Showing posts with label North Anna River. Show all posts
Showing posts with label North Anna River. Show all posts

Friday, January 25, 2019

Diary of Captain Luman Harris Tenney: March 15, 1865

Reveille at 1:30. Moved out on wrong road. Went to Ashland — stayed all day. Pickets rebel division came up and attacked us. 2nd drove back the advance. 2nd N. Y. lost several men. Camped north of the North Anna at 12 P. M. Heard firing from Richmond.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 147

Wednesday, April 4, 2018

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Luman Harris Tenney: June 1, 1864

Skirmishing all the way to Ashland under McIntosh. 5th N. Y. in advance. Soon after reaching Ashland rear was attacked. Then commenced a fight lasting till near sundown, when we left up the R. R. track by order of Gen. Wilson, who was on the telegraph road with the remainder of Div. Reached Hanover C. H. about 11 P. M., the object of the movement being accomplished, viz.: bridges over the North Anna were destroyed. Again the 2nd O. V. V. C. did splendidly — probably saving the Brigade.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 117-8

Sunday, April 1, 2018

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Luman Harris Tenney: May 25, 1864

Troops crossed the North Anna. Regt. camped near the train. Read in “Villette” and played a little at cards.

SOURCE: Frances Andrews Tenney, War Diary Of Luman Harris Tenney, p. 117

Thursday, November 3, 2016

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Friday, May 27, 1864

As I expected the army has commenced another flank movement to the left. We were ordered to hold the line until 11 o'clock then withdraw quietly and overtake the balance of the army. Goodness! I wonder if we are always to be rear guard? It's worrying, besides, we have to march so rapidly, such duty should be passed round. We crossed the North Anna about three miles below Noles Station. It has been terrible marching the roads are so blocked with army supply wagons or trains — however we have made a thirty-mile march and find ourselves near the ford at Hanover Court House. The men stood the march well for we are on the road to Richmond. Goodness! but I'm tired.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 66

Monday, October 31, 2016

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Tuesday, May 24, 1864

The weather continues very warm, but thanks to the citizens along our line of march for their ice houses we are doing very well by helping ourselves to such needed comforts as happen to be in sight. Probably they would rather the Johnnies should have them, but they are on their last legs — they are playing out. We broke camp this morning about 6 o'clock a. m.; arriving at the North Anna river about 10 o'clock a. m.; found the Fifth Corps had crossed last night after a hard artillery duel which was what we heard. We crossed the river at Jericho Mills and laid on the south side of the river until 6 o'clock p. m., and then moved to the left to reinforce General Russell; saw General U. S. Grant to-day for the first time, at his mess table under a tent fly; was in his shirtsleeves; good view. The men enjoyed the bathing this afternoon greatly. The whole army seemingly has been in swimming. At any rate I never saw so many in bathing at once before or those who seemed to enjoy it more. It was a sight to be remembered. We marched towards the South Anna river till 8 o'clock p. m. when we ran into the enemy's pickets, fell back a little, camped and threw up breastworks.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 64-5

Friday, October 28, 2016

Diary of 2nd Lieutenant Lemuel A. Abbott: Monday, May 23, 1864

We were ordered to be in readiness to march at 4 o'clock this morning, but did not start till near 9 o'clock a. m.; marched until about 11 o'clock a. m., and encamped about three miles from the North Anna river; heavy artillery firing heard in the direction of the river; have not heard the result; very warm all day, but the men bear the heat grandly. General Longstreet's Corps is only about three miles ahead of us from which it would seem we are chasing him — anyway, have captured many of his stragglers. It's intensely hot.

SOURCE: Lemuel Abijah Abbott, Personal Recollections and Civil War Diary, 1864, p. 64

Friday, January 22, 2016

Major-General John A. Dix to Major General Henry Halleck, Received July 18, 1863

HDQRS. DEPT. OF VIRGINIA, SEVENTH ARMY CORPS,
Fort Monroe, Va., July –, 1863.
(Received July 18.)

