Showing posts with label Helena AR. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Helena AR. Show all posts

Monday, February 2, 2015

Diary of Salmon P. Chase: Thursday August 7, 1862

Very little accomplished as yet, though much, I hope, in the train of accomplishment. Engaged nearly all day on selections for recommendations of Collectors and Assessors. Prepared letter to President, containing names etc. etc. of candidates, with my recommendations, for Connecticut; made up in very small part on my own personal knowledge, but mainly on the representations and advice — sometimes agreeing and sometimes not — of the Senators, Representatives, State officers and Secretary Wells.

In the evening, went to War Department, where I saw Curtis' dispatch from Helena, urging the clearing out of the Mississippi before attempting inland operations; and McClellan's announcing advance of the enemy on Malvern Hill, and his purpose to order the retirement of Hooker's Division; and those of various Governors, and announcing progress of volunteering and preparations for drafting — on the whole very encouraging and denoting the greatest possible earnestness and determination among the people.

Home. Taylor, Davis, and Hopper (all blacks) called. —  Wrote my friend E. and sent some pencil scribblings. — Mr. Gest called, but not able to see him.

SOURCE: Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1902, Vol. 2, p. 58

Friday, November 7, 2014

Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood to Abraham Lincoln, February 2, 1863

St. Louis, Feb. 2, 1863.
His Excellency the President:

Sir — Appreciating as I do the responsibilities and cares of your position, I have avoided obtruding upon you my opinions, except in cases wherein I would, in my judgment, have been wanting in my duty to my country had I forborne to do so. A case of this kind, in my judgment, now presents itself, illustrating a grave question of policy.

On the 8th of January Col. William T. Shaw received from Major-Gen. Curtis, commanding the Department of the Missouri, written orders to repair to Helena, Ark., and report to the officer commanding the Eastern District of Arkansas, for duty in organizing and mustering in troops to be raised from persons emancipated from servitude for garrison and other duties as contemplated in the proclamation of his Excellency the President of the United States of the 1st of January. In obedience to this order, Col. Shaw repaired to Helena, reaching that point about the 16th of January, and reported to Brigadier-General Gorman, commanding, delivering the order of General Curtis. General Gorman positively refused to recognize Col. Shaw as an officer under his command; positively refused to issue any orders or to afford Col. Shaw any facilities to execute the orders of Gen. Curtis; used grossly insulting language to Col. Shaw for being willing to act under such an order; stated that if he (Gen. Gorman) had any officer under his command that would help to execute such orders he would have him mustered out of service, and that if any man should attempt to raise negro soldiers there his men would shoot them. Throughout the entire interview his demeanor and language to Col. Shaw was grossly insulting and abusive. Shortly after this interview, a member of the Second Arkansas Cavalry handed to Col. Shaw a letter directed on the outside of the envelope, "Col. Shaw, in charge of negro camp." The letter was as follows:


Executive Office, Helena, Ark., Jan. 23, 1865.
General Orders No. 2.

No person, or persons, in the State of Arkansas shall be enlisted, or recruited, to serve as soldiers except by an officer duly appointed by the Military Governor of this State.

amos F. Eno,
Secretary of State, pro tem.


Col. Shaw finding he could not execute the order of Gen. Curtis, reported in person to him.

Mr. President, I do not desire to intermeddle in matters with which I have not legitimate concern, nor do I think I am so doing in bringing this matter to your notice. Col. Shaw is a gallant officer from the State of Iowa, commanding the Fourteenth Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry. He led his regiment bravely at Donelson and Shiloh; was taken prisoner at the latter place, and after a long and severe imprisonment, was paroled and exchanged in October last. Except in military position, he is at least Gen. Gorman's equal. He has been grossly insulted while endeavoring, as a good soldier should, to execute the orders of his superior officer.

But the precise point to which I desire to direct your attention is this: The proclamation issued by you on the 1st of January last was an act the most important you have ever performed and more important than, in all human probability, you will ever again perform. I shall not here argue whether its results will be good or evil.

Had you not believed the good of the country imperatively demanded its issuance, you would not have issued it. I most cordially and heartily endorse it But, Mr. President, that proclamation cannot be productive of good results unless it is observed and put in force. You know its promulgation has afforded many men a pretext for arraying themselves against the country, and if, having been promulgated, it is allowed to be inoperative, its effects must be all evil and none good. Then how may it be executed? Can it be, will it be, by such men as General Gorman?

Permit me to say, in all frankness, but with proper respect and deference, the history of the world cannot show an instance where a policy of a nation to array men strongly for or against it was ever successfully carried into effect by its opponents. It is not in the nature of things it should be so, and with the facts herein presented within my knowledge, I can not feel that I have discharged my duty without saying that, in my judgment, it cannot produce the good effects its friends believe it is capable of producing, and must produce only evil, unless you depend for carrying it into effect upon those who believe it to be a wise and good measure.

Many men holding high commands in the armies of the Union openly denounce the proclamation as an “abolition” document, and say it has changed the war from a war for the Union into a war for freeing the negroes. This is caught up and goes through the ranks and produces a demoralizing effect on the men whose affiliation has been with the Democratic party, and they say “they did not enlist to fight for niggers;” while the men whose affiliation has been with the Republican party are disheartened and discouraged at discovering that the policy of the President, which they heartily endorse and approve, is ridiculed and thwarted by the men who should carry it into effect. If that proclamation is not to be respected and enforced, it had better never have been issued. I am unwilling to be misinterpreted or misunderstood. I am not influenced by party political considerations. There are few men in the country with whom I have differed more widely politically than with Gen. Butler, yet it is to me a source of great pleasure that he is to supersede, at New Orleans, a distinguished and able officer of my own political faith. Gen. Butler is prompt, ready and anxious to do the work assigned him, and such are the men we must have to obtain success. I care not what their political opinions have been, if they are unconditionally for the Union to-day.

