports came in very slowly, and when they were all here, they were only sufficient to move Colonel Spears regiment of cavalry from Norfolk to the White House.

From my inability to move a larger force at once, General Getty's division, Terry's and Wistar's brigades, were landed at Yorktown.

It was not until the 24th that I could send Colonel Spear with the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and about 200 men, mounted, of different regiments, under Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna. He landed at the White House on the 25th, after constructing a wharf, for which I had ordered up materials from Fort Monroe. The same evening, on the return of the transports to Yorktown, I sent General Wistar with a part of his brigade and a battery of artillery to West Point. He pulled down two small buildings, built a wharf, and landed during the night.

On the 26th, in the evening, I reached the White House, General Getty having arrived immediately before me, and being then engaged in landing his division. Major-General Keyes, with Gordon's division and Terry's brigade, and some other troops, amounting to about 9,000 men, arrived at Cumberland on the same evening, and at the White House on the 27th.

Brigadier-General Foster's brigade arrived on the 28th, making an aggregate force at the White House for duty of 18,730.

Brigadier-General Spinola arrived two days afterward from North Carolina with 1,718 drafted Pennsylvania militia, whose term of service was about to expire, with directions that they be sent to Washington, if they would consent to serve until the insurgent forces were driven out of Pennsylvania and Maryland. They gave the requisite consent, and were embarked for Washington on the 7th July.

On the 27th June, in the morning, Colonel Spear returned from the South Anna, having destroyed the bridge of the Virginia Central Railroad over that river and the quartermaster's depot at Hanover Court-House, secured and brought away 700 animals, 35 army wagons, $15,000 in Confederate bonds, and other property, and captured Brig. Gen. W. H. F. Lee, a son Of the general-in-chief of the insurgent army. A detailed report of the movement was forwarded from the White House.

To facilitate anticipated movements at the White House, I ordered a light locomotive and half a dozen platform cars to be sent from Norfolk. They arrived on the 28th, and were landed on the 29th, and put in operation on the railroad. The railroad bridge over the Pamunkey at the White House was left uninjured, but the rails from that point to West Point had been taken up, probably to be laid down on other roads in the seceded States, where there was urgent need for them.

On Colonel Spear's return, I organized an expedition, under General Getty, to seize and destroy the bridge of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad over the South Anna. It consisted of his division, excepting a regiment retained for provost duty at the White House, General Foster's brigade, a provisional brigade (part of Wistar's), under Colonel Wardrop, of the Ninety-ninth New York Volunteers, and the cavalry under Colonel Spear; in all, about 10,000 men. His artillery and wagons were passed over the river on platform cars, the time occupied for the passage of the entire column being fifteen hours – from 5 p.m. on the 30th June to 8 a.m. on the 1st of July.

A copy of my instructions to General Getty is annexed.* I advised you of the movement on the 29th June and 1st July.

On the day General Getty commenced his march (the 1st July), I received a dispatch from you, directing me, as soon as my forces returned from their present expedition, to report before sending out any more; and, on the 3d, another, with the following directions:

As soon as the expedition now out terminates, you will draw in all your forces to Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and the defenses of Norfolk, and send to this place (Washington) all the troops not absolutely required for the defense of those places.

To cover General Getty's movement and insure its success, I ordered Major-General Keyes, with Terry's and West's brigades and one of the brigades of Gordon's division, to advance on the Richmond road, and attack the enemy, who was understood to be in considerable force on the right bank of the Chickahominy, a short distance from Bottoms Bridge. General Keyes was to post his artillery in position so as to command the bridge, and open fire on the enemy. He was also directed to hold his position for two or three days, until there was reason to believe that General Getty had accomplished his object. Major-General Keyes was chosen to command the troops by which this demonstration was to be made on account of his rank, and more especially on account of his supposed familiar acquaintance with the country, gained with the Army of the Potomac during the campaign on the Chickahominy.


GENERAL GETTY'S EXPEDITION.

General Getty moved from the left bank of the Pamunkey, opposite the White House, at 8 a.m. on the 1st July. The weather was intensely hot, and, on his arrival at Littlepage's Bridge, near the junction of the South Anna with the Pamunkey, on the 4th of July, a large number of his men were found unfit for active duty. The road from Taylor's Ferry is very narrow, and difficult for artillery and heavy wagons. It passes over high hills, and is very unfavorable to the movements of troops.

Colonel Spear, agreeably to my orders, had destroyed all the bridges and ferry-boats below Littlepage's Bridge.

The column was crossed on the evening of the 4th, and the advance was immediately made to the bridge of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad across the South Anna. It was found to be held by a very large force, covered by earthworks. From the best information, this force was believed to be about 8,000 men, with fourteen pieces of artillery. Three regiments had been brought down from Fredericksburg. From the evening of the 1st to the evening of the 4th, cars were coming from Richmond with troops inside and outside. Three trains passed up on the morning of the 4th with troops and with eight pieces of artillery. Believing that his own force would not justify an attack on the bridge, that he would sustain very heavy loss, and that success would be doubtful, he decided to destroy as much of the track as possible, and render the railroad unserviceable. General Foster was, therefore, directed to remove the rails, bend them, and burn the ties. This was accomplished from a point near the bridge to a road some 3 miles below.