GENERAL: On the 14th of June, I received from you the following dispatch by telegraph:

Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley. All your available force should be concentrated to threaten Richmond by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible. If you cannot accomplish this, you can at least occupy a large force of the enemy. There can be no serious danger of an attack on Norfolk now.

I had at the time this dispatch was received a force of about 5,000 men moving up the Peninsula. The advance was near the left bank of the Chickahominy, above Diascund Bridge. I had also a considerable force on the Blackwater. These movements had been made to prevent the enemy from sending re-enforcements to General Lee from this department:

At the same time all the transports in the department had been ordered to Aquia Creek, to remove the sick and convalescent of the Army of the Potomac and the public property to Washington. On the 15th, I had not a single transport left. I went on the evening of the 14th to Suffolk, and ordered General Peck to have his command in readiness to move.

On the 17th, transports returned, and were sent to Norfolk to receive Wistar's brigade, which had been ordered there from Suffolk. I advised you on the 18th that part of this brigade went up the York River that morning. The transports came in very slowly, and when they were all here, they were only sufficient to move Colonel Spears regiment of cavalry from Norfolk to the White House.

From my inability to move a larger force at once, General Getty's division, Terry's and Wistar's brigades, were landed at Yorktown.

It was not until the 24th that I could send Colonel Spear with the Eleventh Pennsylvania Cavalry and about 200 men, mounted, of different regiments, under Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South Anna. He landed at the White House on the 25th, after constructing a wharf, for which I had ordered up materials from Fort Monroe. The same evening, on the return of the transports to Yorktown, I sent General Wistar with a part of his brigade and a battery of artillery to West Point. He pulled down two small buildings, built a wharf, and landed during the night.

On the 26th, in the evening, I reached the White House, General Getty having arrived immediately before me, and being then engaged in landing his division. Major-General Keyes, with Gordon's division and Terry's brigade, and some other troops, amounting to about 9,000 men, arrived at Cumberland on the same evening, and at the White House on the 27th.

Brigadier-General Foster's brigade arrived on the 28th, making an aggregate force at the White House for duty of 18,730.

Brigadier-General Spinola arrived two days afterward from North Carolina with 1,718 drafted Pennsylvania militia, whose term of service was about to expire, with directions that they be sent to Washington, if they would consent to serve until the insurgent forces were driven out of Pennsylvania and Maryland. They gave the requisite consent, and were embarked for Washington on the 7th July.

On the 27th June, in the morning, Colonel Spear returned from the South Anna, having destroyed the bridge of the Virginia Central Railroad over that river and the quartermaster's depot at Hanover Court-House, secured and brought away 700 animals, 35 army wagons, $15,000 in Confederate bonds, and other property, and captured Brig. Gen. W. H. F. Lee, a son Of the general-in-chief of the insurgent army. A detailed report of the movement was forwarded from the White House.

To facilitate anticipated movements at the White House, I ordered a light locomotive and half a dozen platform cars to be sent from Norfolk. They arrived on the 28th, and were landed on the 29th, and put in operation on the railroad. The railroad bridge over the Pamunkey at the White House was left uninjured, but the rails from that point to West Point had been taken up, probably to be laid down on other roads in the seceded States, where there was urgent need for them.

On Colonel Spear's return, I organized an expedition, under General Getty, to seize and destroy the bridge of the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad over the South Anna. It consisted of his division, excepting a regiment retained for provost duty at the White House, General Foster's brigade, a provisional brigade (part of Wistar's), under Colonel Wardrop, of the Ninety-ninth New York Volunteers, and the cavalry under Colonel Spear; in all, about 10,000 men. His artillery and wagons were passed over the river on platform cars, the time occupied for the passage of the entire column being fifteen hours – from 5 p.m. on the 30th June to 8 a.m. on the 1st of July.

A copy of my instructions to General Getty is annexed.* I advised you of the movement on the 29th June and 1st July.

