From the World.

Peace, on the basis of a restored Union, is a consummation so devoutly to be wished that the people will watch with intense interest the faintest indications of its return.  Now that the Government, by authorizing Mr. Greeley’s mission, has turned the public mind in that direction, the country will hardly let the occasion pass without a free expression of opinion on the possibility, method, conditions, and probable consequences of the peace which all but army contractors and abolitionists so ardently desire.  The President having sanctioned the Niagara negotiations, the subject is fairly before the public for such discussion as may seem appropriate.

We are bound to say that we expect no results from the breaking of the diplomatic ice across the Niagara river.  It is, probably, on one side and on the other, a mere politician’s trick.  But it wears the external form of duly authorized preliminaries to a more formal negotiation   On the same side, the presence of the private secretary of the President of the United States is as valid an authentication of Mr. Greeley’s mission as would be a written letter of credentials; and it is to be presumed that the President would not have given the affair this degree of countenance had he not been satisfied that the alleged commissioners on the other side were duly authorized.  The selection of Mr. Greeley as an intermediary was on many accounts politic, and especially as protecting Mr. Lincoln from the kind of imputations put upon Secretary Seward for his informal intercourse with rebel commissioners in the first days of the Administration, previous to the attempt to provision Fort Sumter.

P. S. Since writing the above we have received the papers that passed in this odd negotiation; and, if the subject were not to serious for laughter, we should go into convulsions.  That dancing wind-bag of popinjay conceit, William Cornell Jewett, has achieved the immortality he covets; he has reversed the adage about the mountain in labor bringing forth a ridiculous mouse—the mouse has brought forth this ridiculous mountain of diplomacy.  This is Jewett’s doings, and it is marvelous in our eyes!  He got Greeley and the President’s private secretary to the Falls on a fool’s errand, and made even the President an actor in this comedy; he has bade each of them play the part so well suited to himself, of

———“A tool

That knaves do work with, called a fool.”

Sublime impudence of George Sanders!  Enchanting simplicity of Colorado Jewett!  “But—ah!—him”—how, oh benevolent Horace, shall we struggle with the emotions (of the ridiculous) that choke the utterance of THY name?  Greeley and Jewett—Jewett and Greeley; which is Don Quixote and which is Sancho Panza?

SOURCE: The Daily True Delta, New Orleans, Louisiana, Tuesday, August 2, 1864, p. 1

Clement C. Clay Jr. to Judah P. Benjamin, August 11, 1864

SAINT CATHERINES, CANADA WEST,            

August 11, 1864.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,

Secretary of State Confed. States of America, Richmond, Va.:

SIR: I deem it due to Mr. Holcombe and myself to address you in explanation of the circumstances leading to and attending our correspondence with Hon. Horace Greeley,* which has been the subject of so much misrepresentation in the United States, and, if they are correctly copied, of at least two papers in the Confederate States.

We addressed a joint and informal note to the President on this subject, but as it was sent by a messenger under peculiar embarrassments it was couched in very guarded terms and was not so full or explicit as we originally intended or desired to make it. I hope he has already delivered it and has explained its purpose and supplied what was wanting to do us full justice.

Soon after the arrival of Mr. Holcombe, Mr. Thompson, and myself in Canada West it was known in the United States and was the subject of much speculation there as to the object of our visit. Some politicians of more or less fame and representing all parties in the United States came to see Mr. Holcombe and myself—Mr. Thompson being at Toronto and less accessible than we were at the Falls—either through curiosity or some better or worse motive.

They found that our conversation was mainly directed to the mutual injury we were inflicting on each other by war, the necessity for peace in order to preserve whatever was valuable to both sections, and probability of foreign intervention when we were thoroughly exhausted and unable to injure others, and the dictation of a peace less advantageous to both belligerents than they might now make if there was an armistice of sufficient duration to allow passion to subside and reason to resume its sway.