Major Stratton was sent with a detachment of cavalry to Ashland Station, on the same railroad, about 11 miles from Richmond, where he destroyed the railroad depot, brought off the telegraph instrument, and tore up the track above and below the place, burning the ties and bending the rails. He also destroyed a trestle bridge a mile below Ashland, and a number of cars loaded with materials for the reconstruction of the railroad bridge over the South Anna destroyed by Colonel Spear. He also tore up the track and disabled the rails.

It is the opinion of Major Stratton, who is a very judicious man, and who was a railroad engineer before the rebellion, that the injury he did could not be repaired in less than a week, and it is the opinion of General Getty that, considering all the injuries done to the road, a fortnight will be necessary to put it in running order.

The position of General Getty on the right bank of the Pamunkey, with Richmond in his front, a large force on his right, and a narrow bridge to recross the river, was a critical one, and if he had been attacked by a superior force he would have been in great danger.

Having substantially accomplished the object of breaking up the direct railroad connection between Richmond and General Lee's army in Pennsylvania, he recrossed the Pamunkey, destroyed Littlepage's Bridge, and returned to the White House, bringing with him 21 prisoners, one a commissioned officer, and having lost 2 killed and 7 wounded. The information in regard to the strength of the enemy at the bridge is fully confirmed by the prisoners.


GENERAL KEYES' DEMONSTRATION.

General Keyes, agreeably to his orders to attack Bottom's Bridge, advanced on the 1st of July to Baltimore, or Crump's, Cross-Roads, where he halted for the night, sending his advance, under Colonel West, 3 or 4 miles farther on. Bottom's Bridge is but 13 miles from the White House, and it was expected that General Keyes would take, on the evening of the 1st, a position which should command it, and prevent the enemy from crossing. The correspondence forwarded to you on the 12th instant shows that he proposed to me the same night to fall back to the White House; that I directed him to hold his position, unless the enemy showed himself in such force as to make it necessary to fall back, and that at daybreak on the 2d he fell back to Baltimore Store, or Talley's, though no enemy had appeared, with the exception of some skirmishers on the 1st. His letter, No. 5,­** advising me of his intention, did not reach me till after daylight, when it was too late to arrest the movement.

On the afternoon of the 2d, the enemy advanced, with eight pieces of artillery and an infantry force, on Baltimore Cross-Roads, and Colonel West, who had been left there with the advance, fell back, to avoid being outflanked. The enemy's field pieces were brought within a mile of Baltimore Store, to which General Keyes had retired, and fired from 100 to 150 shots during the night, without doing any injury whatever. From information derived from Colonel West, who is an experienced officer and a man of cool judgment, the enemy's whole force could not at any time have exceeded 3,000 men. General Keyes had 6,000, and fourteen pieces of artillery.

After the night firing, which was manifestly intended for intimidation, the enemy withdrew nearly his whole force before daybreak, and there is little doubt that it was hurried back to Richmond, and sent up to the South Anna by railroad, to oppose General Getty.

From the morning of the 3d to the 7th, when General Getty returned, I am now satisfied that there was at no time more than a regiment of infantry and some small parties of cavalry between the Chickahominy and the White House.

On the correspondence between General Keyes and myself, I make no comment, but leave it to speak for itself. I desire, however, to say, that after the letter, No. 24, showing a concurrence of opinion and feeling on the part of General Keyes and his brigade commanders, I deemed it most prudent to suspend the movement, and leave his command where it was in no danger of molestation.

It is my opinion that if a prompt and vigorous attack had been made on the 1st July on Bottom's Bridge, it would have been regarded as a real movement and not a mere demonstration; that the enemy's troops would have been retained in Richmond, and that General Getty would have succeeded in destroying the railroad bridge over the South Anna. But when General Keyes fell back on the morning of the 2d without being attacked, and it became manifest that the movement was a mere feint, a large portion of the force in Richmond was sent against General Getty.

THE ENEMY'S FORCE IN RICHMOND.

On the 28th of June, the day the last of my force arrived at the White House, Jeff. Davis wrote to General Lee that there were three brigades in Richmond, and part of Hill's division, besides Wise's brigade, on the east side of the city. These different corps could not well have numbered less than 12,000 men. There were, in addition, a body of trained artillerists in the intrenchments, which are very strong; the Home Guard, embracing all males capable of bearing arms, a convalescent brigade, and the Home Guard called in from Petersburg. My information, corroborated from a variety of sources, is, that there were in Richmond on the 1st July not less than 20,000 persons under arms, a majority of whom were regularly organized and trained troops.

On the 2d July, Mr. Ould declared 1,800 paroled prisoners of war at Richmond exchanged, and they were no doubt immediately put in service there. My information that there were about 8,000 men at the South Anna, prepared for General Getty's attack, is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the letter of Jefferson Davis and corroborating intelligence from other sources.