On the day General Getty commenced his march (the 1st July), I received a dispatch from you, directing me, as soon as my forces returned from their present expedition, to report before sending out any more; and, on the 3d, another, with the following directions:

As soon as the expedition now out terminates, you will draw in all your forces to Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and the defenses of Norfolk, and send to this place (Washington) all the troops not absolutely required for the defense of those places.

To cover General Getty's movement and insure its success, I ordered Major-General Keyes, with Terry's and West's brigades and one of the brigades of Gordon's division, to advance on the Richmond road, and attack the enemy, who was understood to be in considerable force on the right bank of the Chickahominy, a short distance from Bottoms Bridge. General Keyes was to post his artillery in position so as to command the bridge, and open fire on the enemy. He was also directed to hold his position for two or three days, until there was reason to believe that General Getty had accomplished his object. Major-General Keyes was chosen to command the troops by which this demonstration was to be made on account of his rank, and more especially on account of his supposed familiar acquaintance with the country, gained with the Army of the Potomac during the campaign on the Chickahominy.


GENERAL GETTY'S EXPEDITION.

General Getty moved from the left bank of the Pamunkey, opposite the White House, at 8 a.m. on the 1st July. The weather was intensely hot, and, on his arrival at Littlepage's Bridge, near the junction of the South Anna with the Pamunkey, on the 4th of July, a large number of his men were found unfit for active duty. The road from Taylor's Ferry is very narrow, and difficult for artillery and heavy wagons. It passes over high hills, and is very unfavorable to the movements of troops.

Colonel Spear, agreeably to my orders, had destroyed all the bridges and ferry-boats below Littlepage's Bridge.

The column was crossed on the evening of the 4th, and the advance was immediately made to the bridge of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad across the South Anna. It was found to be held by a very large force, covered by earthworks. From the best information, this force was believed to be about 8,000 men, with fourteen pieces of artillery. Three regiments had been brought down from Fredericksburg. From the evening of the 1st to the evening of the 4th, cars were coming from Richmond with troops inside and outside. Three trains passed up on the morning of the 4th with troops and with eight pieces of artillery. Believing that his own force would not justify an attack on the bridge, that he would sustain very heavy loss, and that success would be doubtful, he decided to destroy as much of the track as possible, and render the railroad unserviceable. General Foster was, therefore, directed to remove the rails, bend them, and burn the ties. This was accomplished from a point near the bridge to a road some 3 miles below.

Major Stratton was sent with a detachment of cavalry to Ashland Station, on the same railroad, about 11 miles from Richmond, where he destroyed the railroad depot, brought off the telegraph instrument, and tore up the track above and below the place, burning the ties and bending the rails. He also destroyed a trestle bridge a mile below Ashland, and a number of cars loaded with materials for the reconstruction of the railroad bridge over the South Anna destroyed by Colonel Spear. He also tore up the track and disabled the rails.

It is the opinion of Major Stratton, who is a very judicious man, and who was a railroad engineer before the rebellion, that the injury he did could not be repaired in less than a week, and it is the opinion of General Getty that, considering all the injuries done to the road, a fortnight will be necessary to put it in running order.

The position of General Getty on the right bank of the Pamunkey, with Richmond in his front, a large force on his right, and a narrow bridge to recross the river, was a critical one, and if he had been attacked by a superior force he would have been in great danger.

Having substantially accomplished the object of breaking up the direct railroad connection between Richmond and General Lee's army in Pennsylvania, he recrossed the Pamunkey, destroyed Littlepage's Bridge, and returned to the White House, bringing with him 21 prisoners, one a commissioned officer, and having lost 2 killed and 7 wounded. The information in regard to the strength of the enemy at the bridge is fully confirmed by the prisoners.


GENERAL KEYES' DEMONSTRATION.