In the meantime Mr. George N. Sanders, who had preceded us to the Falls, was addressing, directly or indirectly, his ancient and intimate party friends and others in the United States supposed to be favorably inclined, assuring them that a peace mutually advantageous to the North and the South might be made, and inviting them to visit us that we might consider and discuss the subject. He informed us that Mr. Greeley would visit us if we would be pleased to see him. Believing from his antecedents that he was a sincere friend of peace, even with separation if necessary, we authorized Mr. Sanders to say that we would be glad to receive him. Mr. Greeley replied, as we were told, through Mr. Jewett, who had been an active and useful agent for communicating with citizens of the United States, that he would prefer to accompany us to Washington City to talk of peace, and would do so if we would go. We did not then believe that Mr. Greeley had authorized this proposal in his name, for neither we nor Mr. Sanders had seen it in any telegram or letter from Mr. Greeley, but had it only from the lips of Mr. Jewett, who is reported to be a man of fervid and fruitful imagination and very credulous of what he wishes to be true. Notwithstanding, after calm deliberation and consultation we thought that we could not in duty to the Confederate States decline the invitation, and directed Mr. Sanders to say that we would go to Washington if complete and unqualified protection was given us.

We did not feel authorized to speak for Mr. Thompson, who was absent, and we moreover deemed it necessary that he or I should remain here to promote the objects that the Secretary of War had given us and another in charge.

Mr. Sanders responded in his own peculiar style, as you have seen, or will see by the inclosed copy of the correspondence, which was published under my supervision.† We did not expect to hear from Mr. Greeley again upon the subject, and were greatly surprised by his note from the U.S. side of the Falls, addressed to us as “duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace.”

How or by whom that character was imputed to us we do not know. We suspect, however, that we are indebted for the attribution of the high and responsible office to Mr. Jewett, or to that yet more credulous and inventive personage, Dame Rumor. Certainly we are not justly chargeable with having assumed or affected that character, or with having given any one sufficient grounds to infer that we came clothed with any such powers. We never sought or desired a safe-conduct to Washington, or an interview with Mr. Lincoln. We never proposed, suggested, or intimated any terms of peace to any person that did not embrace the independence of the Confederate States. We have been as jealous of the rights, interest, and power of our Government as any of its citizens can be, and have never wittingly compromised them by act, word, or sign. We have not felt it our duty to declare to all who have approached us upon the subject that reunion was impossible under any change of the Constitution or abridgment of the powers of the Federal Government. We have not dispelled the fond delusion of most of those with whom we have conversed—that some kind of common government might at some time hereafter be re-established. But we have not induced or encouraged this idea. On the contrary, when obliged to answer the question—“Will the Southern States consent to reunion?”—I have answered:

Not now. You have shed so much of their best blood, have desolated so many homes, inflicted so much injury, caused so much physical and mental agony, and have threatened and attempted such irreparable wrongs, without justification or excuse, as their believe, that they would now prefer extermination to your embraces as friends and fellow-citizens of the same government. You must wait till the blood of our slaughtered people has exhaled from the soil, till the homes which you have destroyed have been rebuilt, till our badges of mourning have been laid aside, and the memorials of our wrongs are no longer visible on every hand, before you propose to rebuild a joint and common government. But I think the South Will agree to an armistice of six or more months and to a treaty of amity and commerce, securing peculiar and exclusive privileges to both sections, and possibly to an alliance defensive, or even, for some purposes, both defensive and offensive.

If we can credit the asseverations of both peace and war Democrats, uttered to us in person or through the presses of the United States, our correspondence with Mr. Greeley has been promotive of our wishes. It has impressed all but fanatical Abolitionists with the opinion that there can be no peace while Mr. Lincoln presides at the head of the Government of the United States. All concede that we will not accept his terms, and scarcely any Democrat and not all the Republicans will insist on them. They are not willing to pay the price his terms exact of the North. They see that he can reach peace only through subjugation of the South, which but few think practicable; through universal bankruptcy of the North; through seas of their own blood as well as ours; through the utter demoralization of their people, and destruction of their Republican Government; through anarchy and moral chaos—all of which is more repulsive and intolerable than even the separation and independence of the South.

All the Democrat presses denounce Mr. Lincoln's manifesto in strong terms, and many Republican presses (and among them the New York Tribune) admit it was a blunder. Mr. Greeley was chagrined and incensed by it, as his articles clearly show. I am told by those who profess to have heard his private expressions of opinion and feeling, that he curses all fools in high places and regards himself as deceived and maltreated by the Administration. From all that I can see or hear, I am satisfied that the correspondence has tended strongly toward consolidating the Democracy and dividing the Republicans and encouraging the desire for peace. Many prominent politicians of the United States assure us that it is the most opportune and efficient moral instrumentality for stopping the war that could have been conceived or exerted, and beg us to refrain from any vindication of our course or explanation of our purposes.

