The Assault on Mr. Sumner—Indignation Meeting In New York, published June 2, 1856

NEW YORK, May 30.—A meeting was held this evening in the Tabernacle to express the indignation entertained at the assault on Senator Sumner. Long before the hour of meeting the building was crowded to overflowing with one of the most respectable audiences ever convened there. Mr. G. Griswold presided, assisted by some twenty vice-presidents, including Moses H. Grinnell, P. Perritt, President of the Chamber of Commerce, Benj. F. Butler, Ex-Mayor Havemeyer, Ex-Mayor Kingsland, Wm. C. Bryant, Wm. M. Eveasts, Erastus Brooks, and others.

A series of appropriate resolutions were adopted, in which the assault on Mr. Sumner was characterized, in the language of Senator Wilson, as “brutal, murderous and cowardly;” and calling upon the House to expel, immediately and unconditionally, Mr. Brooks from his seat.

The resolutions were advocated by Daniel D. Ford, Charles King, President of Columbia College, E. D. Morgan, John A. Stevens and others. The tenor of the speeches was that party feeling among the patriotic conservative Union loving men of the North must henceforth be sunk at the North and a united effort be made to avenge the insult put upon it.

SOURCE: Richmond Daily Whig, Richmond Virginia, Monday Morning, June 2, 1856, p. 2

Diary of Gideon Welles: Wednesday, January 4, 1865

Called on the President to consult as to the selection of counsel in the Henderson case, since the death of William Curtis Noyes. Told him I thought we should have the best lawyer we could obtain, for the defense had secured Evarts and Pierrepont, and suggested the name of O’Conor provided we could secure his services. He is of the opposite party in politics, but in a matter of this kind the public interest should not be permitted to suffer from that cause. It may be difficult to secure him, for I understand he has relinquished his practice. The President heartily concurred in my views and earnestly advised that O'Conor should be employed.

The President does not yet decide whether exemplified copies shall be furnished in the Stover case, but Mr. Speed informs me that there can be no question that they should be furnished. This will, I presume, be the result; but, inquiring to-day for the record, it is found to be missing from the Department. Some months since the President called for it, and it was, I understood, committed to the custody of Mr. Browning, counsel for Stover.

A special messenger from Admiral Porter brings word that the fleet is at Beaufort. Rode home with Stanton, who tells me the troops are embarking at Hampton Roads to-day for Wilmington.

SOURCE: Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy Under Lincoln and Johnson, Vol. 2: April 1, 1864 — December 31, 1866, p. 220

William M. Evarts to William H. Seward, June 10, 1862

NEW YORK, June 10, 1862.

Governor SEWARD,

Secretary of State:

MY DEAR SIR: A gentleman well-informed in the financial relations of the New Orleans banks has handed me the inclosed memorandum of what he supposes to be the probable status of the specie found under the protection of the Dutch consul at New Orleans. I send it to you, thinking it may be of some service in your investigations.

The idea of this gentleman is that the existence of an occasion for a remittance of some $800,000 to Hope & Co. has been made a cause for this deposit, without the least intention of so paying or providing for the debt, which had, doubtless, been otherwise met.

I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Weed yesterday at a very agreeable dinner given to him by the district attorney. He seems in excellent health and spirits.

I am, very truly, yours,

WM. M. EVARTS.

[Sub-inclosure.]

MEMORANDUM.

The Citizens' Bank was chartered by the Legislature of Louisiana about the year 1836. The State loaned its bonds to the bank to constitute or raise the capital on which it has been doing business. The bank indorsed the bonds of the State, and negotiated some $5,000,000 of them through Hope & Co., of Amsterdam, where the interest and principal are payable. It is said that $500,000 of these bonds become due and payable at Hope & Co.'s counting-house this year (1862), which, with one year's interest on the whole amount outstanding, probably constitutes the sum placed by the bank shortly before the capture of New Orleans in the hands of the consul of the Netherlands. It is almost certain that Hope & Co. have nothing at all to do with any funds intended to be applied to the payment of the bonds negotiated through them by the Citizens' Bank until they reach Amsterdam; they (Hope & Co.) acting merely as distributors of the funds when placed there with them, all risk of transmission belonging to the bank. Such, I know, was the case with the bonds negotiated by Baring Bros. & Co., issued by the State of Louisiana to the Union Bank of Louisiana. Moreover, it is very probable that the Citizens' Bank has ample funds in London to make the payment due in Amsterdam this year, and will use them for that purpose should the money seized be given up. It should not be forgotten that the Citizens' Bank, or the president, or some other person connected with the bank, has been reported as acting in some way, directly or indirectly, as fiscal agent of the Confederate Government, and that that Government may have funds in the hands of such agent, which were on deposit with the Citizens' Bank. It is even probable that a portion of the gold stolen from the mint in New Orleans at the commencement of the rebellion was deposited in the Citizens' Bank by some agent or officer of the Confederate Government. My opinion is that if the money seized should be delivered up to the consul it will find its way back into the vault of the Citizens' Bank, and that Hope & Co. will be placed in funds to meet the bonds and coupons due this year from other resources of the bank. If the money seized should be found to belong rightfully to Hope & Co., then let the Government send the equivalent amount from here to Hope & Co. by bills of exchange on London, and use the specie where it is for their own purposes.