General Keyes, agreeably to his orders to attack Bottom's Bridge, advanced on the 1st of July to Baltimore, or Crump's, Cross-Roads, where he halted for the night, sending his advance, under Colonel West, 3 or 4 miles farther on. Bottom's Bridge is but 13 miles from the White House, and it was expected that General Keyes would take, on the evening of the 1st, a position which should command it, and prevent the enemy from crossing. The correspondence forwarded to you on the 12th instant shows that he proposed to me the same night to fall back to the White House; that I directed him to hold his position, unless the enemy showed himself in such force as to make it necessary to fall back, and that at daybreak on the 2d he fell back to Baltimore Store, or Talley's, though no enemy had appeared, with the exception of some skirmishers on the 1st. His letter, No. 5,­** advising me of his intention, did not reach me till after daylight, when it was too late to arrest the movement.

On the afternoon of the 2d, the enemy advanced, with eight pieces of artillery and an infantry force, on Baltimore Cross-Roads, and Colonel West, who had been left there with the advance, fell back, to avoid being outflanked. The enemy's field pieces were brought within a mile of Baltimore Store, to which General Keyes had retired, and fired from 100 to 150 shots during the night, without doing any injury whatever. From information derived from Colonel West, who is an experienced officer and a man of cool judgment, the enemy's whole force could not at any time have exceeded 3,000 men. General Keyes had 6,000, and fourteen pieces of artillery.

After the night firing, which was manifestly intended for intimidation, the enemy withdrew nearly his whole force before daybreak, and there is little doubt that it was hurried back to Richmond, and sent up to the South Anna by railroad, to oppose General Getty.

From the morning of the 3d to the 7th, when General Getty returned, I am now satisfied that there was at no time more than a regiment of infantry and some small parties of cavalry between the Chickahominy and the White House.

On the correspondence between General Keyes and myself, I make no comment, but leave it to speak for itself. I desire, however, to say, that after the letter, No. 24, showing a concurrence of opinion and feeling on the part of General Keyes and his brigade commanders, I deemed it most prudent to suspend the movement, and leave his command where it was in no danger of molestation.

It is my opinion that if a prompt and vigorous attack had been made on the 1st July on Bottom's Bridge, it would have been regarded as a real movement and not a mere demonstration; that the enemy's troops would have been retained in Richmond, and that General Getty would have succeeded in destroying the railroad bridge over the South Anna. But when General Keyes fell back on the morning of the 2d without being attacked, and it became manifest that the movement was a mere feint, a large portion of the force in Richmond was sent against General Getty.

THE ENEMY'S FORCE IN RICHMOND.

On the 28th of June, the day the last of my force arrived at the White House, Jeff. Davis wrote to General Lee that there were three brigades in Richmond, and part of Hill's division, besides Wise's brigade, on the east side of the city. These different corps could not well have numbered less than 12,000 men. There were, in addition, a body of trained artillerists in the intrenchments, which are very strong; the Home Guard, embracing all males capable of bearing arms, a convalescent brigade, and the Home Guard called in from Petersburg. My information, corroborated from a variety of sources, is, that there were in Richmond on the 1st July not less than 20,000 persons under arms, a majority of whom were regularly organized and trained troops.

On the 2d July, Mr. Ould declared 1,800 paroled prisoners of war at Richmond exchanged, and they were no doubt immediately put in service there. My information that there were about 8,000 men at the South Anna, prepared for General Getty's attack, is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the letter of Jefferson Davis and corroborating intelligence from other sources.

In review, I beg leave to say that the objects in contemplation of your order of the 14th June were substantially accomplished; that the railroad connection between General Lee and Richmond was effectually broken; that a large force of the enemy was occupied, and that very severe injury was inflicted on him.

My position at the White House was one from which the enemy could have been greatly annoyed had the public necessities elsewhere allowed me to retain it. The time required to pass General Getty's column across the river led me to plank over the railroad for the passage of supply trains and artillery, and by means of this facility the whole country could have been controlled from the Pamunkey to the Rappahannock, either by holding the bridge and operating from the White House, or by crossing my whole force, destroying the bridge, making West Point the base of my movement, and avoiding the long and circuitous navigation of the Pamunkey below the White House. With the aid of a pontoon bridge, the Pamunkey can be crossed at New Castle Ferry or Hanovertown, each about 15 or 16 miles from Richmond, 8 or 9 miles nearer than the White House.