At all events, we have developed what we desired to in the eyes of our people—that war, with-all its horrors, is less terrible and hateful than the alternative offered by Mr. Lincoln. We hope that none will hereafter be found in North Carolina, or in any other part of the Confederate States, so base as to insist that we shall make any more advances to him in behalf of peace, but that all of our citizens will gird themselves with renewed and redoubled energy and resolution to battle against our foes until our utter extermination, rather than halt to ponder the terms which he haughtily proclaims as his ultimatum. If such be the effect of our correspondence, we shall be amply indemnified for all the misrepresentations which we have incurred or ever can incur.

Mr. Greeley's purpose may have been merely to find out our conditions of peace, but we give him credit for seeking higher objects. While we contemplated and desired something more, yet it was part of our purpose to ascertain Mr. Lincoln's condition of peace. We have achieved our purpose in part; Mr. Greeley has failed altogether. He correctly reports us as having proposed no terms. We never intended to propose any until instructed by our Government. We have suffered ourselves to be falsely reported as proposing certain terms—among them reunion—for reasons that our judgment approved, hoping that we would in due time be fully vindicated at home.

If there is no more wisdom in our country than is displayed in the malignant articles of the Richmond Examiner and Petersburg Register, approving of the ukase of Mr. Lincoln, the war must continue until neutral nations interfere and command the peace. Such articles are copied into all the Republican presses of the United States, and help them more in encouraging the prosecution of the war than anything they can themselves utter.

If I am not deceived, the elements of convulsion and revolution existing in the North have been greatly agitated by the pronunciamento of the autocrat of the White House. Not only Democrats, but Republicans are protesting against a draft to swell an army to fight to free negroes, and are declaring more boldly for State rights and the Union as it was. Many say the draft cannot and shall not be enforced. The Democracy are beginning to learn that they must endure persecution, outrage, and tyranny at the hands of the Republicans, just as soon as they can bring back their armed legions from the South. They read their own fate in that of the people of Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland. They are beginning to lean more on the side of our people as their natural allies and as the champions of State rights and of popular liberty. Many of them would gladly lock arms with our soldiers in crushing their common enemy, the Abolitionists. Many of them would fall into our lines if our armies occupied any States north of the Ohio for a month, or even a week. Many of them are looking to the time when they must flee their country, or fight for their inalienable rights. They are preparing for the latter alternative.

The instructions of the Secretary of War to us and the officer detailed for special service have not been neglected. We have been arranging for the indispensable co-operation. It is promised, and we hope will soon be furnished. Then we will act. We have been disappointed and delayed by causes which I cannot now explain.

I fondly trust that our efforts will not be defeated or hindered by unwise and intemperate declarations of public opinion, by newspaper editors or others who are regarded as its exponents.

We have a difficult role to play, and must be judged with charity until heard in our own defense.

I am much indebted to Mr. Holcombe, Mr. Sanders, and Mr. Tucker for the earnest and active aid they have given me in promoting the objects of Mr. Thompson's and my mission.

Mr. Thompson is at Toronto and Mr. Holcombe is at the Falls. If here, or if I could delay the transmission of this communication, I should submit it to them for some expression of their opinions.

As I expect this to reach the Confederate States by a safe hand, I do not take the time and labor necessary to put it in cipher—if, indeed, there is anything worth concealing from our enemies.

I have the honor to be, &c.,

C. C. CLAY, JR.

_______________

* See Series III, Vol. IV.