In review, I beg leave to say that the objects in contemplation of your order of the 14th June were substantially accomplished; that the railroad connection between General Lee and Richmond was effectually broken; that a large force of the enemy was occupied, and that very severe injury was inflicted on him.

My position at the White House was one from which the enemy could have been greatly annoyed had the public necessities elsewhere allowed me to retain it. The time required to pass General Getty's column across the river led me to plank over the railroad for the passage of supply trains and artillery, and by means of this facility the whole country could have been controlled from the Pamunkey to the Rappahannock, either by holding the bridge and operating from the White House, or by crossing my whole force, destroying the bridge, making West Point the base of my movement, and avoiding the long and circuitous navigation of the Pamunkey below the White House. With the aid of a pontoon bridge, the Pamunkey can be crossed at New Castle Ferry or Hanovertown, each about 15 or 16 miles from Richmond, 8 or 9 miles nearer than the White House.

I inclose herewith the reports of Major-General Keyes and Brigadier-General Getty, giving a detailed account of their movements.

The loss of General Keyes was 25 killed, wounded, and missing, and of General Getty, 2 killed and 7 wounded.

I desire to acknowledge the zeal and promptitude of the officers and men under my command in the performance of all their duties.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.
 General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
_______________

* See Addenda to Getty’s report, p. 840.
** See p. 826.
See p. 832.

SOURCES: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 57; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 820-4

Wednesday, January 13, 2016

Major-General John A. Dix to Major General Henry W. Halleck, April 19, 1863

FORT MONROE, VA., April 19, 1863.

I deem it due to the forces at Suffolk to notice briefly their gallant conduct during the last six days. On Tuesday General Peck's right was attacked and the enemy's advance was gallantly met by Colonel Foster's light troops, driving him back to the line of his pickets; Anderson's division was engaged at the same time on the water front with our gunboats and batteries, and suffered materially. On Wednesday a rebel battery of 20-pounder rifled guns was effectually silenced, and an attack on the Smith Briggs, an armed quartermaster's boat, was repulsed. Repeated attempts have been made on our lines but have all been foiled. The storming of the enemy's battery near the West Branch of the Nansemond by General Getty and the gunboats under Lieutenant Lamson of the Navy, and the capture of six guns and 200 prisoners closes the operations of the six days against the enemy's large force very satisfactory.

 JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

SOURCES: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 56; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 18 (Serial No. 26), p. 268

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, December 13, 1864

December 13, 1864

As the Rebels have known the fact for some time, and as the newspapers have hinted at it in unmistakable terms, I conceive there is no impropriety in my saying that we have now with us the 6th Corps once again. A week ago Sunday night the first division came from City Point on the cars, having come straight from the neighborhood of Winchester by car and boat. The next morning we were treated to the sight of the familiar red crosses, and soon General Wheaton rode up, to see the General and report. . . . Very loath were the Sixth Corps bucks to leave the valley (where they had plenty of sheep and chickens and victories, and no fighting except in the regular battles), and come to a place with which they only connected more or less fighting, day and night (rather more than less), much dust, heat, and drought, and no particular victories. However, they find things better now, and will doubtless get contented in time. What must have gratified them was that they relieved Crawford's division of the 5th Corps, on the line, and took possession of their very nice log huts, which had been carefully constructed uniformly in all the brigades. Crawford's people by no means saw the thing in the same light. They took down their canvas roofs and rolled them up with dudgeon, and marched off to take a temporary camp, previous to the Weldon road expedition. I rode along the breastworks as the red crosses marched into the deserted camps, and observed the aspect of grim satisfaction with which the new comers went about, looking into the abandoned huts. The luxurious Crawford had his nice log cabin taken down and carted to his new locality. “However,” said Wheaton, “I slept in Crawford's kitchen, and that was good enough for me.” On Tuesday came the 3d division, also with a new commander, for brave General Ricketts lies at Washington, still suffering from his wound; and General Seymour, he who was taken the second day of the Wilderness, has the command. Seymour is a fiery and irrepressible sort of party, and enraged the inhabitants of Charlottesville beyond measure. When they told him they had had most extraordinary victories over Grant, he made them a speech, in which he said it didn't make any sort of difference how many victories they had, it wouldn't do them any sort of good; that in every battle we killed off a good many of them, and that we intended to keep piling up men indefinitely, until they knocked under, or were all shot! This enraged them much, and they invited him to air himself for sixteen miles on foot, after it.  . . . It was only last Monday that the 2d division got here, under Getty, and with it came General Wright, commanding the corps. Good General Wright, though always pleasant, is, I think rather in low spirits. He has had poor luck, on numerous occasions, and it culminated at Cedar Creek, where he chanced to have command of the army when it was surprised. He had rallied it, when Sheridan arrived on the field; but of course Sheridan had the credit of the victory, and indeed he deserved it. All the officers say that Wright made prodigious exertions and rode along all parts of the line in the hottest fire.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 298-300