I inclose herewith the reports of Major-General Keyes and Brigadier-General Getty, giving a detailed account of their movements.

The loss of General Keyes was 25 killed, wounded, and missing, and of General Getty, 2 killed and 7 wounded.

I desire to acknowledge the zeal and promptitude of the officers and men under my command in the performance of all their duties.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JOHN A. DIX,
Major-General.
 General H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.
_______________

* See Addenda to Getty’s report, p. 840.
** See p. 826.
See p. 832.

SOURCES: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 57; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 2 (Serial No. 44), p. 820-4

Sunday, January 17, 2016

Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Major-General John A. Dix, June 14, 1863 – 12 m.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, June 14, 1863 12 m.
Major-General Dix,
Fort Monroe, Va.:

Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley. All your available force should be concentrated to threaten Richmond, by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible. If you cannot accomplish this, you can at least find occupation for a large force of the enemy. There can be no serious danger of an attack on Norfolk now.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

SOURCES: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 57; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 3 (Serial No. 45), p. 111

Major-General John A. Dix to Major-General Henry W. Halleck, December 15, 1863

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
New York City, December 15, 1863.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:

GENERAL: In your report of the 15th November, to the Secretary of War, I find the following paragraph:

When the rebel army was moving north upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, General Dix sent all of his available force from Norfolk and Fort Monroe up the York River, for the purpose of cutting off Lee's communications with Richmond, and of attacking that place, which was then defended by only a handful of militia. The expedition, however, failed to accomplish a single object for which it had been fitted out, the failure resulting, it was alleged, from the inefficiency of one of the generals commanding. General Dix therefore ordered its return, and sent the troops of which it was composed to re-enforce the army of General Meade north of the Potomac.

As there seems to be a misapprehension on your part in regard to two or three of the most essential particulars, I desire to call your attention to them in connection with the subjoined statement of facts.

1. That I sent all my “available force, * * * up the York River, for the purpose of cutting off Lee’s communications with Richmond, and of attacking that place.”

The following is your order, under which I acted:

Lee's army is in motion toward the Shenandoah Valley. All your available force should be concentrated to threaten Richmond by seizing and destroying their railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do them all the damage possible. If you cannot accomplish this, you can at least occupy a large force of the enemy. There can be no serious danger of an attack on Norfolk now.

It will be perceived that an attack on Richmond was not a part of the plan. That city is understood to be nearly as strongly fortified as Vicksburg, and only to be taken by regular siege.

2. That Richmond “was then defended by only a handful of militia.”

An intercepted letter from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, dated the 28th of June, the day the last of my troops arrived at the White House, states that there were three brigades in Richmond, and part of Hill’s division, besides Wise's brigade on the east side of the city. These were all regular troops and not militia; there was, in addition, a body of trained artillerists in the intrenchments, the Home Guards, and a convalescent brigade.

3. That the “expedition failed to accomplish the object for which it had been fitted out.”

The objects of the expedition, as stated in your order, were threefold: (1) To threaten Richmond; (2) to destroy the railroad bridges over the South and North Anna Rivers, and do the enemy as much damage as possible; and (3) to occupy a large force of the enemy. The first and last of these objects were effectually accomplished, the second partially, and, I may say, substantially. One of the bridges over the South Anna was destroyed. Although the other was not destroyed, the railroad track between it and Richmond was-torn up for a considerable distance, and the bridge at Ashland, on the same road, 11 miles out of Richmond, was completely demolished and burned, as well as the depot at that station.

Colonel Spear's expedition, sent out under written instructions, was a most successful and creditable one. He destroyed the first-mentioned bridge and the quartermaster's depot at Hanover Station, bringing back 35 army wagons, 700 horses and mules, and General Fitzhugh [W. H. F.] Lee, the son of the rebel general-in-chief, now in confinement at Fort Lafayette as a hostage, and over 100 prisoners.

I had only been three days at the White House when my forces were ordered back to re-enforce General Meade. At that time I had completely cut off General Lee's communications with Richmond by way of the two railroads crossing the South Anna, and had control of the whole country from the Pamunkey to the Rappahannock.