† Not found.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series IV, Volume 3 (Serial No. 129), p. 584-7

Diary of John Hay: about July 21, 1864

. . . . Got in to New York at 6 o'clock the 16th, Saturday, and, while I was washing my face, came up Greeley’s card. I went down to the parlor and delivered the [President's] letter to him. He didn't like it, evidently; thought he was the worst man that could be taken for that purpose; that as soon as he arrived there the newspapers would be full of it; that he would be abused and blackguarded, etc., etc. Then he said, if the President insisted on his going he would go, but he must have an absolute safe-conduct for four persons, saying the President's letter would not protect him against our own officers. This seemed to me reasonable, and I had even presented the matter to the President in the same way. I wrote the despatch, and sent it to Washington. About noon came the answer. I then wrote the safe-conduct and took it to the Tribune office. I left the names blank, and was going to let G fill them up, but he said “no,” in his peculiar, querulous tone: — “I won't write a word. I expect to be pitched into everywhere for this; but I can't help it.”I was going to write a safe-conduct for “H. G. and four others;” but he would not permit it. “I want no safe-conduct. If they will catch me and put me in Fort La Fayette, it will suit me first-rate.” I wrote the names in and gave it to him. “I will start to-night,” said he; “I shall expect to be in Washington Tuesday morning if they will come.”

He was all along opposed to the President proposing terms. He was in favor of some palaver anyhow; wanted them to propose terms which we could not accept, if no better, for us to go to the country on; wanted the government to appear anxious for peace, and yet was strenuous in demanding as our ultimatum proper terms.

As I left his office, Mr. Chase entered.

I went back to Washington, arriving there Monday morning (July 18). A few hours after I arrived, a despatch came from G. I took it to the President. He told me a few minutes afterwards to hold myself in readiness to start if it became necessary, — that he had a word to say to Mr. Seward in regard to the matter. In the afternoon he handed me the note, and told me to go to the Falls, see Greeley, and deliver that note, and, to say further, that if they, the commissioners, wished to send any communications to Richmond for the purpose indicated, they might be sent through Washington, subject to the inspection of the government; and the answer from Richmond should be sent to them under the same conditions. Provided that if there was anything either way objectionable to the government in the despatches sent, they would be returned to the parties sending them without disclosure.

I went over to see Seward; — he repeated about the same thing, adding that I had better request the commission to omit any official style which it would compromise our government to transmit; that they could waive it in an unofficial communication among themselves, and not thereby estop themselves of every claim.

I left Washington Monday evening, — arrived in New York too late Tuesday; took the evening Tuesday train and arrived at Niagara Wednesday morning (July 20) at 11½ Saw G. at once at the International Hotel. He was evidently a good deal cut up at what he called the President's great mistake in refusing to enter into negotiations without conditions. He thinks it would be an enormous help to us in politics and finance to have even a semblance of negotiations going on; — that the people would hail with acclaim such a harbinger of peace. He especially should have, as he said, shown his hand first. That he should have waited their terms — if they were acceptable, closed with them, — if they were not, gone before the country on them.

I, of course, combatted these views, saying that I thought the wisest way was to make our stand on what the moral sentiment of the country and the world would demand as indispensable, and in all things else offering to deal in a frank, liberal and magnanimous spirit as the President has done;—that the two points to insist on are such points, — that he could not treat with these men who have no powers, that he could do no more than offer to treat with any who came properly empowered. I did not see how he could do more.

Mr. Greeley did not wish to go over. He had all along declined seeing these people and did not wish to give any handle to talk. He thought it better that I should myself go over alone and deliver the letter. I really thought so too — but I understood the President and Seward to think otherwise, and so I felt I must insist on G’s going over as a witness to the interview. We got a carriage and started over.

We got to the Clifton House and met George Saunders at the door. I wrote G’s name on my card and sent it up to Holcombe, Clay being out of town at St. Kate’s.

Sanders is a seedy-looking rebel, with grizzled whiskers and a flavor of old clo'. He came up and talked a few commonplaces with G. as we stood by the counter. Our arrival, Greeley’s well-known person, created a good deal of interest, the bar-room rapidly filling with the curious, and the halls blooming suddenly with wide-eyed and pretty women. We went up to Holcombe’s room, where he was breakfasting or lunching — tea and toasting — at all events. He was a tall, solemn, spare, false-looking man, with false teeth, false eyes, and false hair.

Mr. Greeley said: — “Major Hay has come from the President of the United States to deliver you a communication in writing and to add a verbal message with which he has been entrusted.” I handed him the note, and told him what the President and Seward had told me to say, and I added that I would be the bearer of anything they chose to send by me to Washington, or, if they chose to wait, it could go as well by mail.