SOURCE: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 2 (Serial No. 123), p. 139-40

John M. Forbes & William H. Aspinwall to Salmon P. Chase, June 27, 1863

London, June 27,1863.

. . . You will have seen in the papers a report of the Alexandra trial, but as a matter of record we have advised the consul, Mr. Dudley, to have it reprinted in pamphlet form, and sent to every member of the House of Commons, and to other influential parties. The ruling of the judge caused universal surprise, and we consider the chance good for a reversal of the decision next fall, when the full court meet; until which time we understand the government intend to hold the Alexandra. We are also advised that the consul can make out so strong a case against the Liverpool ironclads that he counts with great confidence upon getting them stopped until the full court meet; we shall hope to bring you more exact information as to the time of this meeting.¹

We shall also have a full consultation with our minister and Mr. Evarts as to the best time to strike at the ironclads, and we hope to report to you in person very soon after you receive this letter, as it is our purpose to leave in the Great Eastern on Tuesday, the 30th, and we ought to reach New York on Friday or Saturday, 10th or 11th of July. Meantime we beg to say that the law officers of the Crown seem entirely taken by surprise at the decision of the Chief Baron, and that it is received by the bar and the public as an evidence that, if such be the proper construction of the law, it will be absolutely necessary to the peace of nations to have a better law made. . . . We still do not think, in the fluctuating state of public opinion (upon which, to a certain extent, hangs the action of the British government), that it is safe to trust to the British law alone for security from the ironclads. If things look worse, in regard to the law, when we strike at the ironclads, we think the Navy Department ought to be prepared to put a sufficient force near each to stop her before she can get her armament or her full complement of men. This would be a very irritating and dangerous experiment upon our friendly relations with England, but it may become necessary. We understand from the minister that, except for repairs in case of accident, or for shelter in stress of weather, our national ships are not admitted to the hospitalities of British ports; but our continental friends are not so uncharitable, and we can have vessels at various ports in the reach of telegraph. . . .

_______________

¹ This case, The Attorney-General B. Sillem and others, is found fully reported in parliamentary documents of 1863 and 1864 ; and also, on appeal, in 2 Hurlstone & Coltmau's Reports, 431, and 10 House of Lords Cases, 704. It was an information for an alleged violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and was tried 22-25 June, 1863. Chief Baron Pollock charged the jury that it was lawful to send armed vessels to foreign ports for sale, and that the question was whether the Alexandra was merely in the course of building to carry out such a contract. The act did not forbid building ships for a belligerent power, or selling it munitions of war. And so a belligerent could employ a person here to build for them a ship, easily convertible into a man-of-war. He defined the word “equip” as meaning “furnishing with arms,” and left to the jury the question, Was there an intention to equip or fit out a vessel at Liverpool with the intention that she should take part in any contest: that was unlawful. Or was the object really to build a ship on an order, leaving it to the buyers to use it as they saw fit: that would not be unlawful. The jury found for the defendants. On a rule for a new trial, the court was equally divided; whereupon the junior judge withdrew his own judgment in favor of a new trial, and it was refused. Thereupon the Crown appealed, but the appeal was dismissed on technical grounds for lack of jurisdiction, first by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and finally, on April 6,1864, by the House of Lords. The Alexandra was not one of the rams, but only a gunboat. She seems to have been used for a test case. — Ed.

SOURCE: Sarah Forbes Hughes, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes, Volume 2, p. 46-8

Abraham Lincoln to the Congress of the United States, May 26, 1862

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1862.