To myself, this correction of a statement, which I am sure is inadvertent, is of less consequence than to the gallant troops under my command. For their sake I ask permission to give publicity to this letter, or to my report of the expedition, dated the 16th of July last.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 JOHN A. DIX,
 Major-General.

SOURCE: Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix, Volume 2, p. 57, 8-9; The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27, Part 1 (Serial No. 43), p. 18-9

Tuesday, December 9, 2014

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, May 24, 1864

May 24, 1864

We started quite early — a little before six — to go towards the North Anna; and halted at Mt. Carmel Church, where this road from Moncure's strikes the "telegraph road" (so called, because the telegraph from Fredericksburg ran along it). If you want a horrible hole for a halt, just pick out a Virginia church, at a Virginia cross-roads, after the bulk of an army has passed, on a hot, dusty Virginia day! There was something rather funny, too. For in the broad aisle they had laid across some boards and made a table, round which sat Meade, Grant, General Williams, etc., writing on little slips of paper. It looked precisely like a town-hall, where people are coming to vote, only the people had unaccountably put on very dusty uniforms. General Meade is of a perverse nature; when he gets in a disagreeable place, he is apt to stay there. I think he likes to have officers who are prone to comfort feel decidedly uncomfortable. That reminds me of an anecdote. The day before yesterday, when we had our bloody attack along the whole line, General Meade had ordered his whole Staff ready at four in the morning. Now, such people as the Judge-Advocate-General are Staff officers and at Headquarters, but not aides. Ours is an old army officer, with many characteristics of a part of his class, that is, rather lazy and quite self-sufficient. He came to the front with us and staid some time; but, as dinner-time approached, late in the afternoon, he thought it would be bright to go to the camp and arrange a snug dinner. Pretty soon the suspicious and not very kindly gray eyes of the chief began to roll about curiously. “General Williams! did you give orders that all my Staff should accompany me?” “Yes, sir; certainly, sir.” (Seth is rather scared at his superior, as are many more.) “Where is Major Platt?” “I think he must have gone to camp for a moment, sir.” “Send at once for him!” In no great time the Major arrived at a gallop. “Major Platt,” said the General slowly and solemnly, “I wish you to ride along our whole lines (possibly about eight miles) and ascertain as accurately as possible the amount of our casualties during the day!” Somewhere about nine o'clock that night Platt returned with his statement, having missed a nice, six o'clock dinner, and happily been missed by stray balls and shells. . . .

I am glad to hear that you take once more an interest in the furniture coverings; an excellent sign! Keep a-going; that's the way! That is the way I do: heart in my mouth for half a day; then come home and eat a good supper; there is no use in “borrowing trouble” — you do learn that here. You know I am not sanguine in my military hopes; but I have the strongest hopes of ultimate success, taking into consideration the uncertainty of war. You must go by the general features; and these are: 1st: Watchfulness, caution, and military conduct of our generals. 2d: The defensive attitude of the enemy; an attitude which Lee never assumes unless driven to it. 3d: The obstinacy and general reliability of our troops. 4th: The fact, that we have worked them, from one position to another, to within nine miles of Richmond across a highly defensible country. 5th: That their counter-attacks on us have been few and comparatively weak, and of no great moment, showing that they have no large force with a “free foot”; but have to put all their men on their lines. Nevertheless, I look on the future as still long and full of the common hazards of war. If the Rebels are forced to abandon Richmond, I believe the effect would be very heavy on them. This I judge not only on general grounds but also from the stupendous efforts, the general concentration, they are using to defend it. Do not, for a moment, look for the “annihilation,” the “hiving,” or the “total rout” of Lee. Such things exist only in the New York Herald.