He said: — “Mr. Clay is now absent at St. Catherine's. I will telegraph to him at once, and inform you in the morning.”

We got up to go. He shook hands with Greeley, who “hoped to meet him again;” with me; and we went down to our carriage. Sanders was on the piazza. He again accosted Greeley; made some remark about the fine view from the House, and said, “I wanted old Bennett to come up, but he was afraid to come.” Greeley answered:— “I expect to be blackguarded for what I have done, and I am not allowed to explain. But all I have done has been done under instructions.”

We got in and rode away. As soon as the whole thing was over, G. recovered his spirits and said he was glad he had come, — and was very chatty and agreeable on the way back and at dinner.

After dinner I thought I would go down to Buffalo and spend the night. Went down with young Dorsheimer, formerly of Fremont’s staff. I found him also deeply regretting that the President had not hauled these fellows into a negotiation neck and ears without terms. He gave me some details of what G. had before talked about, — the political campaign these fellows are engineering up here. He says Clay is to write a letter giving three points on which, if the Democracy carry the fall elections, the South will stop the war and come back into the Union. These are: 1st. Restoration of the Union. 2d. Assumption of Confederate Debt. 3d. Restriction of slavery to its present limits and acknowledgment of de facto emancipation. On this platform it is thought Judge Nelson will run. . . . .

SOURCES: Abstracted from Clara B. Hay, Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary, Volume 1, p. 212-8. See Michael Burlingame & John R. Turner Ettlinger, Editors, Inside Lincoln’s White House: The Complete War Diary of John Hay, p. 211-2 for the full diary entry.

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, July 26, 1864

Headquarters Army oF The Potomac, July 26, 1864.

I consider the peace movement in Canada, and the share Horace Greeley had in it, as most significant. The New York Times of the 23d has a most important article on the President's “To whom it may concern” proclamation, in which it is argued that Mr. Lincoln was right to make the integrity of the Union a sine qua non, but not to make the abandonment of slavery; that this last is a question for discussion and mutual arrangement, and should not be interposed as a bar to peace negotiations.

It is a pity Mr. Lincoln employed the term “abandonment of slavery,” as it implies its immediate abolition or extinction, to which the South will never agree; at least, not until our military successes have been greater than they have hitherto been, or than they now seem likely to be. Whereas had he said the final adjustment of the slavery question, leaving the door open to gradual emancipation, I really believe the South would listen and agree to terms. But when a man like Horace Greeley declares a peace is not so distant or improbable as he had thought, and when a Republican paper, like the Times, asserts the people are yearning for peace, and will not permit the slavery question to interpose towards its negotiations, I think we may conclude we see the beginning of the end. God grant it may be so, and that it will not be long before this terrible war is brought to a close.

The camp is full of rumors of intrigues and reports of all kinds, but I keep myself free from them all, ask no questions, mind my own business, and stand prepared to obey orders and do my duty.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 215-6

Major-General George G. Meade to Margaretta Sergeant Mead, July 23, 1864

Headquarters Army Of The Potomac, July 23, 1864.

The stories you hear about me, some of which have reached camp, are mere canards, I have never had any quarrel with either General Hancock or Smith. Hancock is an honest man, and as he always professes the warmest friendship for me, I never doubt his statements; and I am sure I have for him the most friendly feeling and the highest appreciation of his talents. I am perfectly willing at any time to turn over to him the Army of the Potomac, and wish him joy of his promotion.

We have been very quiet since I last wrote; there are signs of approaching activity. The army is getting to be quite satisfied with its rest, and ready to try it again.

It would appear from the news from Niagara Falls that the question of peace has been in a measure mooted. The army would hail an honorable peace with delight, and I do believe, if the question was left to those who do the fighting, an honorable peace would be made in a few hours.

Ord has been placed in Smith's place in command of the Eighteenth Corps, and General Birney has been assigned to the Tenth Corps, largely composed of colored troops.

SOURCE: George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 2, p. 215

Abraham Lincoln’s Niagara Manifesto

Executive Mansion,

Washington, July 18, 1864.

To Whom it may concern:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States will be received and considered by the Executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer, or bearers thereof shall have safe-conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

SOURCES: Abraham Lincoln Papers at the Library of Congress; Roy P. Basler, Editor, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, Volume 7, p. 451