To the SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

The insurrection which is yet existing in the United States, and aims at the overthrow of the Federal Constitution and the Union, was clandestinely prepared during the winter of 1860 and 1861, and assumed an open organization in the form of a treasonable Provisional Government at Montgomery, in Alabama, on the 18th day of February, 1861. On the 12th day of April, 1861, the insurgents committed the flagrant act of civil war by the bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter, which cut off the hope of immediate conciliation. Immediately afterward all the roads and avenues to this city were obstructed, and the capital was put into the condition of a siege. The mails in every direction were stopped, and the lines of telegraph cut off by the insurgents, and military and naval forces, which had been called out by the Government for the defense of Washington, were prevented from reaching the city by organized and combined treasonable resistance in the State of Maryland. There was no adequate and effective organization for the public defense. Congress had indefinitely adjourned. There was no time to convene them. It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it with all its blessings for the present age and for posterity. I thereupon summoned my constitutional advisers — the heads of all the Departments — to meet on Sunday, the 20th [21st] day of April, 1861, at the office of the Navy Department, and then and there, with their unanimous concurrence, I directed that an armed revenue cutter should proceed to sea, to afford protection to the commercial marine, and especially the California treasure ships, then on their way to this coast. I also directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Boston to purchase or charter, and arm as quickly as possible, five steam-ships, for purposes of public defense. I directed the commandant of the navy-yard at Philadelphia to purchase, or charter and arm, an equal number for the same purpose. I directed the commandant at New York to purchase, or charter and arm, an equal number. I directed Commander Gillis to purchase, or charter and arm, and put to sea two other vessels. Similar directions were given to Commodore Du Pont with a view to the opening of passages by water to and from the capital. I directed the several officers to take the advice and obtain the aid and efficient services in the matter of His Excellency Edwin D. Morgan, Governor of New York, or in his absence, George D. Morgan, William M. Evarts, R. M. Blatchford, and Moses H. Grinnell, who were by my direction especially empowered by the Secretary of the Navy to act for his Department in that crisis in matters pertaining to the forwarding of troops and supplies for the public defense. On the same occasion I directed that Governor Morgan and Alexander Cummings, of the city of New York, should be authorized by the Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, to make all necessary arrangements for the transportation of troops and munitions of war in aid and assistance of the officers of the Army of the United States until communication by mails and telegraph should be completely re-established between the cities of Washington and New York. No security was required to be given by them, and either of them was authorized to act in case of inability to consult with the other. On the same occasion I authorized and directed the Secretary of the Treasury to advance, without requiring security, $2,000,000 of public money to John A. Dix, George Opdyke, and Richard M. Blatchford, of New York, to be used by them in meeting such requisitions as should be directly consequent upon military and naval measures necessary for the defense and support of the Government, requiring them only to act without compensation, and to report their transactions when duly called upon.

The several departments of the Government at that time contained so large a number of disloyal persons that it would have been impossible to provide safely, through official agents only, for the performance of the duties thus confided to citizens favorably known for their ability, loyalty, and patriotism. The several orders issued upon these occurrences were transmitted by private messengers, who pursued a circuitous way to the sea-board cities, inland, across the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the Northern Lakes. I believe that by these and other similar measures taken in that crisis, some of which were without any authority of law, the Government was saved from overthrow. I am not aware that a dollar of the public funds thus confided without authority of law to unofficial persons was either lost or wasted, although apprehensions of such misdirection occurred to me as objections to those extraordinary proceedings, and were necessarily overruled. I recall these transactions now because my attention has been directed to a resolution which was passed by the House of Representatives on the 30th day of last month, which is in these words:

Resolved, That Simon Cameron, late Secretary of War, by investing Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money, and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction, without requiring from him any guarantee for the faithful performance of his duties, when the services of competent public officers were available, and by involving the Government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in the business pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts, especially in the purchase of arms for future delivery, has adopted a policy highly injurious to the public service, and deserves the censure of the House.

Congress will see that I should be wanting equally in candor and in justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is unanimously entertained by the heads of Departments, who participated in the proceedings which the House of Representatives has censured. It is due Mr. Cameron to say that, although he fully approved the proceedings, they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President but all the other heads of Departments were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in the premises.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

SOURCES: The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Volume 2 (Serial No. 123), p. 73-5