To return to our Mt. Carmel. About seven came a negro who reported the whole Rebel army retreating on Richmond — a vague expression which left them room to halt anywhere this side of it. Soon after “Tick” Wadsworth — son of the late General — came in from General Sheridan and reported the cavalry corps at Dunkirk. This was welcome news to us. Sheridan had been sent on a raid towards Richmond and had destroyed railroads and depots of stores to a considerable extent. Also recaptured some hundreds of our prisoners on their way to the capital. He was delayed on his return by the rise of the Pamunkey, but got pontoons from Fortress Monroe and crossed it. On his way down, Stuart's cavalry tried to stop him, but he pitched into them, took two guns and a number of prisoners, and killed Stuart, driving off his command completely. It is curious that the southern cavalry cannot now cope with ours. We have beaten them every time this campaign; whereas their infantry are a full match for us. Sheridan was a great help on his return, to watch our flanks and threaten the enemy's rear. . . . About ten there came in a very entertaining nigger, who had been servant of Colonel Baldwin, Rebel Chief of Ordnance. He gave a funny description of Lee's Headquarters. From him and from other sources I judge that the reports of Lee's humble mode of living are true. He has only corn bread and bacon for the "chief of his diet," and this sets an example to all his men. There can be no doubt that Lee is a man of very high character (which you may reconcile as you may with his treacherous abandonment of the flag). He carries on war in a merciful and civilized way, his correspondence is dignified and courteous, and his despatches are commonly (not always) frank and not exaggerated.

General Meade got awfully mad, while waiting at the church. There came a cipher despatch from Sherman, in the West. Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, hastened — with considerable want of tact — to read it to the General. Sherman therein told Grant that the Army of the West, having fought, could now afford to manoeuvre, and that, if his (Grant's) inspiration could make the Army of the Potomac do its share, success would crown our efforts. The eyes of Major-General George Gordon Meade stood out about one inch as he said, in a voice like cutting an iron bar with a handsaw: “Sir! I consider that despatch an insult to the army I command and to me personally. The Army of the Potomac does not require General Grant’s inspiration or anybody's else inspiration to make it fight!” He did not get over it all day, and, at dinner, spoke of the western army as “an armed rabble.” General Grant, who is one of the most candid men I ever saw, has repeatedly said that this fighting throws in the shade everything he ever saw, and that he looked for no such resistance. Colonel Comstock and others, who have fought with both armies, say distinctly that our troops are fifty per cent better than the western, and that the good Rebel soldiers have always been kept near Richmond except when Longstreet went temporarily to the West. At dusk we rode down to cross the North Anna, midst a fearful thunderstorm; some of the lightning fell so near that it really hissed, which was disagreeable, as there was an ammunition train close by. The North Anna is a pretty stream, running between high banks, so steep that they form almost a ravine, and, for the most part, heavily wooded with oak and tulip trees, very luxuriant. It is perhaps 125 feet wide and runs with a tolerably swift and deep stream, in most places over one's head. The approaches are by steep roads cut down the banks, and how our waggons and artillery got across, I don't know! Indeed I never do know how the trains get up, seeing that you are not over well off, sometimes, on a horse. . . .

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 122-7

Saturday, December 6, 2014

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Lyman to Elizabeth Russell Lyman, May 23, 1864

May 23, 1864

It was with regret that early this morning we left the fine clover field of Dame Tyler, and wended our way towards the North Anna. We crossed the Mat (or what is called South River, I am not sure which, at any rate a mere brook), and kept straight on for Garrett's Tavern. Grant, mounted on the purloined black pony, ambled along at a great pace, but General Meade, who got his pride up at Grant's rapidity, set off at a rate that soon raised a cloud of dust and left the Lieutenant-General far behind; whereat George G. was much pleased, and his aides much the contrary, as they had to scramble after. About ten we got to a side road, leading to the right, and here we turned off the 9th Corps, so as to keep the telegraph road open for the passage of the 5th. Then we took a bend to the left again and came out by the Moncure house, crossing the Polecat Creek by the way — a pleasant stream running over stones, and with the trees quite growing into it. There, I knew, Biddle and Mason “straggled” and took a bath. We passed also a house where dwelt four women, all alone; we left them a guard, to stay till next morning. A hazardous position for these people, with all the stragglers and camp scoundrels about! Old Ma'am Moncure was a perfect old railer, and said: “They should soon see us coming back on the double-quick.” However, they (the family) were amazing sharp and eager in selling us sheep, and took our greenbacks with avidity. A gold dollar now is worth about $30 in Confederate money! This afternoon Warren crossed the North Anna at Jericho Bridge, and was fiercely attacked on the other side by Longstreet; but he repulsed him with heavy loss, after a sharp fight. Hancock coming along more to the left, stormed the rifle-pits near Chesterfield station and seized the bridge, ready to cross. I have been lately up at three and four in the morning and I am so sleepy I must stop.