Permit me further to call to your notice the document copied herein issued by “Amos F. Eno, Secretary of State, pro tem. As the Governor of the loyal State of Iowa, duly elected by the people of that State, I would not feel at liberty to order that no person should be enlisted or recruited as soldiers in Iowa, except by an officer duly appointed by myself; and it certainly seems to me that the subordinate of a military governor, appointed by you, for a State in rebellion against the government, should not have that power. This act of this man is evidence of the determination of men holding their authority from you to disregard and bring into disrepute the policy you have felt bound to adopt. There is a further act of this Mr. Eno that I feel obliged to bring to your notice. He claims to act as the Adjutant-General of the Military Governor of Arkansas, and I am informed by authority, upon which I confidently rely, he turned from 100 to 150 sick and wounded soldiers out of a comfortable house, wherein they had been placed, in order to use the house as his headquarters; that these poor fellows were removed while it was raining, and that some of them actually died while being removed. There are many sick and wounded Iowa soldiers at the place, and some of them may have been among those thus treated. I would not, in my judgment, be discharging my duty to them, if I did not bring this matter to your notice and demand an investigation of the facts alleged.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
SAMUEL J. KIRKWOOD.

SOURCE: Henry Warren Lathrop, The Life and Times of Samuel J. Kirkwood, Iowa's War Governor, p. 267-9

Wednesday, November 20, 2013

Diary of Alexander G. Downing: Wednesday, January 21, 1863

The weather continues cold. At daylight our fleet started on down the river, reaching Helena, Arkansas, at 10 o'clock. We left Helena at noon with thirteen transports loaded with troops and tied up for the night sixty miles below. The transports dare not run at night on account of being fired upon by the rebels from the banks of the river. They fire on us even on the day run, but before we can get our boats to the banks to give them chase, they are gone and out of sight.

Source: Alexander G. Downing, Edited by Olynthus B., Clark, Downing’s Civil War Diary, p. 96

Friday, October 11, 2013

Major General William T. Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, January 4, 1863

ON BOARD Forest Queen,
MILLIKEN'S BEND, January 4, 1863.

Well, we have been to Vicksburg and it was too much for us, and we have backed out. I suppose the attack on Holly Springs and the railroad compelled Grant to fall behind the Tallahatchie, and consequently the Confederates were enabled to reinforce Vicksburg. Besides, its natural strength had been improved by a vast amount of labor, so that it was impossible for me to capture or even to penetrate to the road from which alone I could expect to take it. For five days we were thundering away, and when my main assault failed, and Admiral Porter deemed another requiring the cooperation of the gunboats “too hazardous,” I saw no alternative but to regain my steamboats and the main river, which I did unopposed and unmolested. To re-embark a large command in the face of an enterprising and successful enemy is no easy task, but I accomplished it. McClernand has arrived to supersede me by order of the President himself.1 Of course I submit gracefully. The President is charged with maintaining the government and has a perfect right to choose his agents. My command is to be an army corps composed of Morgan L. Smith's old command (poor Morgan now lies wounded badly in the hip on board the Chancellor, and his division is commanded by Stuart), and the troops I got at Helena commanded by Fred Steele whom I know well. These are all new and strange to me but such is life and luck. Before I withdrew from the Yazoo I saw McClernand and told him that we had failed to carry the enemy's line of works before Vicksburg, but I could hold my ground at Yazoo — but it would be useless. He promptly confirmed my judgment that it was best to come out into the main river at Milliken's Bend. We did so day before yesterday, and it has rained hard two days and I am satisfied that we got out of the Swamp at Chickasaw Bayou in time, for now water and mud must be forty feet deep there. . . .  Regulars did well, of course, but they or no human beings could have crossed the bayou and live. People at a distance will ridicule our being unable to pass a narrow bayou, but nobody who was there will. Instead of lying idle I proposed we should come to the Arkansas and attack the Post of Arkansas, fifty miles up that river, from which the enemy has attacked the river capturing one of our boats, towing two barges of navy coal and capturing a mail, so I have no doubt some curious lieutenant has read your letters to me. We must make the river safe behind us before we push too far down. We are now on our way to the Post of Arkansas. McClernand assumed command to-day, so I will not be care-worn again by the duty of looking to supplies, plans, etc. . . .  It will in the end cost us at least ten thousand lives to take Vicksburg. I would have pushed the attack to the bitter end, but even had we reached the city unassisted we could not have held it if they are at liberty to reinforce from the interior. . . .
__________

1 On January 2, Sherman had learned that McClernand had “orders from the War Department to command the expeditionary force on the Mississippi River” (Memoirs, I, 322). On January 24, Sherman wrote to his wife: “It was simply absurd to supersede me by McClernand, but Mr. Lincoln knows I am not anxious to command, and he knows McClernand is, and must gratify him. He will get his fill before he is done.”

SOURCES: M. A. DeWolfe Howe, Editor, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 235-7.  A full copy of this letter can be found in the William T Sherman Family papers (SHR), University of Notre Dame Archives (UNDA), Notre Dame, IN 46556, Folder CSHR 1/150.