SOURCE: George R. Agassiz, Editor, Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, p. 121-2

Thursday, October 23, 2014

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, June 1, 1864 – 6 p.m.

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, 6 P. M., June 1, 1864.

We are pegging away here, and gradually getting nearer and nearer to Richmond, although its capture is yet far off. Our advance is within two miles of Mechanicsville, which, if you remember, is the place where the fighting commenced in the Seven Days. The rebs keep taking up strong positions and entrenching themselves. This compels us to move around their flank, after trying to find some weak point to attack. This operation has now occurred four times, namely, crossing the Rapidan, at Old Wilderness, at Spottsylvania Court House, and recently at North Anna. We shall have to do it once more before we get them into their defenses at Richmond, and then will begin the tedious process of a quasi-siege, like that at Sebastopol; which will last as long, unless we can get hold of their railroads and cut off their supplies, when they must come out and fight.

Whilst I am writing the cannon and musketry are rattling all along our lines, over five miles in extent, but we have become so accustomed to these sounds that we hardly notice them.

The weather is beginning to be hot, but I keep in the saddle during the day, and sleep soundly at night.

The papers are giving Grant all the credit of what they call successes; I hope they will remember this if anything goes wrong.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 200

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, May 29, 1864 – 10 a.m.

South Side of Pamunkey River, Hanovertown,
Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, 10 A. M., May 29, 1864.

We have crossed the Pamunkey, and are now within eighteen miles of Richmond. Lee has fallen back from the North Anna, and is somewhere between us and Richmond. We shall move forward to-day to feel for him. We are getting on very well, and I am in hopes will continue to manoeuvre till we compel Lee to retire into the defense of Richmond, when the grand decisive fight will come off, which I trust will bring the war to a close, and that it will be victory for us.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 199

Sunday, October 19, 2014

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, May 24, 1864 – 9 a.m.

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, May 24, 9 A. M., 1864.

We have maneuvered the enemy away from their strong position on the Po, near Spottsylvania Court House, and now have compelled them to fall back from the North Anna River, which they tried to hold. Yesterday Warren and Hancock both had engagements with them, and were successful. We undoubtedly have the morale over them, and will eventually, I think, compel them to go into Richmond; after that, nous verrons.

I am writing this letter in the House of God, used for general headquarters. What a scene and commentary on the times!1
_______________

1 Battle of North Anna. Federal loss — killed, wounded, and missing — May 22-31,1864 — 1,607 (O. R.).

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 198

Saturday, October 18, 2014

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, May 23, 1864 – 8 a.m.

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, 8 A. M., May 23, 1864.

We expected yesterday to have another battle, but the enemy refuses to fight unless attacked in strong entrenchments; hence, when we moved on his flank, instead of coming out of his works and attacking us, he has fallen back from Spottsylvania Court House, and taken up a new position behind the North Anna River; in other words, performed the same operation which I did last fall, when I fell back from Culpeper, and for which I was ridiculed; that is to say, refusing to fight on my adversary's terms. I suppose now we will have to repeat this turning operation, and continue to do so, till Lee gets into Richmond.

I am sorry you will not change your opinion of Grant. I think you expect too much of him. I don't think he is a very magnanimous man, but I believe he is above any littleness, and whatever injustice is done me, and it is idle to deny that my position is a very unjust one, I believe is not intentional on his part, but arises from the force of circumstances, and from that weakness inherent in human nature which compels a man to look to his own interests.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 198